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Abstract 
Anxiety's Ambiguity 
An Investigation into the Meaning of Anxiety in Existentialist Philosophy and 
Literature 
Stuart Hanscomb 
The dissertation has two primary aims: 1) To investigate the significance and role of anxiety in the 
work of existentialist writers; 2) To synthesize a unified account of its meaning within this 
tradition. There are seven substantial chapters, the first concerning the divergence between clinical 
anxiety and the existential version using the fear-anxiety distinction as a foil. Existential anxiety is 
then defined in terms of anxiety A (before the world as contingent), anxiety B (before the self as 
free), and urangst (an unappropriable disquiet caused by the incommensurability of anxieties A and 
B). Chapter 2 concerns Kierkegaard's The Concept of Anxiety. His emphasis on choice, guilt and 
ambiguity lay the foundations for existentialism , but the suggestion that anxiety can be overcome 
in faith distances him from later existentialists. Chapter 3 reads Heidegger as secularizing 
Kierkegaard's ideas. Here we find the origins of the anxiety A/B structure, but I find that his 
attempt to define an 'authentic' comportment which embraces these two sources fails. In Chapter 4 
Sartre's anxiety before the 'nothingness' of a self responsible for creating values is discussed and 
found wanting. However, his ideas on bad faith and authenticity seem to be more alive to the 
ambiguity of existence that anxiety reveals. The relation between anxiety and death is a primary 
concern of Chapter 5 (on Tillich). I contend that death is important (though not in the way Tillich 
thinks it is), but that otherwise he underplays urangst and the dynamism required in an authentic 
response to anxiety. The complexities of this process are further explored in Chapter 6 with respect 
to Rorty's version of 'irony'; and in the final chapter where two novels (Conrad's Heart of 
Darkness and Camus' The Fall) are read as demonstrating the subjective dynamics of authenticity 
in terms of the anxiety structure that has been developed. 
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In a word, human life is more governed by fortune than by reason; is to be regarded more as a dull pastime than a 
serious occupation; and is more influenced by particular humour, than by general principles. Shall we engage ourselves 
in it with passion and anxiety? It is not worthy of so much concern. Shall we be indifferent about what happens? We 
shall lose all the pleasures of the game by our phlegm and carelessness. While we are reasoning concerning life, life is 
gone; and death, though perhaps they receive him differently, yet treats alike the fool and the philosopher.—David 
Hume (Essays Moral, Political and Literary) 
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Life seems to me essentially passion, conflict, rage; moments of peace are brief and destroy 
themselves.—Bertrand Russell (The Essence of Religion) 
K. was haunted by the feeling that he was losing himself or wandering into strange country, farther 
than ever man had wandered before, a country so strange that not even the air had anything in 
common with his native air, where one might die of strangeness, and yet whose enchantment was 
such that one could only go on and lose oneself further.—Kafka (The Castle) 
Our birth ... is the basis of our activity and individuality, and our passivity or generality—that 
inner weakness which prevents us from ever achieving the density of an absolute individual. We 
are not in some incomprehensible way an activity joined to a passivity ... but wholly active and 
wholly passive, because we are the upsurge of time.—Merleau-Ponty (The Phenomenology of 
Perception) 
The search for unity is deeply natural, but like so many other things which are deeply natural may 
be capable of producing nothing but a variety of illusions.—Iris Murdoch (The Sovereignty of 
Good) 
We live in a world of at least two sides. We live in a world of opposites, and to reconcile these two 
opposing things is the trick. The more darkness you can gather up, the more light you can see.— 
David Lynch (Lynch on Lynch) 
When the old campaigner approached the end, had fought the good fight, and kept his faith, the 
heart was still young enough not to have forgotten the fear and trembling that disciplined his youth 
and which, although the grown man had mastered it, no man altogether outgrows—Kierkegaard 
(Fear and Trembling) 
Preamble 
'There must be some way out of here / Said the joker to the thief—Bob Dylan (All Along the Watchtower) 
« « » » 
My task here is essentially two-fold: firstly to critically examine the philosophical literature on 
anxiety in the work of writers in the existentialist tradition; and secondly, by distilling essential 
structures and features from these and adding more recent ideas and commentaries, to formulate, as 
far as I can, a unified account of the overall meaning and significance of existential anxiety. 
These aims are not confined to separate sections, but instead coexist over the course of seven main 
chapters. As I progress with my critique the idea is to gradually extract what I see as the essentials 
of existential anxiety and develop them into a basic structure. My reading of the seven principle 
philosophers and novelists does not become less faithful, but perhaps becomes more selective as 
this structure attains a more pronounced form. Chapter 1—in some respects a second and more 
substantial introduction—orients existential anxiety in relation to everyday and psychological 
meanings of the word and uses fear as a foil for highlighting its uniqueness. Historical and 
conceptual foundations are more rigorously laid in the Chapter 2 (on Kierkegaard) and this is built 
on in Chapters 3 and 4 (on Heidegger and Sartre)—these three long sections forming the 
dissertation's core. Chapter 5's reading of Paul Tillich's The Courage to Be is as much designed 
as a catalyst for illuminating the structure of this core as it is to examine Tillich's ideas, and from 
this a more explicit formulation of the anxiety's meaning takes place in Chapters 6 and 7 (featuring 
Rorty, Conrad and Camus). 
Of these seven writers—Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Sartre, Tillich, Rorty, Conrad and Camus—only 
the first four examine anxiety by name. It receives such attention from Camus only occasionally 
and Rorty and Conrad rarely, if ever, mention it; but, as I hope to show, in line with the emerging 
results of my investigation, for all three its presence and significance is important i f not pivotal. 
Something similar can be said about Nietzsche who, though he does not have a section to himself, 
makes an appearance by proxy in The Ironic Remedy. A related factor to be considered is the 
presence of anxiety in their work—perhaps in terms of what has been left out or assumptions not 
7 
open for discussion—that is not itself part of the content. I am not referring here to any deliberate, 
indirect method of communication, but rather to a (possibly necessary) lack of completeness or 
rigour determined by conscious or unconscious choices of direction, mood, form and content that 
insure that something must be left unsaid. This is particularly true when attempts are made to 
detail and recommend, upon nihilistic foundations, ways of existing which acknowledge anxiety's 
revelations. 
In each chapter, to a greater or lesser extent, the work of these writers will determine the form and 
content of my critique, but with regard to my own developing synthesis perhaps the best way to 
explain my concerns is to list what I consider to be the most pressing questions about the nature of 
existential anxiety. Roughly these can be summarized as follows: What kind of thing is anxiety?; 
What is it to know oneself as anxious?; How is anxiety experienced?; What are its causes or 
origins (i.e. what is it about ourselves and what is it about the world that makes anxiety possible)?; 
How do we tend to respond to it?; How should we respond to it? Can it be overcome or 
transcended?; What is its relation to other affects and concepts such as fear, despair and 
alienation?, and, relatedly, Why is it so important to the existentialists? 
One way to understand what anxiety is is to understand the process of uncovering its significance 
for the individual, and in this way the first two questions are closely allied. (In truth, all the 
subsequent questions are important for answering the first, just as each is to some extent linked to 
and embellished by the others.) Each writer that I look at has his own answers, and part of my task 
is to unravel what anxiety means for them in the context of their thought. Superficially, and 
sometimes at a more crucial level the meaning of anxiety tends to be dictated by what a writer sees 
as intrinsic to human existence. Looked at in this way it can become a gap-filler—a term obscure 
and flexible enough to smooth over categorial disjunctions and empirical rough edges in theories 
and systems. (Although at its best it can be a powerful means of illuminating a thinker's central 
ideas on our condition) This is of course not to show anything more than that in a particular 
tradition anxiety is there merely as a tool to this end; it is not to say that anything of its kind 
actually exists, or that i f it does that it responds to or reveals anything of particular importance 
about the world or ourselves. 
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When I began writing this I was not that confident that there was anything other than a tool; one 
ready to be unearthed and demystified. I thought anxiety might well be either misused in the way 
mentioned, or a name applied without rigour to a mishmash of feelings about and responses to 
existentialist concepts like alienation, absurdity, death and guilt. But it turns out (if I am right) that 
something quite distinctive does emerge from the tradition. Anxiety is not just something identified 
by the role it plays, but by what it is. 
But what kind of thing is it? If it is an emotion that emerges—something with a distinctive 'feel' or 
something we palpably 'undergo'—then it is one of enormous complexity and shades. It seems 
however inadequate to describe it in this way, not least because there is little else that goes by that 
name that is analogous (As far as I am aware, as I shall say more about shortly, the only analogous 
(alleged) emotion is love). As Chapter 1 stresses, the anxiety most existentialists are concerned 
with is phenomenologically unlike 'worry' or 'fear' or 'panic'. It is perhaps more readily 
describable as 'unease', but it we look for the source of this unease the search quickly becomes 
ontological rather than emotional and what is more, continually escapes us. If we look hard enough 
it might become apparent (or meaningful) in rare moments that it is anxiety itself which drives this 
search and so to hold on to it is the equivalent of looking in two directions at once. Anxiety is 
pervasive and takes on many forms (see particularly Chapter 7), some of which are too intense to 
count as 'unease', but its conceptual and experiential slipperiness makes it very hard to define. It is 
this which prompted Kierkegaard to write about his use of the term; 
If science has any other psychological intermediate term that has the dogmatic, the ethical and the 
psychological advantages that anxiety possesses, then that should be preferred.1 
This looks an innocent enough statement (particularly among the convolutions of The Concept of 
Anxiety) but in truth says a great deal about the difficulty of pinning the concept down. It is not 
precisely a familiar, everyday experience even though it perhaps potentially is. For Sartre (for 
example) anxiety is mostly manifest in comportments which are designed to escape it, and that it 
can be so indirectly expressed is again revealing. In Chapter 1 I outline some psychological and 
psychoanalytic descriptions of the experience of anxiety, but as I discuss in detail, their relation to 
existential anxiety is complex and they perhaps only serve as an analogy. One reason for this is 
that the origins of existential anxiety are not just different from everyday and pathological anxiety, 
1 The Concept of Anxiety (Princeton, 1980), p.77 
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but categorially different. Much of this chapter is spent prising anxiety in philosophy away from 
anxiety in psychology, something that would have been a less demanding task if it were not for 
some damaging category-blurring instituted by certain existential psychologists. Existential 
anxiety, as we shall see, is bound up with conceptions of ethics and the self which are intrinsically 
philosophical, and part of what is so interesting about it is that through it our basic ontology is 
enmeshed with an intensely personal concern for self. 
As seems to be quite well known, another reason why anxiety is unlike your average emotion is its 
lack of an object. In a certain sense this lack is overestimated and has led to definitions and 
applications that are seriously confused or tangential,2 but if correctly located its non-intentionality 
is indeed crucial. It surprised me, however, just how long it took me to locate it: many 
commentators have associated it with intangibles like nothingness (contingency) and possibility 
(freedom, choice), but there is still something essentially object-like about these (e.g. we are 
anxious because our values and choices have no a priori or teleological justification, or because 
there is 'nothing' stopping us from doing what we have avowed not to do). We shall see that, used 
properly, contingency and freedom—an awareness of an objective lack of meaning which runs 
counter to our desire for completion, and a concern for our self actualization and creation— 
represent polarities that are vital to the picture of anxiety as I compose it, but required to locate the 
necessary objectlessness that makes anxiety truly unique is a structure that indicates the central 
incommensurability or paradox of the human condition. I have read most of my authors as, in one 
way or another, displaying this paradox, but I believe that Kierkegaard does it best and most of 
what has subsequently been said (and is interesting) about anxiety owes a massive debt to him. Of 
more recent writers I have found that Thomas Nagel's work on 'absurdity' and 'the meaning of 
life' (which incorporates his central idea about our ability to take up two incommensurable points 
of view)3 to be a clear statement of the structure from which anxiety gains its significance. In 
Chapter 5 I use Paul Tillich's The Courage to Be to illuminate some central ideas and themes that 
have arisen from the core chapters on Kierkegaard, Heidegger and Sartre, and at the same time 
summarize, with help from Nagel, anxiety's origins and the details of the 'anxiety structure'. 
2 See, especially, Chapter 1 with regard to psychology, Chapter 4 on Sartre and freedom, and Chapter 5 on 
Tillich and death. 
3 See Mortal Questions and The View from Nowhere 
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Anxiety's knowledge is to know us in the most basic sense, and if this knowledge is uncapturable 
or irreducible then so are we. Another question I started off with, however, was whether anxiety 
could in some sense be overcome or transcended. This can happen in two ways: either it is lost 
altogether in a radical alteration in what we are or the way we view ourselves, or it is more subtly 
transformed or mastered. My answer, as worked out and incorporated in most of the chapters, is a 
version of the latter, but one which never lets go of the central incommensurability of our 
condition. Without God I do not see how we can let go of this, and even Kierkegaard seems unsure 
(see Chapter 2). For him faith and anxiety sometimes seem necessarily entangled, at other times 
not, but whereas he says 'today nobody will stop with faith; they all go further',4 I am inclined to 
say that we can go no further than anxiety. Unlike faith though, anxiety is no kind of telos—it not 
only does not signify rest or completion, it signifies its opposite, continual movement. 
That we do all want to go further is of course vital We want to go further and still be who we 
are—we want the impossible, in Sartre's words, to be God. The consequences of anxiety—our 
response to it—forms an important part of the dissertation; both in terms of patterns of escaping 
it, 5 and modes of existing which authentically face up to it. As it turns out, the boundary between 
escape and confrontation or acceptance is blurred and for this reason a lot of space is devoted to 
defining just what authenticity in the face of anxiety looks and feels like. Conclusions to this 
question are reached in Chapters 6 and 7. 
Other key concepts in the existentialist tradition—alienation, death, guilt, absurdity, and so on— 
also find themselves illuminated and reassessed as a result of prodding and dissecting anxiety. A 
study of anxiety will inevitably cast a light on these, but it is a light which I think is especially 
stark and revealing, and indeed one reason why anxiety is given such prominence by certain writers 
is that to understand our anxiety is to assume a position or an attitude that most clearly reveals the 
essentials of our condition. The claim (of some) is that to look at the world and ourselves in the 
light of anxiety is like emerging from Plato's cave. What is revealed is though, even once one has 
(to whatever extent this is possible) adapted, far more unsettling.6 Things are transient and 
4 Fear and Trembling (London: Penguin, 1985), p.42 
5 Particularly Heidegger's 'they' in Chapter 3, Sartre's 'bad faith' in Chapter 4, and neurotic retreat in 
Chapter 5. 
6 Plato says' [the good] is that which every soul pursues and for the sake of which it does all that it does, 
with some intuition of its nature, and yet also baffled' (Republic, 505, cited in Murdoch The Sovereignty 
of Good (London: Ark, 1985) p. 98). Anxiety is certainly 'pursued', or ought to be pursued, but in such a 
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contingent not because they are mere shadows but because that's how they are, and we are alone 
and responsible for ourselves not just in moments of despair or Grenzsituationen7 (revealing of our 
trixotrophy) but because that's how we are. Alienation is in many ways the first and last word in 
existentialism8 and anxiety can be fruitfully seen as the messenger or signifier of a sense of 
separation from the world, other people and our self that is both desired and rejected. Anxiety's 
relation to death is complex (and is dealt with in depth in chapters 3 and 5); so too with guilt, 
although I have found that the relation is neater and of significantly greater importance (see 
Chapters 2 and 7 in particular). As for absurdity, the anxiety structure follows closely the features 
of existence which inspire Nagel (see above) to his conclusions on this issue, but I diverge from 
him (and Cooper) in considering a version of absurdity found in Dostoyevsky (and implicitly at 
times in Conrad) and formularized (as much as it can be) by Camus' Sisyphus and Sartre's 
summation of us as a 'useless passion'. As with authenticity and alienation, absurdity features 
throughout the dissertation, although more intensively in chapters 4 to 6. 
Why then is anxiety so important to the existentialists? To a degree this has been suggested by 
what has so far been said, but it is still important to ask why this and not, say, love, despair, 
boredom or joy? Many of these have been claimed as fundamental—love and joy for example as 
means of overcoming alienation that are more than mere 'coping strategies' .9 As I have indicated, 
categorially speaking perhaps love has more in common with anxiety than anything else. The work 
of Martha Nussbaum has helped convince me of this,10 and one of her influences, Iris Murdoch, 
describes love as 'the tension between the imperfect soul and the magnetic perfection which is 
conceived of as lying beyond it . ' 1 1 The 'magnetic perfection' is the Good, which despite its 
mysterious, indefinable nature is (even, I think in terms of Murdoch's dedivinized definition) 
way that the sense of 'bafflement' is predominant and is more than intellectual. Anxiety is existential 
bafflement and, as I argue at length, ambiguous at its core. 
7 'Limit situations'. Jaspers' term for experiences in which we are exposed to the boundaries of our being 
through (e.g.) suffering or being forced to radically reassess our world-view. (See Jacob Golomb, In 
Search of Authenticity (London: Routledge, 1995), p.22) 
8 This is David Cooper's thesis in his 'reconstruction' although he is more optimistic about overcoming it 
than I am. (See Existentialism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), especially Ch.2) 
9 For example Ricoeur's reference to joy in Fallible Man (and Marcel (e.g. Being and Having) and 
Scheler's championing of love as the fundamental affect or mode of engagement (see The Nature of 
Sympathy) 
1 0 See, for example, Love's Knowledge. One of her claims, reminiscent of anxiety, is that love has its own 
peculiar knowledge—it is something revealing, and in which we dwell, as well as being something 
triggered by a prior reflective understanding of the world. 
11 The Sovereignty of Good, pp. 102-3 
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without an equivalent in the anxiety structure. The nearest the structure comes is the objective view 
of ourselves as utter contingencies without a purpose and without any possibility of completion, 
and this of course offers anything but the unity which Murdoch is driving at.12 But to describe 
anxiety as a 'tension' between an acute awareness of one's self and its desires and an acute 
awareness of this objective contingency is accurate. Love, as Nussbaum has pointed out, 
necessarily involves suffering and loneliness as well as joy; and arguably the most intense sense of 
being alive we can experience as well as the most intense sense of alienation is facilitated by an 
engagement with our anxiety. Both are all-pervasive forms of attunement or modes of existence, 
and neither is easily definable in terms of its phenomenology, their objects or causes or their 
behavioural characteristics. My feeling is that there is a lot of work that could be done on the 
relation between these love and anxiety, but little space can be afforded this issue in these pages. 
One way of reading Kierkegaard is to say that anxiety gives way to and is the necessary precursor 
of love, but for most existentialist thinkers anxiety remains dominant. Does this reflect an inherent 
morbidity in existentialist philosophers? In a sense yes, but I would argue that if you are dealing so 
closely with the essentials of human existence a degree of morbidity is inevitable. I do not think this 
is circular, but would claim that even if pessimism motivated the investigation its findings are not 
merely self-fulfilling but rather unavoidable. In a very real sense human existence is tragic—not 
just, as Unamuno would have it, because we are mortal,13 but because what we essentially desire is 
not only unattainable but logically impossible (and even the formal recognition of this impossibility 
does not quench the desire). This is not to say that a philosophy centred on anxiety deals in out and 
out pessimism or despair; an interesting feature of all the writers considered (with the possible 
exception of Rorty) is the lengths they go to to explain or justify their continued engagement with 
and (often) love of life despite its tragic underpinnings.14 This duality is not just what is apparent, 
but as far as I can see, the reality of the situation. Anxiety exists—is considered to be important— 
because it reflects this ambiguity. 
1 2 Medard Boss is wrong when he says; 'If one keeps oneself ... exposed to the full and undissembled 
essence of anxiety, it is precisely anxiety that opens to man that dimension of freedom into which alone 
the experience of love and trust can unfold.' {Anxiety, Guilt and Psychotherapeutic Liberation, Review of 
Existential Psychology and Psychiatry, Vol.2, No.3, 1962, p. 186) 
1 3 See Tragic Sense of Life (New York: Dover, 1954) 
1 4 Commenting on Luther, Charles Taylor says that quite often 'the recognition of my helplessness and my 
lowliness, and the sense of my salvation, are closely bound together.' (Sources of the Self (Cambridge: 
CUP, 1992), p.443 
13 
Joy and other affects or moods may be important, but anxiety is more expansive and categorially 
more flexible.15 The truth of the original Kierkegaard quote is that in this way it is a philosophical 
invention, or at least, only philosophy (or a philosophical theology) could have given it a name and 
attached an idea to it. (So in a sense the name need not have been 'anxiety', but I cannot, as I shall 
shortly explain, think of better candidate.) Often attempts to usurp anxiety as the 
Grundbefindlickheit do not recognize this. Despair may be suitable for a consideration of 
contingency alone, and joy of our self-creation alone, but neither indicate our recognition of 
ambiguity, and, as alluded to, it takes some strenuous analysis just to pin down that it is precisely 
this that is unique about anxiety. 
« < » > 
Before moving on to the main body of the dissertation I will briefly say something about my choice 
of the word anxiety over the most commonly used alternatives 'dread', 'angst', and 'anguish' 
Walter Lowrie originally translated the (19th Century) Danish Angest in Kierkegaard's work as 
'dread'. This is commonly seen as inappropriate and has been replaced, usually by 'anxiety' and 
occasionally by 'anguish' (e.g. in Hannay's translation of Fear and Trembling). I agree that 
anxiety is better, dread being too dark. In Begrebet Angst the individual is enticed and intrigued by 
the experience as well as having a sense of foreboding, and it is vital to convey this ambiguity. 
Roger Poole criticises Reidar Thomte, the translator of the current Princeton edition, saying 
'anxiety is, of course, only one of the many possible modes of dread, which is by far the richer 
concept.'16 But what criterion he uses to assign richness to either term in the existential context I 
have no idea. The whole point of Begrebet Angst is to identify the complexities of (what 
Kierkegaard takes to be) a unified concept, and so, particularly in light of those lines from p .77, it 
does not matter what term is used. If Poole's complaint has any force it is that the term or 
translation chosen should be best suited for the times so that the reader is not misdirected or 
wrongly influenced from the start. 
1 5 Unamuno is making this sort of point when he says, 'Anxiety is something far deeper, more intimate, 
and more spiritual than suffering. We are want to feel the touch of anxiety even in the midst of that which 
we call happiness, and even because of this happiness itself, to which we cannot resign ourselves and 
before which we tremble.' (op cit, p.205) 
16 Kierkegaard: The Indirect Communication (Charlottesville and London: University of Virginia Press, 
1993) p. 92 
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The main worry with using 'anxiety' is that it does not abet the process of distinguishing what the 
existentialists mean from its everyday meaning and from its psychological meaning. In Chapter 1 I 
go to some lengths to sharpen this distinction, but it should not be forgotten that a link between 
everyday and scientific notions like anxiety and melancholy were the sustenance for Kierkegaard's 
initiation of a philosophy that prioritizes the concrete over the abstract. With Heidegger, Sartre and 
Tillich also, anxiety provides the link between the ontic (in terms of scientific, or common-sense 
entities) and the ontological, and so in this respect to use the word that would feature in such 
discourse is not misleading. However, as I will often repeat, part of the reason why we experience 
anxiety in a peculiarly existential way is precisely because there is no smooth transition, no 
common point of view or single category that covers our relation to both the ontic and to the 
ontological. 
Mainly for this reason 'anxiety' is not ideal, but like Robinson and Macquarrie (as influenced by 
Tillich17), Thomte and many others, I prefer it to the most viable alternative 'Angst'. Other than the 
convenience of following in the tradition of what are perhaps the principal texts of the 
dissertation,18 my reason for this is the way 'angst' has been somewhat trivialized in the English 
language in recent times. Examples of this are the term 'teenage angst' and the letters page of the 
NME (simply Angst), and no doubt this reflects, or is reflected in, a process whereby certain 
writers and philosophers have come to regard the term as epitomizing what is most repellent about 
what they see as an emotive and popularist Continental trend. I suppose I could join a rearguard 
action against the abuse of this word, but in some ways it is easier to allow 'angst' to take on its 
own generalized identity and try to re-establish the credibility of the concept using my preferred 
translation. 
In the English editions of Being and Nothingness19 Hazel Barnes translates the French angoisse as 
'anguish' (as do most other translators of Sartre, although in David Pellaur's Notebooks for an 
Ethics it is translated as 'anxiety'20). My reason for disliking this is similar to that in the case of 
'dread'—it is a word too closely linked to ideas like 'grief and 'sorrow' and as such tends to paint 
1 7 See ,4n Existential Theology (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973) p.65 
1 8 i.e. The Concept of Anxiety and Being and Time (Oxford, Blackwell, 1990). I am aware that Joan 
Stambaugh's recent translation of Being and Time (Albany: SUNY, 1997) just leaves the German Angst, 
but I have worked with the original Robinson and Macquarrie translation. 
1 9 New York, Washington Square, 1966, and London, Routledge, 1969 
2 0 Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1992 
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too gloomy and unambiguous a picture of what the existentialists are trying to convey. 'Anguish' 
has, to my ears, retained more pronounced traces of its etymology—the Latin 'angere' and the 
Latin 'ancho' meaning to choke or squeeze21—than its competitors 
Generally then, of the four alternatives that have presented themselves I see 'anxiety' and 'Angst' 
as the best in place of the more obviously misleading 'dread' and 'anguish'. My reasons for 
choosing 'anxiety' spring from the convenience of consistency with principle texts and some 
unfortunate connotations of the word 'angst' in some areas of English usage. Adopting something 
new seems needlessly radical, and short of inventing a word, the options that one might choose 
from—'disquiet', 'unease' etc.—though less confusing than 'anxiety' is some respects, offer only 
the lighter end of a spectrum that has the more tenebrous 'dread' and 'anguish' at the other.22 Of 
course, an easy way round this whole issue is to insist that where I say 'anxiety' this (except at 
certain points where I am making reference to psychological and everyday meanings of the word) is 
short-hand for 'existential anxiety', and if you are wondering about the meaning of this then, well, 
read on. 
2 1 My sources here are Freud's principle translator Alix Strachey (see Complete Psychological Works, 
Vol. Ill (London, Hogarth), p. 116, and Medard Boss (op cit). 
2 2 Where translators have used alternatives (such as Hazel Barnes) I substitute them for anxiety, generally 
without notifying the reader. 
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Even in the quietest moments: Philosophy, psychology, and a 
reassessment of the anxiety—fear relation 
The ability to withstand anxiety is heroic. Probably the only genuine heroism given to man.'—Ernest 
Becker (The Birth and Death of Meaning) 
'Anxiety is the general current coin for which all the affects are exchanged'—Freud (General 
Introduction to Psychoanalysis) 
'Its sound is plaintive ... But its complexity permits it to have overtones at various levels. Of an absolute 
evenness, both muffled and shrill, it fills the night and the ears as if it came from nowhere' 
—Alain Robbe-Grillet (Jealousy) 
'There's too much confusion/I can't get no relief—Bob Dylan (op cit) 
« « \ | / » » 
In both psychology and philosophy most who have written on anxiety begin by discussing the 
distinction between anxiety and fear. The terms are often interchangeable in everyday language, 
but clearly any approach which singles out anxiety as worthy of attention has something more in 
mind than what is suggested by a vocabulary which blurs usage and definition. That there is a 
relation is of course significant, and for a couple of reasons a comparison with fear is a good place 
to start an analysis of anxiety. Firstly (and obviously) it serves as a template for identifying fear-
like elements of anxiety; and secondly it can serve as a foil for isolating those aspects of anxiety 
that make it a broader and categorially richer concept than fear and other related affects. 
My intention here is primarily to detect the distinctions that are commonly seen by psychologists 
and psychiatrists, and then to develop this towards the more distinctive role anxiety plays in 
existential philosophy. This latter move will hopefully do more than just refine anxiety into an 
affect, though more subtle and complex, essentially of a similar kind to fear. Instead it will be 
placed on a new categorial footing which will consolidate the unique status certain writers have 
conferred upon it. The price paid is perhaps an irremediable remoteness from our everyday and 
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clinical understanding of anxiety, and indeed this is where the main body of the thesis keeps us, but 
I shall nonetheless stick roughly to a psychological template in this chapter's investigation. This 
will consist of a comparison of anxiety and fear in terms of the experience, causes, origins and 
consequences with which they are associated. 
I 
My aim then is to generate a greater understanding of the type of circumstances in which it is 
entirely inappropriate to substitute the word 'fear' for the word 'anxiety', but before proceeding 
with this I will briefly discuss some of the differing meanings of 'anxiety'. I think it is accurate to 
say that these fall into three fairly distinct (though by no means exclusive) categories; the everyday, 
the psychological or clinical, and the existential. The everyday sense of anxiety might also be 
referred to as 'worry' or perhaps 'concern'. It implies a state of limbo in a person who is unaware 
of the outcome of a particular event that is important to them. This could be something they are 
actively engaged in (like sitting an exam), or something outside of their control (like awaiting exam 
results). In a related sense it can also refer to the tension or frustration someone feels when, for 
instance, they are impatient to reach a particular target or conclusion (e.g. one might be anxious to 
finish a meeting so as to get outside for a cigarette). Where it meets existential anxiety 
(particularly, as we shall see, in Sartre's philosophy) is in the realm of (important) decision making 
and moral dilemmas. The everyday meaning stretches to include the individual's sense of 
responsibility for themselves and others, and therefore a slightly different kind of uncertainty or 
mdefiniteness is introduced. As indicated in the Preamble, common parlance sometimes knows this 
as 'angst'. 
Psychology and psychiatry are certainly interested in everyday and existential anxiety (which are 
sometimes lumped together as 'normal' anxiety), but there is naturally an emphasis on abnormal or 
clinical anxiety with a view to prevention and cure. Abnormal anxiety might be described (e.g. 
behaviourally) as a level of anxiety that impairs the life of an individual rather than being accepted 
as part of a robust, healthy concern for self and others, but it might also be said that abnormal 
anxiety is qualitatively distinct from its normal counterpart. Psychology, at a theoretical level, will 
tend to seek this distinction: Rollo May defines the abnormal variant as; 
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disproportionate to the threat or object; as involving the unconscious in terms of repression and 
"intrapsychic conflict", and as requiring neurotic defence mechanisms as a means of coping with it. 1 
Karen Horney identifies what she calls 'urangst' (literally 'original anxiety') as 'the expression of 
existing human helplessness in the face of existing human dangers—illness, ... death, powers of 
nature', and contrasts it with the abnormal (what she calls 'basic') anxiety where 'the helplessness 
is largely provoked by repressed hostility'.2 'Hostility' could be exchanged for 'libido', 'sense of 
inferiority', 'guilt' or some other fundamentale depending on the theorist or school of thought in 
question, but in essence what we have here is a typical account of the difference between normal 
and abnormal anxiety. The abnormal variety is caused by processes that to a significant extent by-
pass the will or ego, and although the objects of the anxiety might be the same as the objects of its 
normal counterpart, the anxiety itself is not directly linked to these objects. The result is a kind of 
anxiety ('signal anxiety' in Freudian terminology) that has no obvious origin or cause, or i f 
attached to an object at all it is one that is displaced (as in phobias). With normal anxiety the sense 
of helplessness is subjectively related to the set of circumstances which are straightforwardly its 
cause (even i f these are themselves unsure, ambiguous etc.). 
As suggested, what psychology might refer to as normal anxiety is not necessarily what is meant in 
the everyday use of the word. The often nugatory and transient nature of everyday anxiety makes it 
of interest to psychologists i f it can be shown to have an abnormal aetiology, but otherwise the 
definition of normal anxiety has pertained more to the degree of realism of people's reaction 
towards the same factors that generate abnormal (neurotic) anxiety (such as traumas and conflicts), 
as well as the basic features of existence and helplessness that Homey's urangst refers to. There is 
then a substantial cross-over among the normal and abnormal varieties that interests psychology, 
and certain psychologists have had to reach over into other disciplines—especially existential 
philosophy—to augment their theories.3 Concepts such as 'repression' and 'illness' do not always 
seem applicable to the phenomenology of anxiety (and the general relation of its normal and 
abnormal varients), and many acknowledge that the picture is not complete unless a more abstract, 
ontological facet is recognized. In the words of Rollo May, 'there is a richness to the word 
1 The Meaning of Anxiety (Norton, 1977), p.210 
2 New ways in Psychoanalysis (Norton, 1966), p.203n 
3 Prominent figures have included Medard Boss, Ludwig Binswanger, Leslie Farber, Victor Frankl, and 
R.D. Laing. The principle vehicle for many of these theorists' views has been the American journal The 
Review of Existential Psychology and Psychotherapy. 
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"anxiety" which, even though it presents problems for psychologists, is central in literature, art and 
philosophy.'4 However, the complexity of the normal/abnormal division is added to by the 
existential dimension which places the causes and origins of anxiety not just in the moral category 
of painful conflicts and particular threats to one's self and what one considers to be of worth, but 
also in the realm of certain basic features of human existence—finitude, guilt, freedom, 
responsibility, contingency and so on which should be accepted and lived with rather than 
overcome or even 'coped' with. The concerns and parameters of the two areas are not without 
connections—for example existential anxiety is the cause of certain, what can be called, 'neurotic' 
attitudes towards life—but in this chapter, and in other parts of the thesis, I want to do some 
categorial tidying up with respect to these different meanings and uses of anxiety. This roughly 
equates to drawing firmer lines between the ontological and the empirical than certain writers (e.g. 
May and Tillich) have tended to do, and the anxiety-fear distinction should prove a useful forum 
for achieving this. 
Along these lines an on-going division will emerge in this chapter whereby it will become apparent 
that certain descriptions of anxiety treat it as essentially a response to something threatening, and 
others treat it as something more positive both in terms of its origins and consequences and in 
terms of the subjective experience. Links are made with a sharpened sense of reality and with 
creativity (and even pleasure). Psychologists will often fall into the first camp and philosophers 
into the second, and although the full implications of this division will not become apparent until 
things progress, one upshot worth mentioning here is that psychological definitions will tend to 
suggest (if unwittingly) that anxiety is almost a variety of fear, whereas philosophical definitions 
are more likely to avoid this and class anxiety as something quite different. 
4 opcit, p. 113 
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' I came to a puddle. I could not cross it. Identity failed me. We are nothing, I said, and fell. I was blown 
like a feather, I was wafted down tunnels. Then very gingerly, I pushed my foot across. I laid my hand 
against a brick wall. I returned very painfully, drawing myself back into my body over the grey, 
cadaverous space of the puddle. This is life then to which I am committed.'—Virginia Woolf (The Waves) 
In this section I wil l , as stated, analyse the fear-anxiety distinction in terms of subjective 
experience, causes, origins and consequences. 
A. The Experience 
The psychologist Leslie Farber has said that the 'experience of anxiety has been relatively 
neglected in favour of its causes and, more especially, its consequences'5 and possibly this is the 
case in psychology, but i f one looks at the phenomenology of Heidegger and Sartre, and scratches 
the surface of some (in particular Twentieth Century) literature the balance is redressed somewhat. 
In a sense though there is less that can be said about the experience in itself. Theories of sources 
and consequences lend themselves to objective analysis and debate more readily than the described 
experience, and part of the reason for this is that reference to surrounding causes and consequences 
seems an inextricable part of such descriptions. In a similar vein, when distinguishing anxiety and 
fear, relying on the experience will tend to be inconclusive. Even where the subject describes what 
is felt as 'anxiety' or 'fear' their choice of vocabulary is always likely to have been affected by 
received ideas of what each is. The breadth and intricacy of our vocabulary and our understanding 
of our general environment6 will condition the content and significance we ascribe to our moods 
and emotions,7 and these preconditions are in turn likely to have been influenced by the theories and 
5 Will and Anxiety, Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry, Vol. IV, No.3, 1964, p.201 
6 What Heidegger calls the 'situation'—an awareness of which will reveal the authentic possibilities our 
personal and cultural circumstances make available. 
7 Stephen Mulhall makes this point in his paper Can there Be an Epistemology of Moods. He says 'the 
significance of the situation in which an individual finds herself, and the import and nature of their 
emotions, is determined by the range and structure of the vocabulary available to her for their 
characterization. She cannot feel shame if she lacks a vocabulary in which the circle of situation, feeling 
and goal characteristic of shame is available; and the precise significance of that feeling will alter 
according to the semantic field in which that vocabulary is embedded.'(Verstehen and Humane 
Understanding, Anthony O'Hear Ed. (Cambridge, 1996), p. 196) 
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language of those I am here attempting to reassess.8 Also, many experiences will contain elements 
of both states of mind, but there are occasions where the terminology used will not be subtle 
enough to allow for this to show. As such, we need to consider surrounding factors (i.e. origins and 
consequences) carefully in order to derive a clear picture of what we are dealing with in any 
particular case. 
The 'diagnostic and statistical model' (DSM ID) of the American Psychiatric Association describes 
neurotic anxiety as directly experienced in the form of 'panic attacks' at one end of the spectrum 
and 'free-floating' anxiety (also known as 'Generalized Anxiety Disorder') at the other; and 
indirectly experienced in the form of phobias, obsessions and compulsions.9 Some theories that lie 
behind this classification will be dealt with when we look at causes and objects, but in this section 
it will become apparent that what psychology defines as anxiety is not necessarily what the subject 
might describe as such, and this will begin to explain the divergence between psychological and 
existential ideas on the fear-anxiety distinction. For the time being though I shall borrow this 
framework and provide some examples of firstly panic attacks and then free-floating anxiety. 
Freud says; 
anxiousness—which though mostly latent as regards consciousness, is constantly lurking in the 
background ... can suddenly break through into consciousness without being aroused by a train of ideas, 
and thus provoke an anxiety attack. 
This can consist of the raw experience of anxiety by itself, but more commonly; 
is accompanied by the interpretation that is nearest to hand, as such as the idea of the extinction of life, or 
of a stroke, or of a threat of madness . . . 1 0 
An example of this kind comes from J.D.Salinger's The Catcher in the Rye where the young hero 
(Holden Cauldfield), physically and emotionally exhausted, reaches the end of his tether; 
8 For example many writers, as we shall see, are content to stick with (say) Kierkegaard's two line 
summary of the fear/anxiety distinction (that fear has a definite object and anxiety does not (see COA, 
p.42)) seemingly without giving it much further thought. 
9 The actual breakdown is under the heading Anxiety Disorders and runs as follows: A. Phobic Disorders; 
B. Anxiety State: panic disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder; C. 
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder. (Source: Abnormal Psychology, Davison and Neale (Wiley, 1986)). 1995's 
DSM IV (American Psychiatric Association) adds several more types of disorder to the list (e.g. 'Acute 
Stress Disorder' and 'Panic Disorder with Agoraphobia'), but for my purposes a more streamlined 
classification is sufficient. 
10 Complete Psychological Works (Hogarth Press, 1953-1964 ),Vol I I I , pp.93-4 
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I kept walking and walking up fifth avenue ... Then all of a sudden, something very spooky started 
happening. Every time I came to the end of the block and stepped off the ... kerb, I had this feeling that I 'd 
never get to the other side of the street. I thought I'd just go down, down, down and nobody'd ever see me 
again. Boy, it did scare me . .. I started sweating like a bastard. Then I started doing something else. Every 
time I'd get to the end of a block I'd make believe I was talking to my [dead ] brother Allie. I'd say to 
him, 'Allie, don't let me disappear ... And then, when I'd reach the other side of the street without 
disappearing, I'd thank him. Then it would start all over again as soon as I got to the next corner.11 
The feeling of being confronted by oblivion—of having no platform and no handrail to grasp hold 
of—activates the vertigo metaphor. For support Cauldfield has to reach beyond the immediate 
physical world and a sense of self he can no longer rely on towards the image or memory of his 
dead brother (who is one of the few people he has loved and respected). Only this way (or at least, 
so it feels) can he prevent complete mental collapse. 
A psychiatric textbook illustrates a panic attack with an autobiographical passage from Rilke; 
Why should I pretend that these nights have never been, when in fear of death I sat up, clinging to the fact 
that the mere act of sitting was at any rate a part of life: that the dead did not sit . .. one wakes up panting 
... higher it mounts, here it passes out over you, rising higher than your breath, to which you flee as your 
last stand ... your heart drives you out of yourself, your heart pursues you, and you are almost frantic ... 
your slight surface hardness and adaptability go for nothing.12 
Rationally speaking " I sit therefore I live" is pretty conclusive, and I am told that those who have 
become accustomed to these attacks support an underlying realization that they are in fact not 
going to die. Panic attacks for someone who has not experienced them are very hard to understand, 
and equally this apparent contradiction can only really make sense ( if that's the word) in the 
context of such a particular and intense experience. 
Lectures V I and V I I of William James' Varieties of Religious Experience present us with a 
catalogue of instances of panic, despair, anxiety and fear (although James is not interested in 
making distinctions within this vocabulary). One such example, probably James's own, 1 3 runs as 
follows; 
I went one evening into a dressing-room in the twilight to procure some article that was there; when 
suddenly there fell upon me without any warning, just as if it came out of the darkness, a horrible fear of 
my own existence. Simultaneously there arose in my mind the image of an epileptic patient whom I had 
11 The Catcher in the Rye (Penguin, 1958), p.204 
1 2 Cited in Henderson and Gillespie, Textbook of Psychiatry (OUP, 1962), p. 139 
1 3 My source being Colin Wilson's The Outsider (Picador, 1978), see p. 121 
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seen in the asylum, a black-haired youth with greenish skin, entirely idiotic, who used to sit all day on one 
of the benches . .. with his knees drawn up against his chin, and the coarse grey undershirt, which was his 
only garment, drawn over them enclosing his entire figure ... This image and my fear entered into a 
species of combination with each other. That shape am I, I felt, potentially. Nothing I possess can defend 
me against that fate, if the hour for it should strike for me as it struck for him. There was such a horror of 
him, and such a perception of my own merely momentary discrepancy from him, that it was as if 
something hitherto solid within my breast gave way entirely, and I became a mass of quivering fear.14 
Here an unspecified 'fear' finds itself a home—in this case in the image of the epileptic. This 
process was later identified by Freud and has parallels in existentialist literature.15 Initially at least 
a defining aspect of the anxiety experience is the inability to attach it to a specific object or cause. 
The result of this non-intentionality is a sense of helplessness and bewilderment as we feel both 
'dizzy' and threatened. Anxiety in the form of, or which induces, panic but that does not attach 
itself to specifics is described by Hermann Hesse who writes; 
At times ... a momentary drop in life's mood ... a sleepless night, will bring [an individual] face to face 
with the inexorable and for a while make all order, all comfort, all safety, all faith, all knowledge 
doubtful.16 
Loss of 'safety' or 'faith' is not itself an object or a cause of the anxiety, but no more than a 
attempt to describe an experience that is subjectively rootless. Hesse is echoing Heidegger who 
stresses the sense of groundlessness and uncanniness (unheimlichkeit) in his version of anxiety: 
'That which threatens' he says '... is so close that it is oppressive and stifles one's breath, and yet it 
is nowhere.'17 We have a sense of not being at home in the world, 'everyday familiarity collapses'18 
and we find ourselves without moorings. For him though this is more than a passing pathology, it 
indicates the broader existential significance of an anxiety 'always latent' in the world1—the anxiety 
this dissertation is primarily concerned with. This 'shock' characteristic of the anxiety experience 
is described by clinical theorists, existentialists and those (like James) who straddle both camps. 
As such, distinctions are revealed by reference to cause and origin, and I suspect that Heidegger's 
uncanniness is more of an analogy than he sometimes cares to admit. 
Varieties of 'Religious Experience (Penguin, 1985), p. 160 
1 5 For example Tillich who identifies our need to transform anxiety into fear in order to be able to confront 
it with courage (cf. D. In this section, and Chapter 5) 
16M>-£e/ie/(Triad/Paiadin,1989), p.253 
1 7 BT, p.231 
1 8 ibid, p.233. DSM IV lists among the criteria for diagnosing a panic attack 'sensations of shortness of 
breath', 'trembling or shaking', 'feeling dizzy, unsteady, lightheaded, or faint', 'derealization (feelings of 
unreality) or depersonalization (being detached from oneself)', and 'fear of dying' (p.405). 
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In other clinical descriptions of anxiety we find a similar experience in the form of a pervasive 
'free-floating' affliction. The passage I quoted from James continues with a description of the 
aftermath of this attack; 
After this the universe was changed for me altogether. I awoke morning after morning with a horrible 
dread in the pit of my stomach, and with a sense of the insecurity of life that I never knew before ... 1 9 
In this case the pervading sense of dread did eventually disappear, but in other clinical cases the 
anxiety seems to be almost a permanent character trait described as 'strung up, on edge, constantly 
expecting trouble or calamity: there is a restlessness, impaired concentration, absentmindedness 
and forgetfulness in day-to-day affairs, jumpiness, irritability and intermittently depression of 
spirits.'20 This type of anxiety is not a one-off, not even an occasional affliction but a continuous 
rumble like the ticking-over of an engine that has its idling speed set too high. Whether or not 
though the ticking can be subdued without some impairment of the person's sense of reality (e.g. 
by using drugs) is another issue. Clinically speaking such a person is dysfunctional and when faced 
with symptoms of this kind the relation to existential anxiety is perhaps only metaphorical. Anxiety 
for Heidegger and Sartre is always there, always 'latent' in the world, but this tends to be manifest 
in broad forms of behaviour (such as Sartre's 'bad faith') that is identified objectively rather than 
by the person themselves. The method of postponement of existential anxiety is self-deception 
rather than medication, whereas the psychological version, as we shall see, is more likely to 
identify self-deception as the cause of anxiety in the first place. 
Here the clinical-existential division might be characterized as the distinction between the 
unexpressed (repressed, unresolved) and the inexpressible or unresolvable. 'It is not a distortion, 
but the expression of man's basic nature to be anxious' says Paul Tillich,2 1 and the pertinent 
question is not "How should it be cured?" but "How should we live with it?". It must be recognized 
that there are types of anxiety that are simply in need of a cure—where the cause is not a necessary 
feature of existence that, if we are to be authentic, demands a certain response—and types of 
anxiety that are to all effects regarded as healthy despite their unsettling or even petrifying nature. 
It is this kind to which Kierkegaard addresses his remark 'an attempt should be made to point out 
the subjective predisposition and [anxiety] not as something unsound and sickly, but as an aspect 
"opcit, p. 160 
2 0 Henderson and Gillespie, op cit. (and see DSM IV, pp.447-8) 
2 1 Cited in William Lynch Images of Hope (Mentor-Omega, 1966), p.47 
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of normal constitution'; and of course this kind to which the majority of this thesis is addressed. 
For the time being though I shall concentrate on identifying characteristics of the experience of 
panic attacks and free-floating anxiety that qualify them as examples of anxiety rather than fear. 
Nearly every commentator, from the most traditional psychoanalysts to existential philosophers, 
agree that the experience of anxiety involves an element of indefiniteness (is non-intentional) 
whereas with fear the subject knows what he is afraid of. For Freud '[anxiety] has a quality of 
indefiniteness and lack of object. In precise speech we use the word "fear" rather than "anxiety" i f 
it has found an object.'2 3 He echoed Kierkegaard who wrote ' I must point out that [anxiety] is 
altogether different from fear and similar concepts that refer to something definite.'2 4 Karen Homey 
says 'what characterizes anxiety in contradistinction to fear is ... a quality of diffuseness and 
uncertainty'25; for Tillich 'fear as opposed to anxiety has a definite object ... which can be faced, 
analysed, attacked, endured'26; and at least initially for Heidegger 'that in the face of which one has 
anxiety is completely mdefinite.'2 7 I f we look at just what is meant by this 'indefiniteness' we find a 
number of implications which, for my purposes, fall broadly into two categories. For philosophers 
the suggestion, which I shall expand on shortly, is often (though not always) that what is indefinite 
is necessarily so, and the indefiniteness that psychologists tend to refer to concerns something 
repressed and potentially uncoverable and therefore made definite, or follows Freud's later line that 
'anxiety has an unmistakable relation to expectation.'28 In the latter case the subject is in a 
situation whereby they do not know what the outcome of an event might be, or indeed whether that 
event is occurring in the first place. As such the indefiniteness refers to a future state of affairs that 
might in some way be harmful to us, and the anxiety is a precursor to fear or some other response 
that occurs once the circumstances take on a definite meaning. Briefly pre-empting my discussion 
of anxiety's origins, what Freud, Homey and others are talking about always involves something 
threatening. Anxiety is a warning of possible danger, and as such fear and anxiety are seen as 
commensurable experiences often distinguished only by a time lag that makes the mdefinite 
definite. 
Journals and Paper (Indiana University Press, 1967), p.628-9 
Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety ( Hogarth Press, 1971), p. 79 
COA, p.42 
Horney, op cit, p. 194 
The Courage to Be (Collins (Fontana Library), 1962), p. 34 
Heidegger, op cit, p. 231 
Freud, op cit, p. 79 
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Rollo May says that 'helplessness inheres in the very nature of anxiety', and a feeling of 
helplessness is certainly engendered by mdefinite circumstances. With the type of temporal 
indefiniteness Freud speaks of we are led to assume that the reason a threatening event causes 
anxiety rather than fear is the fact that we can do nothing about it in the present.30 Existential 
philosophy wil l , like psychology, tend to stress the feeling of helplessness in anxiety, but unlike 
psychology does not make the link with possible future threats. For Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Sartre 
and Tillich the cause of anxiety is already in a sense 'present' but still not definite. As I will 
attempt to explain in the thesis, our condition is such that the roots of existential anxiety cannot be 
existentially31 pinned down by the individual. There are certainly causes or objects which go to 
make up the anxiety structure that can be located, but by themselves the anxiety (or fear) they 
engender is not existential. Existential anxiety is not successfully confronted (as one might confront 
an object) by transforming it into fear (although it can perhaps be successfully 'lived through' or 
'lived with') because it is always, in a sense, beyond our grasp. As such it tends to be explained in 
(at least superficially) paradoxical terms—'is so close ... and yet is nowhere' etc. 
With free-floating anxiety indefiniteness of object or origin can be seen as the defining 
characteristic of the experience. There is no suggestion of a possible object or an expected threat 
— i t is simply there. In the examples of panic attacks something fairly definite does occur in the 
mind of the subject: for Cauldfield it is that he will not reach the other side of the road; Rilke states 
clearly that he fears death, and in James' case, as noted, the danger of becoming like the epileptic 
('that shape am I ... potentially') becomes the focus of his dread. Only superficially however are 
these merely examples of fear. In fear the object or imagined object precedes the fearful reaction 
whereas with panic attacks the anxiety is projected onto particular objects in order for the person to 
defer an engulfing sense of helplessness. 
« < y j / » > 
2 Sopcit, p. 163 
3 0 For example, Karen Horney instances the anxiety-fear distinction by describing the difference between 
someone who gets up to investigate a sound in the house at night and someone who cowers in their room. 
The former, proactive person has fear, the latter has anxiety. (See Horney, op cit, p. 195) 
3 1 In this sense of being lived rather than just grasped intellectually. 
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Before I move on to discuss anxiety's causes and origins in greater detail I will mention a further 
aspect of it which, though rarely featuring in the work of psychologists, is sometimes highlighted in 
existentialist philosophy—namely a positive, even pleasurable experience. Kierkegaard remarks 
that in the early stages of our journey through anxiety there is a 'pleasing anxiousness'32 which 
tempts us to explore the full significance of its revelations. In the next chapter I will explain how 
an ambiguous love-fear experience is crucial to Kierkegaard's specific application of anxiety. In 
Heidegger this is perhaps more explicit and we find in the advanced stages of the anxiety 
experience a 'sober joy' and a 'spell-bound peace' . 3 3 Unlike Kierkegaard, one gets the impression 
that for Heidegger the positive side of anxiety is something that has to be worked towards and 
comes with a maturity in which one has learned to understand and live with the more 'altered state' 
elements of the phenomenon. 
Can it be claimed that a positive experience is associated with fear? It is certainly the case that 
there is pleasure in the squirmy fear some of us seek in watching horror movies, but I think it is fair 
to say that this kind of aesthetic fear is not the same thing as the fear instilled in us by threats 
regarded as real. It might also be argued that sensation-seekers—drivers of fast cars, skydivers 
etc.—derive pleasure from the fear of the catastrophe they are risking. I would say however that 
the pleasure in these instances does not so much reside in the fear itself, but rather alongside it. 
These kind of activities inspire both fear and pleasure in the individual so that they are themselves 
ambiguous, but all the while the polarities of experience they contain remain exclusive. That in 
existential anxiety there is the possibility of both a pleasing and a displeasing experience indicates 
not just a more complex emotion or state of mind, and not a fusion (or confusion) of two or more 
emotions, but the requirement of a different category altogether. I f not true for all existentialists (it 
might not be for Tillich), the work that is asked of it by some (especially Kierkegaard and 
Heidegger) seems to necessitate this. Anxiety of this kind lends itself to interpretation in a way that 
fear's immediacy does not; it can be modulated and nurtured in a way that retains its revelatory 
force and does not imply denial. 
3 2 COA P.42 
33 What is Metaphysics (WTM) (in Kaufmann (ed.) Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre (Meridian, 
1975), p.250. Here the engulfing sense of helplessness is transformed into a kind of acceptance and 
relinquishing of self (see Chapter 3 for more on this). 
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B . Causes 
'Life forms a surface that pretends to be the way it is, but under its skin things are thrusting and jostling' 
—Robert Musil (The Man Without Qualities) 
Most emotions are said to have an object but for all the kinds of anxiety I have mentioned this is 
usually not the case. We can however speak of its 'causes' and 'origins' The former are more 
specific and as we shall see tend to be linked to a particular model of the psyche; the latter are 
more plastic and offers the opportunity to point to something non-object like in the world or in 
ourselves which is subject to interpretation and thus not a straight forward causal agent. I f anxiety 
has causes the suggestion is that the experience derives from a source that by-passes the will . I f 
this approach typifies early Freudian theory and much subsequent psychology and psychiatry, then 
unsurprisingly existentialist philosophers and psychologists will focus on perception and 
interpretation—either as a rival theory to the early Freudian model, or as a corollary to their 
different kind of anxiety. 
Returning to the psychopathological classifications of anxiety in which it is manifest as panic 
attacks, phobias and a free-floating condition, we have to look to the unconscious to understand 
why these are regarded as instances of abnormal anxiety rather than simple fears. I will use an 
extended analogy to help explain the classic psychoanalytic theory of anxiety, taking the 
topography of a landscape to be the conscious mind, the rain to be the emotional input from the 
psychological environment—sexual excitation, feelings of hostility etc.—and then considering what 
happens when the rain hits the ground. There are three possibilities: either it can evaporate (as less 
gravitous input might); it can be channelled, via rivers and streams, into lakes and seas (i.e. stay on 
the surface); or it can permeate the soil and rock and collect underground. The healthy way of 
dealing with emotional input is to preserve its ful l impact in the conscious or pre-conscious mind 
and channel it productively and creatively to a conclusion,34 whilst the unhealthy way is to let it 
pass straight through to the unconscious. In this analogy underground reservoirs form from the 
water that trickles through the sub-soil and these then affect the surface landscape in a number of 
ways. One possibility is the continual dampening or soaking of the exposed ground, perhaps to the 
point of forming bogs and marshes. A second possibility is that the water wil l find its way to the 
3 4 This process is structurally similar to what Tillich (see Ch.5) sees as the necessary transformation of 
anxiety into specific fears. The anxiety is not repressed as such, but to deal with it at all we must give it 
contours and classifications rather than let it engulf the whole surface of the landscape. 
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surface at specific points—natural fault lines, or where erosion has caused the surface to 
collapse—in the form of well-springs. A third possibility is that the water remains for the most part 
unnoticed but continually rising until it reaches a point where, for a short period of time at least, it 
entirely floods the landscape. 
The creation of soaked but not flooded soil represents the free-floating manifestation of anxiety; the 
well-springs represent specific phobias,35 and the occasional but catastrophic flooding represents 
panic attacks. In Freud's original theory of anxiety he saw these processes purely as a transference 
of sexual excitation that had little or nothing to do with our perceptions and emotional responses to 
the world. He wrote: 'The mechanism of anxiety neurosis is to be looked for in a deflection of 
somatic sexual excitation from the psychical sphere, and in a consequent abnormal employment of 
that excitation.'36 In cases of, for instance, coitus interuptus, where the build-up of sexual 
excitation is not 'unloaded' in the normal way, the energy is channelled into the unconscious where 
it makes its presence felt through one or other of the manifestations of anxiety. In this sense the 
anxiety is generated from within and there is no possibility of it being a ego-centred reaction to 
external circumstances. A progression from this theory would involve certain 'threats' from the 
environment, or threats emanating from the unacceptability of one's own impulses buried in the 
unconscious since infancy (like the case of 'Little Hans'). As we shall see, it could be claimed that 
these threats, impulses, and the resulting conflicts are themselves conscious objects of anxiety, but 
in the circumstances where they have passed 'underground' the anxiety is a later manifestation that 
has a direct causal link only to the repressed contents of the unconscious which must be understood 
to have a life of their own, exclusive of the will. This being the case, the cause of anxiety has little 
to do with the type of causes or origins of fear. The experience of helplessness, of being unable to 
identify the source of one's dread or unease is there in abundance. We are very much assailed by 
an 'alien power', and yet one whose origin is within ourselves. 
In Kierkegaard's COA (at least structurally speaking) we find a similar state of affairs in his 
discussion of 'dreaming spirit' in the early stages of anxiety,37 but his ideas on did not stop here 
and he offers an account of a different form of anxiety in the latter half of COA in which the 
objects (good and evil) are conscious but the self attempts to deny them. Later in his career Freud 
3 5 Rollo May describes phobias as 'a crystallisation of anxiety around some external event' (op cit, p. 115) 
36 Complete Psychological Works, Vol. Ill, p. 108 
3 7 See Chapter 2, Section II for a more detailed discussion of this. 
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made major alterations in his theory that in some important ways resemble the division in COA. As 
it stands though, this type of causal theory can at best only be seen as referring to something very 
specific that may only touch on the broader concept that writers like Heidegger and Sartre are 
interested in, and at worst (and I think more realistically), it only gives us half the story that it is 
itself trying to tell. Other questions seem unavoidable such as, in the psychoanalytic case, why and 
what type of things are repressed or transferred in the first place? By itself this type of theory 
cannot explain so-called 'normal' anxiety, the type that is linked to perceived events that are 
coherently adjudged ambiguous or mreatening. The temptation is to suggest that entirely different 
processes are at work, but there is evidence (that we shall come on to) that the similarities in the 
nature of the experience, somatic reactions and so on are not coincidental. For Kierkegaard, and for 
the later Freud, the issue was to push further and discover how the self interprets itself in order for 
it to be anxious in the way described, and also what might become of the anxiety once its causes 
become apparent to the individual. 
Inherent in this early stage is conflict—'a desire for what one fears'38—where we at once want to 
flee this alien power, as well as to explore its possibilities. The conflict continues in the form of 
good and evil once spirit is fully awakened; and similarly in psychoanalysis when a patient 
becomes conscious of what was repressed, very often the conflict that was the reason for the 
repression in the first place regains prominence and can now be worked through with the analyst by 
the process of 'transference'.39 Rollo May says that 'neurotic anxiety always involves inner 
conflict' 4 0 and of course the aim is to cure this, but it is not so clear that the existential variety of 
anxiety is necessarily so bound up with conflict, or at least not with resolvable conflict. For the 
non-religious philosophies of Heidegger and Sartre you feel that some given, value-charged 
parameters might be quite welcoming and something towards a cure for the anxiety they describe 
before their respective versions of nothingness. Without the possibility of a resting place the status 
of the conflict becomes ambiguous, and even i f we incorporate a developmental model (which is 
central to Kierkegaard but largely ignored by these two) a point will still be reached where no 
COA, p.44. Herman Hesse in The Glass Bead Game (Penguin, 1972) describes an instance of anxiety as 
'this half-thrilling, half-warning sensation of slight uneasiness, of eager curiosity and pleasure warring 
with fear.' (p.420) 
3 9 A vital feature of the therapeutic process where the analysand transfers repressed feelings (often of 
hostility) into his relationship with the analyst. 
4 0 op cit, p. 226. 
31 
authentic measure can prevent conflict becoming an issue of antinomies rather than an issue of 
resolving frictions caused by, say, an old self running up against a new self. 
One thing we can be sure of though is that to whatever extent conflict resides in the aetiology of 
anxiety, it is certainly more involved with this state of mind than it is with fear. I spoke about the 
indefiniteness of anxiety's source, and how this gives rise to a certain ambiguity and sense of 
confusion that could be said to be a precursor to fear. When, however, there is a more definite 
sense of being pulled in two or more directions at once, anxiety is the enveloping and foremost state 
of mind. More importantly, it is a self-contained phenomenon that does not have to be allied to a 
broader mood of fear, or aim, specifically, to prepare us for fearful situations. 
C. Origins 
'there is one matter on which all seem agreed: whereas the nature and origins of anxiety are obscure, the 
nature and origins of fear are simple and readily intelligible'—John Bowlby (Separation) 
One often stated, or at least implied, origin of anxiety is the possibility of profound loss. A notable 
example is found in Freud whose later and significantly altered theory of neurotic anxiety makes 
this idea central and marginalizes the automatic 'energy transference' process. This fundamental 
change in his thinking is succinctly put when he writes with respect to two cases of 'animal 
phobias', that ' i t was anxiety which produced repression and not, as I formerly believed, repression 
which produced anxiety. ' 4 1 In the same work he tells us that 'we may legitimately hold firmly to the 
idea that the ego is the actual seat of anxiety and give up our earlier view that the cathectic energy 
of the repressed impulse is automatically turned into anxiety.'42 The situation now becomes one 
where we perceive something that makes us anxious and the process of repression follows from 
this.4 3 The question that now arises is what is it that makes us anxious in the first place? Freud's 
broad answer is, fairly predictably, 'danger', and this is defined, again predictably enough, as the 
possibility of losing something that is of basic importance to us. He describes different stages of 
development as having different overriding dangers: first of all separation from the mother (and the 
danger of unfullfilled needs that this entails); then (and I really have to quote this) 'the danger of 
41 Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety, p. 22 
4 2 ibid, p. 7 
4 3 Freud does not, however, entirely give up his earlier theory and suggests that we arrive at a situation 
where we have two types of anxiety that are differentiated by their source. 
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being separated from one's genitals' —better known as the 'castration complex'—which of course 
can be a symbolic danger as well (e.g. loss of power, sexual identity etc.); and finally the loss of 
the love and consent of the super-ego (the danger of non-acceptance by others45). In his New 
Introductory Lectures Freud concluded his theory of anxiety telling us that there is a 'two-fold 
origin of anxiety—one as a consequence of the traumatic moment and the other as a signal 
threatening the repetition of such a moment. '** The first origin differs from fear, I take it, because 
it is not an isolated incident but rather makes apparent the wider and continuing possibility of the 
loss of something of profound importance. In the second we find a certain type of apprehension 
that recognizes the specific danger signs (or what i t takes to be them) and either resigns itself to 
helplessness or initiates avoidance behaviour. Kresten Nordenstoft summarizes Freud's later theory 
of anxiety neurosis in the following way; 
'anticipation of danger (signal anxiety) > reaction (repression of instinctual impulse) > neurosis'47 
But he goes on to say that 'signal anxiety is an innate potential of experience, which can but does 
not always need to lead to pathogenic repressions.'48 A development of this linked anxiety to other 
symptoms and 'anxiety is inserted as a sort of middle term between repression and the formation of 
symptoms.'49 The anxiety is itself repressed or channelled; Freud says, 'in general symptoms are 
only formed to escape an otherwise unavoidable generating of anxiety. I f we adopt this view, 
anxiety is placed, as it were, in the very centre of our interest in the problem of neurosis.'50 With 
this model then, anxiety need not be repressed and we find common ground between the origins of 
normal and abnormal anxiety. 
Signal anxiety can be seen as that which precedes fear, and though vaguer with respect to its 
object, is much like a weakened version of it. Facilitating this, however, there must be a constant 
'readiness to receive the signal' and this state has been linked to basic alertness in animals who are 
constantly on the look out for predators. In animals it is generally instinctive, but with signal 
anxiety danger has been acknowledged to exist in the world and a constant vigil is required (or felt 
op cit, p. 53 
Also known as 'conscience' or 'moral' anxiety (Gewissensangst). 
New Introductory Lectures (Penguin, 1991), p. 127 
Kierkegaard s Psychology (Duquesne University Press, 1978), p. 151 
ibid 
op cit, p. 146 
ibid (taken from Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis) 
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to be required) to combat its existence. A good example is found in Jean Genet's Thief's Journal 
where he explains; 
Having already been convicted of theft, I can be convicted again without proof, merely upon a casual 
accusation, just on suspicion ... I am in danger not only when I steal, but every moment of my life because 
I have stolen. My life is clouded by a vague anxiety which both weighs upon it and lightens it. To preserve 
the limpidity and keenness of my gaze, my consciousness must be sensitive to every act so that I can 
quickly correct it and change its meaning. This anxiety keeps me on the alert. But the anxiety which is a 
kind of dizziness, also sweeps me along, makes my head buzz and lets me trip and fall in an element of 
darkness where I lie low i f I hear the ground beneath the leaves resounding with a hoof.51 
And a similar condition is described in William Godwin's Caleb Williams which also serves to 
illustrate the complexity and ambiguity that the experience of anxiety can involve; 
My blood boiled within me. I was conscious of a kind of rapture for which I could not account. I was 
solemn, yet full of rapid emotion, burning with indignation and energy. In the very tempest and hurricane 
of the passions, I seemed to enjoy the most soul-ravishing calm. I cannot better express the then state of 
my mind, than by saying, I was never so perfectly alive at that moment.52 
Anxiety in this model is not so much a precursor to fear as 'fear ticking over', ready to power into 
life. Generally speaking, i f loss of something (with the something as the object, not the idea of loss 
itself, or more basic aspects of being human that make loss a continual, necessary possibility in the 
first place) is the fundamental origin of anxiety then the fear-anxiety distinction becomes fuzzy. 
The root of fear is that certain things can be lost—the love and respect of others, our life (even our 
genitals)—and there will often be little difference between saying that we fear something and that 
we are anxious (about something). The impact of Freud's altered theory on the distinction between 
normal and abnormal anxiety is that whereas before normal anxiety could be said to be generated 
by external sources, and abnormal by an inner transference, now most sources of anxiety must be 
seen as external—i.e. interpreted by the ego (including impulses from the id) and other reasons are 
required for explaining what is repressed and what is not. The effect, certainly in terms of the 
origins of anxiety is, as with anxiety and fear, a blurring of the normal-abnormal distinction. 
I f the loss that is threatened represents something that is profound and not altogether tangible then 
we are, to some extent, moving back towards a more distinct meaning of anxiety. This theme is 
taken up by Karen Horney and Rollo May who, after Goldstein, see anxiety as related specifically 
5 1 pp. 175-6 (Penguin, 1967) 
5 2 pp. 129-30 (OUP, 1982) 
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to the core of the self. May's concluding definition of anxiety is, 'the apprehension cued off by a 
threat to some value that the individual views as essential to his existence as a personality.'53 This 
value could be anything from God to Freud's 'castration complex', and this is how May attempts 
the bridge the psychology-philosophy divide—by placing our relation to anxiety's objects in the 
common sphere of 'possible objects of devastating loss'—but, for reasons I will come on to, I do 
not think this is the correct approach. 
Both May and Horney would still agree that objects of anxiety, as opposed to objects of fear, are 
characterized by their 'diffuse and uncertain' nature. From what has been said, our search for the 
unique in anxiety can go in two directions here; one which lands us with a definition of anxiety that 
in most essentials is very similar to fear; or one that, from the psychological criteria at least, leads 
to contradictions. As previously intimated, the first option is that the uncertainty spoken of is a 
function of time: the threatening circumstances may prove to be actualized or not, and that the 
possibility of profound loss and associated helplessness is enough to cue the anxiety. The second 
option is that the uncertain object is the type of thing, situation, process etc. that is, as spoken 
about, though necessarily constantly with us, ungraspable and beyond our powers of mastery. This 
being the case, the contradiction seems to arise as to how this could be apprehended as a 'threat to 
some value the individual holds essential to his existence.' I f the origin is so big, so strange and 
ineffable, its connection with what is necessarily threatening is weakened. Admittedly this type of 
thing may inspire anxiety, but not merely anxiety about the destruction or insignification of 
something extant, but also surely anxiety about the positive possibilities of creation, change and 
growth with respect to individual potentiality.54 Essential to the experience of uncanniness is the 
realization that things are not as we thought they were and this, in the short term, arouses a 
panicky fear of profound loss but this is not to say what is revealed is necessarily threatening once 
we have acclimatised. As we shall see, central to anxiety as existentialists view it are both the 
awareness of the ungroundedness (and thus vulnerability) of our values, and the desire to create 
and fulf i l l ourselves as a distinct personality and be in some sense 'actualized'. In an atheistic 
environment each of these concerns necessitate the existence of the other, but at the same time each 
in some sense undermines the other and it is this essentially ambiguous structure that (as I shall 
defend at length in this dissertation) is the origin of existential anxiety. 
5 3 op cit, p. 205 
5 4 May sees creativity as the 'flip-side' of anxiety, not as part of it. 
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I think it is fair to say that psychology on the whole is content to stick with the first of these 
options, and the contradiction I speak of is perhaps not an issue for it. It finds itself, however, with 
a definition of anxiety that is more like a variety of fear than something fundamentally distinct, and 
as such—especially in the case of existential psychology which is directly attempting to bring 
philosophy to the couch—I believe does not do the concept complete justice. 
D. Origins (II) 
At this point we are ready to expand the concept of anxiety and explore its existential regions. By 
so doing I hope to leave behind the notion of anxiety as simply a response to something threatening 
and show how it can be seen to correspond to wider aspects of the self and the world. 
For a clear understanding of the nature of existential anxiety we need to further clarify its twin 
sources as alluded to in the last section—the self and the world. One psychologist who seems to 
have correctly diagnosed this is Otto Rank. For him the neurotic is someone whose 'illusion has 
failed him', for, like most people; 
he perceives himself as bad, guilt laden, inferior, as a small, weak, helpless creature, which is the truth 
about mankind ... All other is illusion, deception, but necessary deception in order to be able to bear 
oneself and thereby life. 5 5 
Rank is driving at a situation where the individual can focus on one of two features of existence. 
One is an objective world in which the individual is without significance. This can be in the relative 
sense of being insignificant in comparison to the planet at large and human history; or it can be in 
the absolute or metaphysical sense of the essential contingency of all meaning whether it be 
personally significant or not. For my purposes at the moment I will not draw a distinction here— 
the key features both perspectives share is a sense of loneliness and helplessness. The second 
feature of existence is the demands we make on ourselves to be true to ourselves, fulf i l l our 
potential, 'be all that we can be' etc. Rank's point—and I agree—is that to maintain this sense of 
optimism and meaning we must live as i f this project has ultimate (or at least far greater) 
5 5 Cited in Earnest Becker's The Denial of Death, p. 188. Rank says that 'the need for legitimate 
foolishness' (i.e.'creative expression') must be recognized if we are to overcome neurosis in the modern 
age (see Beyond Psychology (Dover, 1958), p.49). 
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significance. The world we create for ourselves that embodies this meaningfulness he describes as 
'illusion', but it is a necessary and healthy illusion. 
Of course, i f an illusion moves too far from 'reality' it is as likely to fail as i f it gets too close, and 
so a precarious equilibrium is required (the very equilibrium that, as we shall see, seems so closely 
tied to existential authenticity56). Related to this tension is what Rank calls 'life fear' and 'death 
fear': 'whereas life fear is anxiety at going forward, becoming an individual, the death fear is 
anxiety at going backwards, losing individuality. Between these two fear possibilities the individual 
is thrown back and forth all his l i fe . ' 5 7 'Life fear' is seemingly associated with the risks involved in 
developing ourselves and to a certain extent the choice of our illusion; and 'death fear' is 
associated with the danger of being swallowed up in an illusion-less reality where our individuality 
counts for nothing.58 
A similar structure exists in much of the philosophical anxiety literature. In The Courage to be 
Tillich speaks of the anxieties of 'fate and death', of 'emptiness and meaninglessness', and of 'guilt 
and condemnation'. In Chapter 5 my reading of him places the third kind of anxiety in the realm of 
'life fear' and the second in the realm of 'death fear' (but not the anxiety of death itself which I 
shall argue requires a separate category). Heidegger contrasts that which we have anxiety 'in the 
face o f (contingency, the loss of stable meanings); and that which we have anxiety 'about' (our 
own potentiality and authenticity)—what Sartre refers to as his 'double perpetual nihilation.' 5 9 
Both Tillich and Heidegger stress our helplessness and essential non-involvement in a world 
stripped of meaning. Tillich says 'it is impossible for a finite being to stand naked anxiety for more 
than a flash of time', 6 0 and Heidegger tells us; 
See especially Chapters 3, 4, 6 and 7 
5 7 Cited in May (op cit) p. 130. Rank does not appear himself to differentiate between fear and anxiety, but 
we can nonetheless use his raw material, if not his language. 
5 8 A couple of passages about anxiety by a zoologist (Bergounioux) and a palaeontologist (Dobzhansky) 
respectively, and quoted by Erich Fromm, serve to illustrate this dual origin: l.'Man detaches himself 
from his surroundings; he feels alone, abandoned, ignorant of everything except that he knows nothing. 
His first feeling thus was existential anxiety, which may even have taken him to the limits of despair.' 
2.'Self-awareness and foresight brought. .. the awesome gifts of freedom and responsibility ... but the joy 
is tempered ... Man knows that he is accountable for his acts: he has acquired the knowledge of good and 
evil. This is the dreadful load to carry. No other animal has to withstand anything like it.' (The Anatomy 
of Human Destructiveness (Fawcett, 1973), p.309) 
5 9 BN, p. 51 
6 0 op cit, p.36 
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Anxiety is anxious in the face of the "nothing" of the world; but this does not mean that in anxiety we 
experience something like the absence of what is present-at-hand within-the-world. The present-at-hand 
must be encountered in just such a way that it does not have any involvement whatsoever, but can show 
itself in an empty mercilessness.61 
In both cases we find the key to their ideas on the relation between anxiety and fear. For Tillich the 
'horror' of naked anxiety is 'ordinarily avoided by the transformation of anxiety into fear of 
something, no matter what' 6 2 (although he accepts that 'ultimately all attempts to turn anxiety into 
fear are vain'). An example of this is the passage from William James cited earlier where a non-
specific attack of anxiety is attached the image of an epileptic he had encountered at the asylum. 
An object of fear is seen as something we can cope with, enter into, engage with, understand, and 
be courageous in the face of; but anxiety—signifying non-being—is essentially beyond all these 
possibilities. It inexorably retreats from our grasp and yet is all-pervading and over-powering in its 
indifference. For Heidegger the 'nothing' is not threatening in quite the same way, but one of our 
basic modes of being-in-the-world is that of fleeing the sense of uncanniness it creates. We retreat 
into a world of permanent, objectified meanings and in so doing expose ourselves to anxiety's 
'kindred phenomenon' fear. We are anxious before the world 'as such', but we fear objects within 
the world, and fear becomes, for Heidegger, an adulteration of our basic anxiety before our Being. 
In his words; 'fear is anxiety fallen into the world, inauthentic and as such hidden from itself.' 6 3 
I f Heidegger's and Tillich's anxiety-structures were identical I would accept this as i t stands, but 
the role anxiety plays in Heidegger's philosophy is more complex and so therefore is the anxiety-
fear relation. He accepts that in a certain sense we must be involved with our everyday pursuits and 
this necessitates the creation of personal structures within which certain things matter more than 
others. The relation between these commitments and our uncanniness is not easily mapped and 
requires a close inspection of his notions of 'authenticity', 'resoluteness' and 'care', but in doing 
justice to this complexity I do not think fear can be consumed under anxiety in quite the way he 
thinks it can. I f part of our authentic being is to be committed then surely we must in some sense, 
in some 'mood' (even, perhaps, within the authentic auspices of the broader mood of anxiety) fear 
6 1 BT, p. 234 (By 'present-at -hand' Heidegger means, roughly, an objective and analytical rather than an 
engaged and practical relation to objects in the world.) 
6 2 op cit, p.37 
6 3 op cit, p. 234 
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the loss of certain people, objects and meanings. Fear can of course be a displacement of anxiety 
(like a phobia)—a means of forgetting ourselves, of wrapping ourselves in a concern for the ontic 
and thereby denying the ontological—but it can, accepting its relativity, also have a claim to an 
authenticity or appropriateness in its own right. This type of criticism (as we shall see in Chapter 
3) can, I think, be levelled at Heidegger's treatment of several of the central concepts of BT—death 
and guilt for instance—and anxiety, as I see it, needs unravelling with this in mind. 
The idea that all emotions (except anxiety) are self-deceptive is echoed by Sartre's The Emotions: 
Outline of a Theory65 and its inherent weaknesses seem to arise from the same tendency to lump 
emotions that are a means of escaping reality or responsibility (like the girl who breaks down in the 
confession) together with more honest responses to circumstances. Is running away in fear from a 
charging bull really a 'magical' transformation that makes the world seem easier to deal with, or is 
it perhaps a real and effective transformation of real circumstances? 
On the whole Sartre's concept of anxiety is very much centred on our 'life fear'. With him the 
anxiety-fear relation is effectively the reversal of Tillich's and is summed-up as follows; 
Situations will be apprehended through a feeling of fear or of anxiety according to whether we envisage 
the situation as acting on the man or the man acting on the situation. 
And, 
Anxiety is distinguished from fear in that fear is fear of being in the world whereas anxiety is anxiety 
before myself.66 
For Tillich it is necessary to turn anxiety into fear in order to be 'involved' and be able to cope 
with non-being, but for Sartre it is anxiety that places the individual at the helm and fear that 
reduces him to an object in a causal chain (thus obviating responsibility). Sartre ideally wants to 
place the human being beyond such causality—to insist on a central and intrinsic freedom—and 
The 'care structure' is, after all, where 'the Being of Dasein means ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in 
(the-world) as Being-alongside (entities encountered within the world)' (BT, p.237) 
6 5 Citadel Press, 1993 
6 6 BN, p.65. Simone deBeauvoir's views are much the same; she says in The Ethics of Ambiguity (Citadel, 
1994) for example, 'It is in a state of fear that the serious man feels this dependence upon the object. . . He 
escapes the anxiety of freedom only to fall into a state of preoccupation, of worry.' (pp.51-2) ('Serious 
men' is a pejorative term for those who live as if values and their selves are determined by factors other 
than their freedom.) 
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anxiety is the awareness of freedom and nothingness that signifies this, both for the purposes of his 
theory, and in terms of the conduct of the individual concerned. Why this seemingly contradictory 
state of affairs? For both Tillich and Sartre the idea of 'negation' is important, but it is used in 
very different ways. Tillich's 'non-being' is located firmly in the context of an infinity in which the 
individual is of no significance—a reality before which we stand passive and helpless; and Sartre's 
'nothing' is something that 'slips in ' between our present and our past and our present and our 
future—between reflection, its precedents and our actions—the result being a 'specific 
consciousness of freedom' that is anxiety.67 
The ful l meaning of existential anxiety, I believe, requires both these features and it is their co-
existence that creates the feeling of indefiniteness, ambiguity and conflict that typifies the anxiety 
experience. The individual is denied a resting place, an essence; anxiety destabilizes us by 
revealing our uncanniness and is in turn caused by our reflective apprehension of this uncanniness. 
Humans need meanings, and these require a stable platform (however temporary) so that 
uncanniness—pure nothingness, pure freedom—cannot endure. Then, even i f we make the 
authentic move of individual responsibility and self-creativity and assume the anxiety associated 
with this, uncanniness will readily attack even this foundation and so the process goes on. Of 
course, i f we inauthentically flee uncanniness and replace it with fear we will , for a while, be less 
prone to destabilization, but in one way or another our essential anxiety will take 'revenge'—not 
directly in the mode of panic attacks or free floating anxiety, but in what Sartre calls 'patterns of 
bad faith'—forms of life driven by self-deception in which the individual ensures minimum 
exposure to his ambiguous freedom. A question that will be addressed in several places throughout 
the dissertation concerns the difficulty of identifying the difference between an authentic response 
to anxiety (that must create boundaries or 'illusions' or sorts) and an inauthentic response. Where 
does self-creation and its requisite commitment become bad faith? 
«<\j/»> 
To summarize the last three headings: my analysis has divided the types of indefiniteness in the 
causes and origins of normal/abnormal and existential anxiety into three kinds. Firstly the kind that 
can in principle be made definite and in so doing extinguish the anxiety (by solving the conflict or 
opcit, p. 70 
40 
waiting for events to unfold) but i f repressed can cause an unlocalized sense of disquiet or panic. 
Where this occurs it is not important what is repressed, and the condition is potentially curable. 
Secondly, certain objects or situations create anxiety rather than fear, not because they await future 
resolution or because they are repressed (although of course they can be) but because of the kind of 
thing they are. Examples are the relativity of our values, our finitude, and our historical and 
cultural determinacy—concepts of deep significance to the self that by virtue of embodying non-
being are threatening and alien, but which are part of what we are rather than something that might 
happen to us—and here we can roughly locate the cross-over between psychology and philosophy. 
Such things are abstract rather than thing-like but this is not necessarily why they inspire anxiety 
instead of fear; rather their relation to anxiety is located primarily by the experience which is 
palpable but dissimilar to our reaction to dangers which, to use Tillich's language, exist in the 
realm of 'being' rather than 'non-being'. No matter how we attempt to confront these truths, the 
anxiety they generate, though we can 'authentically' re-orient ourselves towards it so that it no 
longer threatens in quite the same way, cannot be 'cured'. 
Thirdly we come to what I see as the essential locus of existential anxiety. Though not wanting to 
pre-empt forthcoming discussions too much, I will explain briefly that this origin is necessarily 
obscure because of the structure of human existence—essentially the conflict between the 
subjective and the objective points of view which constitute our awareness (which is in turn 
conditioned by our need for personal significance and fixed meanings). Like the duck-rabbit image 
and like Nagel's 'clash of perspectives' (in VFN), we can potentially take up either point of view 
on ourselves and the world, but only one of these points of view at any one time. But the other 
point of view is always, in a sense intuited6 8 (but, because it is contradictory, can never be fully 
understood) by its counterpart, and the anxiety is caused by this implication (or perhaps is this 
implication). In being both subjective and objective the human condition can be seen as essentially 
ambiguous, but the experience, crucially, involves conflict. On a purely moral plain conflict will of 
course arouse anxiety: in the case of a dilemma, even once a choice has been made that which we 
have chosen to forgo does not automatically become wrong or alien but will continue to make its 
(justifiable) presence felt in the form of anxiety or guilt. This is not precisely existential anxiety, 
but it is close (and it most certainly engenders it). Its relation to the structure I have just briefly 
outlined will be developed in later chapters. 
6 8 Perhaps like the nagging feeling we sometimes get when we've forgotten something important. 
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E . Consequences 
In discussing the experience and origins of anxiety and fear something has already been said about 
their consequences—our reactions to them and ways of dealing with them—and this I will 
summarize and expand on where necessary. 
Typically our reaction to that which endangers us is characterized as 'fright, fight, flight'. Once the 
threat is perceived we ready ourselves to either confront it or escape it. The assumption is (unless 
you're Sartre) that whatever it is can be legitimately, and for the time being at least, conclusively 
dealt with in this manner. With the causes of both clinical and existential anxiety, although the 
process is often very similar, these responses are not generally seen as appropriate or in any way 
conclusive. As I have already mentioned, the appropriate response to anxiety caused by repression 
is to uncover what is repressed and then deal with it on its own terms. It may or may not be 
resolvable, and i f not may fi t into the structure of existential anxiety. I f so the correct response here 
is generally seen as a form of openness or acceptance, and sometimes—for example in the case of 
Unamuno, Camus and Tillich—to fight it, but as explained it is in a sense impossible to be open to 
or to fight 'non-being' and so what arises is the complex task of disentangling authentic and 
inauthentic responses to anxiety. That there are these contrasting recommendations says a lot 
itself—both seem valid and yet neither is enough—and this state of affairs relates to the sense in 
which we are anxiety. Just how we are supposed to organize things so that we respond 
authentically to our essential ambiguity is far from clear, and is of course the task Heidegger, 
Sartre and others set for themselves. One writer whose version of anxiety does not necessitate fist-
shaking or acceptance is Kierkegaard. For him anxiety seems to represent a journey—a 'passing 
through'—which i f embarked on in the right way (albeit a way which seems virtually impossible) 
can result in transcending anxiety by virtue of a 'transparent' relationship with God. (Although it is 
open to some doubt as to whether faith really is for Kierkegaard a 'resting place' in this sense. I 
shall discuss this at the end of Chapter 2 .) 
Far easier to explain is the inauthentic response to anxiety—escape. Sartre says that bad faith is 
the expression of ' I am anxiety in order to flee i t ' 6 9 but given that for him we are anxiety this is an 
impossibility. We engineer the illusion of escape however and this can take many forms: 
6 9 BN, p. 83 
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Kierkegaard and Heidegger speak of exhaustive activity and chatter; Nietzsche, Ortega and Rorty 
(among others) of the formation of an identity with mass of humanity, social groups, moral codes, 
religious dogma and so on. Tillich and more psychologically orientated theorists speak of neurotic 
rigidity, an extreme example of which is the fantasy world of R.D. Laing's schizoid personality 
where a secure inner world is created and disassociated from the social persona. The result is that 
what they regard as their real self becomes increasingly divorced from reality to the point of 
schizophrenic breakdown. For the existentialist all these attempts fail, partly because all will 
compromise our essential humanity (the very humanity we are trying to discover and preserve or 
discover in the first place) which is revealed only through an authentic relationship with our 
anxiety (whatever that might be); and partly because anxiety will never disappear and will drive us 
deeper into bad faith or neurosis to the point where we either give in to its demands or disintegrate 
into something less than human. 
I l l 
' I was silent for a long while, for my mind seemed to want to open itself to something—I felt the pressure 
of some truth working there in its depths'—Doris Lessing (The Making of the Representative for Planet 
8) 
Before finishing this chapter and moving on to look in detail at the role anxiety plays in the 
philosophy and literature of specific writers, I will introduce my own jargon and provide a 
breakdown of what I see as the basic kinds of experience and the basic elements of existence that 
form the anatomy of existential anxiety. 
For the present my definitions will be rough, and as the story unfolds from Kierkegaard through to 
Rorty, Conrad and Camus details will reveal themselves and our understanding will alter, or 
thicken accordingly. The picture involves three key elements, 'Anxiety A ' , 'Anxiety B ' and 
'urangst', but before describing these I will mention a fourth form of anxiety that needs to be 
mentioned even though it sits outside of the structure I want to develop—namely 'death anxiety'. 
This is a unique experience, distinct from fear. It is clearly bound up with an attachment to being, 
but is something other than the sense of meaninglessness, despair, sadness or disappointment. 
Rather it is the 'nameless dread' that Tillich speaks of; I hold to the oddness of the Lucretian 
paradox—it makes no sense to 'fear' death, and yet we do, sort of. I think Tillich is right in saying 
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it is not fear exactly but something else—anxiety (or 'death anxiety' in my terminology)—because 
the lack of object, and more importantly the lack of someo«e to be afraid, give rise to something 
utterly dreadful but also uncanny. Like Heidegger's description of the initial experience of anxiety 
we are rendered speechless—sad, forlorn, frightened, lonely, but something else as well (or 
something less) that places this experience in a category of its own. As I see it this is Tillich's 
major contribution to the anxiety literature and I will develop this in Chapter 5. 
Death is central to Heidegger's ideas on anxiety and authenticity but his approach is different to 
Tillich's in that its significance is wrapped up in our encountering ourselves as existentially 
isolated and responsible individuals rather than with non-being as such. To be anxious about our 
death is to incorporate its inevitability into our lives and live 'towards i t ' , rather than to treat it as 
i f it is an object to be feared and avoided (i.e. not allowed to permeate our reflections, projects etc.) 
. He says, 
Anxiety in the face of death must not be confused with fear in the face of one's demise. This anxiety is not 
an accidental or random mood of 'weakness' in some individual; but as a basic state-of-mind of Dasein, it 
amounts to the fact that Dasein exists as thrown being towards its end.70 
I am not convinced however by the status Heidegger affords death. Whereas Tillich seems to touch 
on a unique experience, for Heidegger it is seemingly one among several potential sources of 
existential shock that serve to call us back to our peculiar form of being. I will argue this further in 
Chapter 3. 
The elements of the existential anxiety I am primarily interested in are the following: 
1. Anxiety A. This is closer to Tillich's notion of anxiety as I have so far explained it (although 
distinct from the 'death anxiety' I ascribe to him). The experience associated with it is one of 
helplessness, uncanniness (separation from what one took to be one's self and one's world) or 
perhaps paralysis. As with a panic attack, at its extreme it is akin to a state of shock ('existential 
shock'); the individual, losing all sense of the significance of self and of objects in the world, is left 
detached and floating and with a profound sense of vertigo. The origins of anxiety A are whatever 
causes this experience: infinity, meaninglessness, contingency, nothingness—are various terms 
op cit, p. 295 
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employed by existentialists either to signify the object of anxiety or, more weakly, as the necessary 
conditions of existence that must prevail in order for anxiety A to be a possibility. The consequence 
is either the adoption of a form of authenticity which acknowledges whatever gives rise to anxiety 
A; or it is to flee what are, at least ostensibly, these unpleasant or unsettling revelations by way of 
the various form of rigidity and neurosis that are associated with bad faith. The problem is of 
course how to be a self and yet acknowledge one's contingency, and typically versions of 
authenticity skewed towards anxiety A will recommend a kind of 'openness' to the world or to 
being. 
2. Anxiety B. This is closer to Sartre's anxiety as I have presented it in this chapter. The experience 
is of the trepidation, guilt and uncanniness (in terms of the degree to which we become and are 
therefore entirely responsible for our values) that are associated with a strong sense of individual 
responsibility—i.e. they are experienced within parameters that make this meaningful (broadly 
concern for self or an ethic of self-actualization) and so the type of separation involved is 
incommensurable with that involved in anxiety A. Whereas anxiety A undermines one's sense of 
self (or of the self as we once regarded it), anxiety B accentuates it. The cause is the idea that we 
are free and responsible for choosing or creating ourselves. To blame circumstances, others, 
society, history, biology etc. is only to make excuses, to flee what we know to be down to us alone. 
Forms of authenticity that arise from considerations of anxiety B wil l , like Nietzsche's 'strong 
poet', tend to stress passionate commitment to life (self and world) as i t presents itself with the 
overall aim of the creation of a unique individuality. Anxiety B is closely linked to what might be 
called a straightforward 'moral anxiety' (or conscience) except that it is orientated towards self 
rather than others, and is (crucially) imbued with 'urangst'. 
3. Urangst.11 Urangst is the inexpressible 'shadow' of the conflicts anxieties A and B implicitly 
harbour, and here we find the source of existential anxiety's unique quality. The experience is 
necessarily non-intentional; there is the confusion, mdefiniteness and so on so typically described 
in psychological literature, but this is not caused by an uncertain outcome or by an explicit conflict 
or confusion but by a necessarily slippery structure. It is the structure of the human condition as 
described with its ability to assume conflicting or incommensurable objective and subjective points 
1 1 Although this is not a word in the English language I am going to take something of a liberty and 
refrain from italicizing or capitalizing it. 
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of view, combined with an inherent need for ultimate significance which demands, unreasonably, 
that the incommensurable be commensurable—Sartre's 'desire to be God' . 7 2 In the fashion of the 
Chinese yin and yang each point of view contains the seed of the other (roughly, abstracted from 
the concerns of anxiety B we would not be made anxious about (our) contingency; and we only 
have the freedom to create ourselves at the price of ontological homelessness).73 To flee urangst 
involves a double movement—firstly a settling in the realm of the concerns of anxiety A or B, and 
secondly a fleeing of their demands in the ways outlined. To acknowledge or appropriate i t might 
involve what I call a 'mode of authenticity' which somehow includes both points of view (although 
I doubt this is possible without compromise), or one which is able to move between them with 
grace or perhaps 'style'. I will say a lot more about these possibilities in chapters 6 and 7. In a way 
urangst brings us back to the energy transference of Freud's early thought: the opposing 
perspective is not necessarily deliberately repressed (i.e. this is not necessarily self-deception), but 
is almost an automatic process that takes place whereby it is forced into the background and makes 
its presence felt through anxiety. 
This rough outline of urangst paves the way for a working definition of anxiety's central 
revelation. To do this I will quote Stephen Mulhall who says, with specific reference to Heidegger, 
'the world must be thought of as both intimately related to us and yet separate from us.' 7 4 For the 
moment this is very simple, perhaps platitudinous, but I hope that this dissertation will show that 
though in a sense we can't advance past this, anxiety is of importance to philosophy because to 
study it is to understand the ways in which this simple, but fundamental truth is important to us. 
The point is that such a formula cannot reveal its full significance in a purely intellectual way. 
Rather, it is anxiety that uncovers this; an anxiety that is in turn caused by this significance, and 
part of the problem of explaining urangst is this interdependence (which is itself intrinsically linked 
to our ambiguous condition). To understand certain truths about existence it is necessary to 
7 2 The problem with reason according to Unamuno, is that 'it refuses to even recognize the problem as our 
vital desire presents it to us.' (Tragic Sense of Life, p. 109) 
7 3 In The Concluding Unscientific Postscript (CUP) (Princeton, 1992) Kierkegaard says, 'For the existing 
spirit qua existing spirit, the question about truth persists, because the abstract answer is only for that 
abstraction which an existing spirit becomes by abstracting from himself qua existing, which he can do 
only momentarily, although at such a moment he still pays the debt to existence by existing nevertheless.' 
(pp. 190-1) 
7 4 op cit, p.205. This aligns with Nagel's central thesis in VFN. He says (for example); 'The objective self 
is dragged along by the unavoidable engagement of a whole person in the living of a life whose form it 
recognizes as arbitrary. It generates a demand for justification which is at the same time unsatisfiable, 
because the only available justification depends on the view from inside.' (pp.216-7) 
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understand the way the circumstances that give rise to them are interpreted from the point of view 
of the individual human being as well as understanding their objective formulation. However, as 
Thomas Nagel has so well shown, both aspects must also take the other into consideration and it 
seems that in no sense are we afforded a clear and stable picture of the meaning of Heidegger's (or 
Mulhall's) insight. And yet the urge to do this is unquenchable; to some extent i t is what I am 
giving in to by writing philosophy, and the peculiar upshot of this is that this too must be a partial 
expression of that insight; one that is shadowed by urangst's presence. 
The following six chapters trace the unfolding of this anxiety structure beginning with 
Kierkegaard's COA whilst explicating the significance of anxiety in terms of each writer's 
idiosyncratic concerns. 
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2 
Infinity's Messenger: Kierkegaard's Psychologically Orienting 
Deliberation 
'Action—something that commits one and that one never wholly understands'—Sartre {Iron in the Soul) 
'The Protestant God always seems to isolate His children in the terrible double bind of two great 
injunctions.'—Harold Bloom (The Anxiety of Influence) 
'The Soul. Seek out reality, leave things that seem / The Heart. What, be a singer born and lack a theme? / 
The Soul. Isaiah's coal, what more can man desire? / The Heart. Struck dumb in the simplicity of fire! / 
The Soul. Look on that fire, salvation walks within. / The Heart. What theme had Homer but original 
sin?'—Yeats (Vacillation) 
'Businessmen they drink my wine / Ploughmen dig my earth / But none of them along the line / Know 
what any of it is worth'—Bob Dylan (op cit) 
« « o o » » 
Anxiety, in Kierkegaard's writing, is idiosyncratically adapted to his religious agenda but, like 
much of his work, has a wider relevance in terms of its existential, psychological and ethical 
insights. He is acutely aware that what it reveals is contingent upon the individual's self-
understanding, but also that that self-understanding is itself a function of anxiety and our primary 
response to it. Anxiety portends to what is beyond the individual, enticing him forward into fuller 
awareness, and the foreshadowed but essentially mysterious realm is a source of excitement and 
possibility as well as unease and weightiness, of wonderment as well as fear. His final illumination 
is religious (faith), but structurally speaking anxiety's revelations are akin to, and of course heavily 
influenced the non-religious, phenomenological applications of Heidegger and Sartre. 
Kierkegaard's analysis of the concept can be seen as a progression towards a position where, in 
close proximity to its objects and causes, anxiety comes to represent not alienation, fragmentation 
and non-coincidence, but a sense of at-homeness. It is indicative of what we are (or are not), but 
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also guides us towards a transcendence of our original self, it is something we grow in to and 
inhabit by confronting our fear and disquiet and gaining a sense of belonging. He writes; 
this is an adventure that every human being must go through—to learn to be anxious in order that he may 
not perish either by never having been in anxiety [in full consciousness, as something intentional] or by 
succumbing in anxiety. Whoever has learned to be anxious in the right way has learned the ultimate.1 
I see Kierkegaard as having taken a psychological concept and, with religious leverage, turned it 
into an existential one. He is responsible for categorially uprooting it; for making it more than a 
state of mind, more than an objective label for the human condition, and more than a collection of 
facts amcerning our freedom, responsibility, individuality and so on. It is all of these but it is also, 
crucially, the sense of ambiguity created by their co-significance to an individual existence. 
In this chapter I shall present my analysis broadly in terms of the structure of The Concept of 
Anxiety (COA) and by so doing highlight the various roles Kierkegaard assigns this 'psychological 
intermediate term'. He addresses anxiety as the psychological concept corresponding to original (or 
'hereditary1) sin. In his journals in 1842 he wrote 'the nature of original sin has often been 
explained, and still a primary category has been lacking—it is anxiety, this is the essential 
determinant.'2 Just as concepts like 'sin' and 'guilt' are important in Kierkegaard's philosophy, so 
anxiety's role is central. To understand what this role is takes us a long way to understanding what 
Kierkegaard is trying to do in his writing. 
I 
COA contains a short preface in which Vigilius Haufniensis3 introduces himself, emphasizing his 
humility, his status as a layman (who is, though, well acquainted with the literature) and 
correspondingly a dig at the academics of his day. This is followed by a dense introduction 
concerned with the relation of sin to science, ethics and dogmatics, and five headed sections dealing 
with anxiety itself. Sections I - I I I have much in common with more modern depth psychology 
1 COA, p. 155. 
2 Journals and Papers, p. 39. The Danish for original sin is Arvesynd which literally means 'inherited 
sin'— something which, as we shall see, throws extra confusion on the matter at hand. 
3 Kierkegaard's pseudonym. I shall refer to the author as Kierkegaard in future as in this work, more than 
in most of his pseudonymous works up to 1845, the communication is quite direct. 
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where the significance of the anxiety experience is unclear to the subject; and IV - V are more 
existential—the self has been more firmly established and self-deception is the primary cause of 
hidden significance. Largely because of his religiousness Kierkegaard is one of the few writers on 
anxiety whose theory does not fit particularly tidily into the types of anxiety outlined at the end of 
the last chapter, but the precise nature of the unusual relation these two phases have in 
Kierkegaard's thought will become clear as this chapter progresses (and they are nonetheless 
certainly not entirely removed from the secular existential model so far sketched). The Sickness 
Unto Death (SUD), a later psychological work on 'despair1, is structured in a similar way. The first 
division deals with a form of this 'sickness' found in a self that has, so to speak, not yet discovered 
itself as a self. Objectively Kierkegaard describes their condition as despair, but subjectively the 
person can be more or less oblivious to their condition and even feel quite content. In the second 
division the self is aware of what it is and thus what it should do, but is unwilling to take this upon 
itself as a task. The resultant despair is termed a 'defiance' of God (i.e. sin) which most commonly 
motivates an escape into various forms of self-deception. In both psychological works Kierkegaard 
uses the same term to describe significantly different subjective experiences. This is common to 
many writers on anxiety and can create a good deal of confusion in any attempts to describe it 
anatomically. As this work progresses we shall become wise to this and both in this and other 
chapters the task remains to explain the connections between these two kinds of experience. 
The introduction to COA is concerned primarily with finding the 'correct' mood in which to address 
the concept of sin. It is, says Kierkegaard, 'no subject for psychological concern' 4—i.e. it is not a 
subject for science. Psychology's mood is one of passivity—'antipathetic curiosity1—a 
disinterestedness that would tend to define sin as a natural 'state' of an individual, or as something 
to be cured rather than as something to be overcome by his own efforts. That i t is something that 
can be overcome and yet has all the appearances of a 'state' is vital for Kierkegaard as this provides 
the basis of the paradox that makes the correct mood for dealing with sin 'inwardness' or 
'subjectivity1 (or 'earnestness' as he refers to it at this juncture). Sin should not be described as a 
'disease' or 'abnormality1 but 'is the subject of the sermon, in which the single individual speaks as 
the single individual to the single individual.'5 'Sin', confirms Kresten Nordentoft, 'cannot be 
substantiated psychologically in any unobjectionable fashion. It can only be substantiated by means 
4 COA, p. 14 
5 ibid, p. 16 
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of the Gospel message, i.e., it is not substantiated.'6 The closest we can get to describing sin 
psychologically is in terms of anxiety, a concept, as we have seen, that is flexible enough (or 
perhaps ambiguous enough) to mould itself around ethical and dogmatic considerations without 
obliterating them by its misplaced 'modulation'. Even a description of anxiety, however, stops short 
of explaining sin, and from this point communication (as it must be when the individual is 
addressed as an individual, i.e. in terms of his inwardness) becomes indirect. 'That which can be 
the concern of psychology1, Kierkegaard says, 'is not that sin comes into existence, but how it can 
come into existence,'7 This, then, is the direct concern of COA, and allied to this project is the 
constant exposure of its own limitations. Relatedly there are constant allusions to dogmatics and 
inwardness which serve as reminders of Kierkegaard's broader concern and the difficulties inherent 
in communicating these. 
As well as being inaccessible to science, sin has no part to play in ethics, or at least not in the 
'universal' Hegelian ethic. The ideal of 'absolute mind', of the coincidence of the subjective and the 
objective where the individual's ideals conform without remainder to the wider social structure 
leaves sin either as redundant or as inescapable. Redundant because i f actuality conforms to a 
logical system (an ideality) evil plays a necessary part in the position, negation, mediation process 
and the individual cannot be condemned for doing wrong in an absolute sense. Actions are always 
judged in terms of the wider scheme and not in terms of the individual's status as ultimately 
responsible for himself.8 In COA Kierkegaard says, '[ethics and logic] fit nowhere i f they are 
supposed to fit both. I f ethics has no other transcendence, it is essentially logic. I f logic is to have 
as much transcendence as common propriety requires of ethics it is no longer logic.'9 And in Fear 
and Trembling (FT) he had said 'an ethics that ignores sin is an altogether futile discipline, but 
once it postulates sin it has eo ipso gone beyond itself.'10 From the point of view of the individual, 
the ideal of his 'inner1 coinciding with the 'outer1 is an impossible task without some form of 
transcendence. He may play his part in the wider identity, but for there to be the possibility of a 
6 Kierkegaard's Psychology, p. 173 
7 COA, p. 22 
8 In his Philosophy of Right (Clarendon, 1952) Hegel says, 'since the laws and institutions of the ethical 
order make up the concept of freedom, they are the ... universal essence of individuals, who are thus 
related to them as accidents only. Whether the individual exists or not is all one to the objective ethical 
order. It alone is permanent and is the power regulating the life of individuals. Thus the ethical order ... 
[is] in contrast with ... the empty business of individuals [which] is only a game of see-saw.' (p. 109) 
9 COA, pp. 13-14 
1 0 FT, p. 124 
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true ethic where sin and evil are real possibilities the individual must himself fu l f i l l an ideal, take 
himself beyond guilt, and this the system makes impossible as the individual is rendered 
unaccountable as an individual. The situation Kierkegaard is levelling his criticism at is, I think, 
reflected in the recurring deterministic attitude that sees unethical or inauthentic behaviour as not 
the fault of the individual but of his social background and upbringing. I f society alone is blamed 
for a person's self-destructiveness and anti-social behaviour then that person, no longer culpable 
for his action, becomes something less than an individual.1 1 It can be argued that pragmatically it is 
better to treat people as responsible even though we may not necessarily believe this to be the case, 
but Kierkegaard would want to remedy it by giving the person—what they make of themselves— 
absolute significance before God (and in that way defining individuality). This relation transcends 
the 'universal' without (as he sees it) negating it. 
Sin, for Kierkegaard, is not opposed to virtue but to faith, and both sin and faith fall into the 
(dogmatic) category of the individual's personal accountability to God. Ethics is not trivialized or 
subsumed under the religious but exists in a separate category that, for the individual, is given 
absolute significance in terms of his life by the religious. Ethics is the category within which the 
individual can discover himself and engage in his finite existence. In this sense it is contingent, but 
so is the individual in as much as he is a finite being amongst other finite beings. The key 
difference between Kierkegaard and the Hegelians on this matter is that Kierkegaard provides (or 
attempts to provide) a justification for ethics that is non-circular—that plays on the nature of man 
as a 'synthesis' of the finite and the infinite, giving ethics, firstly, a central role in a movement 
towards the infinite as found in a promotion of individuality rather than a relegation of it; and 
secondly as retaining its significance even after a leap into the religious through the mysterious 
notion of 'repetition'.12 'Absolute Mind', for the existing individual, is an unattainable ideal and i f 
1 1 Implicit in this is the Socratic idea that to do wrong is to be in error. Simone deBeauvoir echoes 
Kierkegaard's thinking when she says that 'existentialism alone gives ... a real role to evil.' (The Ethics of 
Ambiguity, p.34) 
1 2 Something central to his philosophy: the theme of Fear and Trembling (FT) and (unsurprisingly) 
Repetition (REP) but implicitly or explicitly cropping up in other works as well. The idea is that unlike 
the Platonic 'recollection' we do not, as it were, discover the essence of our self or the world but rather 
'enter eternity forwards' (COA, p. 90n.) in an existential relation (a discovery would imply self-
coincidence or an essence that does not involve a personal relation to something necessarily beyond the 
self (i.e. God)). Kierkegaard wants for our ethical sense of self to remain in tact, and yet experience reality 
in its immediacy. In his journals he says that 'repetition occurs' when 'ideality and reality touch each 
other' (p. 171); what was there before remains but is revitalized by its relation to the absolute—described 
in CUP as like a change to a different musical key. What for the aesthetic character is fragmented and the 
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this constitutes sin then a single person will always be in sin, again nullifying the concept. I f sin is 
understood as escapable only by letting oneself be consumed by the Sittlichkeit, then for 
Kierkegaard it is simply not sin. For him this makes the existence of a 'second ethics' necessary. 
The individual, as such, demands a task that he can overcome; 
in the struggle to actualize the task of ethics, sin shows itself not as something that belongs only 
accidentally to the accidental individual, but as something that withdraws deeper and deeper as a deeper 
and deeper presupposition that goes beyond the individual. Then all is lost for ethics, and ethics has 
helped to bring about the loss of all. 1 3 
Instead of becoming sinful as a result of not reaching an ideal, the individual sees the ideal as a 
task in order to remedy his sinfulness which he (albeit ambiguously) is responsible for in the first 
place. To counter Hegel's destruction of ethics the individual must first do something or undergo 
something that makes him sinful (in a subjectively meaningful sense—i.e. as an actuality) and he 
must then be able to do something to remedy (or transcend) this state of affairs. For Kierkegaard 
sin is an actuality that we can strive to transcend, not an abstract condition impossible to 
transcend; but how is he to avoid a repetition of Hegel whereby sin is there as a state from the 
beginning and is equally inescapable? The answer is twofold: Firstly the dogmatic notions of 
'hereditary sin', 'guilt' and 'forgiveness'. These are described as 'dogmatic' because they are 
explainable only in terms of themselves (i.e. not explainable at all)—they are presupposed. They 
constitute the beginning of the individual's task (and indeed the end, though this is not the topic of 
COA). Secondly, for sin to become actual or meaningful requires a movement (or 'leap') of 
'inwardness' whereby the individual becomes sinful (even though sin, prior to this, does not as far 
as the individual is concerned, exist). 
In 'inwardness' ethics is repeated—the individual is again presented with a task. 'Here again ethics 
finds its place' says Kierkegaard, in its demanding of the individual a 'penetrating consciousness of 
actuality1.14 In a footnote concerning FT and REP he explains how by means of transcendence 
ethics is rebom; 
ethical character habit and routine is now given ultimate coherence and meaning (an 'acquired 
originality') through an immanent religious undergirding. 
1 3 COA, p. 19 
1 4 ibid, p.20 
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Either all of existence comes to an end with the demands of ethics, or the condition is provided and the 
whole of life and of existence begins anew, not through an immanent continuity with the former existence, 
which is a contradiction, but through a transcendence.15 
What provides the condition then is the task of subjectivity allied to a presupposed dogmatics that 
is (in itself and in terms of its relation to our subjectivity) fundamentally paradoxical. The study of 
anxiety, in the scientific mood, takes the reader to the boundary of inwardness and dogmatics, and 
the appropriation of (a paradoxical) dogmatics is the profoundest form of 'inwardness' In 
summary, the task of COA is to explain the 'pivotal' role anxiety plays in the relation of sinfulness 
to the individual existence, and, in order to do this it must reposition ethics with respect to 
religiousness. This is achieved by describing the leap into the ethical sphere as one conditioned by 
guilt and sinfulness and thus implementing the 'second ethic' of inwardness over the 'universal' 
ethic. The scene is now set, the categories laid down and correctly positioned, for the further leap 
between the ethical and the religious and the intensifying of inwardness that this entails. As 
Climacus comments in CUP, 'perhaps [Haufniensis] thought at this point a communication of 
knowledge might be necessary before a transition could be made to inward deepening.'16 
I I 
The Concept of Anxiety is interested in the psychological conditions associated with the aesthetic 
existence, ethico-religious inward deepening, and the possibility of faith. This association is not 
merely a case of the individual realizing something about themselves (finitude, despair etc.) and 
becoming anxious, but of the anxiety itself producing a certain awareness and certain responses. It 
is anxiety, responded to in the correct way (as Kierkegaard would have it) that initiates and 
motivates the process of 'beaming'. 1 7 I f it is responded to in the wrong way the self either 
"ibid, p. 17 
1 6 CUP, p. 270 
1 7 'Becoming', an ethico-religious term for Kierkegaard that has become very important for later 
existentialists, is a central feature of the attainment of selfhood. It is perhaps best explained in terms of its 
relative and absolute components. Relatively speaking it refers to something like self-discovery. In E/O 
the Judge describes the individual as having 'these talents, these passions, these habits, who is under these 
influences ... Here then he has himself as a task ... to order, cultivate, temper, enkindle, repress, in short, 
to bring about a proportionality in the soul, a harmony (cited in Mooney, Knights of Faith and 
Resignation (SUNY, 1991) p. 99). Implicit in this, however, is the idea that as a task we can never be 
completed: 'In knowing himself the individual is not complete' the Judge goes on to say (E/O, p.549). As 
existential creatures there is no essence or formula, and no ideal or social role that equates to self— 
summed-up by Sartre's comment in BN (Routledge) that 'human reality is a perpetual surpassing towards 
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stagnates in its immediacy, or makes a movement that is self-defeating. All movements are, as far 
as Kierkegaard is concerned, self-defeating (whether the individual is aware of this at the time or 
not) i f they are not directed towards his version of faith. In this way anxiety can be seen as the 
signifier of the infinite and thus of our relation to the infinite. As we shall see later, in the work of 
Heidegger, Tillich and finally Camus, anxiety manifests itself as guilt at a certain stage and this 
motivates and signifies in a similar fashion. Despair is the underlying state that anxiety (again, 
whether the subject knows it or not) indicates the individual's potentiality to overcome. Anxiety, 
guilt and despair constitute for Kierkegaard the mediators (concrete and subjective, not abstract, 
public and rational) via which the self moves from one stage to another in a process of increasing 
inwardness. The movement is not immanent but involves a process of 'leaps' conditioned by our 
relation to the infinite. The existence of these 'intermediate terms' and our relation to them is 
largely the subject matter of psychology, and what they signify is a matter for ethics and 
dogmatics. In the course of this investigation I shall, on occasion, be looking at some non-dogmatic 
interpretations of what a Kierkegaardian-type anxiety might signify as well as Kierkegaard's 
specific use of the concept. 
Kierkegaard's analysis can be usefully broken down into five sections—'pre-leap anxiety', the 
'qualitative leap', 'post-leap anxiety', 'anxiety disguised and misinterpreted', and 'anxiety as 
educator', and this is how I shall order my investigation. 
A. Pre-leap Anxiety 
Kierkegaard begins by asking about the origins of sin. As stated, it is important for him that sin 
cannot be explained—that it remains tied to dogma. To offer an ethical or psychological 
description that explains everything would necessarily make it the wrong description and would 
indicate that the analysis is being carried out in the wrong mood. 'Sin', he says, 'comes into the 
world by a sin.' 1 8 Sin, as such, is prior to the first sin being committed, and yet comes into 
a coincidence with itself which is never given.' (p.89 (Routledge)) At best there is a way of being which 
implicitly becomes our task, and this is achieved, somewhat paradoxically, by choosing ideals or 'ground 
projects' (Bernard William's term) and thereby choosing our relative self in an absolutist fashion. Key to 
this, however, is the realization that self-coincidence is impossible without God, and as such the only 
absolute project, or absolute task of becoming is faith and repetition. 
1 8 COA, p.32 
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existence only as a result of its being committed. Here then is the paradox, the dogma. 
Psychologically the closest we can get to it is to say that it is somehow latent or innate in the 
individual and only by actualizing it does it truly become what it is. This is close to Kierkegaard's 
psychological description which focuses on sexuality, but he is keen to stress that sexuality is not 
itself sinfulness—sinfulness is a category apart. 
To reinforce the fact that sin cannot be explained entirely in terms of what is innate, Kierkegaard 
emphasises that each individual sins in the same way that Adam sinned. We do not directly inherit 
sinfulness, but must, by our own doing, become sinful. 'How sin came into the world' he insists 
'each man understands solely by himself. If he would learn it from another he would eo ipso 
misunderstand it. ' 1 9 And in CUP he confirms that; 
Development of the spirit is self-activity; the spiritually developed individual takes his development along 
with him in death. If a succeeding individual is to attain it it must occur through his self-activity; 
therefore he must skip nothing.20 
If this was not the case Adam would be qualitatively different from every subsequent person in 
which case we must ask how he could be the origin of the race. There is, however, a quantitative 
difference between Adam and subsequent generations, and indeed from generation to generation— 
'at every moment' we are told 'the individual is both himself and the race.'21 By this Kierkegaard is 
implying that though each of us enters into sin as an individual in the same way that Adam did, we 
are also the product of a whole history of sinfulness (which imbues our culture) and will in turn 
create future generations. It is still important though to realize that it is not just in our subjective 
relation to sin that we are the same as Adam; we relate to God not just as an individual but as a 
member of the human race. As such sin is a condition of humanity and is thus greater and beyond 
the individual, and similarly it is in part beyond Adam even though for him there is no race to 
speak of. How this coheres with the relation of sin to individuality COA attempts to explain—that 
is, as far as a psychological description can explain it. Pregnant in this comment is also the notion 
'Unum noris, omnes' ['If you know one you know them all']. 2 2 To come to know oneself 
subjectively is to come to know others, for in this respect (anxiety, despair, guilt, inwardness etc.) 
19opcit, p. 51 
2 0 CUP, p. 345 
2 1 COA, p.28 
2 2 'One of Kierkegaard's favourite expressions' according to Nordentoft (op cit, p.6). It is found in COA, 
CUP and elsewhere. 
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all men are the same. In subsequent generations we create the potential for selves and therefore for 
sin, but each individual must actualize this as i f he were the first sinner. 
'Innocence', says Kierkegaard, 'is by no means the pure being of the immediate, but it is 
ignorance. ' 2 3 It is lost, not in a way explicable in terms of what has preceded it, but by means of a 
'leap' into an unknown (which both tempts us and repels us)—a leap which results in the ful l 
realization of what we are. In innocence we are ignorant of the true nature of self; we remain in a 
state of 'unity' with our 'natural condition'.24 Psychologically we can and do of course attain a 
sense of self as distinct from its surroundings without any need for a leap (except perhaps Piaget-
style cognitive leaps), but Kierkegaard is interested in how we come to place ourself as a self in 
relation to the infinite. An advanced pre-leap (aesthetic) individual may have an acute awareness of 
self in many respects, but as far as the infinite is concerned this has nothing to do with him. To be 
placed in the context of a self which does have a relation to the infinite is to be, or become, guilty. 
How though is this innocence lost? This, for Kierkegaard, cannot be explained in terms of 
concupiscentia [inordinate desire] for a couple of reasons. Firstly, how can there be genuine desire 
when the subject does not (cannot) know what it is they desire (and i f they do know this they would 
already be in the state of sin). Secondly, this cannot explain the ambiguity associated with pre-leap 
anxiety (assuming of course that Kierkegaard's phenomenological analysis of this is correct); 'the 
psychological explanation', we should remember, 'must not talk around the point but must remain 
in its elastic ambiguity, from which guilt breaks forth in the qualitative leap.'2 5 The term that best 
describes the psychology surrounding the loss of innocence is 'anxiety'—a state of mind with (at 
this stage) no object, but animated by a vague sense of self as a potential. 
The object of anxiety is, to begin with, then, 'nothing'; 
But what effect does nothing have? It begets anxiety. This is the profound secret of innocence, that it is at 
the same time anxiety. Dreamily the spirit projects its own actuality, but this actuality is nothing, and 
innocence always sees nothing outside itself.26 
2 3 COA, p. 37 
2 4 These ideas are borrowed from Karl Rosenkrantz's Psychologie oder die Wissenschaft vom Subjektiven 
Geist (published 1837) where he talks about the formation of personal identity in the child from 
separation from the mother to the development of reason and finally '"the necessarily occurring 
bipartition" of the spiritual and the corporeal' (Nordentoft, op cit, p.21). Kierkegaard is most concerned 
with the development of this latter form of self-awareness. 
2 5 COA, p.41 
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This nothing is a curiosity for the innocent individual, not an idle one but a presentiment of what he 
might become. In his journals Kierkegaard writes that 'all presentiment is murky and rises all at 
once in the consciousness or so gradually fills the soul with anxiety that it does not arise as a 
conclusion from given promises but always manifests itself as an undefined something.'27 This kind 
of anxiety is representative of the aesthetic stage. The aesthete is not considered to be fully a self 
by Kierkegaard and his anxiety (at least in the early stages) is a projection of his potential self. The 
subject is of course not aware of the cause of his anxiety—its content is opaque and ambiguous 
and his reaction to it reflects this. This corresponds to the first of the 'immediate erotic stages' in 
E/O where the 'desire possesses what will become the object of its desire but possesses it without 
having desired it and thus does not possess i t . ' 2 8 Subject and object have not been separated, but 
this separation is foreshadowed—'when desire has not awakened, that which is desired fascinates 
and captivates—indeed almost causes anxiety.'29 Vigilius would say that it most definitely causes 
anxiety, perhaps the 'pleasing' or 'strange' variety.30 Anxiety's ambiguity is summed-up in the oft-
quoted description of it as 'a sympathetic antipathy and an antipathetic sympathy'^—the 
individual both fears i t as something unknown and alien to him, and is enticed by it as something 
intriguing—the suggestion of a new realm of gratification and adventure. Kierkegaard says 'flee 
away from anxiety he cannot because he loves it; really love it he cannot, for he flees from i t . ' 3 2 
The individual, at this stage not being qualified as a self (as 'spirit'), does not have the faculty of 
full self-consciousness that can make sense of this presentiment. The 'nothing' of anxiety remains, 
projected, but for the time being cannot be appropriated. The 'nothing' represents, in Alastair 
Hannay's words, 'the, so far, phenomenologically empty spiritual category.'33 Doris Lessing 
describes a similar phenomenon (in somewhat Jungian terminology) in Briefing for a Descent into 
Hell She says; 
There are lots of things in our ordinary life that are shadows. Like coincidences or dreaming, the kind of 
things that are at an angle to ordinary life ... The important thing is this—to remember that some things 
reach out to us from that level of living, to here. Anxiety is one ... THEY say "an anxiety state", as they 
Journals and Papers, p. 628 
2 8 E/O (Princeton, 1987), pp. 75-6 
2 9 ibid, p. 76 
3 0 See COA P-42 
3 1 ibid, p.42 
3 2 ibid, p.44. 
33 Kierkegaard (RKP, 1982), p. 180 
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say paranoia, but all these things, they have a meaning, they are reflections from that other part of 
ourselves, and that part of ourselves knows things we don't know.34 
The second 'immediate erotic stage' seems to coincide with a strengthening of the voice of that 
'other part of ourselves'. Anxiety's object changes from 'nothing' to the 'possibility of possibility'. 
Kierkegaard describes this in terms of the effect God's prohibition has on Adam. It does not 
awaken him to good and evil as such—he is still essentially ignorant of these—but to his 'being 
able'; to his (negative) freedom. This is described as a 'higher form of ignorance' where 'ignorance 
is brought to its uttermost. ' 3 5 In E/O we see that the desire is now separated from its object but that 
as the object is not clearly defined, the desire is really not a desire. It is presented as a multiplicity 
of objects but does not know what it is about them that it wants. Still, a change has occurred—'the 
dream is over'—awakened by a 'jolt ', but this is nothing compared to the jolt which, potentially, 
awaits the aesthetic individual on the verge of the 'qualitative leap'. 
B. The Qualitative Leap 
Don Giovanni himself is said to represent the third stage of the 'immediate erotic' where both 
desire and its object have come into focus. There is however still a lack of self-awareness about 
him: he seeks to seduce women purely in order to gratify his desire, not with any higher, or even 
ulterior, purpose in mind. He is not reflective and calculating in the way Johannes the seducer is, 
and he does not feel guilt—not because he chooses not to, but because guilt is a category of spirit 
and not currently applicable to him. The fmite/infinite distinction has not been made, although for 
Kierkegaard Giovanni is teetering on the edge of becoming a self in this respect. He describes him 
as 'a picture that is continually coming into view but does not attain form and consistency, an 
individual who is continually being formed but is never finished , . . ' 3 6 As such 'Don Giovanni's life 
is not despair; it is, however, the ful l force of the sensuous, which is born in anxiety; and Don 
Giovanni is this anxiety . , . ' 3 7 
34 Briefing for a Descent into Hell (Panther, 1972), p.247 
3 5 COA P.45 
3 6 E/O (Princeton), p. 92 
3 7 ibid, p. 129. These are A's words, the Judge would say that he is in despair even though he does not feel 
this subjectively. Note also that 'A's understanding of anxiety is going to be limited to the pre-leap 
variety and so he is lacking the complete picture as Kierkegaard sees it. 
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By means of a leap the self becomes a self and this becoming is conditioned by a self-awareness 
that exists only after the leap. A qualitative leap is required by Kierkegaard in order to emphasize 
the inherent absurdity of this idea—an absurdity that amounts to a further formulation of the idea 
that sin presupposes itself. The significance of this will become clear as I describe (or rather 
locate) the qualitative leap, and this can be done in terms of three factors; its relation with the 
infinite, as an 'existential shift', and as the individual's subjective sense of guilt. 
Objectively, what occurs in the qualitative leap is the individual's qualification as a self. By this 
Kierkegaard means that the essential qualities of a self have been posited, although to want to be a 
self and thus accept the nature of self in the ful l sense of the word is still a long way off. A self is 
'a relation which relates to itself; human being is a synthesis of the physical and the 'psychical' 
(of the finite and the infinite, the necessary and the possible, and the temporal and the eternal). 
Until such a being becomes aware of 'spirit' (i.e. itself) as the synthesising or mediating factor it 
sees the physical-psychical relation as a negative relation—one that has no further transcendental 
significance or substance. Once spirit comes into play the synthesis becomes positive, more than 
the sum of 1+1—one that amounts to a relation that has a concrete and potentially free perspective 
on itself. The factors in the synthesis are not negated as a result of the synthesis, but are 
transcended and repeated (viewed in a significantly different way but somehow retained). The 
infinity that is posited by the leap becomes meaningful to the individual as necessarily relating to 
him as an individual. Of course, being an individual he can choose to ignore it, but choosing to 
accept and appropriate it is (largely) itself what makes the experience of individuality as 
individuality meaningful. 
For Kierkegaard the infinite takes the form of God, and i f not necessarily the Christian God at this 
juncture, it is something that we are in some way answerable to. Not until this occurs are there 
concrete grounds for actively seeking to abandon the temporal elements of the synthesis. Once it 
does occur, spirit has this as a 'task'. The contrast between existence and being-in-itself becomes 
not just a matter of fact, but a matter of incompleteness—an existential awareness of one's 
imperfection. Spirit is nicely defined by Hannay as this awareness.38 Self as spirit becomes a task 
of self-actualization and any such task must be chosen. Paradoxically, in the qualitative leap we 
choose ourselves, in the light of good and evil, as guilty. In E/O Kierkegaard says, 'in choosing 
3 8 Hannay op cit, p. 179 
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absolutely ... I choose despair, and in despair I choose the absolute, for I myself am the absolute, I 
posit the absolute and am myself the absolute.'39 
The qualitative leap involves something like a Gestalt (or perhaps paradigm) shift in that the world 
and the individual's place in it is significantly redefined—I shall refer to this as an 'existential 
shift'. Categories apply to it that, from the subjective point of view, once never existed. The shift 
involves a 'becoming inward' in itself, and the beginning of (or potentially the beginning of) a 
profound deepening of selfhood. In CUP Kierkegaard says about sin that 'the individual existing 
human being has to feel himself a sinner (not objectively, which is nonsense, but subjectively, and 
this is the deepest pain).' 4 0 This shift amounts to the movement from the aesthetic or perhaps a 
(levelled) adherence to the universal ethic, to the 'second ethic'. 
The relation between this leap and the one made by Abraham in FT is ambiguous, especially as 
Kierkegaard says, commenting on COA in CUP, that; 
Just as "fear and trembling" is the state of the teleologically suspended person when God tempts him, so 
also is anxiety the teleologically suspended person's state of mind in that desperate exemption from 
fulfilling the ethical.41 
By the ethical Kierkegaard here means oneself defined in terms of a social ethic—the kind that can 
legitimately be read as merely an option in E/O. There is some confusion here because the 
language Judge William uses is that of someone who has made the leap; he speaks of 'choosing 
good and evil', and 'choosing oneself and about guilt and despair. The leap in COA is mostly 
written as i f it is about a leap from the aesthetic to the ethical, but given this comment in CUP are 
we to assume that there is another leap into religiousness, as was taken by Abraham, of a similar 
kind to this first leap, or are we to assume that this was Abraham's first leap? I f the former is the 
case then Judge William is perhaps ripe for an Abraham-type experience, and i f the latter is the 
case then we must assume it is possible to be in the ethical without having made a leap. I can only 
see this as amounting to the unauthentic ethical behaviour displayed by many of Conrad's 
characters—the type that essentially lack inwardness.42 Another alternative might be that the Judge 
is commensurable with Abraham in that they have both made a leap into inwardness (or the 
3 9 E/O, p.515 
4 0 CUP, p. 224. 
4 1 ibid, p.269 
4 2 For example the eponymous Nostromo, and Kurtz prior to his experience in the Congo (see Chapter 7). 
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'second ethic') but in different directions. On a certain level this works: i f actualizing oneself 
involves being answerable to (and appropriating) an ideal we can say that both have done this, the 
only difference being that the Judge's ideal is, say, duty, and Abraham's ideal (allowing for a 
secular spin43) is selfless love. A stricter interpretation of what Kierkegaard actually wants to say 
does not back this up though—it is clear that he places an 'absolute' relation with 'the absolute' in 
a different and higher category to the ideal of duty. 
We are, then, led to the two-leap option, the ethical-religious leap perhaps being less of a shift than 
the first in that the self has already been established. (And well and truly i f we accept the self-
actualization version of the ethical over the Hegelian.) As such there is more control—a more 
palpable sense of choice and the significance of choice (i.e. risk and despair) with the religious leap 
than with the qualitative leap. There is however a deepening of inwardness—the self now having 
the absolute as its measure—and the possibility of repetition being established. Although there are 
secular equivalents to these leaps (for example, see Chapter 7) it is important to remember that for 
Kierkegaard both of them are ultimately movements towards faith. As such they are imbued with 
religiousness so that even the first leap is more than appropriating merely ethical standards, but 
standards that are undergirded by God. Similarly, in the Kierkegaardian context, anxiety, guilt and 
despair are, independent of the subject's interpretation of them, intrinsically religiously orientated. 
'Sin' says Kierkegaard '... is the crucial point of departure for the religious existence ... is ... the 
beginning of the religious order of tilings.' 4 4 Because of this the ethical becomes an absolute within 
which an individual can find himself and to some extent actualize himself. It is not though an 
'absolute relation to the absolute' which must be something directly personal to the individual and 
is found in the leap into Religiousness. 
Johannes de Silentio does not say much about this religious leap in FT—to him it represents a 
paradox (and so we assume he inhabits the ethical realm). What he is clear about is that there is 
anxiety involved. Abraham of course fears losing Isaac and fears God, but his anxiety comes from 
the projected realm of faith he steps into as a result of being willing to obey God's command. 
Anxiety, as the signifier of the infinite, must be seen as enticing him into this relation, but at the 
same time he is anxious because he is stepping outside of what is familiar, outside of himself. One 
As Edward Mooney does so well in Knights of Faith and Resignation. 
CUP, p.268 
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thing that is sure is that whatever happens on Moriah his world will not be the same, as indeed the 
qualitative leap in COA is non-reversible.45 The anxiety he feels is akin to separation anxiety and 
there is a thick seam of this running through FT.4* To regain the world (the currently suspended 
ethical realm) as something new in repetition means leaving our routine, habits and duties behind 
('resigning' them). It is these that define the pre-religious self to a great extent (as they do for 
Judge William) and the leap makes us uncanny or 'dizzy' because we are effectively projecting a 
new self—incommensurable with the old self—that we cannot know until we become it. In a 
qualitative leap we leap ahead of ourselves, and there is a period when we are yet to hit the 
ground. This is the state of suspension so terrifying for the Knight of Faith; he trusts that God will 
return Isaac, but can have little idea of what form this return will take. Love, even joyousness, 
must sit beside the terror in order for there to be faith, but we must not forget the intensity and the 
source of the fear and trembling. The resultant anxious mixture of fear and joy is a highly obscure 
or rarefied state of mind, one which helps make the case for the incommunicability of the Knight's 
predicament. 
As well as separation this associated anxiety has another feature of anxiety A—powerlessness— 
'the ethical', says Kierkegaard, 'is present at every moment with its infinite requirement, but the 
individual is not capable of fulfilling it ... every moment he continues in this state he is more and 
more prevented from being able to begin: he relates himself to actuality not as possibility but as 
impossibility. ' 4 7 For Abraham there is though more control and awareness of conflict that there is 
for the innocent Adam—he is faced with something approaching a dilemma whereas with the 
qualitative leap the overriding feeling is one of ambiguity underpinned by what is more clearly a 
natural progression or growth. To take this view of the aesthetic-ethical leap is to side with the idea 
that the aesthetic mode of existence can never really be said to be chosen. I shall say more about 
4 5 'An ordeal' says Kierkegaard in CUP, ' ... is a passing through; the person tested comes back again to 
exist in the ethical, even though he retains an everlasting impression of the terror ... '(p.266) This 
impression insures the ethical is not the same as it was prior to the ordeal, and, at the very least, gives the 
individual a 'readiness' for anxiety and repetition. The concept of an ordeal, Constantius says in REP is a 
'temporary category'—it is not a dwelling place for the individual but one that spans and aligns the 
temporal and the eternal. Significant here is that i f the individual knows he is undergoing an ordeal it is 
no longer in the category of 'ordeal'. Only once he is back in the ethical can the purpose and nature of 
what he has been through become apparent to him (see REP, pp.209-10). For further comment on this see 
Chapters 3 and 7. 
4 6 Edward Mooney (op cit) is good on this aspect of the book. 
4 7 CUP, pp.266-7. 
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suspension and separation in relation to guilt shortly, and in the final section I will resume the issue 
of the specific relation between anxiety and faith. 
As a result of the qualitative leap the individual comes to see himself as guilty through having 
sinned. 'Guilt' Kierkegaard says, 'is the second thing anxiety discovers'48 after possibility (or 
freedom). Here we return to the issue briefly touched on at the beginning of this chapter: to have 
the ethical weight required it is not enough for the individual to regard themselves as born into a 
state of sin with no hope of redemption. Rather, they must undergo the inward sense of committing 
a sin, and then be able to seek forgiveness. COA is concerned with the former issue and it is in the 
throws of the qualitative leap that the individual becomes guilty. As stated, because of the 
dialectical inconsistency of this Kierkegaard must rely on the irreducibility of both inwardness and 
religious dogma. Psychology can only take us so far, and even then must rely on the flexibility of 
the concept of anxiety. I f he can maintain that anxiety is so closely linked to inwardness and faith 
then its immediacy can indeed override problems brought forth by reflection. The individual, in 
anxiety, somehow chooses itself as a self; that is, it chooses to posit the opposition between the 
finite and the infinite (etc.) and break its unity with the world and God. In so doing it chooses free 
will; it chooses the adventure of the finite—notably sensuousness and sexuality. It is, Kierkegaard 
says, 'the first deep plunge into existence'49—the point where the individual's absolute distance 
from God starts to become meaningful to that individual. Because it has so chosen it sees that it is 
guilty before God for having made a leap away from the infinite. The inconsistency here lies with 
the fact that, firstly, the individual cannot know what he is choosing until he has chosen it ('sin 
came into the world by a sin' etc.), and secondly, in order to become a complete individual we must 
become guilty and let anxiety take us into and through this condition. In Hegelian terms innocence 
is the position, guilt the negation, and faith the mediation. The first of these is partially dealt with 
by the presentiments of pre-leap anxiety, but the second must remain objectively inconsistent. In 
this respect the sense of guilt amounts not to a rational realization of having done something 
wrong, but to an unambiguous inward sense of being guilty, the objective rationality of its source 
not mattering. 
COA, p. 161 
CUP, cited in David Law, Kierkegaard as Negative Theologian (Clarendon, 1993), p. 133 
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This situation influences the kind of guilt common to the existential tradition, and common to 
which is an ambiguity resulting from a conflict between the psychological and the ontological. 
Kresten Nordentoft suggests—'it looks like Kierkegaard wants to have his cake and eat it too', 5 0 
but says later; 
Guilt ... is not due to the fact that the individual wills what is wrong, but it comes into being in the 
attempt to take the task of existence seriously, or rather: it is discovered in this attempt. For the guilt 
which is discovered by this means is naturally also present where it has not been discovered. But this 
fundamental (ontological) guilt is thus not due in the literal (psychological) sense to the individual 
himself. And to this extent it seems reasonable enough that "the existing individual should be able to 
place the guilt upon existence or upon whomever has placed him in existence, and thus be without guilt" 
[CUP]. For the existing individual who has discovered the totality of guilt, however, there is no doubt that 
he is guilty, and even the attempt to cast off guilt from himself would only be a new proof of its reality.51 
As Nordentoft points out, Kierkegaard is looking for guilt to be opaque just as inwardness is 
opaque. I f its existence is logically explainable it is precisely not the kind of guilt he is referring 
to—or rather it is not real guilt at all, but something dictated by the requirements of an impersonal 
system and superficially taken on board by its adherents. He wants it both to be broad enough to 
have ontological significance, and specific enough to account for an inward sense of ethical (or 
psychological) guilt. 
As in Abraham's leap, in the qualitative leap the individual is rendered powerless and it is in this 
powerlessness that he 'succumbs'. When describing anxiety from the subjective point of view 
Kierkegaard says in a very important passage; 
Anxiety may be compared with dizziness. He whose eye happens to look down into the yawning abyss 
becomes dizzy. But what is the reason for this? It is just as much in his own eye as in the abyss, for 
suppose he had not looked down. Hence anxiety is the dizziness of freedom, which emerges when the 
spirit wants to posit the synthesis and freedom looks down into its own possibility, laying hold of 
finiteness to support itself. Freedom succumbs in this dizziness. Further than this psychology cannot and 
will not go. In that very moment everything is changed, and freedom, when it again arises, sees that it is 
guilty. He who becomes guilty in anxiety becomes as ambiguously guilty as it is possible to become.52 
I take this last sentence to mean, not necessarily that this notion of guilt is inconsistent in the way 
described, but that although the individual indeed feels guilty they are not entirely sure why. The 
distinction between the finite and the infinite has been posited but it is not yet sharp, and only an 
5 0 Nordentoft, op cit, p. 169 
5 1 op cit, p. 171 
5 2COA,p.61 
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increased inwardness, driven by this guilt, can hone the individual's understanding. A broader 
picture of individual development might include numerous stages and leaps representing different 
aspects of self-awareness (conceptual, moral, social, sexual etc.). The relation between these would 
be complex with aspects coming in and out of focus at different times and the attendant guilt 
would, correspondingly, be even more ambiguous. It seems pertinent to consider that the line 
between anxiety and guilt would be indistinct for a period extending well beyond the qualitative 
leap. 
Putting aside the paradoxical nature of guilt for the moment, let us look closer at the cause of this 
dizziness. Anxiety is a 'sympathetic antipathy and an antipathetic sympathy'—we at once feel 
attracted to what it offers and repelled by it. The result is that in a sense we dabble with anxiety, or 
more objectively speaking, dabble with the infinite—we posit the possibility and yet we do not 
(cannot) become it. In his unpublished Work on Adler Kierkegaard describes dizziness as; 
the boundlessness of the senses. The infinite is the ground of dizziness, but it is also a temptation to 
abandon to i t . . . The dialectics of dizziness is thus in itself the contradiction of willing what one does not 
will, what one shudders at, whereas this shudder nevertheless frightens, only... temptingly.53 
All the while, it seems, anxiety is directing operations—at once 'on the ground' but representing 
what is above. In The Unbearable Lightness of Being Kundera says 'anyone whose goal is 
"something higher" must expect one day to suffer vertigo.' As such Abraham's suspension is a 
form of vertigo. 'What is vertigo?' Kundera asks, 'Fear of falling? Then why do we feel it even 
when the observation tower comes equipped with a sturdy handrail? No, vertigo is something other 
than the fear of falling. It is the voice of the emptiness below us which tempts and lures us, it is the 
desire to fall . . . ' M Abraham's desire to fall is the temptation of the ethical, and it is a temptation he 
overcomes—an ordeal he passes through successfully. This is not the case in the qualitative leap: 
the infinite is posited in anxiety but the individual cannot resist the temptation to fall, to ' [lay] hold 
of finiteness to support itself.' 5 3 Kundera adds, 'we might also call vertigo the intoxication of the 
weak.'56 From the individual's point of view, he has succumbed to anxiety's intoxicating effects, 
and he is guilty of the weakness which precipitated this. 
Cited in Ferguson, H, Melancholy and the Critique of Modernity (Routledge, 1995), p. 135 
5 4 Kundera, op cit, pp.59-60 
5 5 COA, p. 61 
5 6 Kundera, op cit, p. 76 
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As we have seen though, the suspended, anxious individual not only has no real option (the 
finite/infinite distinction is ambiguous) other than to respond to his instinct for security, but he does 
not know that to do this is to sin, for he does not know what a sin is. Only in this 'laying hold of 
the finite' does the infinite become meaningful, and only then can the individual understand the 
distinction between good and evil. In turn, through exposure to the 'heights' of the infinite we are 
driven further into the depths of the finite: our eternal longing is countered, perhaps anchored, by 
our instinctive earthly nature. Sensual pleasure attains form and depth because the infinite is 
finally revealed in all its beauty and terror. It threatens to liberate but at the same time destroy, and 
the immediate requirement is the protection of identity, to sink roots deeper into the finite so as not 
to be swept up onto the eternal. 'Kierkegaard's pseudonymous works', says Vanessa Rumble, 
'present the subject as both an unassailable Socratic Someone and a divinely ravished No-one. 
Both alternatives betray the all-too-human desire for an ascertainable identity Without anxiety 
none of this would have happened—freedom, the infinite, and ultimately the self—would not have 
been posited as an actuality, hence Kierkegaard's remark that 'anxiety ... is the pivot upon which 
everything turns. ' 5 S In a complex relation to itself the will 'is not free in itself, but entangled. ' 5 9 'He 
who becomes guilty through anxiety', we are told, 'is indeed innocent, for it was not he himself, 
but anxiety, a foreign power, that laid hold of him. ' 6 0 In a sense it was not the self (the pre-leap 
self) that made a choice, but at the same time it is precisely the self because self in its greater 
potential is defined in terms of its future—as a becoming. Anxiety, as the arbiter of that becoming, 
'does not tempt like a choice, but ensnaringly disquiets. ' 6 1 Having become a self the individual does 
not want to return to its pre-leap condition (its 'antipathetic sympathy' still holds), and this only 
enhances the sense of having opted for this condition. Guilt, in this way, is the price paid for 
stumbling across an unearned, but implicitly approved of state of being. 
All of this still leaves guilt in the same paradoxical position, as Kierkegaard would want it, but a 
few attempts have been made to make it more coherent. I will briefly run through some of these in 
order, firstly, to further reinforce the fact that guilt remains a paradox (or must be described as 
op cit, p.311 
COA, p.43 
ibid, p.49 
ibid, p.43 
ibid, p. 61 
67 
something different from the typical ethical/psychological version), and because some of them have 
existential-ethical interest in their own right. 
Firstly, Alastair Hannay attempts to solve the problem by; 
distinguishing between the emergence in consciousness of the ethical as such, and with it an awareness of 
the imperfection of the natural man (Kierkegaard does not appear to contemplate an intermediate stage in 
which ethical language is constituted but where the self refuses to admit its genuinely referential status), 
and the failure to respond positively to this awareness.62 
He seems to be suggesting one of two things here—neither of which resolves the paradox. Firstly, 
as the onus is put on the individual's denial of its own basic imperfection we could accuse Hannay 
of replacing anxiety with another, less ambiguous intermediate term, namely repression. This, as 
we shall see, has some relevance to certain advanced states of pre-leap anxiety where the individual 
can be described as 'blocking' their 'natural' inclination (countering Hannay's point that 
Kierkegaard does not consider such a stage), but the smoother transition to the ethical described in 
the earlier parts of COA does not appear to involve this kind of psychical defence. What's more, 
and this is the second point, no intra-leap individual can be described as unambiguously guilty as 
they cannot have known either the nature, or the result, of activities that relate to the self as a 
synthesis, even i f that activity is some kind of repression. 
A similar point about repression can be made with regard to some of Nordentoft's comments on 
anxiety. He is right to point to similarities between Kierkegaard's and Freud's ideas on anxiety— 
for both it is the cause of repression or suppression—only what is repressed is altered. With 
Kierkegaard it is the demands of spirit and with Freud it is past conflicts, sexual traumas and so on 
(although these are certainly not poles apart). The degree to which a person suppresses something 
and can be seen as guilty in the unambiguous sense depends on their grasp of it in the first place. 
The process of self-deception is a mysterious one in that it involves knowing and not knowing 
something all at once; clearly, the weaker the original grasp we have of it, the easier it is to 
suppress, to the point where we can happily declare that we were never aware of what we are now 
avoiding. In the post-leap state, where the individual is aware of the meaning of good and evil, guilt 
in this respect will exist in shades of grey, but that there is guilt is not really in question. 
op cit, p. 168 
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In many places Kierkegaard has excellent descriptions of the process of self-deception, but these 
have greater relevance to later hindrances to the development of self in the face of anxiety than to 
the guilt associated with the qualitative leap . 6 3 Anxiety's 'laying hold of finiteness' is, as suggested, 
more reflexive and perhaps has more in common with the repression that goes on in childhood than 
with more 'mature' forms of duplicity. As far as guilt is concerned then, we are left with the same 
ambiguousness as before. 
A writer who has placed emphasis on guilt as an appropriation of our (pre-leap or childhood) 
past—i.e. as something we are not directly responsible for, and yet willingly accept as part of 
ourselves—is Edward Mooney. In this way, and in contrast to Nordentoft, he sides with the 
necessity part of the paradox (and the ontological guilt associated with this) rather than the 
'choosing' side (and the ethical/psychological guilt associated with this), and in so doing attempts 
to understand the phenomenological transformation of this into 'guilt feelings'. Mooney says; 
By the time we are capable of reflective self-criticism, our characters are both partially formed and more 
or less stained. Looking back, it will appear that we have done wrong, even though at the time of the 
doing, as children, we were not fully responsible. Further we will seem already joined to a wider circle of 
humanity, starting with family but stretching further outwards. We feel more or less proud—and 
stained—by multiple accidents of birth, race, gender, fortune or rationality. And we may already have 
confronted dilemmas, settings we cannot escape without doing some wrong. To the extent we are 
sensitively reflective, we find ourselves burdened by ineradicable fault, by responsibility we can neither 
evade nor discharge ... [S]in uncovers a personal fault or defect, incurred often unknowingly ... for which 
one feels intimate and proper responsibility—a retrospective responsibility so well entrenched that it 
seems virtually inconceivable that one could extract either the fault or the weight of accountability for it by 
one's own strength unaided .. 6 4 
The end of this passage refers to Abraham's position as one where he must rely on the strength of 
God (the 'absurd') to unburden him, to offer forgiveness. This, as we shall see is where the last 
section of COA is sign-posting the reader. Along with the valid point that we not only take up 
wrongful deeds from our past, but also what is accidentally beneficial to us, Mooney's 
psychological/existential/ethical description is a useful (secular) way of getting to grips with the 
guilt engendered by the qualitative leap (or something like it). It is a viable description of how a 
sense of what we are now becomes fundamentally linked to a sense of responsibility for the way the 
world we find ourselves cast into has shaped us. After all, if we do not appropriate these elements 
See, for example, SUD, pp. 126-7 
Mooney, op cit, pp. 121-2 
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of our past where lies our (finite) essence? If, as Ortega says, the essence of man is his history, it 
seems we either take on board, to one degree or another, all aspects of that history, or we must 
reject the notion outright and along with it any earthly sense of heritage and belonging. Usually the 
desire to have a substantial self overrides the desire to be guilt-free. If to have a self is to have a 
past, and to have a past which is our own is to have one we are responsible for creating, then to 
have a self must involve a sense of guilt about what we feel to be negative elements of that past. 
But there still remains a gap between this condition and the required link between our ontology 
(finite, free etc.) and psychological guilt. In this sense the single individual represents the whole 
race before God, but he still, by all 'common propriety', has not committed an offence. 
Involved in all this is the issue of truth as subjectivity (the product of choice, commitment, 
appropriation and, broadly, the involvement of the whole self (as a task) in the understanding of 
something66). If this is the only way we can be 'in' the truth in some palpable and direct way, then 
the best grasp we can have of other possible truths is that they too could have been subjectively 
true if we had committed to them. What is revealed is firstly that this must be the way things are— 
our sense of reality is in this way limited; and secondly that there are other alternatives that we 
could equally have chosen. Both of these amount to no more than the way we are in our finite 
nature, and yet generate what can be, and often is, described as guilt. As stated, this was taken up 
by Heidegger, and in chapter 7 I will expand further on what I see as the significance of guilt in 
relation to anxiety and in the general existential sense that these commentators are trying to make 
sense of here. 
This though is not exactly what Kierkegaard means: his relation to guilt is religious as well as 
existential and probably the best analogy for Kierkegaardian guilt places it in the realm of an 
individual's personal relation to someone they hold in great esteem. An obvious example is the 
father-son relationship where despite being a difficult child and rebellious adolescent and seemingly 
always in a position of relative naivete, the young adult is still loved by his father, and was always 
loved by him. "How" the young man questions "can he still love me?" This lack of understanding 
6 5 'Man, in a word, has no nature: what he has is—history. Expressed differently: what nature is to things, 
history ... is to man.' (In Kaufrnann (ed.) Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre, p. 157) 
6 6 'There are two senses of 'knowing what a word means', one connected with ordinary language and the 
other very much less so. Knowledge of a value concept is something to be understood, as it were, in depth, 
and not in terms of switching on to some given impersonal network.' (Iris Murdoch, The Sovereignty of 
Good, p. 29) 
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further engenders love and respect, but also a greater sense of not being worthy. Firstly he was this 
difficult, ignorant youth, not, in his own eyes, worthy (but nonetheless needy) of love; but secondly 
and more importantly, how great a man must his father be that he can find it in him to still love. 
This child has sinned against the father but not vice versa, and the father has still accepted him 
(and still accepts him). Perhaps this is closer to the guilt brought forth by the qualitative leap. The 
love an individual needs is given to him by, and thus brings him into relation with, a power 
infinitely greater than himself who could just as easily despise or destroy him. The relationship is 
profoundly imbalanced (hence the 'fear and trembling' of the religious leap (that, as far as I can 
see, overcomes guilt)) and yet it is a relationship in which both sides willingly engage. The 
inequality cannot be changed or corrected but only accepted through repentance and forgiveness. 
This explanation conforms with the Protestant position that 'he who is unjust is just' about which 
Paul Tillich says 'one could say that the courage to be is the courage to accept oneself as accepted 
in spite of being unacceptable.'67 Once again this does not solve the paradox of guilt—we do not 
choose to be in the position of the young adult, answerable to and dependent upon his father, and 
the child does not know that its behaviour is wrong—but the content of this scenario is certainly 
closer to Kierkegaard's set-up (and Protestantism in general) than the more archetypal 
psychoanalytic and existential models. The issue of just why Kierkegaard places so much emphasis 
on guilt is an important one to which I shall suggest a 'structural' answer in the next section. 
< « 0 O > » 
Guilt is then the major subjective element involved in 'situating' the qualitative leap, but there is 
another factor that has some bearing on both this and pre-leap anxiety. Kierkegaard calls this 
'objective anxiety' and it derives from the equation of sin and sensuousness that is at large in the 
world since Adam's first sin. As pointed out, sin is not sexuality or sensuousness, but objectively 
this is how it is comprehended. Not until the individual has become sinful subjectively is he able to 
make this distinction. As the generations pass and humanity becomes less naive, generally speaking 
(for this depends on the culture in question as well as the reflectiveness of the individual in 
question) the object of pre-leap anxiety becomes 'more and more a something'.68 Of course, i f it 
becomes a proper 'something' 'we have no leap but a quantitative transition'6 9 and the concept of 
CTB, p. 160 
CO A, p. 61 
ibid, p. 77 
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the individual and of the sin would be annulled, but still, anxiety does become a 'complex of 
presentiments, which, reflecting themselves in themselves, come nearer and nearer to the individual 
...[and] communicate vigorously with the ignorance of innocence.'70 'Dreaming spirit', in future 
generations, is presented with objective reflections of its potentially awakened state that modify its 
subjective anxiety, and i f not hasten the qualitative leap, then certainly swathe it in a greater 
amount of anxiety. 'At the maximum' Kierkegaard says 'anxiety about sin produces sin',71 
objectively sin is identified with sexuality and sensuousness and the objective anxiety of the 
individual, seeing these as determined by its heritage, will play a role in triggering the qualitative 
leap into sin. 
In The Seducer's Diary Johannes can be seen to bring to fruition Cordelia's leap into sin, at which 
point he backs away and lets her chase him. Prior to this he plays with her in such a way that she is 
brought to the point of the Fall but does not topple over. He maintains her unity, or innocence, but 
slowly nurtures it towards the qualitative leap. To begin with he sends her notes that 'give distant 
and vague hints of the highest',72 and gradually brings her to a 'peak' where 'only unrest and 
anxiety can hold her steady and prevent her from falling over'.73 At this point Johannes correctly 
predicts, 'she herself will become the tempter who seduces me into going beyond the boundaries of 
the normal , . . ' 7 4 On this Nordentoft says, 'Johannes' insight into anxiety is the secret of his 
seducers art' 7 5 He realizes that implicit in love is 'the deep anxiety- filled night, from which the 
flower of love springs forth. Thus does the nymphaea alba [white water lily] repose with her cup 
upon the surface of the water, while thought is filled with anxiety at plunging down into the deep 
darkness where it has its root.' 7 6 These days one can imagine this kind of seduction having less 
intense results than it appears to for Cordelia—the seducer would have less room to manoeuvre in. 
A passage in David Lodge's recent novel Therapy (a work heavily involving Kierkegaard's ideas 
and style) sums this up well. The story's lead character and narrator is reminiscing about the girl 
(Maureen) he dated as a teenager in the 1950s. He describes her as 'tender and yielding in my 
7 0 ibid, pp.61-2 
7 1 ibid, p. 73 
7 2 E/O, p.332 
7 3 ibid, p.358 
7 4 ibid 
7 5 op cit, p.39 
7 6 Cited in Nordentoft, p.39 
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arms, wanting to be loved, loving to be caressed, but quite without sexual self-consciousness' and 
continues; 
.1 suppose Maureen must have experienced her own symptoms of sexual arousal, but I doubt whether 
she recognized them as such ... [S]he loved to be kissed and cuddled. She purred in my arms like a kitten. 
Such sensuality and innocence could hardly co-exist nowadays, I believe, when teenagers are exposed to 
so much sexual information and imagery. Never mind the soft pom videos and magazines available ... 
your average 15-certificate movie contains scenes and language that would have had half the audience 
ejaculating into their trousers forty years ago, and have sent the makers and distributors to gaol. No 
wonder kids today want to have sex as soon as they're able" 
It should be noted here that though increasing exposure to sexuality is related to the qualitative 
leap, becoming sexually active does not necessarily coincide with the leap as Kierkegaard describes 
it A confusion arises in that The Seducer's Diary appears to be talking about the qualitative leap 
and yet Johannes, who understands sexual desire well enough to induce it in Cordelia and has 
himself made this leap, is an aesthetic character. Whatever leap he has made must then be 
considered by Kierkegaard as abortive, that is, as arising from a 'misdefining' of anxiety. His 
perspective is essentially objective and detached and he must be seen as not fully understanding the 
significance of sexuality in terms of sin and the ethical. Though sexuality is posited, as 
Kierkegaard insists, it is not the same thing as sin and can thus be understood by certain people 
(perhaps most of us these days, and as Johannes does) in a way that makes i t extrinsic to notions of 
finitude and guilt. It seems important that nowadays the link between sex, pregnancy and families 
is far weaker than it was. In the bourgeois Copenhagen of the times the link was so close that to 
indulge in sex was tantamount to taking on the responsibilities of marriage, children and generally 
the next generation. As such it was a strongly 'ethical' pursuit rather than recreational and we can 
understand better why the leap into sexual awareness and the leap into the ethical were socially 
fashioned to coincide. This aside, more will be said about 'abortive leaps' towards the end of the 
chapter. 
C. Post-leap Anxiety 
Once good and evil have made their appearance anxiety does not disappear but continues in a 
somewhat altered fashion. Most importantly the object of this state becomes 'a determinate 
something ... because the distinction between good and evil has been posited in concreto—and 
1 7 Lodge, D. Therapy (Penguin, 1995), pp.241-2 
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anxiety therefore loses its dialectical ambiguity ' In terms of the anatomy of anxiety as described 
in Chapter 1, this should qualify post-leap anxiety as anxiety B. Self-actualization (and thus self-
awareness) still has some distance to go in order to be fulfilled in Kierkegaard's eyes, and thus the 
possibilities that remain ahead of it are presumably still imbued with the ambiguity or 'nothing' 
associated with urangst. Moreover, anxiety A should also be present in the post-leap state. The 
suggestion is that through faith we can bridge the gap between the finite and the infinite, but this is 
not of course a certainty in any rational sense, and the possibility of nothingness instead of God, 
emptiness instead of meaning, death instead of eternity cannot have been extinguished. The way 
Kierkegaard writes however does not seem to deal with this, and the tendency is to run anxieties A 
and B together: we can come to terms with the infinite through our own efforts at inward deepening 
which will ideally come to fruition in a faith in God's reciprocity. The stress is on the individual as 
responsible (anxiety B), but responsible not just for his self-actualization and relation to others, but 
also partly for bis relation to the infinite (anxiety A). In the same way that faith is presupposed, so 
guilt is, and this plays a similar role in that it spans both kinds of anxiety but without itself being 
chosen and thus deferring the primary existential condition. The existence of guilt might be 
partially explained (in a Nietzschean sense) in terms of its being chosen by the individual for this 
very reason—i.e. to disburden them of their existentiality—but as it can only be replaced by 
something which plays a similar role, i.e. faith, then this would not fit Kierkegaard's individualist 
agenda. I will return to these issues briefly at the end of this chapter, and further question the role 
of guilt and the possible reversibility of the qualitative leap (which Kierkegaard does not question) 
in Chapter 7. 
I think it is true to say that repeated confrontations with the possibilities of self are less dramatic 
than the qualitative leap or the Abraham-type leap. The distinction between good and evil has been 
made, but even so, this is at times inevitably lost as a concrete, existential awareness. This is 
partly because of the near impossibility of mamtaining the energy required to 'think' one's infinite 
self constantly, and partly because of the related processes of self-deception which facilitate the 
avoidance of the reality of ourselves as revealed in anxiety. Repeating this anxious awareness is for 
Kierkegaard not a question of our degree of attention to it, but always involves further leaps. 
COA,pp.lll-2 
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Remember that for Kierkegaard 'the individual existing human being has to feel himself a sinner.' 
Thus in COA he says; 
The history of the individual life proceeds in a movement from state to state. Every state is posited by a 
leap. As sin entered into the world, so it continues to enter into the world if it is not halted. Nevertheless, 
every such repetition is not a simple consequence but a new leap. Every such leap is preceded by a state as 
the closest psychological approximation.80 
Still, we can only suppose that the relation of these states to the individual's awareness is more 
akin to Freud's pre-conscious than to his unconscious. In the former case the contents of 
consciousness are readily available to the individual, but not spelt-out, whereas in the latter they 
are repressed and cannot be retrieved (directly) by an act of wil l . The relation between post-leap 
awareness and the will is more liquid; not divided by ignorance of undiscovered territory, but by 
the devices of self-deception and the brute reality of human weakness. As such the post-leap state 
is a legitimate topic for psychology, and anxiety, as the signifier of the infinite, manifests itself in 
terms of the proximity of the possibility of good and evil. It is this we shall concentrate on now, 
and return to the issue of leaps and anxiety A in the final section. 
The relative status of self is such that, i f directed towards (desirous of) the good it is anxious about 
evil; and i f directed towards evil it is anxious about the good (God cannot be evil, but man is 
always in a position, no matter what he is currently directed towards, where good and evil remain 
possibilities). This is Kierkegaard's understanding of the post-leap ethical individual placed within 
the framework of sin and faith. The attendant anxiety is, as we shall see, similar to that which 
Sartre speaks of: the parameters of good/evil, authentic/inauthentic etc. are chosen (or 
appropriated) by the individual and then anxiety is directed not at what the nature and status of 
these parameters signify so much as his performance in measuring-up to them. Similarly, Judge 
William says; 
The question here is, under what categories one wants to contemplate the entire world and would oneself 
live. That someone who chooses good and evil chooses the good is indeed true ... but the good here is 
wholly abstract; choosing the ethical merely posits it, and from that it does not follow that the chooser 
cannot choose evil again, notwithstanding he chose the good.81 
CUP, p.224 
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The choice of the ethical is the choice of ourselves, but there now exists the freedom to defy that 
self and turn against the movement of inwardness. The individual is aware of this as a continuing 
possibility, just as Sartre's gambler is supported by 'nothing' beyond himself. Here the structural 
similarity with Freud's evolving theory anxiety becomes apparent: in the first theory consciousness 
plays no part in the generation of anxiety, instead it is produced purely somatically as a result of 
inhibited sexual functions. The body is trying to tell the individual something, whereas in 
Kierkegaard latent spiritual potential is trying to manifest itself as a matured self-consciousness.82 
In the later theory, where the individual consciously apprehends something threatening and this 
triggers the anxiety, the object can be itself the direct cause of the anxiety (in which case it is akin 
to fear) or can trigger off (signal) anxiety associated with something repressed (as in phobias). In 
anxiety over good and evil the individual is aware of the possibility of good and of the possibility 
of evil and this causes the anxiety. Something like repression plays a role in Kierkegaard's 
description and about this I shall say more shortly. 
On the question of what 'good' is, Kierkegaard says in a footnote 'the good cannot be defined at 
all' and then says 'the good is freedom',83 where I think 'freedom' is interchangeable with 'spirit'. 
He qualifies this by saying that freedom's relation to good and evil is only meaningful in the 
concrete sense—i.e. it must be in the good or in evil and cannot hover abstractly between the two. 
As such, 'spirit's' perspective is from one or the other position, in sight of, and in anxiety about its 
opposite. Generally the good as freedom or spirit amounts to self-knowledge which encompasses 
all that has been said about inwardness, and evil the deliberate avoidance of this, typically taking 
the form of the blocking or stagnation of a self-deceiving self which should be moving towards the 
infinite. 
In its anxiety about evil—about the fact that it has been qualified in terms of sin—'spirit' cannot 
find rest; it is an 'unwarranted actuality'. It eddies around and, as far as Kierkegaard is concerned, 
has three options: It can save itself in faith; it can identify itself with evil; or, being directed 
towards the good, it can find some or other form of self-deception ('ingenious sophistry') in which 
to find short-term or 'spiritless' repose. The first two we shall come to in this and later sections, 
Nordentoft translates Judge William's 'the spirit does not let itself be mocked; it revenges itself upon 
you; it binds you in chains of melancholia' (op cit, p. 114) into the Freudian 'the flesh does not permit 
itself to be mocked' (ibid, e.g. p. 145). 
8 3 COA,p. l l l 
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but for the moment we will concentrate on the third which Kierkegaard sees as the most common 
response to spirit's anxiety about evil. 
He describes three forms that this self-deception or repression might take. One alters sin's actuality 
to a possibility and thus is (or mimics) the reverse action of the qualitative leap. This way it creates 
the illusion that it has not made the movement from innocence to sin. This is perhaps similar to 
Sartre's example of the 'pederast' in BN who refuses to accept that he is a pederast on the basis of 
his past actions. In bad faith he uses the sophistry that as a pour-soi he cannot possibly be 
anything, deflecting attention from the fact that we must, within a freely chosen moral community 
and language, accept responsibility for our actions (or else suffer the ful l consequences of opting 
out of that community). In this context he is indeed a pederast, not merely a freedom that has no 
connection with past activities. The second involves quantifying sin. Anxiety 'flirts' with 
movements towards and away from sin which give it the idea that it is not sinful as such, but only 
to a certain degree. 'No matter how deep an individual has sunk', says Kierkegaard, 'he can sink 
deeper, and this "can" is the object of anxiety.'84 Spirit 'relaxes' to a certain extent because sin is 
no longer seen as a state, but as a 'quantitative determinant': 'anxiety is directed towards the 
further possibility of sin' 8 5 and not at its qualitative condition of sin. In this way anxiety lessens 
from the point of view of the subject, whereas in the first form of self-deception it is maintained at 
least to the extent of its advanced pre-leap variant. Anxiety is 'at its highest' however in the third 
kind of anxiety over evil where sin is regarded by the individual as an actuality, but repentance is 
seen as impotent in the face of it: 'repentance cannot cancel sin, it can only sorrow over it. Sin 
advances in its consequences; repentance follows it step by step, but always a moment too late.'8 6 
The individual is effectively trapped in his guilt, helpless like a spectator, moving further into a 
sinful existence. Anxiety is maintained at a peak, constantly predicting punishment but not 
forgiveness. The result is unsurprisingly a kind of madness which in modem psychiatric terms 
might be classed as neurotic guilt or depression. The self sees no way out of the self it discovers 
itself to be; feels, i f you like, condemned, or 'conquered' by its sinfulness. Kierkegaard says, 'the 
phenomenon may appear in connection with the sensuous in man (addiction to drink, to opium, or 
8 4 ibid, p. 113 
8 5 op cit, p. 115 
8 6 ibid. This equates with the 'weak' notion of offence in SUD where the individual is 'wanting in despair 
to be [himself], a sinner, in a way in which there is no forgiveness.'(p.l46) It is a non-acceptance of 
Christ as a measure of oneself—that God 'let himself be born, ... suffered and died' (p. 147) in order to 
forgive man's sins etc. 
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to debauchery etc.) as well as in connection with the higher (pride, vanity, wrath, hatred, defiance 
... etc.).'8 7 It would be like a cosmic version of drinking to forget. 
To be in anxiety about the good (the 'demonic') the individual must, by some means, have come to 
identify himself with evil. This is a state relatively easy to understand in a localized sense—most of 
us harbour unpleasant aspects of ourselves that we are happier to (or find it easier to) define as 
intrinsically bad or selfish rather than expose to the scrutiny of the good and thus the requirement 
for painful self-analysis and change. "There are traces of it in every man' says Kierkegaard,88 and 
later he describes its presence in us as 'like a spot on the sun or like the little white dot on the 
For the entire person to be characterized as demonic is somewhat harder to understand. 
Kierkegaard tells us that such a person wants to box himself up in what he calls 'inclosing 
reserve', because to make any contact with others (perhaps not literally, but certainly to expose 
anything of his orientation and motivations) is immediately to be exposed to the good, which is the 
cause of his anxiety. In E/O it is made apparent that the ethical existence is fundamentally linked to 
the disclosure of one's aims, motivations and so on. In FT the story of the Merman (from 
Anderson's Agnete and the Merman) is an example of the demonic.90 He has no absolute relation 
to the absolute but is alone, and in order to break out of his 'muteness' he must confess his sins 
and so return to the ethical. Not until someone is understood can they be forgiven, and in this 
respect we can understand why a criminal who admits guilt is treated with more leniency than one 
who stubbornly refuses to; we cannot understand the inclosed person and thus they remain a 
greater threat. The contrasting position of the Knight of Faith—one whose temporary silence has 
an altogether different motivation—is nicely summed-up in the following passage from FT; 
Faith's knight knows ... that it is glorious to belong to the universal. He knows it is beautiful and benign 
to be the particular who translates himself into the universal, the one who ... makes a clear and elegant 
edition of himself, as immaculate as possible, and readable for all ... But he also knows that higher up 
there winds a lonely path, narrow and steep; he knows it is terrible to be born in solitude outside the 
universal, to walk without meeting a single traveller.91 
8 7 ibid, p. 116 
8 8 ibid, p. 122 
8 9 ibid, p. 135 
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Another example is Tolkein's Gollum in The Hobbit and Lord of the Rings. 
FT, p. 103 
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The ethical tempts the Knight of Faith with security, but repulses the demonic individual. Their 
denial of the good, of their ethical self, results in an ugly distortion of repetition that Kierkegaard 
refers to as 'suddenness'. The good, he says, 'signifies continuity'92—i.e. a wholeness and 
coherence of self that makes communication and relations with others possible. The demonic 
cannot help but have contact with others (hence the anxiety) but there is no cohesion to this. 
Actions are unpredictable, and as the individual is effectively cut-off from himself they are as 
unfathomable to him as they are to everyone else.93 Perhaps the paradigm of continuity is FTs 
'shop keeper', and below this sit the rest of us, for as Kierkegaard rightly says, 'every individual 
has a little of this suddenness.,94 
Like the person in self-deception, the demonic is 'his own worst enemy' in Kierkegaard's eyes. The 
only way he can protect his evil identity is by 'making bis sin into a personal strength, and 
inventing the 'sin' of being or doing or welcoming good.' 9 5 The motivation behind this is, broadly, 
to avoid the trial of becoming more inward and to avoid facing up to the truth behind 'despair'— 
that we are contingent and can only transcend this by repenting before God and receiving 
forgiveness 'on the strength of the absurd'. The modern psychiatric equivalent to this kind of 
defence Nordentoft identifies as the phenomenon of 'resistance'—an unwillingness to be cured. In 
this, the analysand 'breaks "the fundamental rule of analysis" which requires complete honesty.'96 
Kierkegaard is here attempting an analysis of resistance, of the individual's 'motives to persist in 
the neurosis and to oppose recovery.'97 Roughly, the motive of the analysand is that he does not 
want to face what he must face i f the analysis is to be successful, so unconsciously he attempts to 
scupper the process by lying. He is, Nordentoft goes on to say; 
aware of the situation and of his own critical condition. He comes to the analyst with his sickness and with 
the express wish to be healed. When he then defends himself ... in the analytic situation, it is an 
unconscious defence quite clearly directed against an anticipated conflict or an anxiety-laden possibility— 
namely, that which threatens when the old defence is analysed away.98 
nCOA, p. 130 
9 3 Kierkegaard's imagery is brilliant here:'The continuity that inclosing reserve has can best be compared 
with the dizziness a spinning top must have, which constantly revolves upon its own pivot.' (COA, p. 130) 
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A pernicious regress looms at this point whereby there will be resistance against the discovery of 
resistance and so on. 
Returning to what Kierkegaard would see as the motivation behind 'anxiety about the good', 
Nordentoft says (rightly I think) that this is the same as 'despair of the eternal' in SUD, which is 
despair of what 'rightly understood, releases one from [despair]: of the eternal, of one's salvation, 
of one's own strength, etc.'9 9 Kierkegaard suggests that this kind of despair must be unconscious 
(or repressed), for i f the despairer was clearly aware of what was causing his despair he would no 
longer be in despair. He says; 
this is the obscurity which ... allows a person to see and know with such passionate clarity what he 
despairs over [misfortune, the earthly etc.], while what he despairs of escapes him. The condition for his 
being healed is always the conversion of the of, and purely philosophically it could be a subtle question 
whether it is possible both to be in despair and to be quite clear about what one despairs of.100 
The contents of the 'of, in a grand form of self-deception, are seen as threatening to the isolated 
and self-protective individual's sense of identity which, in this inclosed state, he will cling on to, 
forever losing sight of his infinite possibility. A similar explanation for the demonic (or Freud's 
'deconstruction instinct' perhaps) is found in Dostoyevsky who says in Notes from Underground, 
Doesn't [man's] passionate love for destruction and chaos ... arise from his instinctive fear of attaining his 
goal and completing the building he is erecting ... Perhaps man's sole purpose in this world consists in 
this uninterrupted process of attainment, or in other words in living, and not specifically in the goal, 
which of course must be something like twice two is four, that is, a formula; but after all, twice two is four 
is not life,. . . but the beginning of death.101 
To find completion is seen as surrendering a part of ourselves (our will) that is basic to individual 
identity. The demonic, the urge to destroy, is then a primal drive towards its retainment for i f 
knowledge, or the self, is completed it is lost to a greater power. That power—pure rationality for 
Dostoyevsky—may be threatening in this way, but of course in a different sense it is also 
Kierkegaard's enemy and he would want to claim that only our volition and passion can lead to the 
God-relation. In this sense that which he, Dostoyevsky, and many other existentialists see as 
intrinsically human is retained and heightened as a result of self-discovery within a higher power, 
and it is only an aesthetic temptation to not be willing to pass through rationality (and the ethical) 
SUD, p.92n 
°ibid 
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and out the other side. Whether all this amounts to the end of anxiety is a question I will address 
shortly. 
D. Anxiety disguised or misinterpreted 
We saw in the case of objective anxiety that in a culture where man is qualified as spirit, an 
individual, even though they have not made the qualitative leap themselves, can be described as 
'anxious'. Kierkegaard distinguishes between the anxiety of pagans and that of 'paganism within 
Christianity'. In the former case, as we shall see, anxiety is truly a 'nothing' that is interpreted (or 
misinterpreted as Kierkegaard would have it) not as 'spirit' but as 'fate'. For the pagan Christian 
the 'spirit' and its anxiety is effectively repressed and a state of 'spiritlessness' is achieved. In this 
way spirit is not (innocently) misinterpreted but is 'disguised'. 
The major difference, as far as I can see, between the pagan and the spiritless person is that the 
latter uses the language of spirit, but in such a way that it has no relation to inwardness; 
Spiritlessness can say exactly the same thing that the richest man has said, but it does not say it by virtue 
of spirit. Man qualified as spiritless has become a talking machine, and there is nothing to prevent him 
from repeating by rote a philosophical rigmarole, a confession of faith, or a political recitative ... There is 
only one proof of spirit, and that is the spirit's proof within oneself.102 
The last sentence of this passage is a clue to the nature of the anxiety of spiritlessness. The culture 
and language of such a person has awakened spirit in him to the extent that anxiety is there but 'is 
hidden and disguised',103 buried, we assume, quite deeply, because in his day to day existence he 
does not feel anxious. Nevertheless, 'anxiety ... is waiting' because '... there is a creditor who never 
comes off badly, namely spirit. ' 1 0 4 This apparently blissful existence is that of 'levelling', but it is 
an existence, as described in The Present Age, unconsciously geared towards keeping anxiety 
covered up. One way to do this is to talk the language of spirit, and thus superficially appease 
one's conscience, but the long-term effects wil l , Kierkegaard believes, be much worse. He 
compares the consequences with an unwillingness to face death 'in its true form'. To do this is 
terrifying, but to ignore death, and so have it creep up on us in disguise ' in order to mock the men 
1 0 2 COA,p.95 
1 0 3 ibid, p. 96 
1 0 4 ibid 
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who fancy they can mock death' is to be 'seized by a profound terror.' In psychological 
language, i f one does not face one's fears but represses them, they are transformed into anxiety 
which then manifests itself in the form of phobias, panic attacks, free-floating anxiety, and so 
on—forms of fear in which the object is missing or profoundly distorted as anxiety seeps or pours 
its way back into consciousness. 
Anxiety interpreted as 'fate' or 'guilt', is not, I do not think, a case of repression, of somehow 
recoiling from the 'leap' and from ourselves, but (and here I agree with Hannay) of misinterpreting 
what it signifies. This could be a result of the relevant individual's objective historical situation— 
anxiety defined as 'fate' is associated with paganism (e.g. Greek philosophy) and defined as 'guilt' 
is associated with Judaism—but, as in the case of the 'immediate genius' within Christianity, it 
could be a result of the individual's idiosyncratic attunement. The assumption is that anxiety 
signifies to the individual something beyond the self as it is currently understood. In his pre-leap 
state this appears as a 'nothing' but a 'nothing' with latent meaning that must either be suppressed 
or be given some kind of content The common response is spiritlessness, but i f it is confronted 
then it takes the form of something beyond the individual that the individual in some way or other 
relates to. Someone that Kierkegaard calls the 'immediate genius' (i.e. someone who braves anxiety 
and is outwardly directed) interprets it as fate—an impersonal, meaningless necessity. To consult 
with fate (look for coincidences etc.) seems inherently irrational but Kierkegaard portrays such a 
genius as being beyond the universal —'he would not be striving with men but with the 
profoundest mysteries of existence'106—and fate is this mystery to him; 
Not until sin is reached is providence posited. Therefore the genius has an enormous struggle to reach 
providence. If he does not reach it, truly he becomes a subject for the study of fate.107 
The genius who looks inward Kierkegaard calls the 'religious genius' and he is associated with 
defining anxiety as guilt. Guilt for Kierkegaard is the opposite of freedom and i f we take freedom 
to be self-knowledge or self-mastery (culminating in understanding and accepting oneself as 
'transparently grounded in God' 1 0 8) then such a genius struggles with this in order to avoid the 
possibility of becoming guilty. The problem is that without a leap of some kind the true content of 
1 0 5 ibid 
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1 0 7 ibid, p. 99 
1 0 8 see SUD 
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self never becomes apparent and neither freedom nor guilt are fulfilled, always remaining 
possibilities. In the qualitative leap the individual is qualified as spirit and thus sees himself as 
guilty, but the actuality is not there when anxiety is itself defined as guilt; 'the relation of freedom 
to guilt is anxiety, because freedom and guilt are still only possibilities.'109 
The upshot for both the immediate and religious geniuses is that anxiety never truly comes into 
focus and the qualitative leap, whereby the object of anxiety becomes a 'something', is never made. 
For Kierkegaard these advanced pre-leap states can be seen as the result of 'abortive' leaps 
(Hannay's expression) in that they take the individual in a direction that will not lead to a clear 
understanding of himself in faith. A fairly obvious question here is what makes Kierkegaard's 
specific interpretation correct? His reply would be "because otherwise all is lost, all is 
meaningless", but this calls into question the element of risk in accepting this interpretation. As 
Unamuno says in The Tragic Sense of Life, ' [t]o believe in God is, in the first instance ... to wish 
that there may be a God, to be unable to live without h im. ' 1 1 0 I f this is the case, as it appears to be 
with Kierkegaard, all he is risking is his despair which is no risk at all (unless we accept (and I do 
not think we can) self-deception as a serious (chosen) option—e.g. to pretend, until death, that the 
universal is enough). Here the conflict interpretation vs. the progressive/educative interpretation of 
anxiety makes an appearance again, and again my feeling is that for Kierkegaard the man (and as 
far as he is concerned therefore for all others) there is, in self-deception, only an apparent conflict 
between the truth and the will and thus only an apparent risk. Technically his interpretation cannot 
be correct or incorrect and only inward deepening can provide the passion required to turn what is 
objective (dogma in this case) into truth, and here, for us, lies the risk. But Kierkegaard, we 
presume, has this passion and as such rarely writes as i f everything might be "lost" and 
"meaningless". For him we either accept our relation to God and go all-out for faith, or we sink in 
nihilism and/or flee into self-deception. 
From the point of view of an individual who does not have faith, or is not (or apparently not) 
'unable to live without God', the following question of Hannay's is, however, germane. He asks; 
Can the failure to grow spiritually, and even the ultimate illusoriness of the whole notion of spiritual 
growth, be objects of Kierkegaardian anxiety?111 
1 0 9COA,p.l09 
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And answers 'yes' to both questions. The former is what the pagan and the Jew (and the related 
geniuses) fear, and the latter must be a possibility or else faith would not be faith (i.e. it would 
involve no risk). From the subjective point of view pre-leap anxiety could signify many things— 
many possible directions of a nihilistic kind as well as a spiritual kind. That there are many options 
and little or no guidance is itself a profound source of anxiety and this matter is explored in later 
chapters. Where Kierkegaard says ' i f at the begirining of his education [the individual] 
misunderstands anxiety, so that it does not lead him to faith, but away from faith, then he is 
lost', 1 1 2 a more secular response might be that the only misunderstanding of anxiety is to regard it 
as something to flee from rather than journey into. I think it is possible to accept the qualification 
of the self as comprising conflicting elements with no rational process of unifying them, and I think 
it is possible to accept Kierkegaard's implied growth pattern in principle, but this does not have to 
be a movement towards faith. In Chapter 7 I consider the possibility of a leap of a different sort (a 
'leap of irony') whereby a degree of self-mastery is found not in faith but in the realization of 
ourselves as a contingency with no God or immutable ideal to answer to or move towards. As we 
shall see, this brings into question certain features of the qualitative leap such as its non-
reversibility and its relation to guilt which Kierkegaard is able to side-step with subjectivity and 
dogmatics. In short, i f we remove the Christian framework many more questions arise concerning 
pre/post-leap anxiety, anxieties A and B, and the relationship between them, than Kierkegaard is 
willing to ask. 
To finish this chapter I shall take a look at the last section of COA—Anxiety as Saving Through 
Faith—which will serve for us, as it does for Kierkegaard, as a summary and conclusion of the role 
anxiety plays in his philosophy. Here I will question further the significance and source of the 
underlying assumptions. 
£. Anxiety as Educator 
Concluding his book on Kierkegaard's ethics George Stack says; 
1 1 2 COA, p: 159 
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If the cynic asks, why ought I to exist?, Kierkegaard would probably answer: because it is never possible, 
so long as one lives, to obliterate the inchoate realization that you can exist—to deny completely your 
subjective knowledge of your potentiality-for-becoming-a-self . 1 ' 3 
It is not clear that this is correct; Kierkegaard would say that so long as anxiety is correctly 
understood then we can indeed always exist, but he also says (if we recall); 
This is an adventure that every human being must go through—to learn to be anxious in order that he 
may not perish either by never having been in anxiety or by succumbing in anxiety. Whoever has learned 
to be anxious in the right way has learned the ultimate.114 
But the possibility continually exists that we become anxious in the wrong way. ' I will not deny' he 
says 'that whoever is educated by [anxiety] is exposed to danger ... namely suicide. I f at the 
beginning of his education he misunderstands the anxiety, so that it does not lead him to faith but 
away from faith, then he is lost.' 1 1 5 Reckoning with oneself in terms of the infinite can lead to 
salvation but also to the ultimate defeat. I f one is no longer tied by, no longer anxious about the 
finite (which is Kierkegaard's aim) then to run aground in the realm of the 'possible' may leave no 
other option other than suicide (or at least spiritual suicide). Anxiety, until we have fulfilled the 
seemingly impossible demands of faith at least, is inescapable: i f we are not going to flee it we 
must be educated in the right way of approaching it, and this, I take it, is all part of Kierkegaard's 
mission as a writer. 
What then does Kierkegaard see as the educative possibilities of anxiety? Most have so far been 
encountered, but it is useful to summarize and tie-up the loose ends. Broadly, anxiety can be seen 
as a spiritual journey or trial which, i f completed successfully, brings the inward traveller to 
faith. 1 1 6 Here, perhaps more than anywhere in COA, Kierkegaard stresses the suffering associated 
with this journey in a way that brings FT to mind. 'No Grand Inquisitor' he says 'has such 
dreadful torments in readiness as anxiety has',1 1 7 and in his journals he says 'anxiety is the most 
113 Kierkegaard's Existential Ethics (University of Alabama Press, University, Alabama, 1977), p. 178 
1 1 4 COA, p. 155 
1 1 5 ibid, p. 159 
1 1 6 There is a strong link between anxiety's journey and the classic 'hero quest' myth which applies not 
just to Kierkegaard but other writers on anxiety as well. A good reference for this is Joseph Campbell's 
Hero with a Thousand Faces (Paladin, 1988) in which he points out that the enticement > journey into the 
unknown (the uncanny) > despair > discovery and/or capture of a prize or enlightenment > return to the 
world type story typified by Odysseus and Jonah can be found in most or all of the world's mythologies. 
1 1 7 COA, p. 155 
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terrible kind of spiritual t r ia l . ' 1 1 8 The task is to satisfy the self s desire for actuality and for ideality. 
As a 'becoming' the self can never be actual: in SUD he says; 
The self... at every moment that it exists is in becoming, because the self... does not actually exist; it is 
only that which is to come into being. To the extent, then, that the self does not become itself, it is not 
itself; but not to be oneself is precisely despair.119 
Ideality cannot be attained because of the demands of the actual. Truth as subjectivity is precisely 
'untruth'; objectivity is required but only God can know the truth objectively. Faith, then, is the 
paradoxical state whereby through inwardness objective truth is known concretely (i.e. God 
incarnate). To put this in other words, the task is to overcome despair and the only way to achieve 
this is through faith. 
Despair is described by Kierkegaard as 'the corridor to fai th ' . 1 2 0 It is that which pushes us towards 
faith. Anxiety on the other hand, as the signifier of the infinite, exposes us to freedom and 
possibility and can be seen as that which pulls us towards faith. Without anxiety, despair could 
easily lead to suicide or an 'abortive' leap of some land, but for Kierkegaard anxiety has this 
specific relation with faith and the infinite. In Hannay's words, 'despair is the inherently morbid 
and, to the enlightened observer, predictably unstable condition (or set of conditions) in which the 
self fails to exploit the unique educative possibilities offered by anxiety.'1 2 1 In COA Kierkegaard 
uses a Hegelian definition of faith—'the inner certainty that anticipates infinity' 1 2 2—and this is far 
more precisely defined in SUD as 'the self in being itself and in wanting to be itself is grounded 
transparently in God.' 1 2 3 To want to be a self-sufficient 'in-itself-for-itself is to be in despair 
because this conflicts with our ontology , we are necessarily an unhappy synthesis of the finite and 
the infinite until we become absolute by virtue of our ('lowly') relation to God. 'Having a self 
says Kierkegaard 'is the greatest concession that has been made to man, but also eternity's claim 
upon h im. ' 1 2 4 To refuse this claim is to sin, and sin, as we have seen, is not the opposite of virtue 
but of faith. 
1 1 8 Cited in COA, p. 172 
1 1 9 Cited in Nordentoft, op cit, pp. 97-8 
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Repetition is an aim of inwardness and faith and therefore of anxiety. The most acute anxiety, the 
trial, is a separation from that which defines one's finite self and offers security therein, but it is 
this we must confront in order to truly feel at home: 'he who sank in possibility—his eye became 
dizzy, his eye became confused, so he could not grasp the measuring stick that Tom, Dick and 
Harry hold out as a saving straw to one sinking.' 1 2 5 Anxiety at its extreme point plunges the 
individual into an uncanny isolation, but such a high price must be paid for the infinite where; 
only the one who works gets bread, and only the one who knows anxiety finds rest, only one who descends 
to the underworld saves the loved one, only one who draws the knife gets Isaac. He who will not work 
does not get bread, but will be deluded, as the gods deluded Orpheus . . . 1 2 6 
Not until the individual has resigned the infinite and stopped being anxious over i t can he win it 
back in repetition. Only with his sights on the infinite can the temporal become the eternal. 
But for Kierkegaard separation anxiety works both ways. Because of anxiety we do not feel at 
home in the realm of the finite, in the company of others even ('dependence upon God is the only 
independence'127). In his journals he says 'presentiment is the home-sickness of earthly life for the 
higher, for the perspicuity which man must have had in his paradisic l i f e ' ; 1 2 8 and confirms that 'this 
anxiety in the world is the only proof of our heterogeneity. I f we lacked nothing ... no homesickness 
would come over us.' 1 2 9 When he says that anxiety is 'nothing but impatience'130 he means 
impatience for the infinite, to be at home again. This home is a repetition of our original state of 
innocence and ignorance of duality: ' i t requires no art to be ignorant' he says, but to become 
ignorant, and by becoming so, to be ignorant, that is the art. ' 1 3 1 
I 2 5COA,p.l58 
1 2 6 FT, p.57 
1 2 7 From The Gospel of Suffering cited in Nordentoft, op cit, p. 89 
128 Journals and Papers, p. 3 8 
1 2 9 ibid, p.39 
1 3 0 ibid, p.41 
131 Christian Discourses, p.29. Earlier on though it is not clear if he thought this acquired ignorance can 
be sustained: in CUP he says; '[a]n existing person cannot be in two places at the same time, cannot be 
subject-object. When he is closest to ... [this], he is in passion; but passion is only momentary, and passion 
is the highest pitch of subjectivity.' (p. 199) The beginning of this is similar to Nagel's message in VFN, 
and in later chapters (5-7) I shall discuss what seems to be the necessary oscillation between (roughly) the 
subjective and the objective perspectives involved in authentic existence. 
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Our education in the infinite is the task of anxiety and Kierkegaard describes it as being 'educated 
by possibility'.1 3 2 Human being cannot be everything and cannot be in the truth, but must choose 
and as such leap beyond reason and what is to hand. Possibility is the 'weightiest of all 
categories'133 because it brings human desires face to face with limitless good and limitless evil; 
in possibility all things are equally possible, and whoever has been brought up by possibility has grasped 
the terrible as well as the joyful ... when a person graduates from the school of possibility ... he knows 
better than a child knows his ABC's that he can demand absolutely nothing of life and that the terrible, 
perdition, and annihilation live next door to every man . . . 1 3 4 
Anxiety schools us in possibility, and part of this process is its constant hounding out of any 
attempts to escape into self-deception. 'No discerning judge' we are told 'understands how to 
interrogate and examine the accused as does anxiety.'1 3 5 Kierkegaard sometimes makes it sound 
like a kind of spiritual enema—'anxiety enters [the individual's] soul and searches out everything 
and anxiously torments everything finite and petty out of him, and then leads him where he wants 
to go. ' 1 3 6 As we have seen, once purged of finite attachments and self-deception the individual in as 
much as he is anxiety will move towards faith, and only further 'weak' moments will deter him 
from that path. In his journals Kierkegaard writes 'when the believer has faith, the absurd is not 
absurd—faith transforms it, but in every weak moment... it is again more or less absurd to him. ' 1 3 7 
In these moments doubt and the finite ground us and anxiety is avoided and distorted rather than 
understood in the context of infinity. As discussed, a secular interpretation of anxiety would agree 
with the purging but not necessarily with the clarity of direction this results in. Questions of the 
nature of an existing self and how this is best fulfilled are left unanswered and potentially 
unanswerable. For Kierkegaard of course there is no rational certainty offered by anxiety—anxiety 
does not speak this language—but his approach seems to assume that the infinite is there to be 
found i f we respond to anxiety in the correct way. This involves, for the individual, the torments 
described and a constant letting-go of ourself, but a meaningful potentiality is assumed, i f only on 
the strength of Christian dogma. 
1 3 2 COA, p. 156 
1 3 3 ibid 
1 3 4 ibid 
1 3 5 ibid 
136 ibid, p. 159 
1 3 7 Cited in Mooney, op cit, p. 131 
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The journey of anxiety is indeed not fully understandable to the non-initiate, and its goal is not 
transparent to thought, but the structure of Kierkegaard's movement towards self is fairly well 
determined. This likeness to Hegel is summed up by Hannay in the following way; 
Although [Kierkegaard's] description of anxiety and despair can indeed often be construed 
phenomenologically, they are nevertheless liberally supplemented by descriptions specifying or hinting at 
a divine destiny, as of the abyss of ignorance into which freedom or spirit inexorably draws the self were 
the gateway to a goal whose nature has been fixed in advance of an analysis of the situation of individual 
138 
existence. 
This is mitigated by the necessarily unique relation each individual has with the absolute, but 
Kierkegaard's emphasis on Unum noris, omnes certainly suggests that we all share a common 
route through anxiety and out of despair. There is a question mark, however, concerning the level 
at which this dictum applies. I f COA is read, not as an objective account of the significance of 
anxiety, but as the expression of Kierkegaard's particular existential commitment then the mood is 
slightly altered. We are warned from the start about confusing our scientific categories with 
subjectivity and dogmatics and the full implications of anxiety clearly stretch beyond science. Once 
in the subjective and dogmatic realms, commitment, risk, inwardness etc. take precedence and the 
direct style of COA is, as previously suggested, inefficacious. Its scientific mood is suitable for 
presenting the case for the full significance of anxiety only once assumptions and commitments 
have been made within these incommensurable moods. I f this is so, then the Hegelian style of the 
book may be a pointer (in the form of a dig at Hegel) to its own embodiment of a category mistake 
of which Kierkegaard is surely well aware (possibly explaining the use of a pseudonym). The 
empirical evidence, the phenomenological descriptions of anxiety, has only a speculative 
connection with the nature of God and faith, but Kierkegaard writes as i f one is not only evidence 
for the other, but is an explication of the other. This does not reduce the whole work to a parody, 
or merely a comment on the impossibility of meaning (as Roger Poole would have it), it just means 
that for Kierkegaard this is the context in which anxiety should be understood in light of his own 
prior and largely (directly) incommunicable commitment to Christianity. As I hope I have shown, 
even i f we subtract the dogma, COA is full of accurate and useful insights into the nature of 
anxiety. 
op cit, p. 175 
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For Heidegger and others anxiety does not necessarily signify a 'resting place' in the infinite. It can 
purge us, tell us what we are not, but this is not the same as telling us that we are free to be what 
we want to be or that we can become that which can be what it wants to be without repressing 
aspects of ourselves. Without the Christian structure anxiety is, at its furthest point, blind, and in 
telling us that anxiety teaches that we can 'demand absolutely nothing of life ' it might appear that 
Kierkegaard would basically agree with this. Further evidence is found in the journals where he 
says that 'deep within every human being there still lives the anxiety over the possibility of being 
alone in the world , . . ' 1 3 9 However, as C. Stephen Evans points out, he often sounds as i f knowledge 
of God's existence is innate and unquestionable except for someone in self-deception. Evans says; 
in a draft version of Philosophical Fragments, it is said that there has never been a genuine atheist, only 
people who did not wish to "let what they knew, that God existed, get power over their minds.140 
COA is seemingly built on a similar premise.141 What is perhaps unsaid in COA is the very anxiety 
that preceded its creation. I f not then Kierkegaard's emphasis on risk is somehow nullified. The 
ultimate risk must be the belief in God's existence, or at least in the type of being that he is (i.e. one 
that has forgiven). I f this is taken as established then there is indeed hardship in reaching a position 
of faith, but surely it is not a risky endeavour—the hard work and sacrifice can always be seen as 
teleologically significant. As such, it makes sense to assume that the whole of COA was written 
against a background mood of risk and anxiety. This, as will become clearer, would have consisted 
of anxieties A and B and a (chosen) state of mind that attempts to cope with the paradox inherent 
in their co-existence. Kierkegaard instead appears to begin with such a state of mind as a given, 
and this he calls Christianity or faith. As such it is not chosen, and as such the separate anxieties 
that for the secular existentialist should precede it and make it necessary are not posited. To 
subscribe to any metaphysics not reliant upon an infinite being to whom we are answerable 
generates this basic duality without any in-built possibility of salvation through discovery (of God, 
our infinite nature etc.). This creates more diverse possibilities in response to anxieties A and B 
and its own embodiment of groundlessness engenders greater uncanniness than a religious 
1 3 9 In COA, p. 171 
1 4 0 Evans, C.S. 'Kierkegaard's View of the Unconscious' (in Matustik and Westphal (ed.) Kierkegaard in 
Post/Modernity, Indiana University Press, 1995), p. 90 
1 4 1 Although I have already quoted a passage where he says that 'man as such does not know about the 
religious in the Christian sense' (see p.44n). This suggests that we have a given or innate sense of the 
infinite (a 'maker's mark') but not necessarily of the Christian God. If so then clearly a choice of 
interpretation is required. 
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alternative. It does not, i f you listen hard enough, say "faith or despair", but at most says "choose 
resolutely or be less than authentic"—a dictum imbued with a pointing backwards to its beginnings 
and not, as in the Christian alternative, fairly forcibly forwards into the actualization of a God-
relation. 
As suggested, the difference can be seen as resulting from a blurring of anxieties A and B. For 
Kierkegaard we are not paralysed in anxiety before the ultimate emptiness and meaninglessness of 
self, but only by an obscurity and ambiguity as to what constitutes the self. As we shall see in the 
following chapters, it can be argued that the structure of existence for the secular existentialist is 
founded on the conflict between an anxiety 'in the face o f our fundamental ontology and an 
anxiety 'about' ourselves as responsible, 'inward' beings. The conflict exists because the former, 
as Tillich shows, continually threatens to undermine the latter, but in Kierkegaard's system this 
conflict only occurs in self-deception (despair). For him the inward being taken to its passionate 
limits is the being which coincides with itself as 'grounded transparently in God'. As such there is 
only one kind of anxiety which can be said to be directed both at the self and at the infinite because 
the infinite is what the self can and should become: for Kierkegaard the infinite is, oddly, 
personalized. 
On the question of whether anxiety can be overcome, Kierkegaard, in his later Christian 
Discourses explicitly says that it can, but qualifies this; 
the salvation is commanded, namely to be without anxiety ... To be without anxiety ... that is a difficult 
gait to go, almost like walking on water; but i f thou art able to believe, it can nevertheless be done.142 
This then is the ideal, and this indicates Kierkegaard's firm rejection of the finite. Other writers, in 
particular Heidegger (as we shall see in the next chapter), do not see an overcoming of anxiety even 
as an ideal (whether a possibility or not) and this is indicative of a basic acceptance of some or 
other form of a limited, finite existence which can be construed as authentic. The experience of 
anxiety changes in certain ways (even to the point where it becomes ' joyful ' or 'peaceful') but key 
elements remain (or are claimed to remain) which justify (or attempt to justify) anxiety as the 
perennial and defining mood of human existence. 
Christian Discourses (OUP, 1939), p. 24 
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3 
The Sense of Nothing: Heidegger 
'Sense experience is to objects what moods are to the world'—Stanley Cavell1 
'Innumerable 'lookings' have discovered and explored a world which is now ... compulsively present to 
the will in a particular situation, and the will is dismayed by the feeling that it ought now to be everything 
and in fact is not.'—Iris Murdoch (The Sovereignty of Good) 
'No reason to get excited / The thief he kindly spoke / But there are many here among us / Who feel that 
life is but a joke'—Bob Dylan (op cit) 
« « $ » » 
In Heidegger's philosophy anxiety plays its most prominent role in the early work, particularly 
Being and Time (BT) and the essay What is Metaphysics? (WIM), and it is these that I shall 
concern myself with. My aim, firstly, is to summarily locate anxiety in the schema of BT and thus 
orient it with respect to the general project of Heidegger's early philosophy. Secondly, I will present 
a detailed sketch of the process of anxiety itself; an unpacking of its components, including a close 
look at way of being that Heidegger calls 'falling'. Thirdly, I want to compare two conflicting 
readings of what the revelations of anxiety mean for Heideggerian authenticity; and fourthly I shall 
offer my own interpretation of how the discoveries of Division I of BT might relate to the issue of 
an authentic existence as explored in Division I I . Amongst all this I want to lend support to the 
views of those commentators who think that Heidegger owes a largely unacknowledged debt to 
Kierkegaard (although I do not think this debt is always given the correct emphasis)2 This issue 
will not form a section of its own, but rather crop-up where relevant as indeed Kierkegaard's 
influence crops-up across the breadth of BT. 
1 Cited in S. Mulhall's Can there be an Epistemology of Moods? 
2 As far as I am aware, the only references to Kierkegaard in BT (Blackwell, 1990) are in notes on pages 
278, 235 and 388. 
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Heidegger's mission statement for BT is, to say the least, ambitious: 'Our aim in the following 
treatise is to work out the question of the meaning of being and to do so concretely1.3 By this he 
does not mean the definition of being but something like the significance of being; as existing 
beings we want to know what significance being itself has for us. The being of Dasein is 'being-in-
the-world' [in-der-Welt-sein]. This refers not to our spatial locality but to our essentially mutually 
defining relationship with entities in the world, other people and cultural significations. We arise 
out of and attain identity in terms of our language and the way our surroundings have been 
interpreted. There is a strong vein of pragmatism running through BT: the world is primarily 
encountered not in theoretical terms (as 'present-at-hand' in Heidegger's language) but as 
equipment which is 'ready-to-hand'. The world has primordial significance in terms of what we 
require from it and not in terms of a detached, theoretical perspective. This is in turn significant in 
terms of the broad network of meanings that is, for Heidegger, 'the world'. The relationship is 
reciprocal in that, as intentional, consciousness is reliant upon this world to give it content, but this 
content does not consist of essences discoverable by 'eidetic reduction'. The network of meanings 
that is 'the world' is the product of Dasein's cultural and historical interpretations and has no 
essence or absolute status beyond this. These interpretations are the result, primarily, of 
encountering objects as 'ready-to-hand' and the theoretical stance becomes important only when 
this fails us. I f Husserl rejected Descartes' position by identifying consciousness as intentional and 
not a substantial, independent entity possessing God-given knowledge, then Heidegger rejected 
Husserl's emphasis on its ability to 'bracket' the nexus of meanings and practical relations in order 
to identify the specific contents of one's consciousness as meaningful in themselves. For Heidegger 
the self and the world, imbued as they are with meaning, are contingencies to the core. 
I f then Heidegger wants to investigate 'the meaning of being' this immediately raises the problem 
of how we are able to step beyond the particular set of interpretations that have formed us and our 
thinking and pass comment on being. I f the tools of our analysis are themselves a product of our 
particular, contingent form of being then in what way, i f any, can we use them to successfully 
3 BT, p. 19. I am using the Robinson and Macquarrie translation throughout although, like Stambaugh's 
translation (SUNY, 1997), I do not use the capital 'B' in the translation of Sein. Similarly I do not use 
capitalize 'nothing' where both the translations of WIM that I use have done so. 
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uncover the meaning of being in itself? Heidegger attempts to avoid a vicious circularity by 
investigating not the contents of consciousness as a Husserlian phenomenological analysis would 
do, but human existence in its entirety In light of this, expressions like 'man' or 'human being' 
carry too many preconceptions and so for the purposes of his enquiry Heidegger speaks of 
'Dasein' (being there). So, by means of an ontological investigation of Dasein's being, Heidegger 
is attempting to work out the meaning of being in general, but how is this able to happen? 
Uncontroversially Heidegger says that 'Dasein ... is ... distinguished by the fact that, in its very 
being, that being is an issue for it'; and 'Understanding of being is itself a definite characteristic of 
Dasein's being.'4 More mterestingly, however, he claims that we have a 'pre-ontological awareness 
of being'—one that is categorially more basic than the type of understanding and interpretation that 
confines us to a contingent perspective. This awareness is ingrained in these forms of 
interpretation, in our cultural practices, in what is seen as useful and important—in what 
Heidegger calls our 'average everydayness'. I f we care to turn our ontological gaze upon ourselves 
then our being is there to be uncovered and , so the claim goes, in uncovering the being of a being 
for whom being is a basic issue, the meaning of being itself is revealed. 
What though is Dasein's kind of being? Heidegger says that it is existence QThe essence of Dasein 
lies in its existence'*). By this he means that Dasein does not have properties as, for example, a tree 
has the property of being made of wood, but rather has possibilities. In Hubert Dreyfus' words 
(after Charles Taylor) 'Dasein is interpretation all the way down'6—there is no content of life that is 
essentially us, rather we must choose from various possible contents and, to be true to our kind of 
being is to somehow maintain this awareness whilst living the content a life must have and which to 
a great extent is given by its history. As introduced to us by Kierkegaard, the existential nature of 
human beings or Dasein is such that to be authentic in one way or another, the kind of being that 
we essentially are must be appropriated or accepted. Despite his attempts to avoid circularity, the 
difficulties associated with this position—one where this very acceptance is infused with contingent 
interpretations—are considerable and constantly hound Heidegger's analysis. 
To begin with, i f Heidegger is to investigate being via the being for whom being is an issue he must 
begin with Dasein as it presents itself. 'In this everydayness', he says, 'there are certain structures 
4 op cit, p. 32 
5 ibid, p. 67 
6 Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Being and Time Division I (MIT Press, 1991), p.25 
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which we shall exhibit—not just any accidental structures, but essential ones.'7 But, i f an 
interpretation is then offered of Dasein in its 'average everdayness', by what standard are we to 
judge this interpretation? Existentially speaking it has been suggested that much of the power of 
BT derives from its being a 'hermeneutics of suspicion'.8 The suspicion is that we are not facing up 
to our being because we find it uncomfortable or unpleasant in some way. A correct interpretation 
will elicit a reluctant admittance or perhaps a (predicted) strengthening of defensive measures. (In 
psychoanalysis, another 'hermeneutic of suspicion', the vehemence of denial is taken as an 
indication of recognition on the part of the patient.) As pre-ontological beings Heidegger's 
suspicion is that we are for the most part attempting to escape our essence as existence but that i f 
faced with a correct interpretation of this state of affairs we can, in some way, be shown to 
acknowledge it. To ask, in a straight-forward manner, "what is the meaning of being?" is liable to 
generate an answer suited to this general 'flight' from being. 'Is' is predefined, particularly in the 
sense of it referring to the ontic rather than the ontological.9 A further suspicion about fleeing, 
indicated by (what Heidegger saw as) philosophy's recent lack of attention to the question of being, 
regards our tendency to see ourselves as thing-like. Given the opportunity, this way of 
understanding will also infect an investigation into being itself and so Heidegger's methodology 
attempts to pre-empt this kind of subversion by directing its efforts at uncovering whatever it is 
average everydayness is occupied with covering-up. 
That a hermeneutics of suspicion does not entirely solve Heidegger's methodological problems has 
been pointed out by Dreyfus 1 0 and Hodge11 among others. The thesis of BT is that temporality is 
'the meaning of the being of that entity which we call "Dasein"'12 but what is to say that this is the 
interpretation of Dasein, that there are not still other factors that offer further or even greater 
illumination of the meaning of being? I f there are, then the being that is revealed in the analysis of 
Dasein as essentially temporal is not going to be the complete picture, a greater illumination of 
being might be revealed by a differently-skewed suspicion. The issue of love and authentic relations 
with others, for instance, is not something that Heidegger pays much attention to, and although in a 
7 BT, p.38 
8 Paul Ricoeur's term, cited in Dreyfus, op cit, p. 3 7 
9 i.e. to the nature of things rather than the nature of the being which gives rise to the possibility of thing-
ness in the first place. 
1 0 op cit 
1 1 Joanna Hodge, Heidegger and Ethics (Routledge, 1995) 
1 2 Heidegger, op cit, p.38 
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sense I think his emphasis on temporality is correct in as much as it is basic, the mistake he makes 
is in attempting to capture our subjective response to this in a systematic philosophy—something 
he perhaps remedied in his later work. 
As I see it, Heidegger's use of anxiety is a central part of this attempt to offer a final meaning of 
being and part of my purpose in what follows is to ask whether or not he succeeds. Another way of 
putting this is to ask whether his analysis of Dasein offers a singular and concrete way of being 
that makes it possible to exist in the ful l illumination of being itself. As I shall go on to explain, 
anxiety can be seen as functioning for Heidegger in such a way as to provide an escape clause, a 
way of completing his analysis that relies on a profound experience that is potentially available to 
all of us. Justification is sought for the substantive power of the hermeneutic circle by appeal to a 
primordial experience in which we encounter being in its most primitive significance, the result of 
which is a radical (but predictable) alteration in our mode of existence. It can still be claimed of 
course that there are experiences other than anxiety that are equally basic, and other ways of 
existentially acknowledging these experiences, but as I shall go on to explain in more detail, 
anxiety should not be seen as a particular experience with a limited epistemic or emotional 
potential, but as a categorially unique way of experiencing all kinds of moods and a way of 
acknowledging them. 
« < 0 > » > 
The 'da' of Da-sein—the being-in of being-in-the-world—is described by Heidegger as the way in 
which we 'illuminate' the world, and 'by its very nature, Dasein brings its "there" along with it ... 
Dasein is its disclosedness.'13 We are then our own illumination of the world—to be compared less 
with a source of light ... than with the light itself 1 4—and this process has, depending on your 
reading, two, three or four essential components. One of these is Befindlichkeit, variously 
translated as 'state-of-mind', 'affectedness', 'mood', 'frame of mind', and 'situatedness'—none of 
which is accurate, either swaying too much towards the subjective and psychological or too much 
towards impersonal objectivity. The literal translation is 'how one finds oneself (a form of greeting 
in German) which is deliberately ambiguized by Heidegger to give emphasis to the way we always 
encounter ourselves as already in the world with a particular comportment towards it. 
1 3 BT, p. 171 
1 4 Cooper, D.E. Heidegger (Claridge Press, 1996), p.27 
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Beflndlichkeit provides the background for intentionality in that it is on its terms that particular 
things show up as significant. Before we can find something fearful we must already have provided 
the context of fearfulness by the mood of fear. An analogy might be to see a particular mood as the 
colour of a projection screen. The prominence of what is then projected upon the screen will 
depend upon that colour so that on a red screen black objects will be more distinct than orange 
ones and so on. An object that is both black and orange will gain a different aspect than i f i t were 
projected upon a blue screen. This analogy is imperfect in that a mood does not merely illuminate 
in terms of what we perceive, but in terms of what matters. Indeed, how something is perceived is 
indelibly influenced by its practical significance; with respect to fear Heidegger says 'pure 
beholding could never discover anything like that which is threatening'.15 By 'pure beholding' 
Heidegger means an ideal kind of theoretical understanding; the kind that, i f there were any, would 
apply to objects free from interpretation. For Heidegger even the practice of scientific 
experimentation is not mood independent.16 
Whether we are aware of it or not we are always ' in ' a mood, always comporting ourselves 
towards the world in one way or another. Heidegger acknowledges the existence of the 'pallid, 
evenly balanced lack of mood' but this he says is itself 'far from nothing at all. ' 1 7 In such a state, 
he continues, 'Dasein grows tired [uberdrussig] of itself. Being has become manifest as a burden.'18 
We are in a mood, in other words, but its burdensome nature encourages us to flee it, and flight in 
this instance takes the form of a kind of denial. As with all forms of disclosure, Dasein is then 
(potentially) revealed to itself in a particular way by its moods. We have a (pre-ontological) 
awareness that mood signifies that we are the arbiters of being—something that brings with it (and 
is revealed in) relentless anxiety. In a fundamental way it signifies, in David Cooper's words, that 
'the world ... is indelibly human; and humans are indelibly worldly.' 1 9 It is, Heidegger says, 'a 
primordial kind of being for Dasein, in which Dasein is disclosed to itself prior to all cognition and 
volition, and beyond their range of disclosure.'20 To 'lack' mood is not to be free of this (which is 
1 5 BT, p. 177 
1 6 In a footnote in COA Kierkegaard says, 'That science, just as much as poetry and art, presupposes a 
mood in the creator as well as the observer, and that an error in the modulation is just as disturbing as an 
error in the development of thought, have been entirely forgotten in our time (p. 14) 
1 7 BT, p. 173 
1 8 ibid 
19 Existentialism (Blackwell, 1990), p. 81 
2 0 BT, p. 175. For my purposes mood can be taken as a particular example of Befindlichkeit such as a 
peaceful mood, a bored mood etc. 
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impossible) but to attempt to deny it. The moods that are easiest to ignore are those which belong 
to our culture and are thus the most pervasive and the most easily misunderstood as 'the way the 
world is and must be'. 2 1 As we shall see when we come to discuss anxiety, there is perhaps a 
certain mood in which the very fact that Dasein is subject to moods becomes not just an implicit 
awareness but the primary revelation of that mood. For the moment it is important to realize that 
for Heidegger not only are moods unavoidable, but that for the most part it is beyond our ability to 
change from one mood to another. In terms strongly reminiscent of Kierkegaard he says 'a mood 
assails us', and continues, 'it comes neither from 'outside' nor from 'inside' but arises out of being-
in-the-world, as a way of such being.'22 
A further important aspect of Beflndlichkeit is its capacity to expose Dasein to itself in its 
'thrownness' [Gerworfenheit]. Thrownness is our condition of finding ourselves already 'in-the-
world' and predefined in terms of that world. We are not self-creating, but rather hit the ground 
running among and as a set of contingencies. Slightly ambiguously Heidegger says that in a mood; 
Dasein is always brought before itself, and has already found itself, not in the sense of coming across itself 
by perceiving itself, but in the sense of finding itself in the mood that it has.23 
I say this is ambiguous because even though Dasein can potentially confront itself in its thrownness 
by encountering the significance of mood it does not do this. Heidegger goes on to say; 
The way in which the mood discloses is not one in which we look at thrownness, but one in which we turn 
towards or turn away. For the most part the mood does not turn towards the burdensome character of 
Dasein which is manifest in i t . 2 4 
What matters is not mood surely, but the manner in which it is encountered. The importance of 
mood in terms of revealing how Dasein is is that it is a simple and fundamental structure of our 
being-in which when exposed for what it is manages to reveal the very essence of Dasein's special 
kind of being. When Heidegger says 'even in the most indifferent and inoffensive everydayness the 
being of Dasein can burst forth as a naked 'that it is and has to be" 2 5 he is, I think, referring to a 
change of perspective upon that mood from its being an unstated background for intentionality to 
2 1 Later on I shall discuss what appears to be a significant incommensurability between the mood or a 
culture or an age, and the changing moods of an individual Dasein. 
2 2 BT, p. 176 
2 3 ibid, p. 174 
2 4 ibid 
2 5 ibid, p. 173 
98 
itself being the object of concern. To briefly pre-empt myself, as an object of concern mood reveals 
our essential ambiguity in terms of our essential attachment to and alienation from the world. On 
the one hand the world must be encountered within a mood and is in this sense human, but on the 
other hand these moods are not the property or the power of an individual Dasein. A corollary to 
this is the realization that our mood-based existence disallows a certain substantial notion of 
transcendence—if the world is indelibly human there is no room for anything extra-human, for 
anything God-like. What does this perspective amount to though? Can we talk of a mood that 
highlights the very nature of mood? And i f so does this mood become its own mood or is it 
something that somehow subverts the original mood? Indeed, can it in any sense, perhaps for the 
briefest moment, leave us mood/era? These particular questions are central for understanding the 
nature of anxiety as Heidegger employs it but, as I shall be looking at anxiety in depth shortly, I 
shall leave them to simmer for the time being. 
A second basic way in which the world is revealed Heidegger calls 'understanding' [Verstehen]. To 
extend my projection screen analogy, understanding refers to the totality of that which shows up 
against the background of mood—roughly, a pragmatic intentionality. In the mood of fear, for 
instance, a particular scenario such as the sound of footsteps at night in what you took to be an 
empty house will be understood in a general sense as threatening, and within this certain 
possibilities will present themselves. I f the 'for-the-sake-of-which' (as Heidegger puts it) is to avoid 
or destroy the threat then Dasein must choose from the options it sees as helping to achieve this 
goal such as calling the police, in which case the phone is interpreted as the way out of a situation 
understood as threatening etc. 
Existentially speaking, i f we recall that Dasein's essence is existence, Dasein becomes its 
possibilities and these possibilities are projected in understanding (remembering of course that 
Dasein is always projecting from the position of a previous possibility, not some fixed projection 
room and that it can only project within the limited realm illuminated by itself as mood); 
Dasein has, as Dasein, already projected itself; and as long as it is, it is projecting. As long as it is, Dasein 
always has understood itself and always will understand itself in terms of possibilities.26 
Dasein is constantly 'more' than it factually is, it is always ahead of itself, but equally, because this is 
Dasein's constitution it is 'never more than it factically is'.27 
2 6opcit, p. 185 
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Both Befindlichkeit and understanding are unambiguously part of the essential structure of 
Dasein's being-in, but the status of the other two features—'discourse' and 'falling' is less clearly 
defined. I will not say much about discourse [Rede] except that although in Division I of BT it is 
apparently on an equal footing with Befindlichkeit and understanding (^Discourse is existentialty 
equiprimordial with Befindlichkeit and understanding2*), Heidegger later says 'when the "there" 
has been completely disclosed, its disclosedness is constituted by understanding, Befindlichkeit and 
falling; and this disclosedness becomes Articulated by discourse.'29 Unfortunately this statement 
forms part of a further confusion regarding the status of the concept of'falling' [Verfallen]. 
In Division I 'falling' is referred to as 'a basic kind of being of the "there"',30 specifically the 
'everyday1 kind of being. As far as this goes it is clear that falling is not a mode of being-in on all 
fours with Befindlichkeit and understanding; it is less a structural mode in which the world is 
disclosed as a prevalent species of disclosure. Heidegger, however, seems to sway between this 
interpretation and one where falling becomes an essential constituent of our being-in-the-world. 
The reason why this might be the case will be explored more fully in the next section, but for the 
moment I shall describe what is going on in falling and further draw-out its ambiguity. 
Falling can be read as a way of being-in which we become absorbed into the pursuits of the 'they1 
[Das Man]11 By the 'they1 Heidegger does not mean anything like an uneducated or non-intellectual 
mass. He would appear to condemn this kind of generalization when he says; 
we take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as they take pleasure; we read, see, and judge about literature and art 
as they see and judge; likewise we shrink back from the 'great mass' as they shrink back . . . 1 3 2 
It would however seem that his claim 'our interpretation is purely ontological ... and is far removed 
from any moralizing critique'33 is incompatible with much of what he says about the 'they1. 
2 7 op cit. It is necessary to recognize the difference between factually and factically—the latter refers to 
Dasein's ontology, the former to its ontic status at a particular time. So, factically speaking I am thrown 
and contingent, and factually I am a Ph.D. student. 
2 8 ibid, p.203 
2 9 ibid, p.400 
3 0 ibid, p. 172 
3 1 Also translated as the 'one' (e.g. Dreyfus) and the 'anyone' (e.g. Guignon and Golomb) 
3 2 op cit, p. 164 
3 3 ibid, p.211 
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To live ^authentically is to live in a way defined by amorphous public opinions and standards and 
not to acknowledge, firstly the essential contingency of these measures, and secondly one's 
singularity or individuality. One's 'they-self is characterized by 'distantiality1 (defining oneself by 
means of comparison with others), and 'averageness' (a suppression of qualitative distinctions not 
sanctioned by the rigidity enforced by 'distantiality'34); which reveal our appetite for 'levelling-
down' the possibilities open to us so as not to have to face the unsettling demands of authenticity. 
All this amounts to what Heidegger calls 'publicness' [qffentlichkeit], a conspiratorially self-
deceiving mode of existing that acts like a thick fog, obscuring Dasein's basic ontology. Part of the 
temptation of 'publicness' is that 'the particular Dasein ... is disburdened by the "they"', it is 
deprived of its 'answerability1.35 Just what it is disburdened of will become more apparent as this 
chapter progresses, but generally this sort of insight is of course not new to Heidegger. He clearly 
owes a substantial debt to Kierkegaard's The Present Age for his analysis of 'publicness'.36 With 
respect to disburdening I think we find a close link with Kierkegaard's comments on the tendency to 
act on unappropriated 'principles'. A principle provides someone with a painless response to a 
situation that would otherwise call for personal responsibility and strength of wil l , 'we demolish 
"on principle" what we ourselves admire—what nonsense ... Meanwhile modesty or repentance or 
responsibility have a hard time getting hold of such behaviour, for after all it was done on 
principle.'37 
I f the anxiety associated with authenticity is a primary motivation to become 'levelled' then 
indolence is as great, and one equally well documented. In Schopenhauer as Educator Nietzsche 
says, 'men are even lazier than they are timorous, and what they fear most is the troubles with 
which any unconditional honesty and nudity would burden them.'38 In his sections on the 'they1 
(particularly his emphasis on 'disburdening') Heidegger seems to be highlighting this tendency 
among Daseins and this supports the claim that falling is not (simply) part of a structural account 
of being-in-the-world but a psychological account of why, in terms of our reaction to and 
interpretation of our being, most of us spend most of our lives as 'they-selves'. 
In Kierkegaard's words the self is 'ground smooth as a pebble' by 'the others' (SUD, p.64) 
3 5 opcit, p. 165 
3 6 For example, see Harrison Hall's Love and Death: Kierkegaard and Heidegger on Authentic and 
Inauthentic Human Existence (Inquiry, 27, 1984), for an interesting discussion of this. 
37 The Present Age, p. 102 
3 8 In Kaufmann, op cit, p. 122 
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The type of understanding that goes on in 'publicness' is worth explaining in that it seems to further 
bring home the gravity that sustains the 'fall'. 'Idle talk" [Gerede] generates what is called 'average 
intelligibility' as against 'primordial understanding'. In it our entire field of understanding is defined 
in terms of opinion and loses contact with the appropriative possibilities of first-hand experience. 
This field then takes on a life of its own, self-generated by opinions formed through other opinions 
and creating the illusion of genuine understanding. This process shores-up the whole structure so 
that it can ascend to greater heights of inauthenticity; the 'self-certainty of the 'they" says 
Heidegger, is 'tranquillizing'.3 9 As with Kierkegaard's suspicion of 'principles' 'idle talk is the 
possibility of understanding everything without previously making the thing one's own.' 4 0 And, 
because this discoursing has lost its primary relationship-to-being towards the entity talked about ... it 
does not communicate in such a way as to let this entity be appropriated in a primordial manner, but 
communicates rather by following the route of gossiping.41 
Sustaining this ever rising and enlarging bubble of gossip is what Heidegger calls 'curiosity1 
[Neugier]. Here the levelling-down of qualitative differences is most apparent and the 'curious' 
person shares characteristics with someone in Kierkegaard's aesthetic stage; 
Curiosity is characterized by a specific way of not tarrying alongside what is closest ... [it] seeks 
restlessness and the excitement of continual novelty and changing encounters. In not tarrying, curiosity is 
concerned with the constant possibility of distraction.42 
The third aspect of the way the world is disclosed to the 'they1 is 'ambiguity1 [Zweideutigkeit]. 
Ambiguity, I take it, is the ideal tool for sustaining self-deception. The 'they* only hear what they 
want to hear, see what they want to see etc. and so long as their understanding is ambiguous 
enough then 'averageness'—a common, anodyne currency of comprehension—can always be 
found. 
ambiguity is always tossing to curiosity that which it seeks; and it gives idle talk the semblance of having 
everything decided in i t . 4 3 
i V BT, p. 222 
4 0 ibid, p.213 
4 1 ibid, p.212 
4 2ibid,p.216 
4 3ibid,p.219 
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By such means the stability of the 'they1 is maintained, but this is not the healthy, authentic stability 
characterized by what Heidegger later refers to as 'steadiness' and 'steadfastness'. Rather it is a 
stability held together by fear and indolence where nothing of any consequence happens and indeed 
there is seemingly no true bond between its members; 
Being-with-one-another in the "they" is by no means an indifferent side-by-side-ness in which everything 
has been settled, but rather an intent, ambiguous watching of one another, a secret and reciprocal listening 
in. Under the mask of "for-one-another", an "against-one-another" is in play.44 
Passages like this last one make falling sound like a psychological account of the way in which we 
tend to behave most of the time. Heidegger clearly wants for there to be more than this though; he 
wants falling, or some aspects of falling, to be intrinsic to our ontology. Notoriously there are 
contradictory remarks to be found in BT which suggest both that falling is structural (ontological) 
and that it is motivated (psychological). He says at one stage 'authentic being-one's-self ... is an 
existentiell modification of the "they"',45 but then later on, 'from an existential-ontological point of 
view, the "not-at-home" [in the 'they-world'] must be conceived as the primordial phenomenon',46 
and as i f to drive-home this ambiguity later still we are told that 'proximally and for the most part 
Dasein is not itself but is lost in the 'they-self which is an existentiell modification of the authentic 
To a great extent I think this problem can be sorted out by dropping the ontological use of falling 
and replacing it with thrownness. It can, I think, be acknowledged that as thrown we must inherit 
certain ways of interpreting the world which are common (at least) to our culture and our epoch. In 
amongst Heidegger's seemingly derogatory comments on 'they-behaviour he says, more neutrally; 
The dominance of the public way in which things have been interpreted has already been decisive even for 
the possibility of having a mood—that is, for the basic way in which Dasein lets the world "matter" to it. 
The "they" prescribes one's Befindlichkeit and determines what and how one 'sees'48 
op cit 
4 5 ibid, p. 168 
4 6 ibid, p.234 
4 7 ibid, p.365. By 'existentiell' Heidegger means the concrete possibilities available to a particular Dasein 
as contrasted with 'existential' which refers to the broader structure of being within which existentiell 
possibilities are illuminated (e.g. thrownness and intentionality). 
4 8 ibid, p.213. By 'sees' (sight) he means the totality of our understanding or vision rather than literally 
what we perceive. 
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I f in this respect we are determined in our understanding of the world, he seems also to mean that 
within this we tend to fall into an 'average' way of being in which we are deliberately avoiding 
something—in part the very fact that we are thrown and contingent. As the next section will 
reinforce, it is easy to see why we should want to 'flee' into the 'they*, and this motivation is 
undoubtedly abetted by the established tendency of most others to do the same thing. The slope has 
been greased so to speak; as John Richardson remarks, 
we may capture this point by imagining [the] continuum to have an inherent tilt, so that we tend to slide 
from the position of authenticity towards that of inauthenticity.49 
This hazard is suggested in Strindberg's The Dance of Death where Allan, describing something 
like a 'they' says that' just like the cuttlefish down by the jetty ... [t]hey don't bite, but they stir up 
an eddy that sucks one in. ' 5 0 This though is very different from saying that we must be fallen i f it 
implies that we must be inauthentic. This is clearly not what Heidegger wants to say as most of 
Division I I of BT deals with the way in which we can attempt to be authentic, but why the 
ambiguity? A clue is found, I think, in his (ostensibly at least) anomalous emphasis on guilt. As I 
shall look at this is more depth in the next section, for the moment it suffices to say that there is 
more than a nominal correspondence with the Christian fall and in particular Kierkegaard's 
analysis of it in COA. For Heidegger it is somehow not enough that we are thrown into the world 
and have to get on with it; he wants to provoke a sense of lack to which there is no positive 
response, only a specific (ontological) kind of guilt. 
n 
For my purposes the central issue is, i f falling is structured, what are we falling away from? And i f 
it is motivated, what are we fleeing from? I f there are simultaneous psychological and ontological 
processes at work, is there a phenomenon broad enough to explain both? The simple answer to all 
these questions is 'anxiety1. I will say in advance that I think there are simultaneous processes at 
work, and in a manner reminiscent of Kierkegaard's now familiar remark that ' i f science has any 
other psychological intermediate term that has the dogmatic, the ethical and the psychological 
Existential Epistemology (Clarendon, 1991), p.44 
Five Plays of Strindberg (Anchor, 1960), p. 195 
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advantages that anxiety possesses, then that should be preferred',51 Heidegger chooses anxiety not 
primarily because it is something we can all recognize in everyday life as having the felt quality 
and revelations that he ascribes to it, but because, for reasons already outlined,52 it is the best 
available candidate. He is looking for a way of uncovering Dasein's fundamental ontology that is 
basic and therefore simple, and yet fertile in its powers of illumination. The 'existential analytic', he 
says. '... must seek for one of the most far-reaching and most primordial possibilities of 
disclosure—one that lies in Dasein itself.' He asks, 'is there in Dasein an understanding 
Befindlichkeit in which Dasein has been disclosed to itself in some distinctive way?' and responds, 
'as a Befindlichkeit which will satisfy these methodological requirements, the phenomenon of 
anxiety will be made basic for our analysis.'53 
Anxiety is referred to as a Grundbefindlichkeit or 'basic mood' in which Dasein is revealed to 
Dasein as Dasein in a fundamental and complete sense. It is this realization that Dasein in its fallen 
state is falling away or fleeing from and the task is now to consider how and why this happens. The 
'how* of anxiety, its mechanics, can be described in terms of three aspects. Heidegger's description 
of what I take to be the 'onset' of anxiety sounds very similar to an anxiety attack (in the 
psyche-pathological sense) as described in the opening chapter. As has become familiar, anxiety is 
distinguished from fear in that we fear something whereas anxiety has no object: 'that in the face of 
which one is anxious is completely mdefinite.'54 There is an overohelrning sense of danger but, 
initially at least, no way of locating this threat; ' i t threatens from 'nowhere" says Heidegger, 'but 
it is so close that it is oppressive and stifles one's breath. ' 5 5 The suggestion at this stage, and later 
on, is that in fleeing anxiety we turn towards things in the world and thus the possibility of fear. In 
WEVI he says 'because fear possesses this trait of being "fear in the face o f and "fear for", he who 
fears and is afraid is captive to the mood in which he finds himself.'5 6 In anxiety however; 
The indeterminateness of that in the face of which and for which we become anxious is no mere lack of 
determination but rather the essential impossibility of determining it. In a familiar phrase this 
indeterminateness comes to the fore.57 
5 1 COA, p. 77 
5 2 See Preamble. 
5 3 BT, pp. 226-7. I will later mention how anxiety is better understood as an 'understanding Befindlichkeit 
than just a Befmdlichkeit. 
5 4ibid,p.231 
5 5 ibid 
5 6 (Routledge), p. 100 
5 7 ibid, pp. 100-101 
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The inadequacy of the idea that fear is an ontic version of anxiety was explored earlier on, 5 8 the 
general point being that anxiety as Heidegger describes it is too complex to be merely the 
ontological equivalent of fear and that fear is itself too complex to be explained simply in terms of 
a turning away from the revelations of anxiety. 
Still, the scene is set for anxiety to develop into something more distinctly Heideggerian and the 
account begins to part company with the more typical psychological description. 'That in the face 
of which one has anxiety1, says Heidegger, 'is being-in-the-world as such'.59 In other words the 
cause of the anxiety is not some thing in the world, but the lack of significance that things in the 
world suddenly attain. 'Everyday familiarity collapses'60 and Dasein is left floating as those things 
that once anchored it to the world slips from its grasp. At this point anxiety is a non-intentional (or 
perhaps 'non-comportmental') state—it is not anxiety about anything but the revelation of the 
status of things in general.61 I f Dasein is to be revealed to itself in its fullness it must not rely upon 
the contingent significance of things to facilitate this revelation (which would then be partial or 
finite) but upon 'being-as-a-whole'. This is also revealed by moods like boredom and joy, but, as 
we shall see, anxiety is special in that it reveals the 'nothing' that 'nihilates' and therefore 
relativizes being-as-a-whole. In this respect anxiety can be seen as a meta-mood that reveals the 
nature of mood itself. I f moods like boredom and joy potentially reveal being-as-a-whole—i.e. 
illuminate the significance of beings as essentially dependent upon Dasein's mode of encountering 
them as a totality—then anxiety goes a stage further and reveals the nothing that gives rise to the 
possibility of a totality in the first place. As such, i f Dasein can be fully engaged in the world in 
anxiety (which is questionable, but more of this later) then we must assume that other moods can 
themselves be anxiety-laden (anxious boredom, anxious joy etc.). 
I f we imagine qualitative distinctions—an idea of what is important—as the rough edges and 
contours that help a climber maintain a grip on a rock face, then anxiety smoothes them off and the 
climber falls. Dasein loses its grip on its existence in the world, but instead of falling find itself, or 
5 8 See Chapter 1 
5 9 BT, p.230 
6 0 ibid, p. 23 3 
6 1 'Dasein itself ... gets its ontological understanding of itself in the first instance from those entities 
which it itself is not but which it encounters 'within' its world, and from the being which they possess.' 
(ibid, p.85) 
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'hovers' in the zero-gravity of anxiety. 'In the slipping away of being' Heidegger says, 'only this 
"no hold on things" comes over us and remains. ' 6 2 The expression Heidegger uses for this condition 
is 'uncanniness', the German unheimlichkeit meaning literally 'not-at-home-ness'63 David Cooper 
describes it well when he says that 'instead as serving as a discreet backdrop to our dealings with 
things, the world now gets thematized as a world ... [which is] recognized in its 'worldly1 character 
as the 'relational totality1 which, for the most part, stands unobtrusively as the backdrop to our 
dealings and perceptions.'64 As pre-ontological and pre-linguistic a 'mood' like anxiety is the ideal 
revelatory tool for Heidegger. I f things in the world gain significance and 'thing-ness' through their 
relation to a greater network of meaning defined in terms of the language and categories it employs, 
then a loss of the totality of significance amounts to a failure of language to grasp the basis of 
being and thus Dasein's being. This is what Heidegger calls metaphysics—Dasein's 'basic 
occurrence'.65 That the words that we use are contingent cannot be meaningfully expressed by 
these words because this idea itself becomes contingent upon its mode of expression. The fixedness 
of categories keeps in abeyance their contingent background, but 'once the background qua 
background obtrudes, language itself begins to 'swim". 6 6 'Anxiety' we are told 'robs us of 
speech.'67 This is something that must be lived rather than thought in order to make its ful l 
revelatory impact, and Heidegger's emphasis on anxiety is his acknowledgement of that 
'livedness'. 
WIM (Routledge), p. 101. A further analogy might be the kind of nightmare where you are attempting to 
run up stairs but cannot make any progress and sink into them as if they were made of marshmallow. 
63Freud's essay The Uncanny (The Complete Psychological Works: Vol. XVII) is interesting in that he 
stresses the ambiguity of the term inherent in its etymology. In contrast to Jentsch's theory that a sense of 
the uncanny is inspired by what is unknown, Freud proposes that 'the uncanny is that class of the 
frightening which leads us back to what is known of old and long familiar' (p.220). In support of this he 
points to a convergence in the meanings of the words heimlich and vnheimlich. The former generally 
means 'familiar and agreeable' but can also mean 'concealed, kept from sight'. In this case, though not 
commonly, unheimlich comes to mean 'unconcealed'. Freud's thesis is that we find something uncanny 
when it reminds us of some or other repressed fear or impulse; i.e. something that we know and yet find 
unpleasant and have buried in the unconscious. The uncanny is, he says, 'in reality nothing new or alien, 
but something which is familiar and old established in the mind and which has become alienated from it 
through the process of repression' (241). Similarly with Heidegger what appears familiar is really a 
concealing of a more primordial truth about our contingency and state of not belonging in the world in the 
way we thought we did; one that we are aware of pre-ontologically. As such uncanniness is distinguished 
from other forms of fear and plays a central role in defining what is unique about anxiety. 
64 Ineffability, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplt.Vol LXV.1991 
6 5 WIM (Routledge), p. 109 
6 6 Cooper, op cit, p. 14 
6 1 Heidegger, op cit, p. 101 
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In anxiety, then, our 'dealings and perceptions' are starkly revealed as contingencies. An example 
of culture shock from Douglas Adams serves as an illustration; 
Assumptions are the things you do not know you are making, which is why it is so disorientating the first 
time you take the plug out of the wash basin in Australia and see the water spiralling down the hole the 
other way round ... In New Zealand even the telephone dials are numbered anticlockwise. This has 
nothing to do with the laws of physics—they just do it differently there. The shock is that it had never 
occurred to you that there was any other way of doing it. In fact you had never even thought about it at 
all, and suddenly here it is—different. The ground slips.68 
Dasein encounters culture shock on an infinite scale (Tillich later calls this 'existential shock')—it 
finds itself no longer firmly entrenched in a world, the basic contingency of which is now all that is 
in evidence. The realization that we are thrown means that the understanding, language and 
interpretation we have, and must have, is not our own, and by extension, the self we have up to 
now taken as absolute (perhaps amongst other contingencies) is also seen as something that could 
have been otherwise (or even not at all). In W I M Heidegger says, 'it is not "you" or " I " that has this 
uncanny feeling, but "one". In the trepidation of this suspense where there is nothing to hold on to, 
pure Da-sein is all that remains.169All this is revealed in the mood of anxiety that can be said to 
assail us, altering our way of interpreting the world, and i f there is a psychological corollary it is 
the separation anxiety caused by the shock of suddenly being denuded of all that we thought was 
safe and secure. This, initially at least, is an uncomfortable or even panicky feeling; a sense of 
paralysis. We are told, 'this withdrawal of what-is-in-totality ... is what oppresses us.' In the 
throws of anxiety, pure Da-sein may feel paralysed and helpless (as Dreyfus claims) and this is 
certainly one response to what, in essence, is the kind of existence that can only be and not do. This 
sounds similar to Hume's account in the Treatise of losing our 'natural beliefs' about which John 
Gaskin has said; 
If, in a moment of 'philosophical melancholy and delirium', one loses these beliefs then one can only 
remain in a state of paralysed non-communication with the world, 'utterly deprived of the use of every 
member and faculty'.70 
The difference is that in anxiety it is meaning rather than belief that is lost, but the relation is close. 
I get the impression though that the more meditative, peaceful version of anxiety that Heidegger 
Last Chance to See (Pan, 1991), p. 136 (my italics) 
p. 249 (Meridian) 
Hume's Philosophy of Religion (MacMillan, 1978), p. 133 
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occasionally speaks of amounts to a more positive (or mature) response to the sense of Da-sein as 
'nothing' or pure being than a panic-laden paralysis.71 
What I see as the third facet of anxiety (one that is primarily distinguished from the others in terms 
of its origin, the first two being distinct in terms of the experience they are associated with) carries 
with it a slightly different version of uncanniness. As well as that 'in the face of which' Dasein is 
anxious, it is also anxious 'about' something, specifically its 'authentic potentiality for being-in-the-
world'. 'Anxiety1, says Heidegger, 'individualizes [vereinzelt] Dasein for its ownmost being-in-the-
world, which as something that understands, projects itself essentially upon possibilities.'12 This 
process seems to occur in two phases, firstly Dasein is singularized as it confronts its 'nullities', 
and secondly it is individualized as it extracts itself from the 'average' interpretation of the 'they*. 
The first of these overlaps with the imcanniness described as the second aspect of anxiety. The 
nullities are 'thrownness' (as revealed in guilt) and death. Thrownness has already been described, 
but it is worth dwelling on what Heidegger means by guilt. He goes to great lengths to distinguish 
an ontological form of guilt from an everyday ethical one and even claims that the latter is entirely 
dependent upon the former" Guilt in the Heideggerian sense has two distinct features: firstly we 
are guilty of not being our own creators, of being contingent; 
In being a basis—that is, existing as thrown—Dasein constantly lags behind its possibilities. It is never 
existent before its basis, but only from it and as this basis. Thus "being-a-basis" means never to have 
power over one's ownmost being from the ground up ... [Dasein] has been released from its basis not 
through itself but to itself...74 
Secondly, a result of our contingency, existentially speaking, is that though we are free and can 
thus 'project' ourselves upon possibilities, we are always foregoing other, equally valid 
possibilities: 'freedom ... is only in the choice of one possibility ... in tolerating one's not having 
7 1 Pure Dasein, one could argue, would not encounter or 'face' anything but would simply be. Only the 
Dasein which still understands and interprets (that is to some extent identifiable in terms of entities in the 
world) can be anxious in the way Heidegger describes in BT. I shall further draw-out this distinction 
towards the end of this section. 
7 2 BT, p.232 
7 3 Which, for similar reasons to my rejection of Heidegger's relation between fear and anxiety, I do not 
agree with (see BT p.332 in particular). This is a point Sartre makes in BN—'The intuition of our 
contingency is not identical with a feeling of guilt.' (p. 128) 
7 4 BT, p.330 
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chosen the others and not being able to choose them.'75 The upshot of all this is that Dasein as 
Dasein is guilty—not in terms of anything it has done, but simply in terms of what it is. Clearly 
this situation is close to Kierkegaard's ambiguous guilt in COA, and the same paradox is attached. 
As with Kierkegaard I think there is something important about this kind of guilt and that it is not 
just an invention (or in Heidegger's case, a hangover from Christianity) the author finds convenient 
to appropriate. Involved in Heidegger's anxiety structure is a genuine subjective sense of guilt that 
is not objectively coherent, but whereas the father-son analogy is the most illuminating in 
Kierkegaard's case, something else is required for the German—something, as I shall expand on 
shortly, closer to Mooney's ideas about the individual's appropriation of an impersonal history. 
The other 'nullity1, death, tends to be given greater emphasis by commentators than guilt but 
Heidegger does refer to them as 'equiprimordial' . 7 6 Death is fundamental to Dasein in that it offers 
its other (negative) defining characteristic. When confronted in anxiety death sets the limits on 
Dasein's possibilities. Basic to Dasein is its self-projection into the future, but in anxiety the 
realization that at some point there will be no future—no 'in-order-to' by which to locate present 
possibilities and past decisions—is foremost. Even though the time and circumstances of its 
occurrence remains indefinite, an anxious appropriation of death makes us aware that it is going to 
occur and that it is going to put an end to whatever possibilities we may decide to actualize. In 
Jacob Golomb's words, 'one way to explore what it means to be is to investigate what it means not 
to be ... Each time we entertain the possibility of dying we undertake an assessment of our being. In 
our anticipation we define our existence.,77 An unauthentic fleeing from death would tend to result 
in a sense of thinking it is "someone else's problem"78 which in turn will cast an inauthentic light 
upon just what (existentiell) possibilities are open to us. I think it is accurate to say that when 
young there is a tendency to view death as a thing (obscure and distant as it may be), like a 
bogeyman that as we get older will grow ever larger and become ever more frightening. I f this is 
how we do grow up then to attempt to flee death might seem an appropriate response, like fleeing a 
op cit, p.331. With respect to what the artist must forgo when he represents the world, Degas once said 
'a picture must be painted with the same feeling as with which a criminal commits his crime.' (Cited in 
Rollo May's The Meaning of Anxiety, p. 44) 
7 6 ibid, p. 354 (for example) 
77 In Search of Authenticity (Routledge, 1995), pp. 106-7. Paul Auster makes a similar point; 'The 
circumstances under which lives shift course are so various that it would seem impossible to say anything 
about a man until he is dead. Not only is death the one true arbiter of happiness ... it is the only 
measurement by which we can judge life itself.' (The New York Trilogy, Penguin, 1990) 
7 8 "Dying' is levelled off to an occurrence which ... belongs to nobody in particular' (BT, p.297) 
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smoking volcano or indeed a bogeyman. For Heidegger however an authentic attitude to death will 
alter it from something that threatens in the form of an independent entity—something "added 
on"—to a way of being that, as we get older, becomes an indelible part of our way of l i fe . 7 9 
Authentically we acknowledge in anxiety that we are 'being-towards-death' and respond 
appropriately, an attitude Heidegger calls 'anticipation' whereby 'In the anticipatory revealing of the 
potentiality for being, Dasein discloses itself to itself as regards its uttermost possibility .' 8 0 
Part of the appropriate response to an anxious awareness of death is to be individualized. In a 
sense every possibility Dasein takes up in its life is something that someone else might take up and 
equally something that particular Dasein might not have taken up. No one, on the other hand, can 
die in the place of a particular Dasein. This awareness is seen as crucial in Dasein's discovery of 
itself as not-at-home amongst the 'they1: we can trundle along the tracks of the 'they1 until the last 
when 'they1 continue as they ever were but we die alone. Death, says Heidegger; 
does not just 'belong' to one's own Dasein in an undifferentiated way; death lays claim to it as an 
individual Dasein. The non-relational character of death, as understood in anticipation, individualizes 
Dasein down to itself ... [authentic Dasein] is thus forced by that very anticipation into the possibility of 
taking over from itself its ownmost being.81 
Exactly what Heidegger means here though I am not too clear about. In a sense only we can die 
our death, but in another sense everyone dies and so death itself does not signify anything special 
about our existence. Concerning the idea that the universe would be the same were we not born, 
which parallels the feeling we have that it will not be altered once we are dead, Nagel says; 
When I do get my mind properly round this idea, it produces a sinking feeling which reveals that a 
powerful but unnoticed support has been removed from my world ... If you concentrate hard on the 
thought that you might never have been born ... I believe you too will find that this perfectly clear and 
straightforward truth produces a positively uncanny sensation.82 
What Heidegger must want to say is that a prior or latent sense of our individuality is illuminated 
by the consideration of our death: as Golomb points out, death is not the only route to authenticity 
but it is perhaps the most efficacious. He goes on to say that death is 'uniquely mine' because such 
strength is required to face up to the intense anxiety associated with i t that i f we succeed we 
An echo of Kierkegaard's remarks on death in CUP (see pp. 165-70) 
BT, p. 307 
ibid, p308. 
VFN, pp.211-12 
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'emerge' resolute or 'in f i rm possession of ourselves.' My next question would be "in firm 
possession of ourselves as what?" I f we are to be confirmed as individuals this must be validated 
by our ontology (as revealed in the prospect of our demise) but surely death would equally 
undermine any sense of uniqueness we potentially might have. It makes apparent our basic 
contingency and therefore the somewhat illusory status of the mearungfulness of individuality. 
What Heidegger requires is a prior ethical anxiety that paves the way for our establishment as 
individuals in the face of ourselves as a nullity. An individual is an individual in as much as he 
differs from other people and is thus 'subject to a life' , and he is a singularity from an ontological 
point of view. In the latter sense alone the notion of individuality does not seem to make sense until 
combined with the former sense. I f this is what Heidegger wants to say he must, I feel, sacrifice the 
purely ontological character he ascribes to BT. To explain individuality would require a 
developmental (psychological) and ethical inquiry (including an analysis of how a particular 
culture identifies the notion of individuality and its historical basis) not just an inquiry in the mode 
of fundamental ontology; Dasein's attitude to death, and therefore temporality would be revealed as 
a non-essential structure. This kind of problem I see as occurring throughout BT and accordingly I 
shall return to it again later in the chapter. 
In understanding itself as a nullity, Dasein also realizes its 'existential' character as earlier 
described. As a projection it must project itself upon certain possibilities in-the-world, none of 
which defines Dasein concretely in a complete sense. Dasein becomes an empty category of 
possibility in a way perhaps more famously characterized by Sartre in his chapter on bad faith. To 
exist we must be what we are which is essentially nothing. 'Anxiety1 Heidegger says 'individualizes 
Dasein for its ownmost being-in-the-world, which as something that understands, projects itself 
essentially upon possibilities.'84 In W I M he seems to be making the same point when he says, 'only 
Golomb, op cit, p. 110. Returning to Auster, two passages in The New York Trilogy serve to sum-up 
these contrasting interpretations of death: 1) ' I couldn't find myself anymore. The sensation of life had 
dribbled out of me, and in its place there was a miraculous euphoria, a sweet poison rushing through my 
blood, the undeniable odor of nothingness. This is the moment of my death, I said to myself, this is when I 
die.' (p.352) 2) ' I did not die there, but I came close, and there was a moment, perhaps there were several 
moments, when I tasted death, when I saw myself dead. There is no cure for such an encounter. Once it 
happens, it goes on happening; you live with it for the rest of your life.' (p. 356) 
8 4 BT, p.232. It should be noted that in these kinds of passages it becomes apparent that there is a 
distinctive form of understanding that accompanies the mood of anxiety—Heidegger says, 'neither of these 
moods, fear and anxiety, ever 'occurs' just isolated in the 'stream of experience'; each of them determines 
an understanding, or determines itself in terms of one.' (BT, p.395) As I will discuss shortly, this has an 
important bearing on the content and significance of anxiety's revelations. 
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on the basis of the original manifestness of nothing can our human Da-sein advance towards and 
enter into what-is. But insofar as Dasein naturally relates to what-is, as that which is not and which 
itself is, Da-sein qua Da-sein always proceeds from nothing as manifest.'85 
In the second phase of the individualizing aspect of anxiety Dasein is confronted with the 
un<^nniness generated by being absorbed in the 'they1. The presupposition, clearly enough, is that 
despite being thrown there is a way of taking up possibilities in the world whereby Dasein can 
maintain a grip on its essential nullity. What exactly this might amount to will be discussed in the 
next section, but the general point here is that the revelations of anxiety concerning our ontology 
have the effect of plucking us out of our complacent 'average' understanding of the world and 
putting us on an alternative footing. Uncanniness now refers, not to Dasein's general state of 
contingency, but to an awareness of the lnauthenticity of the publicness that surrounds it; a public 
that has un-dis-covered itself as a nullity. 'As Dasein falls, anxiety brings it back from its 
absorption in the world', but as Dasein is necessarily in-the-world it must somehow be 
'individualized as being-in-the-world.'86 
It is probably apparent by now that these two aspects of uncanniness relate to the ambiguities 
associated with death and falling. On the one hand Heidegger is saying that Dasein's uncanniness 
results from its 'null-basis', of its having no form of life that it can possibly be through and 
through, and thus the impossibility of it feeling (authentically) at home in the world. On the other, 
uncanniness is the sense of not being at home amongst the inauthentic pursuits of the 'they1. The 
first would appear to be a reaction to our condition of 'thrownness', the second to our condition of 
absorption in 'average everydayness'. The first we can do nothing about altering but we can 
perhaps adopt a way of life that somehow acknowledges it; the second we surely can do something 
about. In terms of Heidegger's ideas on authenticity we might be looking for a response that deals 
with the first form of uncanniness and a separate response that deals with the second, and we might 
only find one of these; or we might be looking for a response that attempts to deal with both. By 
way of pre-empting future discussion I will suggest that in terms of the first we might be looking 
for a passive 'openness' to being-in-the-world, and in terms of the second an active rebellion 
against certain modes of being. 
p. 251 (Meridian) 
BT, p.233 
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In the meantime I will represent what I take to be the process of anxiety in BT in the form of a 
diagram. 
Figure 1 
being-in-the-world 
obtrudes 
B A 
uncanniness (Dasein as nullity/individualized) 
* V. * 7 
inauthentic 
falling V 
/ 
/ 
/ 
D authentic 
falling 
Anxiety (call of conscience) 
Inauthentic Dasein falls along axis A, is assailed by anxiety and is brought before its uncanniness 
at C. At this point Dasein is confronted with the option of choosing its 'ownmost possibility1 as 
revealed in anxiety, or fleeing back into the ambiguity of the 'they1. If authenticity is chosen the 
oblique line D represents the 'inherent tilt' back towards inauthenticity caused by the gravity of the 
'they-world'. 
This rather simple diagram leaves a lot of questions unanswered but I think it is not an unfair 
representation of what Heidegger has in mind, at least in Division I of BT. I shall, however, 
attempt to shore-up its structure by again raising the issue of the thrown/falling distinction, this 
time concentrating on guilt and conscience. A highly pertinent question is, where does Dasein fall 
from exactly? Heidegger, at times, seems to be saying that we fall from 'x'—i.e. we are thrown into 
an average way of understanding and, initially at least, know no better. This, as pointed out, is 
ambiguous and becomes increasingly so when clouded by Heidegger's emphasis on the 'call of 
conscience' The general picture is of Dasein, absorbed in the 'they-world', suddenly struck dumb 
114 
by a kind of ontological calling. The call, though, does not say anything as such, for if it did it 
would be lost amidst the 'hubbub' of 'idle talk*. For it to be effective the call must say nothing that 
can be made ambiguous in chatter; 'it gives the ... curious ear nothing to hear which might be 
passed along in further retelling and talked about in public.'87 The image is of an 'abrupt' shutting-
up ('reticence') not unlike Sartre's attack of'nausea' and much of the 'theys' motivation towards idle 
talk is to keep the call at arms length like Kierkegaard's 'Sectarians' in F T who 'deafen each other 
with their clang and chatter, hold anxiety at bay with their shrieks';88 and as he puts it in The 
Present Age, 'chattering dreads the moment of silence'.89 
The call of conscience brings Dasein before its anxiety and all that is revealed there-in, but, we are 
inclined to ask further, who does the calling? Heidegger tells us 'the call of conscience comes from 
me and yet from beyond me',90 suggesting that it is some sort of pre-ontological authentic 
awareness. This is further supported when he proposes 'what if this Dasein which finds itself in the 
very depths of uncanniness, should be the caller of the call of conscience?'91 And what Dasein is 
called 'back1 to is its special kind of being which Heidegger calls 'care' [Sorge]. Care encompasses 
all that has so far been said about Dasein as revealed in anxiety, and importantly, if I am reading 
Heidegger correctly, it accounts for both the concrete nature of its thrownness (the existentiell 
possibilities it must work with as thrown into a particular environment alongside particular people) 
and the fact that it is always projecting itself without recourse to a positive constitution (i.e. is 
existential). 
If care is that which we are called 'back1 to in the 'call of conscience' it may appear curious as to 
why Heidegger wants to refer to us as 'guilty1 (guilt is an intrinsic constituent of care). My feeling 
is that care will not be coherent unless Heidegger can adequately bridge the gap between the 
existentiell and the existential, and guilt is a raw material of that bridge. If Dasein originally falls 
from 'x', is assailed by anxiety and brought before uncanniness, there should certainly be no sense 
of guilt in the more orthodox meaning of the word.92 Subsequently however, whether Dasein falls 
8 7 op cit, p.322 
8 8 p. 107 
89 Two Ages, p.98. And in SUD he says 'from man man learns to speak, from the Gods to keep 
silent.'(p.l61) 
9 0 BT, p. 320 
9 1 ibid, p.321 
9 2 And even if, as some have suggested (e.g. Guignon), Heidegger is referring to our indebtedness to our 
heritage it is not clear why the individual should feel that he owes anyone anything. His history, even his 
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from uncanniness, or slides from authenticity back to inauthenticity, it has most certainly fled, or 
fallen away from anxiety and thus subsequent anxiety could be referred to as the 'call of 
conscience1 in a more orthodox sense. The non-naive 'they-self is now aware of the meaning of 
authenticity and can be seen as guilty of evading it. 
As suggested in the last chapter there is a sense whereby we do appropriate our past actions even if 
we might not otherwise be regarded as being responsible for them. By so doing we give ourselves 
continuity through and within our personal history, but unlike the more straight-forward ethical 
guilt we must choose to do this. Such guilt, authentically chosen, must be unsettled by anxiety and 
not be assumed to be necessary to what we are. Even this though is not what Heidegger strictly 
means by guilt, but if we superimpose Kierkegaard's description of the Fall as discussed in the last 
chapter I suggest we get slightly closer to Heidegger's meaning. Kierkegaard is using the more 
orthodox sense of guilt when he talks about the 'qualitative leap', but he admits that though the 
person who makes the leap comes to see themselves as guilty this is in a highly ambiguous fashion; 
their action (or inaction) is crossed with their basic guilt before God's perfection. As mentioned, 
Heidegger goes to great lengths to deny an ethical content to BT but I think that in this instance he 
may be using a sense of guilt associated with an ethic of authenticity, or alternatively he is treating 
Sein, or Sorge, in a way that reinforces Golomb's claim of 'theological undertones' in his work,93 
and Kaufmann's claim that they are an example of Nietzsche's 'shadow of God1.9 4 (I suspect there 
are elements of both—a claim I will fill-out when I later go into greater detail about resoluteness 
and authenticity.) In a highly Kierkegaardian way he says at one point that 'the caller is unfamiliar 
to the everyday they-self; it is something like an alien voice';95 that, guilt is 'asleep' (like 
Kierkegaard's 'slumbering spirit'), and that 'being-guilty is more primordial than any knowledge 
about it.'96 
parents, did not set out to produce Mm. If he is speaking merely as a voice of a particular tradition then 
there is a kind of indebtedness, but surely only an individual can truly be indebted, and it is just this angle 
on things that precludes individuality. 
9 3 Golomb, opcit, p. 123 
94 From Shakespeare to Existentialism (Princeton, 1980), p.364 
9 5 BT, p.321 
96ibid, p.332. In WIM he says of non-anxious Dasein 'anxiety is there, but sleeping. All Da-sein quivers 
with its breathing', and 'it is always on the brink, yet only seldom does it take the leap and drag us with it 
into the state of suspense.' (Meridian, p.253) 
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When defining 'care' Heidegger quotes a fable 'in which' he says, 'Dasein's interpretation of itself as 
care has been embedded1; 
Once when 'Care' was crossing a river, she saw some clay, she thoughtfully took up a piece and began to 
shape it. While she was meditating on what she had made, Jupiter came by. 'Care' asked him to give it 
spirit, and this he gladly granted. But when she wanted her name to be bestowed upon it, he forbade this, 
and demanded that it be given his name instead. While 'Care' and Jupiter were disputing, Earth arose and 
desired that her own name be conferred on the creature, since she had furnished it with part of her body. 
They asked Saturn to be their arbiter, and he made the following decision, which seemed a just one: 'Since 
you, Jupiter, have given its spirit, yon shall receive that spirit at its death; and since you, Earth, have 
given its body, you shall receive its body. But since 'Care' first shaped this creature, she shall possess it as 
long as it lives.97 
Care begins to sound very similar to Kierkegaard's 'spirit'—the synthesis of the finite and the 
infinite that 'relates itself to itself. As suggested spirit, like care, is prior to the positive synthesis of 
the finite and the infinite so that even when it does not 'relate to itself as a synthesis its reality is 
made known via the 'presentiments' of anxiety.98 The trouble is that God does not belong in 
Heidegger's philosophy and so anything that resembles him is potentially problematic. There is a 
danger of care looking like an invention that bridges the gap between our day to day concerns, our 
concrete possibilities, and our uncanniness—in other words, a false unity. But, Heidegger does say 
that care is 'not simple in its structure'99 and maybe this is a hint at an inherent disjunction or 
incommensurability in Dasein's existence, one that is exposed by the incoherence (or, more 
generously, duality) of guilt which in turn resembles the incoherence (duality) in his ideas on death 
and falling.100 That we are motivated by guilt, death and our relationship to others is not fully 
explicable in ontological terms. Relatedly, if authenticity is regarded as the 'primordial 
phenomenon', at what stage are we supposed to have been authentic? I would suggest that the 
whole notion of authenticity/inauthenticity only becomes apparent once Dasein has been in-the-
world and thus in lih&Mitwelt for some time. Heidegger says that, 'in terms of its possibility Dasein 
is already a potentiality-for-being-its-self, but it needs to have this potentiality attested.'101 Only 
9 7 BT, p.242 
9 8 More specifically, some commentators (e.g. Kresten Nordenstoft (op cit, pp. 84-5) and George Stack (op 
cit)) have aligned Care with Kierkegaard's 'interesse' or 'concern'. 
9 9 BT, p.240 
1 0 0 And what appears to be an incoherence in the notion of mood. As mentioned, I do not think that the 
moods of an culture or age are explainable in the same way that the moods of an individual are. To a 
certain extent we are never going to become aware of or be able to do anything about the former kind, 
except be aware that we are situated in one way or another. With the latter kind I would suggest that we 
do have a degree of control (should we choose to acknowledge this fact) and thus the related anxiety will 
be different. 
1 0 1 BT, p.313 
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this way, as explained, can individuality possibly be meaningful, but, the question still remains as 
to how Dasein is aware of the possibility of a different mode of existence. My answer is that there 
does exist something like the 'call of conscience' just as there exists Kierkegaard's 'dreaming 
spirit', but that this does not call us back to a specific kind of existence but only to our anxiety. For 
Heidegger authenticity involves a 'forerunning' of death and a 'repeating' of our heritage but I do 
not see that he has any grounds for making such a substantial claim. The call of anxiety, as I shall 
proceed to explain, must always be interpreted, but at the same time this interpreting must itself be 
dogged by its own contingency in the way set out by David Cooper. If Care is anything it is 
perhaps only the sum of two incommensurable perspectives, something which, as Nagel as made 
apparent, has no unified substance at all. 
Jacob Golomb's 'circle of authenticity' is formulated as follows; 
(1) 'ownness' of my being-the-world > (2) anxiety in the face of (1) > (3) [authenticity] lost by flight and 
fall into the [they] > (4) latent anxiety and the feeling of unheimlichkeit (5) > individuation > (6) 
authentic ownness of my being > ... etc.102 
Mine would start at (4) (which perhaps belies the fact that my dissertation is about anxiety and his 
book is about authenticity) and I think we would both acknowledge that this circle is not as 
seamless as Heidegger would have us believe. To expand on this I will redescnbe the experience of 
anxiety adding to it a developmental dimension that I think is necessary for psychological or ethical 
accuracy, but which of course removes us somewhat from what Heidegger wants to say. 
Figure 2 
LUetc. 
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1 0 2 Golomb op cit, p. 104 ('ownness' is an alternative (and more literal) translation to 'authenticity') 
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In this version a true, uncanny awareness of our being is not realized in one leap but is reached 
after an indefinite number of minor leaps that constitute, or are motivated by, the project of 'self-
enlargement'. Point ' Y could represent a fledgling Dasein—perhaps an adolescent —who first 
experiences anxiety in the form of a 'world' (a set of principles, sexual awakening, a peer group 
fashion perhaps) that reaches into and exposes his restrictive family set-up. The uncanniness he 
experiences (Ui) will be relatively mild but qualifies in the sense of being at the beginnings of a 
wider perspective on existence. In the short term he is thrown into confusion as values once taken 
as certain lose their weight and become unconvincing, but once established in this perspective he 
'falls' once more and lives out his existentiell possibilities in a new light. In REP Kierkegaard says 
that, in search of an identity, the youth goes to the theatre 
in order to see and hear himself as a doppelganger, to disperse into all his possible differences from 
himself, and yet in such a way that every difference is also one self... In such a fantastic self-perception, 
the individual is not an actual form, but a shadow, or, rather, the actual form is invisibly present, and 
therefore not satisfied with casting one shadow, but the individual has a multiplicity of shadows ... The 
personality has not yet been discovered; its energy heralds itself only in the passion of possibility.103 
Anxiety strikes again at a later date when, for instance, he becomes politicized or finds religion, 
and so the process continues. At each stage, however, is the possibility of fleeing back to one's 
prior perspective and no doubt something like this goes on in the oft-seen sclerosis of adulthood. As 
Heidegger (like Kierkegaard) recognizes, in order to be in the world we must assume a form and 
this necessitates at least a degree of closedness—'each one of us has some single specialized 
vocation of his own', says William James, '[a]nd it seems as if energy might be got only by 
hardening the heart toward everything unlike them.'104 
If though the spiral is allowed to unfold we can imagine stages where one's fundamental ontology is 
confronted in an increasingly meaningful way. I say 'meaningful' because even when close to the 
centre of the spiral we can surely abstractly understand the logic of our thrown-being-towards-
death (each dose of uncanniness can be said to be caused by a pre-ontological awareness of being, 
but our interpretation of this experience figures in terms of our response to it) but not until we have 
experienced for ourselves the lack inherent in each prior way of falling can this realization be fully 
Cited in Nordenstoft, op cit, p. 34 
On a Certain Blindness in Human Beings {Selected Papers on Philosophy (Dent, 1967)), p. 8 
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appropriated This much I borrow from Kierkegaard's stages (the experience of the lack is what he 
calls 'despair') and I wonder if Heidegger is alluding to something similar when he says near the 
beginning of BT; 
The question of existence never gets straightened out except through existing itself. The understanding of 
oneself which leads along this way we call "existentiell".m 
Within this 'spiral of uncanniness' the call of conscience does not, I think, have to be silent but can 
come from an alternative source and have a significantly alternative message to those already 
available to the falling Dasein.106 In the first instance it could be something as simple as peers from 
a different family background, then perhaps a particular writer, musician or artist who, as it were, 
'hits the right note'. A more advanced example is found in Conrad's Heart of Darkness (HOD) 
where Marlow is thrown into a state of shock and uncanniness by the primitive howls of the 
tribesmen on the banks of the Congo; 
they were not inhuman ... that was the worst of it—this suspicion of their not being inhuman. It would 
come slowly to me ... Ugly. Yes, it was ugly enough; but if you were man enough you would admit to 
yourself that there was in you just the faintest trace of a response to the terrible frankness of that noise, a 
dim suspicion of there being a meaning in it which you ... could comprehend.107 
As the novel demonstrates, this is part of a process whereby Marlow is forced to reassess all 
aspects of existence and his attitude towards it. That there is a distinct process or progression 
involved is important and would explain why a leap between Ai and U4 is unlikely. Each level is 
imbued with the possibilities contained in higher levels as well as the 'pure' unranniness Heidegger 
seems to be talking about in WDVL, and in competition with these uncanniness is always going to be 
adulterated (creating an unavoidable sense of confusion akin to COA's 'qualitative leap') 
A useful analogy is found in Plato's Phaedo where he describes a soul that is polluted by 'physical 
desires and pleasures' to the point where these become 'ingrained in it'. 1 0 8 Just as for Plato 
dialectics is the process whereby the soul is freed from the body, so for the existentialist a correct 
l U 5 BT, p.33 
1 0 6 Charles Guignon seems to agree with this when he says 'if we assume that the primordial roots and 
sources of our heritage are also embedded in language, then the authentically historical encounter with the 
world may still be seen as constituted by language.' (op cit, p. 143) 
107 Youth, Heart of Darkness, The End of the Tether (Dent, 1974), p.96. Another example would be the 
laughter in Camus' The Fall (see my Ch.7, Unending Ordeals). 
1 0 8 81b-c (Translation by Grube (Five Dialogues, Hackett, 1981)) 
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response to the 'call' of anxiety is the means of attaining freedom and authenticity. At each level 
anxiety is the response to a lack, but that lack is quickly filled in by a new perspective. If of course, 
under the right guidance, the 'lack' was captured and given an ontological significance in the form 
of WEvl's 'nothing' then pure uncanniness might be reached more quickly. Here Plato is useful 
again with his notion of maieusis: if a pre-ontological awareness exists we can presumably 
recapture and 'understand' it with greater economy if competently directed. The role of guide in 
this context is the existential writer or therapist—Golomb believes that much of Nietzsche's 
philosophy is an attempt to 'entice' us to overcome ourselves partly by overcoming his thought. 
'His philosophy' says Golomb 'stands and falls neither on its rational validity or invalidity, nor on 
its truth or falsehood, but on the degree of its allure.'109 Relatedly he says 'at every stage of his 
philosophizing Nietzsche is conscious that this stage is actually only a 'step' to overcome and 
proceed further: "Those were steps for me, and I have climbed up over them; to that end I had to 
pass over them. Yet they thought that I wanted to retire on them."110 
The fall at each of these levels is akin to one of man's 'four errors' as Nietzsche sees it. 
Specifically, that he 'continually invented new tables of values and for a time took each of them to 
be eternal and unconditional.'111 Maintaining a degree of openness or 'readiness for anxiety' 
however will result in a process of continual 'overcoming', all the time the air beaming thinner 
and more rarefied, and allowing uncanniness the space to make its presence existentially 
meaningful. As this happens the motivation to flee anxiety (i.e. the clarity and significance of the 
anxiety) is increasing and thus the outer limits are rarely braved. 
Closer to the centre of the spiral the response to the call does not have to be 'reticence' but can be 
some or other form of creative expression. By this I mean something that has a voice, but one 
which is not readily comprehensible to the 'they* of one's current fall, and indeed, like one of 
Mooney's interpretations of Abraham's silence,112 not fully comprehensible to the person in the 
grip of conscience and the uncanny. I am sure a lot of serious art derives from, and is the vehicle of 
similar movements towards uncanniness. Within this model it helps to view anxiety, as earlier 
l u sopcit, p. 84 
1 1 0 ibid, p. 85 (the Nietzsche quote is from Twilight of the Idols) 
1 1 1 From The Gay Science (cited by Hollingdale in the introduction to Thus Spoke Zarathustra (Penguin, 
1969) p. 13). 
1 1 2 See Knights of Faith and Resignation, Ch.9. 
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suggested, as something different from a mood; as a way of facing up to the nature of 
Befindlichkeit and to the status of our 'being-in'. This being the case many moods would be 
possible responses to anxiety including the 'unshakeable joy1 that Heidegger says goes 'along with 
the sober anxiety which brings us face to face with our individualized potentiality-for-being.'113 
The possible meaning of a pure experience of uncanniness is given its fullest expression in WTM, 
and I think David Cooper's situating of the ineffable is a useful reference here. It is not just certain 
belief systems that are undermined but one's whole 'relational totality'. Its contingency becomes 
apparent, the 'background' is exposed as a background but of course 'the words we would like to 
employ for describing these will, like all words, lose their secure moorings. They will not be 
available for 'committed' description.'114 In the throws of pure uncanniness eveiything, including, 
in a concrete, existential sense, the self, is unstable and insubstantial. The sense of nothing is the 
exposure to the full weight of the lack of an external telos, of the pervasiveness of chance, that 
everything could be otherwise. As the wordly self infringes on this experience uncanniness takes on 
a less pure, more existential (and more typically 'anxious') aspect: the self finds itself an issue for 
itself again, but despite its authenticity the limits of the 'ethical' or 'inwardness' are increasingly 
exposed in terms of the impossibility of completion. In my terminology anxiety B gives way to 
anxiety A and the sense of nothing seems to existentially or experientially engender the realization 
we must inhabit one realm or the other—there is no faith, no passion that can unify them, but at 
best a helpless and paralysed holding them before oneself in what must amount to a (necessarily) 
brief transcendence of our worldly, 'understanding' self. As I shall spell-out in subsequent 
chapters, from here we can either adopt (choose) a comportment that assumes the weight to anxiety 
A or anxiety B, or we can opt for something more Zen-like that provides a sense of unity at the 
cost of the full significance of this antinomy. 
This brief transcendence can be expressed as a confrontation with 'nothing' as Heidegger does, or 
perhaps as an all-encompassing question mark, a mystery ('Why something and not nothing?').115 
As indicated, a basically non-intentional state of mind cannot even be expressed in terms of the 
negation of beings and so 'nothing' must mean something other than this. What this is however, 
1 1 3 BT, p.358 
114 Ineffability, p. 14 
1 1 5 On art and the mystical iris Murdoch says 'we take a self-forgetful pleasure in the sheer alien pointless 
independent existence of animals, birds, stones and trees. 'Not how the world is, but that it is is the 
mystical.' (op cit, p.85) 
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formally described as 'the complete negation of the totality of beings'116 cannot, in itself, be 
thought. It must be revealed in 'a fundamental experience of the nothing'117 and this can be 
understood as a sense of mystery or wonder. He says to this effect 'the indeterminateness of that in 
the face of which and for which we become anxious is no mere lack of detennination but rather the 
essential impossibility of determining it ... [T]his indetermination comes to the fore.'118 If it is in 
anxiety we experience this then this experience is significantly removed from the dizziness and 
foreboding we have associated with existential anxiety up to this point. In BT anxiety, after the 
initial onset at least, does have an object or cause. Dasein is reinstated and the objectless disquiet is 
interpreted as its 'nullities' and here there is a clear connection with the more psychological 
Kierkegaardian version. Heidegger is consistent however in that anxiety as purely non-intentional, 
as not experienced in relation to an identifiable individuality, also cannot be disturbing in the same 
way. The nothing is encountered not as a negation (or potential negation) of beings (or our being), 
nor as the annihilation of being as a whole, but as what he calls a 'nihilation'. In this, notiiing is 
'encountered at one with beings as a whole' . 1 1 9 Beings remain but we are 'repulsed' by their thing-
ness and, devoid of Dasein's projected meanings, 'otherness': 'nihilation' he says '... discloses 
these beings in their full but heretofore concealed strangeness as what is radically other.'120 There 
is clearly a relation to Sartre's 'nausea' here but Da-sein's reaction is not necessarily so negative. 
A powerful reaction, or one you can assign a word like 'nausea' to, seems unbefitting for such a 
mysterious or 'wondrous' experience, and Heidegger's 'bewildered calm', where it is not '"you" or 
T " that undergoes it but 'pure Da-sein', does seem more appropriate. 
Returning to the uncanny spiral, Heidegger seems to recognize the difficulty of reaching pure 
uncanniness. He says; 
We are so finite that we cannot even bring ourselves originally before the nothing through our own 
decision and will. So profoundly does finitude entrench itself in existence that our most proper and 
deepest limitations refuse to yield to our freedom.121 
In Buddhist practices a person 'fastens upon tathata (suchness, is-ness)'122 as a result of certain 
practices and a certain way of life, but these do not themselves explicitly lead to enlightenment but 
1 1 6 WIM (Routledge), p.98 
1 1 7 ibid 
1 1 8 ibid, pp. 100-1. 
1 1 9 ibid, p. 102 
1 2 0 ibid, p. 103 
1 2 1 ibid, p. 106 
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rather facilitate its spontaneous occurrence. For Heidegger finitude 'entrenches itself in experience' 
in the way that for Plato the demands of the body become 'ingrained in the soul', and part of this 
entrenchment is the emphasis on controlling and interpreting the world by acts of will. I will say 
more about the significance if this kind of orientation for Heidegger's authenticity in the next 
section 
If the spiral of uncanniness has a ceiling of pure uncanniness, experienced as a 'nothing' which 
reveals itself as an authentic ideal but also our necessary entrenchment, the next question is; "How 
is Dasein to live so as to authentically appropriate this realization without falling back into one of 
its old forms of existence (which in terms of courses of action available seem to be the only option 
open to it)?" In the next section I want to look at two answers to this. 
I l l 
What then is Heidegger's authentic mode of being as 'attested to in conscience'? His answer is 
'resoluteness' [Entschlossenheit] which is defined as a 'reticent self-projection upon one's 
ownmost being-guilty in which one is ready for anxiety.' At this stage this is understandable in 
terms of its constituent parts—guilt, anxiety and so on—but it remains unclear just how resolute 
Dasein should be in-the-world. This is not something I will explain immediately, but rather let 
unfold within a couple of interpretations of Heideggerian authenticity. 
Dreyfus sees authenticity and resoluteness123 as incomprehensible as far as Heidegger's description 
in BT goes, but he does provide a revised account along the lines of Kierkegaard's Religiousness A. 
Religiousness A, as he describes it, is an attempt to enter into an existence where any project, or 
way of life, is as good as another. No risk is involved in our choice because we do not stand to lose 
ourselves if the chosen lifestyle does not work out. This is achieved by 'self-annihilation before 
God'—effectively an imitation of God for whom the world has no qualitative distinctions. For 
Kierkegaard this mode of existence is incomplete in that it does not recognize the fact that we are a 
self-relating synthesis of the finite and the infinite (i .e. spirit). Whilst attempting to pay heed to the 
infinite, as a finite existence we are unfulfilled, and thus as a self we are unfulfilled. Religiousness 
Cooper, opcit, p. 12 
I shall explain what I think is the distinction between these two terms a bit later. 
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B more or less reverses this in that the infinite is reached via the inwardness that arises from total 
commitment in the finite realm, necessarily involving risk. The individual, as spirit, should not be 
imitating God, but imitating Jesus (or perhaps anyone, as Dreyfus says, with a 'world defining 
concrete commitment'124) 
In terms of the structural account of falling in Division I of BT, so Dreyfus believes, Religiousness 
A is not inconsistent with Dasein's essential ontology and he wants to show how resoluteness can 
be seen as an authentic way of responding to the world in an undifferentiated way. His corrected 
interpretation of resoluteness emphasises passivity—Entschlossenheit is sometimes written Ent-
schlossenheit by Heidegger when he utilizes its etymological meaning 'not-closedness' (i.e. 
openness). This gives it an opposite spin to our usual interpretation as concentrated commitment to 
a particular project. This reading in turn derives from Dreyfus' understanding of anxiety as 
revealing Dasein's individuality to be 'meaningless'. Ontologically speaking Dasein, as we have 
seen, is not given any positive content—it is a 'thrown projection'—and Dreyfus' point is that all 
alternative projections open to Dasein are predefined by history and culture and therefore have no 
specific meaning for any single Dasein. The authentic response to this state of affairs is not to 
commit to some way of life in order to create a self, for there is no possibility of such a creation: 
'The ultimate "choice"' says Dreyfus 'is no choice at all. It is the experience of transformation that 
comes from Dasein's accepting its powerlessness.'125A passage from Sartre seems to express the 
shift that occurs; 
up to that minute, there was still something that could call itself Mathieu, something to which he clung 
with all his strength. Something, indeed, beyond analysis. Perhaps some ancient habit, perhaps a way of 
choosing his thoughts in his own likeness, of choosing himself from day to day in the likeness of his 
thoughts ... He relaxed his grip and let it go: all this happened deep in his inmost self, in a region where 
words possess no meaning. He let go and nothing remained but a look. A new and passionless look, a 
mere transparency. 'I have lost my soul,' he thought with satisfaction.126 
Resoluteness becomes an openness towards the world that acknowledges the meaninglessness of 
individuality The incomprehensibility of Heidegger's account arises for Dreyfus in BT's Division 
U where the elements of choice and risk in authenticity are given emphasis What is it about Dasein 
that tempts it to flee its authenticity: 'Why' he asks 'does even authentic Dasein have a tendency to 
Dreyfus, op cit, p.297. This part of the book (the appendix) is co-authored by Jane Rubin. 
ibid,p.319 
The Reprieve (Penguin, 1986), p.298 
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flee? Why, in short, are we the kind of beings that can't face being the kind of being's we are? 
The obvious answer would seem to be that human beings seek secure meaning.'127 But Heidegger 
does not give Dasein such substantial characterization, and if (as Dreyfus over-emphasises) once 
the illusion of the they-self has been cleared anxiety is experienced as a 'sober joy' why the 
tendency to become inauthentic? 
In a response to this position Elizabeth Ewing says that Dreyfus is; 
concerned about 'who' is left when the 'they' part if the 'they-self has collapsed, i.e. in what sense there 
is a self in Dasein distinct from the they-self? This is a legitimate concern and a troublesome ambiguity in 
Heidegger's text.128 
Indeed, but she does not see it as one which is fatal for Heidegger's account of authenticity. What 
he requires is as substantial notion of self that is distinct from that which is defined purely in terms 
of our culture and history; it is this that Dasein finds burdensome and is tempted by the 
surrounding 'publicness' to flee. Essential to this self is also the need for 'secure meanings'— 
something which is undermined by Dasein's potential to create meanings and the contingency of the 
society which has hitherto provided the illusion of meaning. It is these truths that Dasein wants to 
escape by fleeing into its 'they-self. 
Ewing says that 'it seems clear that Heidegger wants to maintain that there is always some sort of 
notion of self in Dasein' but adds '[i]n what way and with what justification Heidegger can make 
such a claim is the object for another inquiry ' 1 2 9 This though seems fundamental to the consistency 
of Heidegger's account of authenticity, and later on Ewing returns to this when she says that 
'Heidegger's analysis runs into the philosophical problem of how to articulate a concept of a 
continuous self without resorting to an entitative language that Heidegger emphatically rejects.'130 
This strikes me as coming very close to Dreyfus' position. Even if Heidegger is implying a 
substantial self in Division II what right has he to do this? If he has to lapse into empirical inquiry 
then he undermines the foundations of BT and it is perhaps those foundations that Dreyfus wants 
to support by jettisoning his ideas on authenticity. Ewing on the other hand is happier to see this 
Dreyfus, op cit, p.334 
Ewing, E. Authenticity in Heidegger: A Response to Dreyfus (Inquiry, 38, 1995), p.481 
ibid, p.482 
ibid, p. 486 
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inconsistency in Heidegger's work than to lose the intelligibility of authenticity, but either way 
Heidegger is in trouble.131 
Both these commentators are, I believe, highlighting the disjunction in BT that I have analysed in 
terms of falling, death and guilt; all of which culminate in a final and damaging assault on the 
coherence of authenticity/resoluteness and anxiety. My feeling is that Heidegger wants to say what 
Ewing says he is saying, but of course not at the cost of BT's status as a work of pure ontology. 
My preferred method of dealing with this is, naturally enough, in terms of my developing picture of 
existential anxiety which translates Heidegger in the following way: 
i) The pure uncanniness experienced by (or as) Da-sein in the encounter with nothing is that which 
Dreyfus focuses on. In this fleeting state Dasein loses its sense of identity and is paralysed, even 
though this may be associated with 'sober joy' or 'bewildered calm'. As suggested, this 
approximates to a palpable experience of the nature of our entrenchment in the world along with a 
realization of the world's inability to 'complete' an individual Dasein. 
ii) A less transcendental state than this is where Dasein retains an identity but only in terms of its 
'nullities', death and thrownness. In this condition that which Dasein took to be meaningful is 
rendered meaningless, but enough of Dasein's sense of individual identity remains to find this 
disturbing. It is here that fleeing or the temptation to flee is likely to occur, but this can only be 
made sense of in terms of a substantial concept of self that in a sense demands meaning and 
fulfillment (or actualization). Not to flee is to face up to anxiety A—the demand for authenticity 
that makes its presence felt in the 'call of conscience'. To respond to both demands Dasein must 
make what I call a 'first order choice' which concerns the mode of life it takes up within which it 
can best respond to the demands of the substantial self and the demands of its basic 
ungroundedness. One option would be the conquering of certain desires as found in asceticism and 
another would be the enhancement and creation of personality and individuality in the sense I take 
Nietzsche to be recommending.132 My point would be that a greater consistency is found in BT if 
1 3 1 I suspect Sartre is making a similar point when, talking about the relation between negation and 
nothingness he says, 'If I emerge in nothingness beyond the world, how can this extra-mundane 
nothingness furnish a foundation for those little pools of non-being which we encounter each instant in 
the depth of being.' (BN, p.53) 
1 3 2 The former option seems to correspond with Dreyfus' interpretation on the strength of BT's Division I, 
and the latter with Rorty's as found in EHO and CIS. 
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we do not read Heidegger as recommending one or the other, but only that we must make a choice 
along these lines. He is possibly making this point when he says; 
When Dasein brings itself back from the "they", the "they-self" is modified in an existential manner so 
that it becomes authentic being-one's-self. This must be accomplished by making up for not choosing. But 
"making up" for not choosing signifies choosing to make this choice—deciding for a potentiality-for-
being, and making this decision from one's own self. In choosing to make this choice, Dasein makes 
possible, first and foremost, its authentic potentiality-for-being.133 
In a sense the content of this choice is not important; Dasein need only choose resolutely in order 
not to sink back into averageness. Still, for the reasons given it only makes sense to speak of 
'being-one's-self if some sort of self exists (at least as an ideal) which we want to actualize (and 
that this fact remains means the inconsistency which has been outlined remains). 
I take the distinction between 'authenticity' and 'resoluteness' to be bound up with the idea of first 
order choice. To face up to and make this choice is key to authenticity, and to commit to whatever 
is chosen in readiness for anxiety is to be resolute. As such, authenticity is (for Heidegger at least) 
closely associated with anxiety A; and resoluteness is associated with the co-existence of anxieties 
A and B. 'Resoluteness' says Heidegger 'appropriates untruth authentically',134 the untruths being 
the contingencies of our thrown condition which to a great extent must be lived as if absolute. The 
relation between the two is reciprocal—one engenders and acts as a reminder of the other. 
Resoluteness, harbouring urangst, makes us ready for anxiety and the first order choice of 
authenticity. 'Even resoluteness' we are told 'remains dependent upon the "they" and its world. 
The understanding of this is one of the things that a resolution discloses, inasmuch as resoluteness 
is what first gives authentic transparency to Dasein.'135 And that which preserves authenticity 
within the that one must choose part of what is chosen authentically is the attitude of resoluteness. 
iii) The third form of anxiety concerns the maintenance of the individuality attested to by this first 
order choice and this takes the form of responsibility for the chosen conception of self. If 
commitment wavers Dasein feels guilty in the more orthodox sense of the word and the anxiety 
associated with this is anxiety B. 
BT, p.313 
1 3 4 ibid, p.345 
1 3 5 ibid. In other words, resoluteness embodies the realization of its own contingency, and this on occasion 
engenders a transformation to authenticity and anxiety A's realization of the need for first order choices. 
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Dasein's authenticity or resoluteness will be measured in terms of the freedom and flexibility of 
movement it has between anxiety's A and B. It is this realm that I see as ideally embodying 
'readiness for anxiety' and the existential notion of individuality. Unfortunately it also embodies a 
paradox. Individuality is neither wholly contained in our substantial self nor wholly in our basic 
ontology but in both these two conflicting sources of self. Readiness for anxiety seems crucial in 
that a reminder of Da-sein's relation to Nothing as encountered in pure uncanniness should 
maintain Dasein as Dasein-individual, not Dasein-'they-self. In this respect it plays a role not 
dissimilar to Kierkegaard's 'repetition', and resoluteness, like faith, is the mode of authenticity that 
keeps a hold of the fundamental paradox. As with Abraham, it might be seen as an 'ordeal' which 
for Kierkegaard is a 'passing through; the person tested comes back again to exist in the ethical, 
even though he retains an everlasting impression of the terror.' 1 3 6 In the postscript to WEVI 
Heidegger speaks of the need to 'sacrifice' what is in order to illuminate being. He says, 
Sacrifice is a valediction to everything that "is" on the road to the preservation of the favour of being. 
Sacrifice can be made ready and can be served by doing and working in the midst of what-is, but never 
consummated there. Its consummation comes from the inwardness out of which historical man by his 
action—essential thinking is also an act—dedicates the Da-sein he has won for himself to the preservation 
of the dignity of being. The inwardness is the calm that allows nothing to assail man's hidden readiness 
for the valedictory nature of all sacrifice. Sacrifice is rooted in the nature of the event through which being 
claims man for the truth of being.137 
Here there is a Religiousness A type relation between the Da-sein 'historical man' has won for 
himself and the 'preservation' of being. The direct concerns of one's thrown condition are 
'sacrificed' in favour of the a remembering of our ontology. This emphasis on anxiety A becomes, 
I take it, the role of the philosopher or metaphysician. 
Along these lines I think we can see parallels between the three kinds of anxiety found in Heidegger 
and Kierkegaard's aesthetic/ethical/religious stages. In the first instance where anxiety comes from 
'nowhere' we have something like the dreaming spirit where desire for the sensual is there but 
undifferentiated from its object. Uncanniness might not fascinate in quite the same way but the odd 
familiarity of the not-at-home presents it as something deeper, perhaps more intriguing and not 
simply threatening. The first suggestions of freedom then emerge for Kierkegaard in the form of the 
CUP, p.266 
p. 263 (Meridian) 
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possibility of possibility and this is similar to our 'understanding' of ourselves as in-the-world as a 
possibility. Anxieties A and B I have argued have an intrinsic ethical element and i f these can be 
inserted into Heidegger's analysis then we have something similar to Kierkegaard's 'second ethic'. 
Just as Kierkegaard's ethical individual has an implicit awareness of his incompleteness, so the 
Dasein-individual is, though authentic, imbued with urangst and thus 'readiness for anxiety'. This 
is concretized by the rare 'moments' in which pure anxiety is experienced in Da-sein's encounter 
with nothing. Like the Knight of Faith's leap this strips him of his sense of self and the 
significances he previously attached to the world, and like the 'ordeal' he retains this as his world 
comes back into focus. If at this point he does not decide to flee the implications of anxiety he will 
embody these in his shift to resolute/authentic existence—an existence which involves a lived 
awareness of, or readiness for the experience of nothing, contingency, death, guilt and the 
precarious status of individuality. 
Merleau-Ponty does not ascribe a position quite like this to Heidegger, but, partly in criticism of 
him seems to sum up what I have been saying; 
Our birth . . . is the basis both of our activity and individuality, and our passivity or generality—that inner 
weakness which prevents us from ever achieving the density of the absolute individual. We are not in 
some incomprehensible way an activity joined to a passivity ... but wholly active and wholly passive, 
because we are the upsurge of time.1 3 8 
In the next chapter I will attempt to describe Sartre's interpretation and utilization of anxiety in a 
way that accommodates Kierkegaard and Heidegger more in the spirit of this passage than in the 
terms he specifically lays down. In so doing I hope to add further flesh to the anxiety structure as 
defined, implied or inspired in many of its details by Heidegger's secularization of Kierkegaard. 
The Phenomenology of Perception (RKP, 1986) p.428 
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4 
Anxious Engagement: Sartre 
'Anxiety exists when a man has decided on new values in and through action.'—Sartre {Notebooks) 
' I must create my own system, or be enslaved by another man's'—William Blake1 
'You gotta stand for something / Or you're gonna fall for anything'—John C. Mellencamp {Scarecrow) 
'On Monday and the long week when they must perform again their impersonations . . . of adults who are 
not the world's guests but its hosts'—John Updike {Couples) 
'But you and 1 we've been through that / And this is not our fate'—Bob Dylan (op cit) 
« « * » » 
In this chapter I will investigate anxiety's role in revealing and responding to the ethically skewed 
Sartrean versions of freedom and nothingness; its relation to bad faith, and its more explicitly 
ethical significance in terms of what has been called 'reciprocal freedom' and the possibility of 
'authenticity'. What I take to be the sense of ambiguity that dwells in the heart of human existence; 
that which is essentially revealed in the dynamics of existential anxiety, is not always made explicit 
by Sartre whose broad emphasis is on commitment and ethical anxiety and who appears to assume 
a relatively unproblematic relation between ethics and ontology. I hope to show however that, 
though the point of view and thus the spin is different, the same structure of anxiety that we find in 
Heidegger is at play. The following chapters (on Tillich and Rorty) will serve to further reinforce 
this structure, and chapter 7 will concentrate on the way anxiety alters depending on the point of 
view of one's form of authenticity, which in turn is dependent upon whether anxiety A or anxiety B 
is considered primary. 
1 Cited in Rorty, EHO 
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Freedom and nothingness are central to Sartre's philosophy and on their phenomenological 
significance hinges his notion of anxiety In his War Diaries (WD), pre-empting Being and 
Nothingness (BN) he writes; 
Anxiety at nothingness, with Heidegger?, Dread of Freedom with Kierkegaard? In my view it is one and 
the same thing, for freedom is the apparition of nothingness in the world.2 
I f by this he means that for there to be anxiety before freedom there must be nothingness this might 
be true for Heidegger, but it is not the case for Kierkegaard for whom God is certainly not a 
nothingness. I f however he means (as he sometimes says) that for there to be freedom there must be 
nothing stopping me from doing or not doing something or other then this appears to be true but an 
inaccurate representation of these other philosophers. It is important not to confound the various 
meanings of freedom and nothingness as they relate to anxiety, but this is a weakness of Sartre's 
that, at times, leads him to neglect important aspects of the phenomenon. 
In BN he tells us that 'there exists a specific consciousness of freedom, and ... this consciousness is 
anxiety1,3 but it is important to ask just what this awareness of freedom amounts to and just how it 
relates to nothingness. Sartre is bringing ncrthingness into the world through our ability to negate. 
Whenever we elect to do something we are denying other possibilities, by having expectations we 
are prone to disappointment and so on. We are armed with a battery of negatites —absence, 
refusal, denial, change and so on—all sigriifying an intuitive grasp that our being is intrinsically 
bound-up with non-being. Opposed to Heidegger's overwhelrning uncanniness, or 'extra-mundane 
nothingness' ('nothing'), Sartre refers to 'little pools of non-being which we encounter in the depth 
of being'4. 'Nothingness' he says 'lies coiled in the heart of being like a worm.' 5 He uses the 
example of arriving at a cafe in order to meet his friend Pierre. He is a quarter of an hour late and 
knows that Pierre is punctual and may not have waited. Because of the particular structure of 
Sartre's consciousness on entering the cafe he is struck, not by the many faces, the activity in the 
cafe, but by Pierre's absence. In phenomenological terms the cafe becomes the 'ground' upon 
2 WD, p. 132 
3 BN, pp.70-71 
4 ibid, p.53 
5 ibid, p. 56 
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which Pierre's 'not being there' is the 'figure'. In Sartre's words, ' I myself expected to see Pierre, 
and my expectation has caused the absence of Pierre to happen as a real event concerning the cafe 
... Pierre's absent haunts this cafe'.6 This intuitive grasping of absence is contrasted with say, a 
deduced conclusion of Pierre's absence arrived at by studying each face in a cafe where he is not 
expected. In this instance the person does not bring the 'negative judgement' with them, rather it is 
conditioned by the result of Pierre's simply not being there. A fictional incident which demonstrates 
how we also bring (or 'secrete') nothingness into the world is found in John Steinbeck's Of Mice 
and Men. Carlson has taken Candy's mangy old dog out to shoot it—a mercy killing which Candy, 
attached to the animal as he is, reluctantly agrees to. All the farm labourers who live in the barn are 
aware of this and are anticipating the gun shot; 
It was silent outside. Carlson's footsteps died away. The silence came into the room. And the silence 
lasted. 
. . . It came out of the night and invaded the room.7 
Sartre's point, that '[m]an is the being through whom nothingness comes into the world' 8, leads him 
to ask what kind of being man must be in order to do this. His answer is that we are free, but not 
until he has spelt out just what this freedom means, can we see how it relates so thoroughly to 
nothingness. Anxiety, as we have seen, is defined as the awareness of freedom, and so it must also 
be regarded (as in Heidegger) as the awareness of nothingness or contingency. Iris Murdoch has 
commented on Sartre's 'stupefying ambiguity in [his] use of the word freedom'9 and this also 
applies to his use of the word 'nothingness'. In the remainder of this section and in section JJ I hope 
to sort these out in a single raid by focusing on his application of anxiety. 
For Sartre, i f we recall, the distinction between anxiety and fear runs as follows: 'Situations. . .will 
be apprehended through a feeling of fear or of anxiety according to whether we envisage the 
situation as acting on the man or the man as acting on the situation.'10 So, I am due to meet a 
woman on a blind date; I fear that she might be unattractive or unpleasant, but I am anxious about 
how I will behave in her presence. In the first instance I am helpless before circumstances, before a 
chain of events, but in the second kind of apprehension there is no causality as such, only the 
6 op cit, p. 42 
7 Of Mice and Men / Cannery Row (Reprint Society, 1947), p. 65 
8 BN, p.59 
9 Sartre: Romantic Rationalist (Penguin, 1989), p. 103 
1 0 BN, p.66 
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nothing that lies between my present self and my future self. Anxiety replaces causality as far as 
my actions are concerned; 'at the heart of consciousness' Sartre says, 'a link is missing—and it's the 
absence of this link that deprives us of any excuse.'11 Consciousness is not only cut-off from future 
events, but also from its past. In a well known example Sartre places himself in the role of a 
gambler who returns to the table after resolving not to gamble again; 
After having patiently built up barriers and walls, after enclosing myself in the magic circle of resolution, 
I perceive with anxiety that nothing prevents me from gambling 1 2 
We are presented with a picture of consciousness as disengaged from the world in as much as 
nothing is necessary,13 but, as we shall shortly see, necessarily engaged in the world via the 
meaning we confer upon it in our capacity as the creator of values. Our grounds for existence (if 
you can call it a 'grounds') is ourself and only ourself. 
A slight ambiguity emerges when we compare Sartre's definition of the anxious experience with the 
subjective experience of anxiety we surmise from his own examples. He says in the W D that 
'anxiety at a possible one does not want to realise is, in fact, anxiety at the nothingness which 
separates one from that possible1.14 This is, I think, strictly speaking, wrong. You cannot both be 
anxious in the face of an undesired possible and in the face of ncilhingness itself at the same time. 
Take the example Sartre uses in BN of the soldier under attack; 
The artillery preparation which precedes the attack can provoke fear in the soldier who undergoes the 
bombardment, but anxiety is born in him when he tries to foresee the conduct with which he will face the 
bombardment, when he asks himself if he is going to be able to "hold up" . 1 5 
Here I would certainly agree it is the fact that nothingness separates the soldier from his future 
conduct that enables him to feel anxiety, but the anxiety itself is not directed at this nothingness but 
at the possibility of acting in a way he would be ashamed of, i.e. in a cowardly way. He is aware 
that he is free to do something other than what he wants to do, not that he is free per se. The 
anxious soldier is concerned with a pre-established code of conduct (to what degree established by 
him is not important here)—he places value on bravery and the praise this elicits from his 
1 1 WD, p. 133 
1 2 BN, p. 70 
1 3 ' I am in anxiety precisely because any conduct on my part is only possible', BN, p. 68 
1 4 WD, p. 133 
1 5 BN, p. 65 
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comrades, and no value on pusillanimity—he is not anxious in the face of the nothingness that 
underlies his predicament. It might even be more accurate to say that the soldier's feeling is akin to 
a kind of fear before something unknown and instinctive within him (survival instinct?) that might 
determine whether or not he is going to be able to 'hold up'. I once heard a bomb disposal expert on 
duty in Northern Ireland saying the greatest concern he had was the 'fear of fear"—the threat of 
losing his nerve as i f this were something that could happen to him. The question of our 'nerve' 
being under our control or not in such extreme circumstances is more ambiguous and more 
complex than Sartre suggests. 
A further example is found in WD where he admits, with reference to his decision to diet, that; 
there's ... an image at the back of my mind which usually makes me stick to these decisions to the bitter 
end: it's the holy terror I have of all those fellows who decide at three-monthly intervals to stop smoking, 
keep it up for a day or two with a hell of a struggle, and then give in and start smoking again.16 
The anxiety here is directed towards not being like these weak-willed people. Sartre is unimpressed 
by their behaviour and it is this, surely, that is the object of his anxiety rather than the nothingness 
that makes it possible for them to start smoking again and him to stick to his diet. 
My point is that in the type of case Sartre describes there is more than a nothingness that separates 
us from our conduct, there is also a set of values which direct our behaviour, and in these kinds of 
instances it is the living up to, or not, of these values that prompts anxiety. I f this were not the case 
we would suffer anxiety over the most trivial actions. Of course, as Sartre goes on to say, the 
purest form of anxiety is based on the realization that we are responsible for choosing these values 
in the first place (more of this later), but before moving on it should be acknowledged that when 
faced with possibilities of one kind or another there may well be an associated anxiety that is a 
response to nothingness. To illustrate this I will use another of Sartre's examples: he describes a 
situation where one is walking along a narrow path with no railings by the side of a precipice. The 
usual reaction is fear in the face of something happening to us that might cause us to fall (slipping 
on a stone etc.), but there may be a sudden rush of anxiety as we realise there is nothing stopping 
us from jumping over the edge rather than pressing ourselves against the mountain side. A more 
urban example, that I am familiar with, is the onset of anxiety that sometimes occurs when walking 
1 6 WD, p. 124 
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on a narrow pavement by a busy road. The ease with which I could step into the road, or nudge my 
companion under a bus creates a distinct sense of vertigo, of all of a sudden feeling, perhaps 
paradoxically, very insecure. The insecurity is caused, not by the horror of what might happen i f I 
do step into the road so much as the simple fact that there is nothing beyond myself stopping me 
from doing something like this. 
In the earlier two situations Sartre describes, there might well be an element of anxiety before 
nothingness accompanying the anxiety before the possibility of a 'possible one does not want to 
realise' (although I very much doubt this in the case of the soldier) but i f so this is clearly separate 
from, and subsidiary to, anxiety about an unwanted outcome. For it to be more than this, I think a 
far greater degree of detachment is required by the agent. Moments of detachment do occur, such 
as when walking by the busy road, when there is a glimmer of pure freedom or pure nothingness, 
but Sartre goes on to suggest (and I agree) that a more profound level of detachment (one that, 
contrary to so many of his examples, perhaps requires contemplation) is required for anxiety to 
bring us before the sense of our ontological basis as nothingness and freedom. Along these lines 
Marcel says of the question 'What am I?'; 'the true question presupposes a certain detachment or 
separation of myself from what I do and from my manner of sharing in the common life of man.'1 7 
Anxiety, in one of Sartre's definitions, 'is the reflective apprehension of freedom by itself ... it 
appears at the moment when I disengage myself from the world where I had been engaged'. In these 
moments, ' I apprehend myself at once as totally free and as not being able to derive the meaning of 
the world except as owning from myself.'1 8 I think the best way of understanding this type of 
statement, however, is not in terms of inventing meanings and values as we might invent a new 
card game, but in terms of appropriating them. I f there is a way in which values and value systems 
can be authentically lived then it is this that should be reflected upon both in terms of what it 
reveals and in terms of the freedom, commitment and so on that defines the condition of the for-
itself in the first place. Predictably this combining of commitment and detachment causes problems 
which I shall further spell-out and discuss later on. 
The root of anxiety is for Sartre the fact that there is no objective basis for our values, combined 
with the fact that we must nonetheless act on what amounts to an unbounded freedom. The 
1 7 Being and Having (Dacre Press, 1949), p. 109 
1 8 BN, p.78 
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responsibility for what we are doing falls squarely on our shoulders and is inalienable. I f this is 
what he is saying then, as suggested, we need to identify two different kinds of anxiety. On one 
level we are anxious before ourselves, before the responsibility we have to use our freedom in the 
right way (such as in the example of the soldier); and on another level we are anxious before the 
realization that we have chosen what is to be considered right in the first place. Putting aside, for 
the moment, the issue of choosing as meaning appropriating, there is surely more than an a further 
(meta)ethical anxiety here, but also an ontological anxiety before the fact that values are human 
creations. Values, for Sartre, are not objectively valid, not necessary, and this brings us into the 
realm of anxiety A. The anxiety which faces this is for Heidegger the sense of uncanniness the 
everyday world assumes as it loses the significance of its categories and the individual confronts 
the nothing which has been concealed by the Mitwelt. 
My analysis suggests there is no straightforward way of making the connection between the 
ontological and the ethical, and both of these elicit their own kind of anxiety. I f Sartre does not 
explicitly acknowledge this it might be because of his insistence on nothingness and freedom being 
equated. I f so, he has two possible ways out: either to find some way in which he acknowledges a 
separate anxiety before nothingness as distinct from anxiety before freedom, or to exclude the 
particular awareness of nothingness from the ambit of anxiety. His remarks on Heidegger suggests 
that he takes the latter option. As we have seen, anxiety for Heidegger has two distinct 
components; anxiety before the world, and anxiety about oneself as an existing individual with 
distinct possibilities, the ultimate one being one's death. These roughly match up with the two 
sources of anxiety we find in Sartre, but for Heidegger it seems possible to experience a sense of 
uncanniness and detachment without this directly relating to one's responsibility within the world. 
For Sartre, anxiety only has meaning from an engaged, personal perspective. We become aware of 
our contingency and freedom when, as in the case of the student in Existentialism and Humanism, 
we are left without support from the world of pre-appointed values. It is this that leads Danto to 
conclude that anxiety 'must finally mean . . . a recognition of freedom as hateful in a situation where 
there is recourse only to i t . ' 1 9 
An example from my own experience is this: I am in a position where I can choose to tolerate or be 
rudely dismissive towards an irritating but far from malign acquaintance—both actions probably 
1 9 Sartre (Fontana, 1975), p. 133 
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resulting in far-reaching consequences in terms of my relation to them (for example hurting their 
feelings or being lumbered with their company, now and in the future, when I do not desire it), but 
also in terms of my own general attitude towards the world and how I see myself amongst other 
people. The anxiety experienced can be seen as existential in that there is an implicit sense of 
helplessness or limitation concerning the inevitability and tragedy of having to make such a choice. 
I must choose one way or the other; there are good reasons for taking either approach, but 
whatever I decide will commit me in a far deeper sense than my sense of freedom would ideally 
want. The situation has exposed the raw tissue of my nothingness and freedom (and thus my 
ambiguity) and is as such greater and more portentous than the specific moral issue in question. 
For Heidegger, anxiety is not linked to value in this way and can come upon us seemingly at any 
time. It is a 'mood' in which things in the world lose their significance rather than illuminating the 
individual's significance as responsible for the values it has chosen. It is not attached to any one 
event, but spreads itself over the whole, and a sense of this—a 'readiness for anxiety' akin to 
Kierkegaard's 'repetition'—is maintained as we re-engage with our existentiell concerns. It is not 
obvious that this is the case with Sartre. His student is gazing anxiously upon two conflicting value 
systems with no meta-system to consult, only his freedom; but the very fact that he is looking in 
this direction, that he is concerned about the choices available, means that he has already placed 
some value on this freedom—that he is, as an individual among others, responsible. To complete 
the picture the student would feel at this point uncanny—less than at home in his value-laden 
existence which includes his freedom. Though subjectively he is unaware of this (at the moment at 
least) this sense of uncanniness is essentially a slight hardening and clouding of his otherwise 
transparent urangst, and potentially this could radically reorientate him towards anxiety A. 
Heidegger takes this step and lets our anxious hero gaze, not at himself as responsible, but at the 
contingency of the world itself. A clue to Sartre's position on contingency lies in something he says 
in WD; 
An existential grasping of our facticity is Nausea, and the existential apprehension of our freedom is 
anxiety.20 
I think the first, disengaging stage of Heidegger's anxiety can also be viewed as a kind of nausea.21 
There is a sense of 'repulsion' towards 'submerging' beings 'which is the action of the nothing that 
2 0 p. 133 
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oppresses Dasein in anxiety.' The 'nihilation' (a kind of de-signifying rather than a 'negation' or an 
'annihilation') 'discloses these beings in their ful l but heretofore concealed strangeness as what is 
radically other.'2 2 The realm beyond human values is cold and alien, it is without meaning, but it 
can nonetheless be felt to be there. As such, for Roquentin, it threatens us; 
Objects ought not to touch, since they are not alive. You use them, you put them back in place, you live 
among them: they are useful, nothing more. But they touch me, it's unbearable. I am afraid of entering in 
contact with them . . . 2 3 
In the famous passage about the chestnut tree root he says; 
the world of explanation and reason is not that of existence ... That root... existed in so far that I could 
not explain it. Knotty, inert, nameless, it fascinated me ... repeatedly brought me back to its own existence 
... Each of its qualities escaped from it a little, flow out of it, half solidified, almost became a thing . . . 2 4 
The significance of things in themselves is how they contrast with our nothingness; it is their very 
thing-ness that drives home the insubstantial nature of consciousness and all the anxiety that this 
entails. A little later, Roquentin's understanding of nausea places it even closer to Heidegger's 
uncanniness: 'The essential thing' he says 'is contingency. I mean that, by definition, existence is 
not necessary. To exist is simply to be there, what exists appears, lets itself be encountered, but 
you can never deduce i t . ' 2 5 The emphasis here is slightly different; the gratuitousness of things 
highlights both the power consciousness has to create meanings, and the ungroundedness of those 
meanings—a revelation that can be unpacked in terms of anxiety A and anxiety B. 
Roquentin suffers a kind of existential fever and the only cure is some or other means of re-
engagement—of coming to terms with the contingent nature of values and the contingent nature of 
his self. He needs, it seems, to reinstitute anxiety (or anxiety B in my terminology). Heidegger, as 
we have seen, sees something in this kind of disengagement that is not necessarily threatening. 
Certain passages in W I M indicate that, i f approached in the right way, the nihilation of the world 
can constitute a state of 'peace' or 'calm'. For him we can find a home of sorts in the primacy of 
2 1 Although Sartre does say that 'anxiety at the nothingness of the world, anxiety at the origins of the 
existent—these are derived and secondary'—acknowledging, albeit dismissively, something in what 
Heidegger claims, (ibid) 
2 2 WIM (Routledge), p. 103 
2 3 Nausea (Penguin, 1965), p. 22 
2 4 ibid, p. 186 
2 5 ibid, p. 188 
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'nothing' but Sartre does not indulge anxiety's obscurity in this way and the unambiguous horror of 
nausea makes it plain that for him salvation can only lie in a authentic re-entry into the world of 
'mundane' commitment. The trouble is, within what I claim must be a double-edged anxiety, it 
seems all too easy for our awareness of freedom to change its aspect from anxious responsibility to 
nausea before the facticity of our condition—before the fact that we are 'condemned to freedom'. 
Anxiety of this kind is contrasted with the attitude of what Sartre calls the 'serious man'. He is 
someone who is fully engaged in a world which for him consists of given, thing-like rules and 
values. He is unaware (or contrives to be unaware) of his freedom and the fact that nothing rational 
or necessary underwrites his commitments. Our freedom is unsettling and we are inclined to flee 
the responsibility it (for Sartre) necessitates. But our facticity is likewise unwelcoming; it tells us 
that human reality is the only source of meaning, and how does one 'welcome' oneself? The 
Mitwelt on the other hand offers plenty of opportunity for believing and acting as i f there exists an 
absolute, ultra-human validity, and that there is a necessity in what we do rather than the onus 
being on the individual—plenty of opportunity in other words to become serious. Bad faith, I shall 
proceed to explain, can (and probably should) be read as a reaction to both these facets of anxiety. 
n 
'belief is ... thought at rest'—C.S. Peirce (How to Make our Ideas Clear) 
As these 'pools of non-being' gradually form 'the craters of the spirit', 2 6 the question inevitably 
arises as to how we are to be at once engaged in the world, and yet avoid the 'mood of seriousness'. 
In BN Sartre creates for us a sense of absurdity—we care both about having values, and about 
being honest with ourselves about our freedom and the contingency of these values. He has posited, 
roughly, the realms I have designated as objects of anxiety A and anxiety B, but we are yet to be 
told how to combine these in an authentic existence. 
To tackle this question I want first to review Sartre's idea of 'bad faith'—which I see as more 
revealing of the anxiety structure than his comments on anxiety itself-—and see how a kind of 
2 6 Saul Bellow's phrase (see Dangling Man) 
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negative ethic of authenticity emerges from it. Bad faith is not a full denial of anxiety, but an 
inauthentic attitude towards it. It is important for Sartre that we cannot not be in anxiety; he says, 
'It is certain that can not overcome anxiety, for we are anxiety.'27 In other words we are freedom, 
we are a nothingness, we are being-for-itself. Yet we are also in a sense being-in-itself and being-
far others. The Bad Faith chapter seems to recommend a 'meta-stable' equilibrium between these 
three modes of existence that is coherent with our short and long term commitments. Underlying 
these is indeed a choice or a series of choices and thus our freedom, but this then creates the 
structure around which our attitude to our body, our past, our social roles and so on can be seen as 
excuse-making or not. For reasons that will become apparent here and in the remainder of the 
dissertation, this edifice is inherently unstable or even paradoxical; it is shot-through with 
ambiguity and even though nothingness and responsibility remain the primary phenomenal foci of 
existential anxiety, it is this ambiguity that is its essential origin. 
A fundamental feature of our freedom (the closest it gets to an essence perhaps) is its desire to be 
fully engaged as a being-in-itself (yet maintaining itself as freedom). Sartre puts it in the following 
way; 
The supreme value towards which consciousness, by its very nature, is constantly transcending itself is the 
absolute being of the self, with its qualities of identity, purity, permanence.28 
The concluding message of BN is that we are doomed to frustration, a 'useless passion' who cannot 
attain this value. Part of our motivation for wanting to attain it as has already been outlined is the 
for-itself s supposedly complete and inalienable responsibility for its actions, and in this sense 
flight from freedom is manifest as a craving for excuses. Allied to this, in a way that may or may 
not be a direct consequent (the latter in my interpretation), is our desire, as human beings, not to be 
the foundation of all values. There is then this duality in the structure of our wanting to escape our 
anxiety, just as there is ambiguity in the meaning of nothingness and freedom. 
Though we cannot escape our freedom, 'it still remains possible for me to maintain various types of 
conduct with respect to my own anxiety—in particular patterns of flight ' . 2 9 Just as Marcel 
proposes that 'it may be of my essence to be able not to be what I am; in plain words, to be able to 
2 7 BN, p. 82 
2 8 Cited In Murdoch, op cit, p. 93 
2 9 BN, p.78 
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betray myself,30 so Sartre speaks specifically of 'distracting1 ourselves from anxiety at the 
nothingness that separates us from future possibilities by regarding them as formal possibilities— 
things that may happen—rather than my own possibilities; and from the anxiety with respect to the 
nothingness that separates us from the past by treating our progress as somehow necessary (e.g. 
'continual transformations are conceived as a biological order131). We do not take our being as free, 
but see freedom as one of our properties—'a matter of envisaging the self as a little God which 
inhabits me and which possesses my freedom as a metaphysical virtue.'32 This kind of flight occurs 
in the reflective state of mind. 
Escape is achieved in the immediate sense by a 'decentring' of consciousness so that we become 
aware of anxiety indirectly in the form of 'I am anxiety in order to flee it'.3 3 Bad faith, as 
mentioned, it is not a complete dispelling of anxiety but an inauthentic attitude towards it that is, in 
the short-term at least, an avoidance of its full implications. The falseness of bad faith is that it is a 
mode of being chosen in anxiety and can therefore never escape anxiety as it is designed to do The 
person in bad faith has substituted a self that must flee anxiety for a self that is simply anxious. To 
do this it must deny its freedom and take up a false attitude towards its being-in-itself and its being-
for-others. In other words it must come to regard itself not as that which chooses or 'assumes'34 
itself as a particular thing or role, but as that which must be these modes of existence. This denial 
amounts to self-deception: in Sartre's words, 'in bad faith human reality is constituted as a being 
which is what it is not and which is not what it is.' 3 5 Exactly what this means will become clearer 
shortly. 
A famous example from BN is the over-acting cafe waiter (or the barman in The Age of Reason36) 
and the 'dance' of vocational activities in general. In being a waiter, this man is fulfilling a role, 
playing a game whose rules are dictated by a nameless convention. That most jobs will demand 
3 0 Being and Having, p. 106 
3 1 BN, p. 81. Or an unconscious determinism like Philippe in Iron in the Soul (Penguin, 1963) who, with a 
'self-important air of destiny' declares ' I suffer from a Oedipus-complex ... I'm a regular case-book type.' 
(p. 149) 
3 2 ibid 
3 3 ibid, p. 83 
3 4 'Assuming' as used by Sartre and Simone deBeauvoir I take as meaning something close to 
'appropriating'. 
3 5 BN, p. 107 
3 6 See p. 173 
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that we behave in certain ways is inevitable, but whether or not we are in bad faith depends on the 
attitude we take to our position. Bad faith is the attempt to create a solidity and permanence in 
ourselves through, in this case, the role we play for others. It is to deny, from the waiter's point of 
view, that, 'there is no common measure' between the being of being a waiter and his being as 
being-for-itself. The nothingness that lies between myself and this role is, in the immediate, non-
reflective sense, filled in; 
What I attempt to realise is a being-in-itself of the cafe waiter, as if it were not just in my power to confer 
their value and their urgency upon my duties and the rights of my position, as if it were not my lack of 
free choice to get up each morning at five o'clock or remain in bed, even though it meant getting fired. As 
if from the very fact that I sustain this role in existence I did not transcend it on every side, as if I did not 
constitute myself as one beyond my condition.37 
In 'being what he is not' the waiter is constituting himself as an 'in-itself whose freedom is 
solidified through a corruption of its 'being-for-others'. In 'not being what he is', he is avoiding the 
nothingness of the for-itself and its attendant freedom and anxiety. That we must escape from 
something to something is of course important; there is no neutral, middle ground from which to 
take (a purely objective) stock of our situation, and an attempt to do so is liable to fall into the trap 
of 'sincerity'. As suggested 'meta-stability' is a kind of middle ground, but it is thus far unclear 
what this would amount to. One might think that sincerity is the obvious counter to bad faith, but 
for Sartre the 'sincere man' is a further product of it. He is a 'judge' or a 'critic' who in criticising 
himself or others for not facing up to a particular feature of themselves, is creating only a new 
being-in-itself to replace the one being scrutinized. This view of sincerity as duplicity has a specific 
application. Take Sartre's first example—that of the homosexual who, racked with guilt, refuses to 
accept that he is a 'pederast' and disassociates himself from his past actions by virtue of a whole 
range of excuses. His friend, a sincere man, wants him to admit his guilt, to say, 'I am a pederast'. 
If this story was about someone who is authentic (in the sense Sartre uses in the N E 3 8 ) we should 
suppose that the friend wants to make sure the homosexual is being honest about his motivations— 
to admit, if it is the case, that what prompted him to do these things in the past is likely to be what 
prompts him to do them again. In this case though, the example is supposed to reveal, not just the 
3 7 BN, p. 103 
3 8 Here authenticity seems to be a complex attitude, or set of attitudes, directed towards ourselves as an 
ambiguous tension between freedom and facticity. What seems to me a good summary is as follows: 'we 
discover a new tension at the heart of our authenticity: that of being a living absolute that nothing can 
change during the time that we live and that of being irremediably and necessarily a future past about 
which a freedom that will be both new and yet me will decide ... And authenticity must precisely lay claim 
to live this very situation ...' (NE (University of Chicago Press, 1992), p.477) 
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homosexual but the critic as in bad faith; as someone who does not help his friend understand 
himself in the following way; 
To the extent that a pattern of conduct is defined as the conduct of a pederast and to the extent that I have 
adopted this conduct, I am a pederast. But to the extent that human reality can not be finally defined by 
patterns of conduct, I am not one.39 
Rather he is someone who wants to define his friend as a pederast in order to make his freedom a 
thing and thus make his dealings with him easier to handle ("he's just a pederast"). 
I will briefly jump ahead of myself here and point out an issue raised by this example. Sartre seems 
to accept that by virtue of his conduct and the accepted language, this person is a pederast. In an 
ethical sense this is crucial, for i f the man were, against all reason, to deny that in this sense he is a 
pederast he would have to be outlawed from the moral community. The main claim an existentialist 
would have against him would be one of inconsistency (probably bom of self-deception). If, on the 
one hand, he has chosen to be part of a rule-following community (as we presume he has) he 
cannot, on the other, opt to step outside of it when it suits him and still expect his wider ethical 
network to remain intact. The essential problem here is that the irrationality of this action makes i t 
impossible to communicate with him, and communication and understanding are fundamental to a 
system of praise and blame. What I think this indicates in Sartre's philosophy is the idea of 
authenticity amounting to something thicker than an awareness of ourselves as free; it also requires 
a knowledge of a moral, socially-relevant self (being-for-others) which involves preferences we 
may have that have a bearing on our ethical network. Here it is an issue of authentic commitment 
to past decisions—a commitment which is necessary i f we are to entertain a coherent sense of self-
identity over time. As I shall later expand on with regard to Camus' The Fall,40 we do not choose 
everything about ourselves and thus the first step in developing a freed-up attitude towards these 
aspects is knowing and understanding them in the fullest sense. 
Sartre gives a second example of the pejorative sense of sincerity. This time the sincere man is 
directing his judgement towards himself—a self he admits to himself is evil. But; 
3 9 BN, p. 108 
4 0 See Chapter 7 
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the man who confesses that he is evil has exchanged his disturbing "freedom-for-evil" for an inanimate 
character of evil 4 1 
By doing this he has an excuse, he is no longer himself the evil but is able to transcend it. The 
duplicity here is evident—the man is evil, but only on the grounds that he is not evil. This is indeed 
a means of escaping the anxiety, the responsibility, that accompanies the free choice of evil actions, 
and i f this is how Sartre defines sincerity then the sincere man is indeed in bad faith. He is being 
what he is not, i.e. a tiling that is evil, and not being what he is, a 'freedom-for-evil'; and so Sartre 
can say that 'the sincere man constitutes himself as what he is in order not to be it 4 2 
The impossibility of assuming a neutral vantage point on ourselves makes it difficult to pinpoint 
the locus of a mode of existence free from bad faith. On the one hand we must not lose our grasp 
on freedom in our representations and projections, and on the other we must take ful l responsibility 
for our actions in these modes of being.4 3 I f the waiter spills soup over Sartre's jacket he would 
equally be in bad faith i f he were to act without concern, disassociating himself from the task of 
apologising and clearing up the mess on the grounds that a nothingness separates himself from the 
waiter. The nothingness means he has chosen to be a waiter and therefore chosen the 
responsibilities that go with it. A flavour of absurdity sneaks into the equation here—not because 
we are a nothingness who must at all times choose himself—but because this choice, whilst 
grounded in nothingness, forces us to take it seriously (or to choose something else). As 
Kierkegaard's says, not to take our choices seriously, not to commit ourselves, is to commit to not 
comnutting ourselves. Seriousness therefore seems unavoidable. This conclusion is what Joseph S. 
Catalano terms the 'weak notion' of bad faith. Good faith, on this account, only amounts to 'a 
fleeting realization that we cannot escape bad faith itself, 4 4 or, 'a fleeting glimpse of the futile 
character of our condition'.45 Catalano suggests that there is a stronger sense of bad faith in which 
4 1 BN, p. 109 
4 2 ibid 
4 3 This is nicely put by Tibor Fischer in The Thought Gang (Polygon, 1994) when he says, 'Belief causes 
problems, it reduces your flexibility, but it's a spiritual skeleton—difficult to move without one.' 
4 4 Good and bad faith: weak and strong notions, in K. Hoeller (ed.) Sartre and Psychology (Humanities 
Press, 1993), p. 81 
4 5 ibid, p. 79. Sartre actually says very little about good faith but I think Catalano is wrong to use it in the 
way he does. In BN Sartre says '[fjhis which I define as good faith is what Hegel would call the 
immediate. It is simple faith.' i.e. it also moves towards the in-itself, but with no duplicity. I will use the 
term 'authenticity', more or less as I have been using it up to now—i.e. in terms of a mode of existence 
which attempts to face up to anxiety in all its aspects. In a footnote Sartre says we can 'radically escape 
bad faith' and that 'this self-recovery we shall call authenticity.' (p. 116). He says no more about it in this 
work but of course discusses in detail in the NE. 
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something more constructive can be done with our freedom. I would be inclined to agree, not least 
because i f bad faith is an escape from anxiety—an anxiety that we can still trace back to the 
soldier during a bombardment—then there must be something meaningful (or personal) that it 
attaches itself to. I f not, then would not bad faith be an escape from our facticity, from nausea? 
Merleau-Ponty describes freedom in the following way; 
It is true that I can at any moment interrupt my projects. But what is this power? It is the power to begin 
something else, for we never remain suspended in nothingness.46 
Authenticity, in the strong sense, is to be aware of, and not take flight from this 'power1 to 'refuse' 
and 'begin something else'. Just how we are to achieve this whilst never 'suspended in nothingness' 
is of course a fundamental question and one which the various modes of authenticity must address. 
In the weak sense, it might be suggested, i f there is any sense to be made of authenticity, it must 
fall at the exact point after we have refused, and before we 'begin again'. This though seems 
incoherent because it either denies such authenticity any content, or it leads to an infinite regress in 
which each reflection is parasitic upon a language game or a form of life. My solution would be to 
accept a form of reflection upon our contingency that, as with Heidegger, dramatically contrasts it 
with our unreflective day to day comportment. This is to be compared and contrasted with Simone 
deBeauvoir's 'modern meaning of the festival' which is the ecstatic, subjectively absolute 
celebration of a successful commitment (a 'victory'). This can be seen as the zenith of anxiety B, 
the period before it inevitably lapses and urangst (perhaps engendering strong bad faith) makes its 
presence felt again. In claiming that '[i]n festival, in art, men express their need to feel that they 
exist absolutely' she has I think captured something crucial to the anxiety dynamic, and 
importantly she adds that '[o]ne of art's roles is to fix this passionate assertion of existence in a 
more durable way. ' 4 7 In terms of an authenticity that encompasses both anxiety A and B, however, 
it is not any purely formal, timeless instant by itself that is important but a reflection upon or 
insight into contingency closely allied to, or perhaps brought about by our 'power to begin 
something else' in the context of commitment and a concrete sense of responsibility. In sum I see 
these instances as occurring in (and as fundamental to) anxiety A and anxiety B; they are an 
important part of the movement between them, but are not themselves the loci of authenticity. 
The Phenomenology of Perception, p. 45 2 
The Ethics of Ambiguity, p. 127 
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The final section of the Bad Faith chapter presents an identical structure to what has preceded it, 
but this time Sartre refers to belief rather than action. The alteration provides our first real clue, in 
this text at least, of what form authenticity might take i f something other than a realization that we 
are doomed to bad faith. Belief, for Sartre, is haunted by 'non-belief as soon as it passes beyond its 
immediate 'simple' phase.48 Otherwise stated, all our beliefs are precisely not what they are, they 
are essentially self-denying and always lacking confirmation. We can never fully immerse 
ourselves, or lose ourselves in our beliefs because we can never eradicate doubt. In the same way 
that the person in bad faith plays on the ambiguity of being, so he plays on this necessary 
ambiguity of belief. The homosexual in Sartre's example 'reasons' that because he can never be 
what he is (the for-itself can never be an in-itself), he can equally be something other than a 
pederast as much as he can be a pederast. This though is faulty logic because the 'what he is' part 
refers to a description that is befitting of a for-itself (i.e. it does have some meaning and content 
within the context of action, social responsibility etc.). In the same way, the person in bad faith 
reasons that any belief he holds is possible because all beliefs are impossible. 
The weak version of bad faith lies in the reasoning, or rather acceptance, of the impossibility of 
belief. In this version the person is seemingly not facing up to themselves as a 'futile passion'—as 
being a pour-soi that wants to be an en-soi-pour-soi. Sartre says to this effect; 
The ideal of good faith (to believe what one believes) is, like that of sincerity (to be what one is), an ideal 
of being-in-itself.49 
In authenticity however, unlike sincerity, the person never takes refuge in a false construct of 
being-in-itself. The problem here though is as stated: authenticity is denied an existence beyond the 
thinnest imaginable. I f it is to be itself it must believe something, it must be something, for not to 
do these things is not to exist, and to do these things in authenticity is not to do them which is 
4 8 This he describes as good faith, but quickly passes over it in a similar way that Kierkegaard does not 
find the idea of innocence/ignorance in itself particularly interesting (see COA). On the paradox of how 
we find ourselves in, and can be seen as guilty of, bad faith in the first place ('a decision made in bad 
faith' according to Sartre) we find something similar to the murmurs of Kierkegaard's 'dreaming spirit'— 
'one puts oneself in bad faith as one goes to sleep and one is in bad faith as one dreams' (p. 113) This is 
what Mark Johnston calls 'subintentionality'—referring to mental processes which are purposive but not 
actively intended. He sees this as ironic '[given] Sartre's ambition to use the paradox of repression to 
undermine Freudian pessimism about the scope of conscious choice in mental life . . .' (Self-Deception and 
the Nature of Mind, in McLaughlin and Oksenberg Rorty eds. Perspectives on Self Deception (University 
of California Press, 1988), p. 76) 
4 9 BN, p. 115 
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impossible. Anxiety amounts, in this case, to an awareness or intimation that we are not and can 
never be what we would like to be. It becomes a helpless, marginalized awareness that the 
embodied, existing self that we are is a continuing creation of non-essential beings-in-themselves 
and beings-for-others. 
Catalano's point, however, and this is indeed something implied throughout the chapter, is that 
there is a concurrent, stronger version of bad faith and authenticity that does leave room for the 
individual to make a difference. This point is backed-up i f we consider the following comments at 
the end of the chapter. Sartre says; 
If bad faith is possible ... it is because consciousness conceals in its being a permanent risk of bad faith. 
The origin of the risk is the fact that the nature of consciousness simultaneously is to be what it is not and 
not what it is. 5 0 
Earlier on however we were told that; 
in bad faith human reality is constituted as a being which is what it is not and which is not what it is. 5 1 
This version focuses not so much on the attitude of the believer towards the ontological status of 
his beliefs, but on his attitude towards the content of those beliefs. In Catalano's words; 
In the strong sense of these terms, [authenticity] and bad faith thus appear as two different ways of coping 
with the ambiguity that is inherent in every act of belief. [Authenticity] accepts ambiguity and does not 
use it as an excuse for being uncritical; bad faith uses ambiguity for its own purposes of justifying its 
uncritical attitudes.52 
An example of strong bad faith would be the musician who, for cynical reasons, 'sells-out' and 
begins recording commercial records, but who, avoiding admitting to his greed and lack of artistic 
integrity argues that all artists have 'sold-out' because just to have recording contract is to be part 
of the establishment and the world of business. One example Catalano uses is the following; 
A soldier may say that his role is to obey orders and that if everyone questioned superiors all the time 
there would be anarchy. But it is ever an issue of questioning all orders all of the time or is this reasoning 
used as an excuse to relieve him of the burden of living with the possibility that he may have to question 
orders sometimes.53 
5 0 op cit, p. 116 (my italics) 
5 1 ibid, p. 107 
5 2 op cit, p. 87 
5 3 ibid 
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To bring the discussion into the context of anxiety, I think that i f the strong/weak dichotomy is the 
case (as I think it has to be) then it follows the implied ontological/ethical distinction found in 
Sartre's application of anxiety. Why should the soldier sometimes question orders?—the example 
of World War I I concentration camps is an obvious one—because some orders would go beyond 
even the utilitarian and pragmatic ethics of being a soldier. How is the soldier aware of the 
possibility of defying orders? Because he is aware of his freedom. How can it be that he is free? 
Because he is a nothingness, a for-itself. What though is his anxiety directed at? Surely at the 
possible result of defying orders, not at the nothingness itself. As stated, he can become anxious 
before his nothingness in itself, but this, in my terminology, is essentially different from the anxiety 
in these circumstances, and in Sartre's terminology is either 'secondary1 or may slip into a form of 
nausea. My point is that in anxiety there is no seamless movement between the ethical and the 
ontological realms—its 'objects' are in one or the other, and i f in both then there must be two kinds 
of anxiety on offer that may or may not be linked by a mode of authenticity. In my terms, we can 
flee anxiety B and be in bad faith in the strong sense i f we neglect our freedom as an individual in a 
specific situation, but this does not necessarily preclude us from facing up to the content of anxiety 
A; and we can be in bad faith in the weak sense i f we deny the impossibility of belief, deny our 
'useless passion' etc. but this does not preclude us from facing our responsibility as an (ethically) 
free individual. 
An absurd predicament remains, exemplified by my description of the waiter's options. Crucially 
though, the waiter, or whoever, does not become authentic by confronting just his contingency or 
just his responsibility. Although aware of the contingency of his role he can (and should) feel 
anxiety B about his performance, about whether he should be doing this or some other job, about 
the consequences of not getting up in the morning and so on. He would be in bad faith (in the 
strong sense) however i f he were to avoid this anxiety by claiming to be anxious purely before his 
nothingness and his freedom and using this as an excuse for neglecting his duties/situation as a 
waiter. Given what I have said about the business of appropriating values so as to make ourselves 
the basis of them, a thorough commitment is required which involves the risk of losing our grip on 
our freedom to 'refuse' and 'begin something else'. An awareness of our contingency, even i f no 
longer primary, is necessary for a genuine appreciation of the nature of commitment and 
responsibility. The corollary of this is that ethical responsibility is not a necessary demand of the 
contingency of our values and nor is it by itself a mode of authenticity. 
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My suspicion about the Sartre of BN is that he does not want to admit to strong and weak notions 
of bad faith in the same way he insists that our freedom as individuals and our nothingness amount 
to the same thing. My view is that they do not, and one important upshot of this is that the ethical 
and ontological are kept quite distinct. Authenticity and bad faith in the strong sense imply that a 
system of values is being adhered to or accepted in some way; even i f that system is as thin as a 
general personal responsibility. Sartre says that, 'the primary meaning of Necessity applied to 
things is always that of excuse'5*, but the expression 'excuse' only seems to apply in the case of 
strong bad faith. To look for an excuse surely means we must be looking for a way of absolving 
ourselves of a particular responsibility, and to acknowledge responsibility in the first place must 
mean acknowledging a value system. The soldier wants an excuse not to question orders and so 
deceives himself that all orders must be followed out of necessity. In this sense he flees the anxiety 
which arises before the fact that the rules he follows do not always coincide with a broader idea of 
morality that he subscribes to. A more sophisticated level of excuse reflects that of many of 
Sartre's own examples; he could 'sincerely1 admit to himself that he is weak-willed or a coward and 
thus cannot help but follow orders. Could he not however, in the form of 'nauseous' honesty, say to 
himself that he might as well follow orders as not follow orders, for all is contingent and one choice 
is as good as another? And though this glimpse of nausea might be as fleeting as pure uncanniness, 
it is no less valid, no less free because it involves facing up to our nothingness. It is quite possible 
that this itself could be used as an even more sophisticated excuse by the soldier to cover up his 
cowardice, in which case he is, by abusing the ontological status of values, in strong bad faith. For 
Sartre of course, to remain in nausea and behave like Roquentin, rather than experiencing it 
fleetingly, is necessarily to be in (weak) bad faith, because to assume a 'disengaged' stance is to be 
what one is not as much as being a soldier is to be what one is not. In bad faith in the strong sense 
we flee freedom as responsibility (anxiety B). In the weak sense we depart from, or are one 
removed from the truth offreedom as facticity (nausea/anxiety A). 
Can there be a sense, I wonder, in which we can, more consciously confront our freedom as 
facticity in something like strong authenticity? Saul Bellow, a writer profoundly influenced in his 
5 4 WD, p. 135 
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early years by Dostoyevsky and to a lesser but significant extent by Sartre, describes the anguished 
hero of Dangling Man55 in the following way; 
Joseph suffers from a feeling of strangeness, of not quite belonging to the world ... he says all human 
beings share this to some extent. The child feels that his parents are pretenders; his real father is 
elsewhere and will someday come to claim him. 5 6 
I think here we find a more realistic kind of innocence. Joseph enters a period of alienation after 
giving up work and before being drafted into the army. He finds himself overwhelmed by 
contingency and nothingness; at a distance from both his city life and the conflict in Europe, he 
struggles to see where exactly he should locate responsibility.57 We can perhaps see from the 
reader's perspective that he would end his agonies by hastening his draft or taking a temporary job, 
but how is he supposed to know this? He has never found himself in this position before; his 
instinct, for the time being at least, is in shock, and reason cannot provide a clear-cut answer to his 
situation (which has no meaningful 'question' as such). He is, in the sense of dealing with his 
uncanniness, an innocent. As the novel progresses and he learns more about himself, or his 
condition, he moves towards a conclusion of sorts and the closer he gets to this without 
acknowledging it the more we can legitimately accuse him of bad faith. His conclusion is that he 
must commit himself to going to war (although this feels as much like a giving in to the weight of 
history and his 'thrownness' as it does a choice) and there is a final release from the barriers he has 
been erecting to defend his increasingly fragile sense of self. My interpretation is that Joseph is in 
good faith so long as he grapples with his newly discovered ontological freedom (or notriingness) 
without being committed to anything. As soon as he becomes committed to maintaining his 
ultimately illusory ideal of freedom (freedom from others, political ideals etc.) he is in bad faith, 
but the slide between these positions is subtle (though inexorable) and, as the novel cleverly shows, 
wrought with ambiguity. 
5 5 His first novel, about a man who is waiting to be drafted to fight in W.W.II and, having given up his 
job, finds himself struggling to maintain a sense of identity and unable to use his freedom creatively. He 
becomes alienated from his friends, his family and society at large, and concurrently from his moral and 
political ideals before finally volunteering for the army and admitting both that his freedom had defeated 
him and that creativity requires a context of demands and limitations. 
5 6 Dangling Man (Penguin, 1963) p. 24 
5 7 Malcolm Bradbury says of him 'Joseph is a clerkly intelligent man of humanist aspirations, struggling 
between outward history and inner freedom and finding that there are no laws for their connection—the 
essential anxiety of contemporary fiction.' (Saul Bellow (Methuen, 1982), p.37) 
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Joseph's situation is similar to that of Camus' Clemence (as I shall later interpret him 5 8 ) in that it 
mirrors the specific guilt of the artist and no doubt that of the authors in question. Art can itself be 
a mode of authenticity whereby the artist's confrontation with anxiety A (contingency, death etc.) 
makes contact with a social and ethical environment through his role as creator, critic and 
commentator. The ensuing and inevitable guilt brought about by this relationship is that one is at 
once both insider and outsider—parasitic in one's independence. This 'dark night of the soul' (as it 
is for Joseph) is a vital stage in self-understanding, and though it perhaps cannot last for long 
whilst retaining its innocence, it is I think a legitimate form of 'stepping-back. How, after all, does 
one learn about the nature of freedom as responsibility and commitment, i f not through 
experiencing all sides of it? More than anything, i t is the process of learning that necessitates some 
kind of bad faith in order to understand bad faith. Bad faith here though can only really have 
meaning retrospectively, for at the time, in innocence, it is still being learnt about and thus cannot 
be, as Sartre would have it, truly 'chosen' in bad faith. It begins to look like a new category is 
required; one that roughly equates with Kierkegaard's qualitative leap. The key to the situation's 
authenticity is the complex relation of urangst, the individual's courage before this, and the choice 
of a 'guide' (which could be an ideal, even one as vague as 'self discovery') to help the individual 
'pass through' this kind of anxiety in the right way. Joseph is not really guilty in the ethical sense, 
and yet, as discussed in Chapter 2, he is by virtue of his embodying (at least potentially) anxieties 
A and B, ambiguously guilty. His guide is the imaginary 'spirit of alternatives', conversations with 
whom bring to life some central antinomies and ambiguities. Various 'ideal constructions' from 
history are considered ('God-man', 'courtly lover' etc.); 
'Do you want one of those constructions, Joseph?' 
'Doesn't it seem that we need them?' 
' I don't know.' 
'Can't get along without them?' 
' I f you see it that way.' 
'Apparently we need to give ourselves some exclusive focus, passionate and engulfing.' 
'One might say that.' 
But what of the gap between the ideal construction and the real world, the truth?' 
'Yes...' 
'How are they related?' 
'An interesting problem.'59 
5 8 In The Fall ( See Chapter 7). 
5 9 p.116 
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This category applies to any character who undergoes an 'awakening' of this kind—for example 
Clemence, or Marlow in HOD. Towards the end of the book, once he has joined the army, Joseph 
is able to reflect on his alienation. The innocence is now well and truly lost, and to become an 
outsider again would amount to bad faith. He says; 
I had not done well alone. I doubted whether anyone could. To be pushed upon oneself entirely put the 
very facts of simple existence in doubt ... The next move was the world's. I could not bring myself to 
regret i t . 6 0 
This resonates with Merleau-Ponty's view that 'freedom modifies [history] only by taking up the 
meaning which [it] was offering at the moment in question, and by a kind of unobtrusive 
assimilation.'61 But it also highlights the fact that commitment, at least fleetingly, disburdens us. 
This I do not regard as strong bad faith, but more like a period swathed in the at-homeness of 
anxiety B facilitated by the leverage of a period spent in anxiety A. The story is similar for Orestes 
in The Flies except that the circumstances are more demanding than they are for Joseph. His 
freedom is conditioned in the sense that it is thrust upon him and in the sense that he feels like he 
has gained an insight into himself (or into freedom perhaps) that gives him (rather than his 
absolutely choosing) a kind of resolute ecstasy. Like Joseph his youth is over: 'freedom crashed 
down on me, and swept me off my feet', 6 2 and like Joseph his new life ('a strange life ... ') must be 
partly determined by what the world is offering. Sartre's later views on love also suggest a 
movement in this direction as they involve a choice and a succumbing to the object of love. 
'Through this twofold characteristic of love' we are told; 
there is a reciprocal contestation: to love is never just to love since it is also to will to love, and willing to 
love is never pure willing to love since it is to love in spite of oneself, to allow oneself to be overcome by 
one's love . . . 6 3 
Of course, i f one starts to take refuge in the 'world's move', then one is fleeing one's (now 
acknowledged) freedom to 'refuse' and 'begin something else' and the relatively innocent flow from 
alienation to commitment is interrupted. 
6 0 op cit, p. 158 
6 1 op cit, p.450 
6 2 p.310 
6 3 NE, p.477 
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In the symbolism of the 'hero quest' Joseph might be seen as guilty of 'refusing the call1, but I do 
not think it is as simple as this. I f the call is to go to war, then at some stage in the story he might 
be guilty of this, but I think we can identify another call—something akin to Heidegger's 'silent call 
of conscience' I f we take this as a primordial inclination to confront our nothingness and 
contingency in anxiety then I do not see why this should be a straightforward sense of freedom 
before conflicting moral systems as with Sartre's student. Why should i t not involve a journey of its 
own—one in which all value systems lose their significance and become uncanny? Perhaps the 
student, when confronting Sartre had embarked on this very journey. He was discovering 
nothingness and then responsibility, and Sartre's advice was his golden fleece in as much as to 
approach him was the ultimate act of confirmation after a protracted period of ontological and 
moral disquiet. 
For Sartre to claim then that a sense of personal responsibility is so closely allied to our ontological 
understanding of ourselves, is, I think, an exaggeration. An interesting and important role of self-
deception is, however, its relevance to the realm of anxiety B (strong bad faith); in many ways, and 
especially in its relation to individual authenticity, it is the existentialists' strongest claim to an 
ethical doctrine. This I want to explore a bit further. 
IEI 
'He would give up then, and console himself with something she'd said; that you could not love what you 
fully understood. Love, she maintained, was a process, not a state. Held still, it withered.'—Iain M. Banks 
(Use of Weapons) 
There is a hierarchy in representing responses to anxiety that can be found in the pages of BN, and 
which is more explicitly echoed in Simone deBeauvoir's Ethics of Ambiguity. I f the levelled 
existence is seen as sub-aesthetic by Kierkegaard, then this lowest rung can be seen as divided by 
the French pair into the 'sub-man' and the 'serious man'. The former is like a corruption of good 
faith that takes place prior to a full awareness of what anxiety means. Such people are in flight 
from its portents and thus, in contrast to nihilists, 'reject existence' before having fully existed. The 
'sub-man' stagnates in a no-man's-land, 'afraid of engaging himself in a project as he is afraid of 
being disengaged and thereby being in a state of danger before the future. ' 6 4 
6 4 op cit, p. 44 
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The next rung—'serious men'—seem to come in various forms depending on the lengths they have 
to go to to deny their anxiety. What they have in common though is a narrow commitment to a set 
of values they take to be fixed and unquestionable. Sartre says that; 
Anxiety is opposed to the mind of the serious man who apprehends values in terms of the world and who 
resides in the reassuring, materialistic substantiation of values.65 
A more sophisticated form of seriousness is 'sincerity'. This type has already been described but 
interestingly more flesh can be added to it by offering Sartre himself (in his early years) as an 
example. In a passage from his biography we get a clear picture of the way a flight from anxiety 
can occur in someone who is (intellectually at least) explicitly aware of the importance of not 
fleeing it; 
For a long time, writing was asking death or religion in disguise to tear my life away from chance I 
pulled off this noble achievement at the age of thirty: describing in Nausea—most sincerely, I can assure 
you—the unjustified, brackish existence of my fellow-creatures and vindicating my own. I was Roquentin 
... Later on, I cheerfully demonstrated that man is impossible; impossible myself, I differed from others 
only in this one mandate: I had to illustrate this impossibility, which, suddenly was transfigured and 
became my most intimate potentiality ... I was restoring with one hand what I destroyed with the other 
and I took anxiety as the proof of my safety; I was happy.66 
Although Sartre's self-deceiving motivation is made public, I do not think it seriously detracts from 
the validity of what he wrote, or from his general application of anxiety. Someone in Sartre's 
position need not be out to confirm their own being as something solid, but might be helping others 
(his readers) to come to terms with their fundamental project. A sizeable proportion of 
existentialism (particularly the work of Kierkegaard)—maybe a defining feature of i t— can be 
usefully described as a kind of therapy; as having the purpose of revealing something to the reader 
about himself ihat will affect the way he lives his life. 
To a degree BN plays this role, and it might be said to become conscious of this fact in the section 
on Existential Psychoanalysis. The key feature of this process that I want to make apparent is that 
we need help, or a 'guide' as Sartre puts it, to reach a proper understanding (a 'self-evident 
intuition') of ourselves as wanting to be en-soi-pour-soi. Even Bellow's profoundly alienated 
Joseph has imaginary conversations with the 'spirit of alternatives' which go some way to helping 
6 5 BN, p.78 
6 6 Words, p. 156 
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him understand the nature of his situation. An extension of this is the existentialist ethic of 
'reciprocal freedom' which has been illuminatingly unpacked by David Cooper.67 With reference 
to Buber, Marcel and some of Sartre's ideas in NE we are reminded that human relations do not 
have to involve the sado-masochistic objectification described in BN. Instead the suggection is that 
not only can we be free in the presence of another, but that the relationship itself plays a vital role 
in facilitating any realistic conception of freedom. Cooper says, 'my view of myself is indelibly 
coloured by how I take myself to stand in the eyes of others',68 and thus i f we do not encourage 
authenticity in them their consequent inauthenticity will backfire on us as we are left without a 
reliable 'guide' or judge for our behaviour. 
From here it is a short leap to identifying the necessity of encouraging anxiety A as well as the 
freedom-related anxiety B in the other. For Unamuno for example; 
true charity is a kind of invasion—it consists of putting my spirit into other spirits, in giving them my 
suffering as the food and consolation of their sufferings, in awakening their unrest with my unrest, in 
sharpening their hunger for God with my hunger for God. It is not charity to rock and lull our brothers to 
sleep in the inertia and drowsiness of matter, but rather to awaken them to the uneasiness and torment of 
spirit.6 9 
At one level reciprocal freedom/anxiety is clearly a vital means of maintaining an authentic relation 
to anxiety B, but as soon as anxiety A is in play it becomes clear that for the individual even a 
commitment to authentic and reciprocating others cannot bridge the gap between our subjective 
concern for self and anxiety A's perspectivism. There may be moments when Marcel's ideal of 
'possessor and possessed' being 'lost in a living reality' 7 0 is achieved, but across time the best we 
can imagine is continual oscillation between alienation and commitment. This is of course made 
possible by the authentic other, but not directly because as their authenticity will involve periods of 
detachment, (and it is partly these which bring us to our freedom) their commitment to the 
relationship is inevitably destabilized and the ontological-ethical link is again revealed as 
disjointed.71 
6 7 See Existentialism, Ch.10 
6 8 opci t , p. 189 
6 9 Tragic Sense of Life, p.282 
7 0 Being and Having, p. 166 
7 1 Paul Auster is insightful as far as this disjunction goes. One of his characters says about his marriage; 
'The discovery that two people, through desire, can create a thing more powerful than either of them can 
create alone. This knowledge changed me ... and actually made me feel more human.' (New York Trilogy, 
p.274). But later confirms; 'we exist for ourselves, perhaps, and at times we can even have a glimmer of 
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Closely linked to this are the ideas of certain theorists who look to love as the primary affect or 
mode of being: Max Scheler, for example speaks of love in terms reminiscent of Heidegger's and 
Sartre's prioritizing of anxiety— it is 'primitive' and 'immediate' and offers an 'evidence of its 
own'.72 As I indicated in the Preamble I think there might be some fruitful links between love and 
anxiety, but I do not believe that without its being divinized (as it is by Buber and Marcel) love can 
be as basic. In terms of contingent human relations, no matter how honest they are, we cannot be 
completed by the other—fulfill our fundamental desire. In Kierkegaard's words, 'one man cannot 
make another man quite free.'73 
who we are, but in the end we can never be sure, and as our lives go on, we become more and more 
opaque to ourselves, more and more aware of our own incoherence. No one can cross the boundary into 
another—for the simple reason that no one can gain access to himself.' (ibid, p.292) 
7 2 The Nature of Sympathy (RKP, 1954), p. 150 
7 3 The Journals, p. 180 
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5 
'The Existential Awareness of Non-being': Tillich's The 
Courage to Be 
' [death] is not even such a bad smell, no worse than whiskey vomit, but the reek of our death goes like a 
shock to some early unevolved ganglion just at the head of the spine, to the home of all wordless, 
thoughtless fear'—P.J. O'Rourke (Holidays in Hell) 
' So let us not talk falsely now/The hour is getting late'—Bob Dylan (op cit) 
« « * » » 
The Courage to Be (CTB) is principally a work about courage rather than anxiety or fear. As I 
shall go on to explain, that Tillich should choose to give this concept primacy is significant, for he 
could just as well have started with its 'flip-side'. Courage is shown in the face of fear and fear, for 
Tillich, is a metamorphosis of anxiety. 'Anxiety' he describes as 'the existential awareness of non-
being' 1: its origin is 'the negation of every object'2 which represents a constant threat before which 
we are helpless. 'Naked anxiety' cannot be endured for any length of time and must either result in 
despair or be transformed into fear. In fear the non-being central to anxiety becomes something 'in 
the world', something that can be met on our own terms. This transformation is of course not 
seamless, and anxiety, in one way or another, is always present. Towards the end of the book 
Tillich posits 'absolute faith' as a religious form of courage which does not overcome nor even 
fortify itself before anxiety, but 'accepts' non-being as having an essential relation to being. 
Tillich's agenda is then not an investigation into the nature of anxiety, but a treatise on how to live 
with it centred at the concept of courage and culminating in his notion of acceptance. This, 
however, involves an analysis of anxiety and he goes into some depth about the various 
manifestations of non-being it is taken as responding to. In the course of this we find a useful 
introduction to some central issues of existentialism, and though the conclusion of the work is 
1 The Courage to Be, p. 44 
2 ibid, p.45 
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essentially religious, there is a lot that is of relevance to an atheistic approach. He also has some 
insight into what motivates existential philosophizing and thus into the relationship between 
psychology and metaphysics. Despite this, he does not, as far as I am concerned, complete the 
picture as far as anxiety is concerned; or at least he does not compose it in the right way. If one 
reason for this is that this book is primarily about courage, and (possibly) another is his 
religiousness, then a further one is his misplaced emphasis on death. As I shall shortly explain, 
anxiety concerning our death can legitimately form a category of its own—a fourth kind of 
anxiety—but I am not convinced it does the work Tillich wants it to do. In the third section I will 
realign the types of anxiety, or the primary causes of anxiety he speaks of in terms of the emerging 
anxiety structure. 
I 
In CTB Tillich outlines three basic constituents of existence in the threatened negation of which we 
find the origins of anxiety. The first is our bodily or material existence, negated by death; the 
second is our 'spiritual' existence, negated by meaninglessness, and the third is our moral existence 
which is negated by 'condemnation'. The 'foreground' or relativized version of these kinds of non-
being are, respectively, 'fate', 'emptiness' and 'guilt'. 
The anxiety of death is for Tillich the most basic and most important: '[anxiety] of death' he says 
'determines the element of anxiety in every fear'3. For this anxiety to be existential it must be 
realized or grasped in terms of our own lives; 
It is not the realization of universal transitoriness, not even the experience of the death of others, but the 
impression of these events on the always latent awareness of our own having to die, that produces 
anxiety.4 
The inevitability of death supposedly causes anxiety, but can this be classed as anxiety A or 
anxiety B, and moreover, why, in light of the discussion in the Chapter 1, anxiety rather than fear? 
Is Tillich pointing to anything special about our relationship with our death that has a bearing on 
the distinctiveness of anxiety? My feeling is that he is, but that a new category of anxiety is 
3 op cit, pp.46-7 
4 ibid, p. 44 
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required in order to understand this. In the above passage his reference to our 'latent awareness' of 
death suggests that latency is the issue. So long as we are distracted then 'that we must die' is not 
an object of our concern but nevertheless impinges on the periphery of consciousness. In this way it 
is the origin of an 'objectless disquiet', but as already argued, something that attains this status 
simply because it is not the focus of consciousness or is somehow covered over, is not enough in 
itself to qualify it as intrinsically anxiety-creating in any unique meaning of the word. I f it were, 
then anything could be the cause of anxiety so long as it were important enough to make its 
presence felt even when we are concerned with other things. In terms of a psychological or 
psychopathological definition of anxiety this is true, but i f existential anxiety is to have a more 
specific content, or rather a more specific kind of content, then more needs to be said. 
As it turns out this is not what Tillich really means when he speaks about the anxiety of death: that 
we must die is purely and simply the origin of anxiety, whether this realization is latent or not. 
Tillich's answer to why this is anxiety rather than fear is that the simple negation of certain 
concerns (non-being) cannot provide the object required for a reaction to be classed as fear. If, for 
example, death meant time spent in Purgatory then he would say that we would rightly fear death, 
or the consequences of death. But the nothingness that is death, the absence of being and the 
impossibility of experience, is a cause of anxiety. I think it is clear that we cannot rationally fear 
being dead but only the process of dying and the loss of life. I f Tillich also agrees with this then 
his anxiety before death must, as I see it, indicate any one, or any combination, of three 
possibilities. 
The first relates to the unique terror generated by the unimaginableness of death. In a sense this is 
as incoherent as wondering what it is like to be dead, but it seems to embody an emotional reaction 
that is utterly pre-rational and cannot be thought away. An example is found in Sartre's The Wall 
where a prisoner in the Spanish Civil War is awaiting execution; 
I tell myself there will be nothing afterwards. But I don't understand what it means. Sometimes I almost 
can ... and then it fades away and I start thinking about the pains again ... I've got to think ... think that I 
won't see anything anymore and the world will go on for the others. We aren't made to think that ... 
Believe me: I've already stayed up a whole night waiting for something. But this isn't the same: this will 
creep up behind us,... and we won't be able to prepare for it. 5 
5 Sartre, The Wall (in Kaufmann (ed.) Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre), pp.288-90 
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'It isn't natural to die' he says later on, echoing Yeats' line 'man has invented death'.6 However 
non-rational this primordial terror is we cannot deny its existence and maybe this is what Tillich is 
referring to, but even i f he is it is still open to question just what qualifies this as anxiety rather 
than fear. A quick answer is "nothing that can be defended by what I have said so far in this 
thesis", but I still think there is a qualitatively distinct experience being described here for which, in 
light of its profoundly disturbing but ultimately ungraspable and insubstantial nature, the most 
suitable term is 'anxiety'. In attempting to pin down this sense of dread or 'wordless fear' I find 
myself slipping into a state of utter forelorness and sadness which is akin to the sense of 
helplessness and passivity associated with anxiety A. 
Related to this distinctive 'death anxiety' is a second possible meaning of death in Tillich's 
thought. This is concerned with the fact that in our day to day existence most of us are oblivious to 
the issue of our death. We may automatically, or even in full consciousness of our fragility, be 
careful crossing the road or make sure we eat healthily, but this is different from a full-blown 
existential awareness that we will one day no longer exist. Such awareness is of a special kind and 
the species of realization it produces can be seen as a kind of 'existential shock'. This shock is 
directed not at death's unimaginable nothingness but the contrast between this realization and the 
mood of obliviousness in which we usually live our lives. Nagel agrees that from the subjective 
point of view the nothingness of death is unimaginable—the basis of all subjective experience is of 
course our experiencing it, or the possibility of our experiencing it, and i f this is removed the 
imagination is left without any kind of handhold. We can however make sense of our death 
objectively and the occasions when we do this lead to this sense of shock. He says; 
The subjective view does not allow for its own annihilation, for it does not conceive of its existence as the 
realization of a possibility. This is the element of truth in the common falsehood that it is impossible to 
conceive of one's own death ... My existence seems ... to be a universe of possibilities that stands by itself, 
and therefore in need of nothing else in order to continue. It comes as a rude shock, then, when this partly 
buried self-conception collides with the plain fact that TN will die and I with him ... [A] 11 along you have 
been thinking you were safely on the ground and suddenly you look down and notice that you're standing 
on a narrow girder a thousand feet above the pavement.7 
It is on these occasions that 'kitsch'—the view of life in which it becomes meaningful, beautiful 
and benign—'an integral part of the human condition' according to Kundera, and at bottom 'a 
6 From Death (in Selected Poetry (Pan, 1974), p. 142) 
7 VFN, pp.227-8. (By TN Nagel means himself viewed objectively) 
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folding screen set up to curtain off death' becomes transparent. The resulting state of mind 
(perhaps accompanying terror or disgust) is one of 'uncanniness', of feeling alienated from the self 
we had taken ourselves to be. It is this broader impact that the experience has on our life that 
brings it closer to anxiety A—the sense of helpless passivity, but at the same time the more 
Heideggerian realization that our lives can, and perhaps should, be led with this viewpoint in mind. 
Death is the annihilation of the self as a creation, but the feeling is that it should also be part of, or 
modulate that creation. The objective point of view is something we can take and so in order to be 
complete or authentic the fact that we will die should play a role in fashioning what we become. 
Related to this point, and again retreading Heidegger's ground, is the point that it is not death as 
such that causes anxiety but the part it plays in revealing the contingency of our existence. This 
can be the cause of anxiety in that it makes apparent the complete strangeness of the world—the 
fact that it could all be otherwise.9 It is this that Tillich describes as the 'anxiety of fate' and is 
indeed for him closely allied to the anxiety of death. He says; 
Fate is the rule of contingency, and anxiety about fate is based on the finite being's awareness of being 
contingent in every respect, of having no ultimate necessity. Fate is usually identified with necessity in the 
sense of an inescapable causal determination. Yet it is not causal necessity that makes fate a matter of 
anxiety but the lack of ultimate necessity, the irrationality, the impenetrable darkness of fate.10 
This seems closer to the real issues of existential anxiety, but even here the cause of anxiety is 
'lack of ultimate necessity' and 'the impenetrable darkness' rather than the way this relates to our 
particular existence. As far as death is concerned Tillich does not seem to complete the picture in 
terms of its relation to the anxiety A-anxiety B structure and its inherent ambiguity. I f it qualifies 
as a fourth kind of existential anxiety, as I believe it does, it must pay the price of standing slightly 
removed from the central concerns of Kierkegaard, Heidegger and Sartre; otherwise we can only 
incorporate it by ignoring some of what he says and reading it as an essentially Heideggerian take 
on death. I am not happy with this though, and my feeling is that for a less marginalized existential 
significance to be salvaged from Tillich's 'anxiety of fate and death' it must collapse into, or be 
defined in terms of, his second type of non-being—meaninglessness. 
Kundera, M. The Unbearable Lightness of Being, p.253 
9 It is this aspect of the revelations of anxiety in Heidegger that Golomb says does not necessarily need to 
be facilitated by the awareness of our death, even if this is the best candidate, (cf. Chapter 3, section II) 
1 0 CTB, p.52 
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A sharpened awareness of contingency can cause anxiety because of its relation to absurdity. Here 
I am specifically referring to Nagel's use of the term which he sums up as follows; 
The things we do or want without reasons, and without requiring reasons—the things that define what is a 
reason for us and what is not - are the starting points of our skepticism. We see ourselves from outside, 
and all the contingency and specificity of our aims and pursuits become clear. Yet when we take this view 
and recognize what we do as arbitrary, it does not disengage us from life, and there lies our absurdity: not 
in the fact that such an external view can be taken of us, but in the fact that we ourselves can take it, 
without ceasing to be the person's whose ultimate concerns are so coolly regarded.11 
Tillich does not acknowledge this situation directly but he certainly employs contingency in his 
'anxiety of meaninglessness'. I will say something here about his treatment of this topic and return 
to it later, in conjunction with Nagel's notion of the absurd, to show how it should play a 
connecting role between the two other primary sources of anxiety—death and condemnation. 
The 'anxiety of meaninglessness' Tillich describes as 'anxiety about the loss of an ultimate 
concern, of a meaning which gives meaning to all meanings.'12 The relative version he calls 
'emptiness' and this applies to situations where specific pursuits lose their significance and are 
drained of their meaning. This of course can be indicative of a healthy form of creativity and 
development so long as we come to see a pursuit as 'empty' only in contrast with another pursuit 
which then replaces it (as in the uncanny spiral). This is certainly the case i f some form of 
progression is in evidence for this is suggestive of a broader process of self-discovery (or self-
creation). I f such a progression is lacking then it suggests no such task and the situation can be 
likened to certain forms of Kierkegaard's aesthetic existence. Al l that dictates the aesthete's 
movements from one interest to another are such things as mood and caprice rather than an 
evolving sense of self. Kierkegaard describes bis state of mind (whether he knows it or not) as 
'despair' and Tillich follows suit. He says; 
one is cut off from creative participation in a sphere of culture, one feels frustrated about something which 
one has passionately affirmed, one is driven from devotion to one object to devotion to another ... because 
the meaning of each of them vanishes and the creative eros is transformed into indifference or aversion.13 
1 1 Nagel, Mortal Questions (Cambridge, 1979), p. 15 
1 2 CTB, p.54 
1 3 ibid, p.55. In Kierkegaard's higher order aesthete we do not find 'passionate affirmation' but ironic 
detachment. This mode of existence is seen by Kierkegaard as covertly bringing a higher meaning into 
existence; irony sits on the borderline between the aesthetic and the ethical. 
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For Tillich this emptiness is likely to drive the person to seek an ultimate meaning, but he says that 
'a spiritual centre cannot be produced intentionally, and the attempt to produce it only produces 
deeper anxiety.'14 I think it is certainly true to say that a 'spiritual centre' cannot arise simply 
because one desperately needs one: towards the end of CTB the suggestion is that such an ultimate 
meaning can arise through a willed rejection of ultimate meaning, but I take it that this is 
significantly different from the willed creation of such a meaning.15 
Broadly speaking I think Tillich is right in his outline of the relation between emptiness, 
meaninglessness and anxiety. Meaninglessness is in a sense a constant threat, but as I shall 
elaborate on later, it is not clear whether this is a coherent threat in itself or whether it is very much 
a psychological state attached only to the specific significance of specific pursuits. As Kierkegaard, 
Sartre and others have said, we can never coincide with our projects, never be 'at home' in them, 
but does this in itself really point to the possibility of life itself being or becoming meaningless? 
What exactly this could mean is not at all clear. Nagel's his point about absurdity is that we tend to 
take our lives seriously even though there is no ultimate significance in what we do. It is not a 
question of life-saving self-deception, but of the difference between a subjective and an objective 
point of view, neither of which is more correct or authentic than the other (but each as incorrect as 
its conflicting view attests). The distinction between the 'moods' of Camus' two books on the 
absurd is significant. In The Myth of Sisyphus he says; 
The feeling of the absurd is not the same as the idea of the absurd. The idea is grounded in the feeling that 
is all, it does not exhaust i t . 1 6 
It is one thing to realize absurdity objectively, but quite another to feel it, to embody it subjectively 
and existentially. This latter state of mind is mysterious, perhaps pathological. Sartre, as 
mentioned, says about Mersault, 'we can neither understand nor quite judge him' . 1 7 Significantly 
he becomes most comprehensible at the end of the novel when he does discover meaning and a 
reason to live in life's (now objective) meaninglessness. Here objective absurdity is not translated 
into subjective despair or indifference but into an ultimate meaning of sorts. 
1 4opcit 
1 5 Either that or he is hinting at revelation. 
1 6 Cited in Sartre's Camus' "The Outsider" (in Literary and Philosophical Essays), p.32 
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I think we must acknowledge a schism in human existence; we have the need for objective meaning, 
for this product of our rationality to be satisfied, but the leap from this state of affairs to despair or 
suicide remains peculiar. That it exists is not in question and here we have a link between the 
anxieties of death and meaninglessness. Tillich says; 
Man's being includes his relation to meanings. He is human only by understanding and shaping reality... 
according to meanings and values ... Therefore the threat to his spiritual being is a threat to his whole 
being. The most revealing expression of this fact is the desire to throw away one's ontic existence rather 
than stand the despair of emptiness and meaninglessness.18 
There is then a strong sense in which the anxiety of meaninglessness is more important than the 
anxiety of death, but of course in a Heideggerian reinterpretation of the anxiety of death the two 
'types' of non-being amount to something very similar.19 Interestingly, an instance of a reversal of 
this, where death's ever-presence and uncertainty leads to suicide, is cited by the psychiatrist Freda 
Fromm-Reichmann who describes; 
certain emotionally disturbed people to whom [death's] uncertainty is so anxiety provoking and 
unbearable that they evade its acceptance ... by committing suicide. As if, by their own determination they 
take the power of decision out of the hands of... fate, or of nature.20 
There is a close relation between this and forms of avoiding our passivity before the 'facticity' of 
anxiety's sources that I shall speak about shortly. With the exception of this kind of case, death is 
not a constant threat in the same way that meaninglessness is. Even though it could occur at any 
time we are not going to know much about it i f is does come 'out of the blue'. Outside of this it 
exists quite meaningfully in the future (even i f I am diagnosed as having terminal cancer 
tomorrow) whereas meaninglessness is the kind of thing that imbues our activities and projects in a 
pervasive manner. It is this tangible, living, fragility that seems essential to existential anxiety as 
opposed to a concern for what will or might happen in the future. By making death his locus, 
Tillich gives anxiety's indefiniteness the wrong spin. A reason why death anxiety is not on all fours 
with the broader anxiety structure is that its absolute nature does not provide space for its 
interpretative element. Life is encountered as meaningless in anxiety precisely because in another, 
incommensurable sense we find it meaningful. This ambiguity inheres in Nagel's subjective-
objective dichotomy but not in the single-centred vortex that Tillich seems to present us with. A 
1 8 CTB, pp.57-8 
1 9 As such Tillich's comment that 'fate would not produce inescapable anxiety without death behind it' 
(p. 5 2) must be seen as untrue. 
2 0 Psychiatric Aspects of Anxiety in An Outline of Psychoanalysis (The Modern Library, 1955), p. 124 
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crucial feature of anxiety that Tillich does not consider is that it is not just a reaction to certain 
features of existence but also a mode of encountering one's self and the world which is 
fundamentally unstable in terms of its own significance. Existentially speaking meaninglessness 
and death do not merely arouse an anxiety before non-being, but embody the urangst which, i f we 
are open to it, constantly informs us that we have not settled on something essential and definitive. 
All that is definitive is the instability and this is not a nothingness in quite the way Tillich 
represents it. Whatever basis we reach—even death's non-being—it is always open to further, or 
alternative interpretation, and the absurdity of the situation arises from the fact that we cannot rise 
above it because we are this interpretation. And in the sense in which we are anxiety, we are 
anxiety in that we are essentially self-interpreters, not simply because we are threatened by non-
being. 
In the same way that emptiness is claimed to lead to a confrontation with meaninglessness and 
potentially suicide, so the anxiety of guilt can drive us towards the third type of non-being— 
condemnation. To perfect ourselves, to be, in Maslow's words 'all that we can be' is an impossible 
task and to sink under the weight of this is what Tillich terms moral despair. The guilt he speaks of 
is a variation of a kind familiar in existential literature; it is not (directly) guilt at having done 
wrong in the eyes of others or in terms of universal duties, but before oneself in terms of one's own 
potential and expectations. 'Man's being' Tillich says '... is not only given to him but also 
demanded of him. He is responsible for it; ... he is required to answer, i f he is asked, what he has 
made of himself. He who asks him is his judge, namely he himself, who, at the same time, stands 
against him. ' 2 1 
As already shown, the relation between anxiety and guilt is of great importance (and more will be 
said about it in Chapter 7), but I am not convinced about its 'absolute' correlate 'condemnation'. 
This could be seen as a complete loss of self-esteem and its consequent depression, but though this 
of course exists i t is not of the same kind as death and meaninglessness. Tillich admits this, saying 
'guilt and condemnation are qualitatively not quantitatively infinite' 2 2 but he does not follow 
through its full implication. Unlike the other absolute forms of non-being, condemnation is more 
one-sidedly related to the subjective point of view. We may set certain standards for ourselves and 
2 1 CTB, p.58 
2 2 ibid, p. 62 
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in not meeting them feel guilty, and perhaps a deepening, downward spiralling guilt will reach a 
rock-bottom sense of worthlessness. This however is not rationally underpinned in the way that the 
certainty of death and the absence of absolute meaning is: it makes little or no sense to say that 
someone is absolutely, objectively worthless. As such there is an ambiguous participation inherent 
in the individual's relation to guilt and condemnation that does not exist in the other two, and this, I 
would argue, makes the notion of condemnation either (philosophically) trivial or incoherent.23 
Of course it is true to say that the impossibility of perfection, our necessarily finite nature, is of a 
form of non-being that looms over our sense of guilt, but the two (as discussed in relation to 
Kierkegaard and Heidegger (and later with regard to Camus)) are not commensurable. The 
impossibility of perfection amounts to the impossibility of self-coincidence and this is 
representative of the anxiety of meaninglessness rather than condemnation. That we do feel guilty 
for what we are, for our inability to coincide with ourselves, is in a certain sense true, but this is 
not the same kind of guilt which arises from not living up to standards we set, or not being 
authentic.24 This kind we can always do something about by attempting to be more 'true to 
ourselves' and to continually fail at this might lead to depression. It is more likely, however, to lead 
to a duplicitous despair designed to cover-up our basic realization that it is up to us and within our 
power to be honest and resolute with respect to the goals we set ourselves. In terms of the anxiety 
of guilt this is as far as we can sink, and (religious arguments concerning our imperfection before 
God aside) to go beyond this is to be threatened (admitting a degree of ambiguity) by the non-being 
of meaninglessness rather than anything like condemnation. 
Absolute meaninglessness, as already indicated, also does not appear to be the same kind of thing as 
death. It is however different from condemnation. The extent of this difference, and its broader relation to 
both these 'absolutes' will be dealt with in section III . 
2 4 The issue of authenticity is though slightly more complicated as it takes on board the ontological guilt 
associated with meaninglessness as well as the guilt more closely related to our actions which Tillich is 
referring to. I shall also say more about this in section III. 
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'Since we are all such absolutists by instinct, what in our quality as students of philosophy ought we to do 
about this fact? Shall we expouse and endorse it? Or shall we treat it as a weakness of our nature from 
which we must free ourselves if we can? I sincerely believe that the latter course is the only one we can 
follow as reflective men.'—William James (The Will to Believe) 
'What is great in man is that he is a bridge and not a goal'—Nietzsche (Thus Spoke Zarathustrd) 
'A question with no answer is a barrier that cannot be breached. In other words, it is questions with no 
answers that set the limits of human possibilities, describe the boundaries of human existence.'—Kundera 
(The Unbearable Lightness of Being) 
'Who can be the earnest huntsman of himself when he knows he is in turn a quarry?'—Saul Bellow 
(Dangling Man) 
Why, in light of Tillich's analysis, should we want to avoid anxiety? Broadly it is because it 
signifies non-being, the constant threat of the negation of what is central to our self and our world. 
Why should we want to avoid contemplating or appropriating this threat? Because there is, in 
essence, ncrthing we can do about it—no obvious way in which we can bring it into or subsume it 
under our being. We are, in Tillich's words 'separated from, while participating /'«' what ultimately 
concerns us.25 
Why then should we not avoid it? Because we ultimately cannot successfully achieve this, and to 
attempt to will take its toll on our existence as a whole. Non-being is intrinsic to reality and to try 
to avoid it would be to shut ourselves off from aspects of ourselves and aspects of the world that 
have positive as well as negative elements. To shut-out non-being wil l , in the long-term, fail; in the 
short-term limit us as human beings. Its long-term failure is closely linked to its stultifying short-
term effects in that the anxiety (or perhaps despair) that arises from denying our psychological and 
ethical potential will awaken us to the anxiety associated with our existential nature. 
For Tillich the two alternatives to this avoidance are 'courage' and 'despair'. Despair is for him the 
result of being defeated by the 'power of non-being'; 
The pain of despair is that a being is aware of itself as unable to affirm itself because of the power of non-
being. Consequently it wants to surrender this awareness and its presupposition, the being which is aware. 
CTB, p.55. Compare Mulhall's remark concerning the revelations of anxiety in Heidegger (see Chapter 
1, section III). 
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It wants to get rid of itself—and it cannot. Despair appears in the form of reduplication, as the desperate 
attempt to escape despair.26 
Courage on the other hand 'resists despair by taking anxiety into itself.' 2 7 It does this by 
transforming the inexorable otherness of non-being into something that we can deal with on our 
own terms. Just how this transformation works is not altogether clear, and how it differs from a 
fleeing from anxiety is likewise not clear.28 In both cases we are not dealing with 'naked reality' 
but instead occupying ourselves, or filling ourselves, with being—with things in the world, with 
our projects and our lives interpreted as a meaningful whole. (The person in despair on the other 
hand does not have the strength or courage to create such a unity but instead lives a fragmented 
and unstable existence, prevented from solidifying by continuous intrusions of non-being.29) In the 
case of courage it must be accepted that the self as such is an object of fear and must have some 
parameters, but for the courage that has properly adapted to anxiety, these parameters must be 
flexible. As a courageous individual I should not have 'settled down': in Marcel's words, ' I must 
keep myself at the disposal of the unknown me', 3 0 and here the vital relation between anxiety and 
movement is touched on. The issue of having parameters whilst mamtaining Merleau-Ponty's 
'power to begin something else' is problematic; and similarly how are we to maintain committed 
concern or fear for the self we currently are whilst accepting the anxiety of non-being? Must this 
result in either pallid compromise or some form of self-deception? 
I shall further deal with this question in the context of an interpretation of Tillich's ideas on anxiety 
in terms of the structure taking shape in this dissertation. Specifically I want to propose that 
Tillich's anxiety of fate and death should be seen as representing anxiety A; his anxiety of guilt and 
condemnation as representing anxiety B; his anxiety of emptiness and meaninglessness as that 
2 op cit, p. 61 
2 7 ibid, p.71 
2 8 Because of space restrictions I will not go into any detail about Tillich's forms of 'unrealistic self 
affirmation' or 'neurotic anxiety' but I will point to a likeness in R.D.Laing's idea of 'ontological 
insecurity'. This is a condition he ascribes to the 'schizoid personality' who because of his fear of being 
'dispersed into' or 'engulfed by' the world (note the similarity to nausea) retreats into a constructed 
'inner' self which disassociates itself from the outer, ultimately fragile self. This may be an extreme 
example of what Tillich is talking about (Laing describes it as a fourth type of basic anxiety to be added to 
Tillich's three), or something qualitatively different (psychosis rather than neurosis), but either way it 
helps illuminate the process. (See The Divided Self and Self and Other). 
2 9 In this respect there is a connection between Tillich's identification of the problem of anxiety with 
passivity and helplessness and Nietzsche's identification of our basic drive as being towards power. 
30 Being and Having, p. 52 
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which acknowledges the conflict between these two (urangst), and his version of faith as the mode 
of existence which acknowledges this final form of anxiety. 
Our relation to the fact of our contingency (and our death) is passive. It indicates our separation 
and alienation from the world, from others, and from ourselves in the way in which we had 
previously been interpreting and appropriating them. As such a full existential appropriation of 
this can be paralysing, at least in the short term. The reason why our response to our condition is 
anxiety rather than fear lies in its relation to the content of anxiety B. As I have indicated, i f i t were 
purely the fact of our own death that we confronted in this state the fear-like 'death anxiety'—i.e. 
something outside the anxiety structure—would seem an accurate term, but this fact and our 
related contingency make us anxious because they conflict with a quite separate concern. That 
concern is for our self as situated in the world and as responsible for its own self-creation. This self 
has certain talents, dispositions, relations with others etc. which to a certain extent are shaped by 
its actions and its level of commitment to them. We are 'thrown' into a world and an identity not of 
our choosing, but nonetheless we find ourselves with a substantial self that we cannot help but care 
about and are in a position to fashion according to our chosen ideals and projects. Within this set-
up there is room to succeed or fail to whatever degree in being this self and these are the origins of 
anxiety B. When Tillich says that guilt and condemnation are 'qualitatively not quantitatively 
infinite' this is what he is driving at. Unlike the anxiety of death we can to an extent control and 
take responsibility for that which causes the anxiety of guilt: we can never (pathologies like 
depression aside) sink so low that we cannot, by our own efforts, redeem ourselves and allay this 
sense of guilt and (what must be the phantom of) condemnation. In an important sense it is our 
culture, with its standards of moral and personal worth, which provides the hand-holds by which to 
pull ourselves up, rather than our having to rely on our own boot laces. 
One thing, however, that can put in relief, or disturb, the motivation behind the project of selfhood 
is the contingency revealed in urangst. Here we return again to Nagel's conception of the absurd: 
we are able to take up an objective view-point where the contingency of our projects and concerns 
is quite apparent. This is a position that starkly contrasts with our subjective commitment to these 
projects but it does not nullify them. Of course, i f this perspective helps reveal them as misplaced 
or borne of self-deception then we might resolve to alter them or stop them and 'begin something 
else', but that they exist and should exist must explicitly or implicitly, and to a greater or lesser 
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degree, be affirmed. What does happen, however, is that they are given a sense of uprootedness; 
'things' in Bernard William's words 'are not quite as they seemed',31 or, in Nagel's terms, given a 
different 'flavour'. The key point about this objective perspective though is that it is not something 
we want to lose, it represents a capacity for rationality and transcendence of the immediate that is 
intrinsic to our self. As well as being the means by which we assess our projects as a whole, it 
itself amounts to an faculty significant in its own right—a form of negative freedom, the constant 
possibility of detaching ourselves from our engagements and possibly 'beginning something else'. 
Here the issue of authenticity enters the equation. This can be seen as the requirement of fulfilling 
the revelations and demands of both kinds of anxiety, and it is at this point that the question of 
meaning enters into things. Meaning is no longer the sole property of moral and personal worth, it 
is no longer filled up with the task of becoming a self against the background comprised of the 
values and standards set by history, culture, society and significant others. Our pursuits must now 
be meaningful in relation to the freedom that is borne of our contingency. This requires (in some 
form or other) a constant acknowledgement of the status of our day to day concerns in terms of 
their relativity and the fact that we will never be the sum of our engagements. 
The locus of meaning is thus shifted and destabilized. Our pursuits remain meaningful to us, but in 
a sense which is not as complete as it once was, and it is this gap which needs bridging. That this is 
the case is made apparent by the fact that we can determine to live rationally by attempting to live 
outside of ourselves. I f for Mersault existence 'feels' absurd, then for Dostoevsky's anti-hero in 
Notes From Underground it is a more rational understanding of absurdity that motivates him to 
deny any commitment to the world. In this situation the absurdity is of course not overcome 
because he must commit to his non-commitment, he must keep a constant check on himself in order 
not to start taking his engagements with others seriously. His sense of self thus becomes one which 
is defined in contrast with those who do not recognize absurdity, but bis sense of contingency is 
such that he cannot, in Tillich's language, 'affirm' this whilst maintaining his authenticity. In this 
way the anxiety of emptiness and meaninglessness thus represents the disparity between the other 
two sources of anxiety. The need to actualize ourselves is threatened or contradicted by its lack of 
a rational foundation, and the requirement of acknowledging this lack is threatened or contradicted 
by our need to, and the una voidability of, affirming ourselves in spite of this. In other words, as 
Sartre says explicitly, we can never be this lack; self-affirmation is unavoidable because i f we are 
31 Morality (Canto (CUP), 1993), p.37 
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to acknowledge our contingency we must do so in a particular way—broadly with a sense of 
anxiety (and the implicit act of choice (and thus the guilt) that this embodies) and this is an act of 
affirmation. Whether we like it or not we are a self that has interpreted, and yet part of what is 
interpreted is ourselves as a 'nothing' or 'lack' and thus the fact that we have to interpret. We can, 
in turn, choose to affirm this but this just takes us into an unhelpful regress. Through interpreting 
(or choosing) ourselves we are confronted with a paradox which I shall call the 'existential 
paradox' and this is (or should be), as far as I can see, the core of Tillich's anxiety of 
meaninglessness. 
If we are to be authentic we must confront, live with, this paradox and to a great extent to 
understand the meaning of authenticity is to understand its nature. It differs from a notion like 
'self-actualization' or 'self-realization' in that it takes on board the understanding that whatever 
measures we use for the 'actual' or 'real' self do not represent completion but have been chosen by 
us in the first place. As such they contain no possibility of self-coincidence, are in no sense 
absolute, and are always open to being undermined or revised. But how is authenticity to be 
achieved? How are we to embrace the basic alienation that the existential paradox represents? That 
this is the central issue of existentialism as Tillich confirms when he defines it as 'the expression of 
the anxiety ... [of] meaninglessness and of the attempt to take this anxiety into the courage to be as 
oneself.'32 The anxiety of guilt (the raw material of anxiety B) is in one form or another what we 
first encounter as this signifies a self and a set of self-relations that are of direct concern to us and 
our responsibility to actualize. When the parameters of right and wrong are viewed as absolute 
then the individual's mission is relatively straight forward and his anxiety is directed at his possible 
failure in this project. Arguably it is our realization of being responsible and therefore of moral 
freedom that opens us up to doubts as to the foundations of our values,33 and I would suggest that 
3 2 CTB, p. 138 
3 3 1 say arguably because I do not see that there is a necessary connection between an awareness of our 
own responsibility and the contingency of the values this responsibility is defined in terms of. Moral 
anxiety can, I think, exist to an intense degree without incurring existential anxiety (even though there 
may be a degree of suppression of urangst going on). Not until a moral system displays its failings does 
the business of existential individualization begin, and even i f we change from one set of values to another 
we might, in a Hegelian fashion, see this as determined by the realization that the new values are correct, 
the old one's only mistakenly thought to be so. In this kind of case the 'existential shock' is limited in that 
the negation is caused by a 'greater' affirmation, not a 'greater' negation. One's own sense of 
responsibility is now broadened to include not just the task of living up to an ideal, but also of choosing 
the right ideal. In a sense one is individuated, but in a way that is undergirded with the (at least implicit) 
hope of there being an ideal to coincide with. This is what Chapter 3's spiral of uncanniness looks like 
minus the ontological element of the 'call of conscience.' 
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to overcome the alienation this engenders is partly to rediscover something like the sense of 'at-
homeness' we had prior to its relativization. To a great extent we are anxious before contingency 
and ontological freedom because of their impact in undermining our original sense of at-homeness 
The self is now seen as an ontologically as well as a morally isolated entity, and the onus is thus 
well and truly on it, and it alone, to find the way back. The new home—the mode of authenticity— 
must somehow encompass the origins of anxiety A and anxiety B and the measure of its efficacy is 
its success in the degree to which it appropriates Tillich's anxiety of meaninglessness. 
One potential problem with Nagel's concept of the absurd is the threat of an infinite regress. We 
can take an objective view of our concerns and projects, yet they do not lose their potency and this 
general state of affairs we find absurd, but are we then in a position to find finding this absurd, 
absurd? The absurd perspective is neither subjective nor objective it seems, but what else can it 
be?34 My answer is that we can only see life as absurd from one or other of these positions and that 
we cannot escape from this represents the existential paradox. This of course can be formalized 
from the objective point of view, but it cannot be existentially appropriated from this point of 
view. It is significant that the feeling of the absurd we associate with Mersault is a despair at the 
world's 'silence' rather than the more lofty or ironic realization that Nagel refers to. Nagel points 
out that the meaning someone like Mersault is looking for does not make sense (even a god (or at 
least a god we could imagine) could not offer the completion required35) but Nagel's absurd 
structure must manifest itself, subjectively speaking, as the desire for meaning and completion and 
this creates only the unfulfilling objective viewpoint (which in turn adds to the absurdity because 
this point of view is necessarily driven by an essentially subjective desire). From here we see that 
what is absurd is that despite the impossibility of meaning nothing really changes in our l ife, 3 6 but 
this viewpoint cannot existentially appropriate the seemingly unquenchable desire that infects the 
subjective viewpoint and is itself a sense of absurdity which is intimately related to the same 
absurd structure. 
When Heidegger speaks of Sorge it seems to capture this broader complexity where not only does 
the 'clash of perspectives' lead to a sense of the absurd, but the absurd manifests itself differently 
Nagel later confirms that '[t]his person does not occupy a third standpoint from which he can make two 
relativized judgments about life.' (VFN, p.216) 
3 5 We would have to become that god—be en-soi-pour-soi—which also involves a contradiction. 
3 6 Although the change in 'flavour' does in a sense amount to a change in life's content. 
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in both viewpoints. This too, though, is formalized—Sorge cannot be lived directly but we can 
nonetheless be 'resolute'. As suggested, the resolute frame of mind captures anxiety A and anxiety 
B by embodying urangst, but even something like this, I will go on to argue in the next two 
chapters, must sit 'for the most part' in anxiety A or anxiety B for it is not so magical that it can 
seamlessly weld the subjective and objective points of view. In this way we can see that not only is 
the anxiety of condemnation not commensurable with the anxiety of death, but neither is the 
anxiety of meaninglessness. It has, i f you like, a finite and an infinite element; the non-being that it 
represents is not absolute as death is absolute—ethical concerns, though relativized, remain—but it 
nevertheless lacks boundaries as in it the self will always be more (or perhaps less) than what it 
takes as its measure. 
The nature of modes of authenticity in general will be given a lot of attention in the remainder of 
the dissertation, but for the present I will concentrate further on the role of courage in Tillich's 
philosophy. My suspicion is that existential anxiety would not be seduced by courage alone. There 
is not necessarily a clear-cut distinction between courage and neurotic anxiety—it could merely be 
a matter of degree. Along similar lines, courage can be read as having a primarily negative 
function—it fortifies our self-affirmation 'in spite of non-being (suggesting there remains 
considerable friction between the two so that the 'in spite o f can be read as similar to saying 
"we'll play tennis in spite of the rain but i t ' l l make the game harder"). Unlike neurotic anxiety it 
does not attempt to pretend non-being does not exist by locking the door on it, but it does place a 
bouncer at the open door. The bouncer is conscious but ill-informed. He has orders to keep out 
anything going by the name of non-being and to report its attempts to get in back to the 
management, but it is not really sure of non-being's real business and so the information it relays 
back is couched in terms of the clothes it's wearing rather than the damage it threatens to do. What 
courage does not do is let anxiety in and dance along with the other guests; it does not appear to 
embrace or fully accept it. 
A more passive acceptance of the non-being revealed in anxiety A is a crucial element of 
authenticity, and it is this that both Kierkegaard and Heidegger seem to want to allow for. Tillich's 
courage can be seen as a 'static' and 'weak' mode of authenticity in that the individual, finding 
some compromise between anxiety A and anxiety B, only remains still by suppressing the full 
impact of one or the other (in this case anxiety A), or possibly elements of both. Its affirmation 
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appears Nietzschean but without the irony. A 'strong' static mode of authenticity would remain 
still but not through suppressing anxiety. As things have been presented this seems impossible, but 
arguably Rorty wants his version of irony to be something like this. (Although i f he does I think he 
fails, as I shall argue in Chapter 6.) More realistic is perhaps the idea of "dynamic' authenticity 
where urangst plays a vital role in facilitating a regular, meaningful, shift between anxiety A and 
anxiety B. Here anxiety is necessarily objectless and indefinite (but nonetheless highly potent) 
because, existentially, the nature of what it implies—its source—is incommensurable with the 
individual's current comportment. In this sense it is like the duck/rabbit phenomenon—we can only 
see (or experience) one or the other The opposing anxiety cannot be 'added on', but how we 
respond to the urangst which is its messenger is essentially the measure of our authenticity. It is 
this dynamic element that I cannot find explicit reference to when Tillich talks about courage, 
although, as I shall briefly discuss in the final section, his 'absolute faith' possibly brings us closer 
to a more complete existential acknowledgement of anxiety.38 
IV 
'human life begins on the far side of despair'—Sartre (The Flies) 
'Man is the joy of yes in the sadness of the finite'—Paul Ricoeur (Fallible Man) 
I f courage is inadequate to deal with the full breadth of the anxiety phenomenon, the 'absolute 
faith' Tillich talks about in the latter sections of CTB is perhaps better equipped. This, 
significantly, he describes as a 'state' rather than a belief, and as such it is likely to remain elusive 
to the non-initiate, but we can at least assess the work Tillich wants it to do. 
The essence of absolute faith seems to be a return to the fact that for non-being to be meaningful 
there must first be being, and it is the sense of being that is the key—'the experience of the power 
of being which is present even in the face of the most radical manifestations of non-being.'39 This 
Although the question of what exactly irony is I will involve myself with in the next chapter. 
3 8 Martha Nussbaum's 'perceptive oscillation' is structurally very similar: 'there is a pervasive tension' 
she says 'between love and the ethical... Any life that wishes to include both cannot aim at a condition of 
balance or equilibrium, but only at an uneasy oscillation between [them].' She reads this into the style of 
Henry James' The Ambassadors where the reader perceives 'around the margins of the novel, the silent 
world of love.' (Love s Knowledge, p. 52) 
3 9 CTB, p. 171 
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sounds like a royal road to mysticism and is not unlike the direction Heidegger takes in WTM, but 
Tillich is keen to avoid this He realizes the need for the affirmation of our individuality, the pursuit 
of self etc., and salvages this by claiming that absolute faith embodies an acceptance of our finite 
self —'the acceptance of being accepted' as he puts it. The problem here is that to feel justified or 
accepted we need someone to do the accepting, but Tillich insists that ' in despair there is nobody 
and nothing that accepts. But there is the power of acceptance itself which is experienced.'40 The 
idea of acceptance despite our basic contingency is a deeply Protestant idea (it also underpins 
Kierkegaard's ontology) and all the time it seems to be taking all Tillich's strength not to bring a 
substantial idea of God into the picture. Without such a God (i.e. a God who is something other 
than 'the ground of being', with which I cannot see how we might have a personal relation) this 
'accepting of acceptance' I find incomprehensible, and yet I can see that what we can perhaps 
accept is an unexplicable life-force or 'natural' affirmation that we as human beings generally 
possess. To say we should 'accept' this seems inadequate in as much as we cannot become it, but 
we can, I suppose, affirm or accept this acceptance. Clearly there is an infinite regress problem 
here and perhaps this whole set-up is in need of an attitude of acceptance to swallow up the 
regress. This may well be what Tillich is getting at, and i f so then we have a weak, static mode of 
authenticity which it is hard not to see in terms of Kierkegaard's Religiousness A and as such its 
(directly) incommunicable quality must be stressed. Still, as Kierkegaard himself says, our 
existential risk is diminished by the immanence of God's acceptance and thus anxiety B is 
suppressed. I f God is thinned down to the 'ground of being' a dynamic authenticity where the 
individual oscillates between courage and absolute faith makes some sense, but Tillich's language 
in these latter stages seems too suggestive of immobility to allow for this. 
« < * » > 
The next chapter will deal with what I see as a full-blooded attempt to fulf i l l Nietzsche's demand 
for an attitude to life that affirms our individuality whilst acknowledging the contingency of all 
things mdudingthat affirmation—namely Rorty's version of irony. As suggested, he appears to be 
striving for a strong static mode of authenticity, but in contemplating this and contemplating his 
approach to it we encounter some puzzling issues: is such a state of mind an unattainable ideal that 
nonetheless plays a vital role in achieving another form of authenticity?; is it a 'state of mind' at 
opcit, p. 172 
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all, or is he driving at something more categorially subtle?; is there an implicit authentic dynamism 
embodied in his style of writing, or in what he does not say rather than in what he openly 
propounds?; and finally, To what extent is he alive to all of this—in other words, how are we 
supposed to read Rorty? In the final chapter I will take many of my findings from this and what 
has preceded it and attempt a final picture of the ways in which the secular individual manifests 
their struggle with anxiety in their general attunement to existence; their day-to-day attitudes, states 
of mind, interpretations and choices. 
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6 
The Ironic Remedy: Rorty 
'In irony a man annihilates what he posits in one and the same act'—Sartre (Being and Nothingness) 
'You can't control life. Only art you can control, art and masturbation. Two areas in which I'm a 
complete expert.'—Woody Allen (Stardust Memories) 
'And modern (or future) man no longer feels this absence of meaning as a lack, or as an emotional 
distress. Faced with this emptiness, he succumbs henceforth to no dizziness. His heart no longer requires a 
hallow place in which to take refuge.'—Alain Robbe-Grillet (Old "Values" and the New Novel) 
'All along the watchtower/Empresses kept the view/While horsemen came and went/Barefoot servants 
too' —U2 (All Along the Watch tower) 
« « * » » 
The previous four chapters have partly attempted to describe a progression in the role assigned to 
anxiety away from a religious or absolutist significance and towards a secular, relativized and 
ethical significance. Some of the work of Richard Rorty—particularly that concerning 'irony' 1 — 
can be seen as continuing and attempting to complete this process, or at least as demonstrating, 
sometimes deliberately or overtly and at other times not, its limitations. Rorty does not refer to 
anxiety by name (probably because it has too many metaphysical connotations) but i t seems clear 
that its significance, so far as I have outlined it, is directly responsible for his seeking after a 
Utopia in which the particular subjective or private concerns of the individual, the issue of the 
individual's relation to history and to other people, and the issue of how these relate to one another 
in the context of a single life, provide the foundational problems that need to be tackled. 
Irony is not a version of anxiety A or anxiety B—it is, directly, neither a response to contingency 
nor an awakening to our individual responsibility and freedom—rather it is an attempt at a mode of 
1 I am mostly concerned with what he has to say on this in Contingency Irony and Solidarity (CIS) and 
Essays on Heidegger and Others (EHO). 
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authenticity (although, again, Rorty would probably reel at the mention of this phrase). Charles 
Taylor says, 'when the commitment to universal concern takes on non-theistic definition, something 
else has to play the role of grace'2 and for Rorty, I argue, it's irony. As such I align it with Tillich's 
'courage', Kierkegaard's 'faith'(or passion), Heidegger's 'resoluteness' and Sartre's 'authenticity'; 
but question whether it is meant to be, and can work as, a form of static authenticity or as a form 
of dynamic authenticity. Should it have turned out to be a viable, non-religious (or non-
metaphysical) static authenticity I would consider this a major breakthrough, but unfortunately, as 
with all its predecessors, irony does not appear to achieve this. For the structural and psychological 
reasons I shall make apparent irony fails, and its failure signifies for me the necessary failure of 
any attempt to bring the concerns of anxiety A and anxiety B into a unified and consistent 
existential attitude. Remember that, even Kierkegaard, whose Religiousness B is a contender for a 
strong static authenticity has said; 
An existing person cannot be in two places at the same time, ... When he is closest ... [to this] he is in 
passion; but passion is only momentary, and passion is the highest pitch of subjectivity.3 
As I have previously alluded to, and shall further discuss in the conclusion of this chapter and in 
the next chapter, human existence is inherently ambiguous or 'meta-stable' and the closest we are 
likely to get to satisfying the demands of the anxieties would involve an alternating, time-
dependent, well-greased and possibly interpersonally-reliant movement between an objective and a 
subjective stance: dynamic authenticity. The role of self-deception (which is in a sense akin to 
Rorty's metaphysical thinking) is vital to this, and significantly the ability, seemingly inherent to 
human consciousness, of self-deceit or deliberate forgetfulness, remains itself shot-through with 
obscurity and ambiguity. In the next chapter I will champion two writers who were well aware of 
this—Conrad and Camus—over those like Rorty who (appear to) write as i f there is nothing 
fundamentally problematic in holding the base elements of anxieties A and B in a single point of 
view. 
2 Sources of the ^ //(Cambridge, 1992), p.410 
3 CUP, p. 199 
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I 
' I conceive of nothing, in religion, science, or philosophy that is more than the proper thing to wear for a 
while.'—Charles Fort {Wild Talents)4 
Rorty's objective is to add to the body of literature that might, he hopes, one day stamp out what 
he calls metaphysics and see it replaced with an 'ironicised' way of thinking and acting. The 
mistake of the metaphysician is perhaps best described in two parts: firstly the propagation of the 
notion of the world or human existence as having an overall purpose like Hegel's Geist; and 
secondly, and more significantly, the search for necessity or truth, for reality behind appearance, or 
for deeper meanings that are in touch with something beyond human creations. In line with 
Nietzsche he says; 
The very idea that the world or the self has an intrinsic nature—one which the physicist or the poet may 
have glimpsed—is a remnant of the idea that the world is a divine creation, the work of someone who had 
something in mind, who Himself spoke some language in which He described His own project. Only i f we 
have some such picture in mind... can we make sense of the idea that the world has an "intrinsic nature".5 
Like Nietzsche and Heidegger (both of whom, ultimately, he considers to have failed to escape the 
'metaphysical urge') Rorty wants to de-devinize our language, to expel all traces of the notion of a 
source of truth beyond the human from our ways of thinking about the world. I f this sounds a 
simple task in theory and/or in practice it is because we have not yet investigated the full 
implications of what it would mean to be non-metaphysical, and Rorty's books and articles-— 
directed at all the main areas of modem philosophy (although I am only concerned with ethics (in 
the broadest sense) and the self here)—seek to do just that. The picture that emerges, superficially 
at least, has a certain structural elegance, but this disguises a substantial problem, pointed out by 
many of his critics, with making cogent the details of a theoretical and a working notion of a 
metaphysically exorcised individual and culture. To someone who has achieved this he assigns the 
pronoun 'ironist', the corresponding culture is (of course) 'utopian', and it is mostly to the question 
of whether there could ever be a full-blown ironist, and partly to the question of whether Rorty's 
Utopia is plausible (although this largely stands and falls on the result of first question) that this 
4 Fort (1874-1932) was an American researcher into anomalous phenomena. In particular he was 
concerned about scientific dogma and attitudes to 'inconvenient data'. 
5 CIS (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989) p.21 
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chapter is addressed. Another way of putting it is to ask whether we can imagine an individual and 
a culture fmctioning healthily (or indeed at all) whilst having an entirely transparent relation to 
anxiety. 
Rorty is a pragmatist: for him truth means only what works, what works is always defined in terms 
of human desires, and our desires are the only thing we can ever be sure about. Broadly speaking 
these desires fall into two categories; what we desire for ourselves, and what we desire for other 
people. Theories are not the sorts of things that could ever be closer to uncovering reality, or 
'getting to the truth' than other things, but only 'new tools to take the place of old tools'6—better 
ways of achieving what we want to achieve rather than being like the piecing together of a jigsaw 
puzzle. For those who 'make things new'7 he admits that the tools analogy is not quite perfect in 
that the craftsman knows what he wants to make before he starts out whereas the creator or 'poet' 
(as he would call anyone—in the sciences or the arts—who is substantially innovative) can never 
be fully aware of what he wants to achieve. 'His new vocabulary' he says 'makes possible, for the 
first time, a formulation of his own purpose.'8 Nietzsche's would say that such a person is more 
'fully' human, and while Rorty would reject this metaphysical sounding claim he would endorse the 
idea that many of us will treat these tools as i f they are part of a jigsaw and in so doing be 
distracted from the task of 'self-enlargement' through a rearrangement of language. A further 
analogy might be the difference between someone who goes travelling after planning all his stops 
on a world tour in advance with the express purpose of visiting the 'seven wonders', learning more 
languages or 'bettering themselves' with the view to fulfilling set tasks which will produce a 
requisite 'self approved in advance, and someone who wanders out into the world, driven by an 
urge to create or discover but with no particular plan or timetable and for no formularizable 
reason. For the latter person what they want for themselves and the nature of the self that wants are 
inextricably linked, and thus the concepts of identity and creation merge. Theorizing—seeing 
patterns—can only do its job retrospectively: 'Christianity', Rorty says, 'did not know that its 
purpose was the alleviation of cruelty, Newton did not know that his purpose was modem 
6opcit, p. 12 
7 ibid, p. 13 
8 ibid 
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technology ... But we now know these things, for we latecomers can tell the kind of story of 
progress which those who are actually making progress cannot.'9 
A stronger aim of Rorty's is not only to make notions like truth redundant, but also to reject 
anything that plays a truth-like role. Arguably (as I shall say more about later) pragmatism of this 
kind can, for the majority of us, make 'what works'—our currently useful but basically contingent 
'final vocabulary'—seem a lot like 'what is the case'. I f most people one encounters 'prefer' (act in 
accordance with, say complimentary things about etc.) the theory of evolution it is easy to slip into 
(or make difficult to break out of) the habit of considering it to be the way things are in themselves. 
But even i f this is avoided, Rorty would consider the idea of universal consensus undesirable—it 
tempts the metaphysical urge in the way mentioned, and impoverishes the potentially rich and 
detailed landscape of ideas from which the individual should be nourishing his project of self-
enlargement. For him this landscape is best represented by those writers who stimulate our 
imagination in terms of this project (i.e. help us realize our contingency and freedom to create) and 
also in terms of our concern for the plight of others . 1 0 The canon includes (for one or other of these 
purposes or both) Darwin, Dickens, Nietzsche, Freud, Proust, William James, Dewey, Heidegger, 
Wittgenstein, Orwell, Nabokov, Derrida, Davidson and Foucault, and it is Rorty's (mis)readings of 
these people that provides the backbone for Contingency, Irony and Solidarity. 
I I 
' I enjoy saying no, always no, and I should be afraid of any attempt to construct a finally habitable world, 
because I should merely have to say—yes; and act like other people.'—Sartre (The Age of Reason) 
In taking elements of Rorty's philosophy to task I am concentrating on how far it seems plausible 
to go in aestheticizing and relativizing the self and its values and in defusing the 'metaphysical 
urge'. In other words to what extent it is appropriate to replace concepts like 'self-discovery', self-
actualization', 'authenticity', 'duty', 'good' and so on with words like 'self-creation', 
'playfulness', 'experimentation', 'preference' and 'usefulness'. I am not so much interested in 
9 op cit, p.55. This difference in perspective is all important, and as Rorty points out, signifies the 
metaphysical trappings all theorists (even ironist theorists it seems) find hard to avoid. Later on I will 
argue that no one can avoid it and that irony fails largely for this reason. 
1 0 That the desirability of universal consensus seems to be built in to this aim is an important point to 
which I shall return. 
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whether there is anything like 'truth' or 'reality' tied in with values and the self, but in whether 
there is a requirement for something truth-like—something meaningful beyond the personal and 
particular—to be attached to what we find ourselves concerned about and committed to. The aim 
of CIS, at least ostensibly, is to paint a picture of what Rorty calls the 'liberal ironist'. In the 
introduction he provides the following working definition of such a person in term of its component 
parts; 
I use "ironist" to name the sort of person who faces up to the contingency of his or her most central beliefs 
and desires ... Liberal ironists are people who include among these ungroundable desires their own hope 
that suffering will be diminished, that the humiliation of human beings by other human beings may 
cease.11 
Embodied in this agenda is the dissolving of traditional philosophical questions into matters of 
aesthetic preference that are judged in terms of their efficacy in stimulating us towards the aims I 
have outlined. As such Rorty decompartmentalizes the library; there is no longer a section 
concerning truth named "philosophy" or a section concerning fiction called "literature" but only an 
alphabetically ordered list of writers who serve essentially the same function. In Rorty's Utopia we 
would no longer read the Republic or the Critique as an attempt to get at the truth of the world but 
rather as sources of private edification or perhaps (in the case of the Republic) as a means to a 
better understanding of the different ways we can be cruel to others. 
An objection that might be immediately raised is that Rorty's treatment of the issue of cruelty, or 
his acceptance of the principles of evolutionary theory or psychoanalysis is itself metaphysical—he 
is saying the latter two bear some claim to truth and that the former should at least be universally 
acknowledged (which itself suggests something which is true of human beings in general). I will 
deal with this in the short-term by repeating that he only claims to prefer these ideas or beliefs, and 
i f it turns out that others prefer the same things its a matter of coincidence or conditioning and not 
something that will necessarily occur because of a general advancement towards a clearer picture 
of 'reality'. In the case of liberalism however it can be argued that universal consensus is desirable 
and the status this sort of claim might have (and the problems it causes) will be discussed later. 
n p .xv 
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Most attacks on Rorty have focused on the impossibility of being both an ironist and a liberal,1 2 
but for reasons suggested in the introduction I am more interested in questioning the possibility of 
irony itself than in its relation to liberalism I cannot, however, ignore the 'public' element because 
in Rorty's picture he wants the concern for contingency and the concern for diminishing cruelty to 
in some sense happily co-exist, and the reason why he wants this to be the case, and the reason (as 
I see it) why they are not, helps underline and undermine why Rortean irony is itself not a coherent 
concept. Before voicing my concerns I shall a give an account of what irony appears to involve, 
and add some bulk to the notion of liberalism. 
Before offering a positive account of what irony is, I will contrast it with a concept that has 
cropped up on occasion throughout this dissertation and which is overdue a more formal definition, 
namely 'cynicism'. Cynicism I use to indicate an essential affirmation in the attitude of a person, 
but not an honest one. Contingency and ambiguity are basically repulsive to him to the extent that 
although he affirms his existence in his denial of a meaning to existence as a whole, he is unwilling 
to accept the paradox inherent in this meta-stable state by appropriating his condition in the form 
of static or dynamic authenticity.13 The upshot is a defensive position not dissimilar to a broad or 
diffused version of Tillich's neurotic anxiety that can manifest itself in the superficial coolness of 
someone like Decoud in Nostromo, or can reveal itself in a non-sensical "shaking one's fist at the 
void". Examples of this kind are easy to find in existentialist literature as writers often find it easier 
to describe cases of ^ authenticity than its opposite. 'We must take revenge for having to die alone' 
says Camus' Clemence in The Fall, and a 'poetic' character of Kierkegaard's rants 'Where am I? 
What does it mean to say: the world? What is the meaning of that word? Who tricked me into the 
whole thing and leaves me standing here? ... Why was I not informed of the rules ... where is the 
manager?'14 Relevant here is Nietzsche's criticism of the 'ascetic priest' who attempts to distance 
himself from the world 'in a rebellion against the most fundamental principles of life' (appearance 
(versus reality), the body, death, reason etc.) 'Man' he says 'would rather will nothingness than 
1 2 For example Guignon and Hiley's Biting the Bullet: Rorty on Private and Public Morality (in Alan 
Malachowski (ed.) Reading Rorty (Blackwell, 1990)), and Simon Critchley's Is Derrida a Private Ironist 
or a Public Liberal? (in Chantal Mouffe (ed.) Deconstruction and Pragmatism (Routledge, 1996)). 
1 3 Tillich's description of the cynic's state of mind is similar to Camus' 'rebel'; 'the acceptance of despair' 
he says 'is in itself faith and on the boundary of the courage to be. In this situation the meaning of life is 
reduced to despair about the meaning of life. But as long as this despair is an act of life it is positive in it's 
negativity.' (CTB, p. 170) 
1 4 REP, p.200 
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not w i l l . ' 1 5 Alain Robbe-Grillet sums up the inconsistency of the cynics position when he says that 
'the distance between my call ... and the mute interlocutor to whom it is addressed, becomes an 
anguish; my hope and my anguish then confer meaning on my l i fe . ' 1 6 In Notes from Underground 
we find Dostoyevsky's diarist, railing against brute facticity, in a state of resignation which lies on 
the border between cynicism and irony; 'in consequence of all this' he says 'to sink ... into inertia, 
silently and impotently gnashing your teeth and reflecting that there isn't even anybody for you to 
be angry with, that an object of your anger can't even be found . . . ' 1 7 
I might sum up the position of the cynic as one where he denies the fact that he affirms himself in 
his denial, as against the ironist who affirms the fact that he affirms himself in his denial, but 
the lack of a clear distinction between Tillich's neurotic and courageous individuals is also a 
problem for your seeker after an attitude free from cynicism. Rorty even says at one point that 
'there can be no fully Nietzschean lives'18—meaning, I presume, no lives that can affirm 
themselves while fully appropriating contingency—but the life of the ironist is, in a certain sense, 
supposed to do just that. It is this kind of problem that throws the possibility of a full-blown ironist 
into serious doubt, but prior to this, as I shall explain, it also casts a degree of confusion on what 
Rorty wants an ironist to be like. 
The terms 'ironist' and 'strong poet' are for Rorty pretty much synonymous. (Although there is a 
case for saying that the strong poet represents just a (possibly unreachable) ideal form of irony that 
always stands against particular instances—more on this later.) The term 'Strong Poet' was 
borrowed from Nietzsche and used by the literary critic Harold Bloom to describe someone who, 
responding to the 'anxiety of influence' ('each poet fears that no proper work remains for him to 
perform' 1 9), manages to break free from, or overcome his cultural inheritance and produce, in some 
small but significant way, something that has not been thought of before. His output is more than 
just an amalgam of available ideas but instead incorporates something that only he put there— 
something which gives his existence an element of autonomy. This classification of course refers to 
more than just poets but rather to any original thinker in any field: for example 'Strong 
15 The Genealogy of Morals (Morern Library, 1968), p.99 
1 6 op cit, p.233 
1 7 p.23. One of the roles of Nietzsche's 'ascetic priest' is almost the reverse of this whereby he gives 
people back their control by putting the blame for their suffering on themselves. 
1 8 op cit, p. 42 
19 The Anxiety of Influence (OUP, 1986), p. 148 
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philosophers' Rorty tells us '—people like Hegel and Davidson [are] the sort of philosophers who 
are interested in dissolving inherited problems rather than solving them. ' 2 0 They give us, in other 
words, radically new ways of thinking and speaking. 
There is, however, a difference inherent in the disciplines of what he calls 'ironist theorists' (i.e. 
philosophers) and ironist writers and poets that has an important bearing on the future of 
philosophy as Rorty sees it. He says; 
The goal of ironist theory is to understand the metaphysical urge, the urge to theorize, so well that one 
becomes entirely free of it. Ironist theory is thus a ladder which is to be thrown away as soon as one has 
figured out what is was that drove one's predecessors to theorize.21 
But the problem is of course how to do this without oneself becoming a theorist—how to avoid 
finding a solution to this problem that is itself merely a continuation of the problem, or how to end 
philosophy, throw away the ladder, in a non-metaphysical fashion. An answer along the lines of 
"human beings theorize because they have an inherent need for stable meanings" is itself a theory 
in the form of an attempt to find something common to humanity. For Rorty, like Nietzsche, the 
whole process of theorizing or philosophizing, certainly in the traditional sense, seems to 
necessitate this trap, and even those who are acutely aware of the problem and set out to expose it, 
including Nietzsche and Heidegger do not, in the end, manage to avoid it. For Rorty the only 
solution is to stop theorizing altogether, and this means maintaining an awareness that all one 
writes has no truth-like status and is only significant as a means of attempting personal autonomy. 
I f others find it edifying it is because it happen to coincide with their own project of 'self-
enlargement', not because it represents something universally valid. For the strong philosopher to 
become fully ironic he must become a strong poet. 
Heidegger's attempt to wind up the project of the Plato-Kant tradition of philosophy is, for Rorty, 
expressed in BT where he says that 'the ultimate business of philosophy is to preserve the force of 
the most elemental words in which Dasein expresses itself, and to keep the common understanding 
from levelling them off . . . ' 2 2 Such words (e.g. 'Dasein', 'Befindlichkeif) are, Rorty says, 'designed 
to express the predicament of the ironist theorist'23 in the way I have outlined, but Heidegger 
2 0 op cit, p. 20 
2 1 ibid,pp.96-7 
2 2 Cited on p. 112 
2 3 ibid, p. 113 
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ultimately fails to achieve both irony and strength. As discussed in Chapter 3, it is not clear how 
his interpretation of Dasein is anything more than that; in other words 'how' as Rorty asks 'does 
Heidegger know an elementary word when he sees one?'24 He also sees Heidegger's disinterest in 
the holocaust as symptomatic of his 'attempt to encapsulate the West, to sum it up and distance 
himself from it ' . I t epitomizes, he believes, a lapse into ascetic priesthood—it was just 'one more 
power play. ' 2 5 
Derrida, on the other hand, Rorty reads as having overcome his earlier transcendental tendencies 
and achieving irony in his later 'playful' work where he; 
privatizes his philosophical thinking, and thereby breaks down the tension between ironism and 
theorizing. He simply drops theory... in favour of fantasizing about [his] predecessors, playing with them, 
giving free reign to the train of associations they produce . .. 
Such fantasizing is, in my view, the end product of ironist theorizing. Falling back on one's private 
fantasy is the only solution to the self-referential problem which such theorizing encounters, the problem 
of how to distance one's predecessors without doing exactly what one has repudiated them for doing.26 
'Derrida', he says later with specific reference to The Post Card, 'is coming to resemble Nietzsche 
less and less and Proust more and more. He is concerned less and less with the sublime and the 
ineffable, and more and more with the beautiful, i f fantastical, rearrangement of what he 
remembers.'27 Rorty's position on the strong philosopher-cum-poet is nicely summed up in a 
comment on Foucault who, he says, 'like Nietzsche, was a philosopher who claimed a poet's 
privileges. One of these privileges is to rejoin "What has universal validity to do with meV I think 
that philosophers are as entitled to this privilege as poets, so I think the rejoinder sufficient.' 2 8 It is 
worth noting that someone determined to overcome aspects of their heritage need not subscribe to 
radical contingency. Such a person, and Kierkegaard might be an example, could be an absolutist 
who believes they and no one else (or only a few others) are in touch with a power or reality that is 
beyond the human. I take it that for Rorty' Nietzsche and Heidegger became just such people— 
strong philosophers rather than strong poets. 
opcit, p. 116 
EHO, p. 70 
CIS, p. 125 
ibid, p. 136 
EHO, p. 198 
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For Rorty the person best suited to maintaining this sense of contingency is the poet (in the narrow 
sense) or novelist. Disciplines that wed subjectivity and creativity in the way fiction and poetry do 
makes the practitioner far less susceptible to grandiose claims to truth and reinforces his sense of 
irony and contingency. In an ideal case, such as Proust, the novelist is not tempted to affirm 
himself via a power over others attained through his claim to being in touch with some non-human 
reality, but only through the creation of his own 'strong' self. "The judge the [strong poet] has in 
mind' we are told 'is himself. He wants to be able to sum up his life in his own terms.' He wants, 
in Coleridge's words, to 'create the taste by which he will be judged',2 9 but that taste and that 
judgement have no greater claim than others for capturing the imagination of present and future 
generations, they represent only the novelist's preferences and a concern for his own life. 
What of the relation between the strong poet or ironist and the forms of anxiety detailed in the last 
chapter? As we have seen, ethically inward people—those who are sensitive to moral anxiety 
because of a keen sense of their responsibility for themselves and (possibly others)—are more 
exposed to urangst and the contingency that makes this freedom an issue in the first place. In my 
terminology the strong poet is profoundly afflicted by anxiety B which is directed at a concern for 
autonomy and individuality, and this to a great extent means in the context of others and within the 
boundaries of one's culture. But the ironist it seems wants more than this: he wants not just a 
culturally relative uniqueness but also to be in a position where no heed is paid by him to any 
measure of that uniqueness other than his own. 
« < * » > 
Before developing a critique of irony in terms of anxiety A and modes of authenticity I will briefly 
describe what Rorty means by 'liberal' when he refers to his 'liberal ironist'. As stated, the liberal 
is someone who thinks 'cruelty is the worst thing we do'. In terms of political or moral theory 
Rorty sees J. S.Mill as having the last word and our only concern, following Wilfred Sellars, is 
expanding our sense of 'us' by improving our understanding of the different ways in which people 
can suffer and be humiliated. To this ends the best kind of books to read are not the theoretical kind 
but novels and ethnographies. 'In Sellars's account' we are told, '... moral philosophy takes the 
form of an answer to the question "Who are 'we', how did we come to be what we are, and what 
EHO, p.99 
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might we become?" rather than an answer to the question "what rules should dictate my 
actions?'"30 In the task of expanding our 'we-intentions'—our sense of who is one of us—he sees 
the moral theorist as redundant. 
The liberal ironist shares with Camus' 'absurd man' the belief that he 'cannot so much expect 
ethical rules at the end of [his] reasoning as rather, illustrations and the breath of human lives.' 3 1 
The characters of Dickens, he says, 'resist being subsumed under moral typologies ... Instead the 
names of [his] characters take the place of moral principles and lists of virtues and vices'.32 
Literary critics too become moral advisors 'not because they have special access to moral truth but 
because they have been around.'33 Been around, that is, the subtle and detailed descriptions found 
in the novels of Dickens, Kundera, Orwell, Nabokov and others who bring to life a variety of 
idiosyncrasies (and the humiliations that can be associated with them) and a variety of ways we can 
be cruel so that they help us to learn how to avoid perpetrating such acts. 
Suffering is made meaningful through the detailed descriptions found in the novels of people like 
Dickens and Orwell. The desired effect would presumably be similar to that described by William 
James in The Varieties of Religious Experience, 
We have a thought, or perform an act repeatedly, but on a certain day, the real meaning of the thought 
peals through us for the first time, or the act has suddenly turned into a moral impossibility. All that we 
know is that there are dead feelings, dead ideas, and cold beliefs, and there are hot and live ones; and 
when one grows hot and alive within us, everything has to re-crystallize about i t . 3 4 
The claim that 'cruelty is the worst thing we can do' sounds metaphysical, but what Rorty wants to 
say is that this is the preferred moral stance of someone he calls a liberal. He is not saying that for 
some foundational reason cruelty is the worst thing we can do, but only that his sensibilities are 
such that he believes it to be the case.35 The difference between the liberal and the non-liberal 
ironist is described by Rorty as a difference in the degree of publicness of their respective concerns. 
3 0 op cit, p. 60 
31 The Myth of Sisyphus, p. 65. Later on he says, 'Not to believe in the profound meaning of things belongs 
to the absurd man ... The absurd man is he who is not apart from time.' (p.69) 
3 2 CIS, p.78 
3 3 ibid, p. 80 
3 4 Cited in Colin Wilson, Beyond the Outsider (Pan, 1965), p. 102 
3 5 1 am not at all convinced that this makes complete sense, but unfortunately there is no room to go into 
this here. 
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The liberal writer writes in order to make people more sensitive to suffering, but the strong poet 
only writes for himself and he appeals only to those who happen to be moved by what he writes, 
making no claims to universal validity. I f this were not the case then for the strong poet there 
would clearly be room for clashes between idiosyncratic ideals which might lead to the subjugation 
and humiliation of others (such as Nietzsche's) and the desire not to be cruel. Rorty wants to 
extinguish the possibility of metaphysics which he sees as inherent to any ideas that are claimed to 
be of relevance to anyone other that their author in all cases except the issue of cruelty. His 
'"poeticized" culture' is then 'one which has given up the attempt to unite one's private ways of 
dealing with one's finitude and one's sense of obligation to other human beings. ' 3 6 
m 
'In art as in everything else one can build only upon a resisting foundation: whatever constantly gives way 
to pressure constantly renders movement impossible.'—Stravinsky 
'Omnipotence and the infinite were our two worthiest foemen, indeed the only ones for a full man to meet, 
they being monsters of his own spirit's making.'—T.E.Lawrence (Seven Pillars of Wisdom) 
The citizen of this culture is the 'liberal ironist'—someone who embodies this public/private split 
so that they are profoundly aware of contingency, and yet committed to cumimshing unnecessary 
suffering. This aspect of Rorty's political/moral writing has caused more controversy than any 
other, but as I said earlier, being an ironist seems to throw up enough problems by itself before 
considering the problems of being a liberal ironist, and because of its more direct links with the 
anxiety structure it is this that I am most concerned with. Still, I will make mention of the this issue 
because it creates problems structurally similar to those of irony itself, and because to understand 
its failing helps us understand the potential failings of Rorty's anti-metaphysical project as a 
whole. 
The central problem is, of course, that of why i f we regard everything as contingent should we care 
about the suffering of others. What gives this any more meaning than anything else? The claim is 
that Rorty is looking for a state of mind which is psychologically impossible. Guignon and Hiley 
sum up this 'ego-splitting' in the following way; 
CIS, p. 68 
190 
we are social selves who cannot help but feel loyal to our group, yet we always have the ability to step 
back and decide what that social identity means to us. At one moment we are swept away by faith in our 
capacity for 'moral and intellectual progress' through imaginative redescriptions of the plight of the 
oppressed; at the next we see all discourse as directionless 'play'. Rorty's ideal of self enlargement 
actually seems to advocate an outsider's perspective on ourselves, encouraging us to speak a new 
vocabulary in which, instead of saying 'Manipulating others is wrong' or 'Slavery is bad', we will be able 
to say, 'My superego is telling a story according to which manipulating others is wrong' or 'Our group 
currently holds the view that slavery is bad.' Yet somehow we are supposed to keep believing that these 
things really are wrong.'37 
Similarly Simon Critchley says; 
if one believes, with Freud, in the narcissistic origin of compassion, or the conscience is an ego-ideal for 
those unwilling to forgo the perfection of childhood, then doesn't this alter one's practical, public relation 
to acts of compassion and the fact of the conscience?38 
The clash between aesthetic irony and sensitivity to suffering is nicely portrayed in a passage in 
Sartre's Iron in the Soul where an American art dealer Richie is showing war photographs to the 
Spanish Civil War veteran and disillusioned artist Gomez; 
'We have brought photography to a high level,' said Richie: 'Look at these colours: might almost be the 
original.' 
A dead soldier, a shrieking woman. The recorded images of a heart at peace. Art is optimistic. Suffering is 
justified as soon as it becomes the raw material of beauty. I am not at peace: I don't want to find 
justification for the suffering I see ... 
' I f painting isn't everything, it's no more than abad joke ... One can't paint evil. ' 3 9 
Richie is an ironist, Gomez a potential liberal ironist, but his sensitivity to pain and suffering leads 
him to give up on art and he is unable to divide the public from the private in Rorty's ideal sense. 
Just how Rorty can weaken his position in order to incorporate these two perspectives I shall 
discuss once I have considered a similar problem in the concept of irony itself and its relation to 
anxieties A and B. His response in CIS seems to deliberately evade the question:40 he turns it into 
an issue of why the ironist is likely to be a better liberal than the metaphysician, but this is surely 
not the point. The question is not why a commitment to openness leads to a greater sensitivity to 
suffering, but how there can be a commitment to openness and why the ironist should want to 
37 opcit, pp. 359-60 
3 8opcit, p. 25 
39 p.32 
4 0 See pp. 88-94 
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sensitize themselves to suffering in the first place My suspicion is that Rorty knows what he is 
doing here, and that this is an example of out-flanking a question to which he knows there is no 
non-circular answer. His work is seemingly ful l of contradictions which are most likely a deliberate 
reflection both of his own liberal irony and of the impossibility of justifying his beliefs. I f this is the 
case (and I shall say more about this in my conclusion) we are led to ask how we are supposed to 
read him; i f meaning is constantly deferred and stable conclusions sabotaged is this because we are 
falling into the trap of reading him as a theorist and not as gravedigger of theory; one who is 
sowing some of the first seeds of liberal irony, a position doomed to ambiguity or self-
contradiction, not through argumentation but by some other form of appeal? 
I shall leave this kind of approach for the moment and turn to the question of the coherency of 
irony itself. I want first to consider its relation to anxiety A's perspectivism. As mentioned, seeing 
the strong poet and the ironist as synonymous is potentially confusing as we often associate irony 
with a distancing from events akin to the cynic rather than the full-blooded engagement of the self-
overcomer. This distance embodies an awareness of contingency, but not in the form of a 
commitment to overcoming one's heritage, but rather in the form of an ironic 'letting things be'. 
Significantly Rorty at one point makes reference to Kierkegaard's 'Shopman'41—a character, 
exemplifying 'Religiousness A' , described as making a constant and seamless movement between 
the finite and the infinite—someone who is 'solid through and through' but whose earthly existence 
is undergirded by faith in God. I f we read this in terms of irony this seamless movement occurs 
between an immersion in contingent projects and an awareness of their contingency. The upshot (a 
weak rather than a strong static authenticity) is a zen-like relation to the world in which all its 
aspects are enjoyed with a sense of playfulness, but in which no particular project stands out as 
more significant than any other. The shopman ironist, because bis self is supported and validated 
by his connection to the infinite is able to 'go with the flow' rather than struggling to alter the 
direction of the stream in order to establish autonomy.42 (As mentioned elsewhere (e.g. Chapter 4, 
section ED) the paradox inherent in this attitude results from the commitment required to sustain a 
4 1 SeeEHO, p. 194. 
4 2 Michael Tanner's description of Nietzsche's notion of 'style' has similarities with this kind of attitude. 
He says 'we can agree that one of the things about a person which leads us to say that he has style is his 
capacity to carry things off, to incorporate disparate and what for most people would be embarrassing or 
humiliating experiences and make them part of a larger scheme.' (Nietzsche, OUP, 1994) 
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perspective.) This version of irony seems closer to the definition offered by Rorty outside of the 
context of the strong poet. He says; 
I shall define an "ironist" as someone who fulfills three conditions: (1) She has radical and continuing 
doubts about the final vocabulary she currently uses, because she has been impressed by other 
vocabularies, vocabularies taken as final by people or books she has encountered; (2) she realizes that 
arguments phrased in her present vocabulary can neither underwrite nor dissolve these doubts; (3) insofar 
as she philosophizes about her situation, she does not think that her vocabulary is closer to reality than 
others, that it is in touch with a power not herself. Ironists who are inclined to philosophize see the choice 
between vocabularies as made neither within a neutral and universal metavocabulary nor by an attempt to 
fight one's way past appearances to the real, but simply by playing the new off against the old. 4 3 
But there is vital sense in which such an anxiety A-type ironist, as with the 'shopman', is in danger 
of claiming privileges to 'a power not herself. Rorty claims that '[the ironist] sees no futility in his 
failure to become an etre-en-soi. The fact that he never wanted to be one, or at least wanted not to 
want to be one, is just what separates him from the metaphysician' . 4 4 This seems fair enough, but I 
presume he is, or is also, referring to the full meaning of our 'futile passion' as presented by 
Sartre. Only in bad faith do we act as i f we are an en-soi, but authenticity needs to acknowledge 
the desire to be en-soi-pour-soi (i.e. God) and somehow deal with this. From what I have said this 
is close (or perhaps identical) to what the ironist is required to acknowledge—our requirement both 
for a fundamental awareness of contingency and for finite commitment. By acknowledging it 
ironically there is either an implicit awareness (embodied in a dynamic mode of authenticity) that in 
a unified sense this is desirable but impossible (an awareness captured by the urangst constantly 
infects both the subjective and objective 'views' perhaps); or, i f the claim is that irony is a static 
mode of authenticity, a unification of this dualistic vision is possible and we have achieved a status 
which gains a perspective on our futile urge to be en-soi-pour-soi, but the problem is that this is 
itself a result of that urge. In this sense irony becomes precisely what Rorty does not want it to be, 
something transcendental and non-linguistic. In not thinking 'her vocabulary is closer to reality 
than others' she is merely satisfying her urge to be 'closer to reality' in a more subtle fashion. 
The strong poet or ironist, as suggested at the beginning of this chapter, incorporates both this 
perspectivalism and the specific commitment typified by the Strong Philosopher. When he says that 
the strong poet is 'best able to appreciate her own contingency'45 he either means that the person in 
CIS, p. 73. By 'final vocabulary' Rorty means a kind of pragmatic belief system, 
ibid, p. 99 
ibid, p. 28 
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anxiety B is best able to do this, or that the person in anxiety A is best able to do this, or he is 
uttering a platitude in as much as the person who can keep their sense of personal responsibility 
and their sense of contingency before them is necessarily most aware of the full weight of 
contingency. In this way irony overarches both kinds of being in the form of a strong mode of static 
authenticity and can be seen as an attempt at a secular version of Kierkegaard's 'Religiousness B' . 
I f this is the case then irony, like Religiousness B (and like any strong mode of static authenticity) 
becomes something quite mysterious; something that backs up Jacob Golomb's claim that 'the 
notion of authenticity ... signifies something beyond the domain of objective language' 4 6 It can be 
experientially attested to, but involves antinomies such that it cannot be formally captured in a way 
that could make complete sense to the uninitiated reader. A generous reading of Rorty might allow 
this, but a less generous one is obliged to expose inconsistencies in the idea of irony as far as it can 
be understood. In other words we could remind ourselves of the strong poet's disanalogy with the 
craftsman in that he does not fully understand what he is making because 'his new vocabulary 
makes possible, for the first time, a formulation of his own purpose';47 or we could remind 
ourselves of the claim that there are no non-linguistic truths. 
I f we are to take the case for irony being a strong static authenticity seriously then we face the 
familiar problem of how an ironist can take himself seriously whilst fully acknowledging 
contingency. How is it possible to become the kind of person 'who [combines] commitment with a 
sense of the contingency of their own commitment'?48 Contingency does not, after all, stop at the 
self so why should we take this seriously as a project as the strong poet of course does? Rorty says 
himself that ironists are '"meta-stable": never quite able to take themselves seriously because 
always aware that the terms in which they describe themselves are subject to change, always aware 
of the contingency and fragility of their final vocabularies, and thus of their selves',49 but he does 
not follow through and expose the full implications of this sentence. In a crucial sense, the sense I 
have outlined above, the strong poet is serious and, as I shall go on to explain, must be serious i f he 
is to be motivated to create himself, and i f he is to be able to maintain bis irony. 
op cit, p. 7 
CIS, p. 13 
ibid, p. 61 
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The full problem the aspiring ironist faces is summed up in a quote from Joseph Schumpeter who 
says; 
To realize the relative validity of one's convictions and yet stand for them unflinchingly, is what 
distinguishes a civilized man from a barbarian. 
And the source of this quote, Isiah Berlin, adds; 
To demand more than this is perhaps a deep and incurable metaphysical need; but to allow it to determine 
one's practice is a symptom of an equally deep, and more dangerous, moral and political immaturity.50 
This sentiment is reflected in Rorty's apparent prioritizing of liberalism over self-enlargement, but 
it also reflects something that Rorty does not want to accept; that our 'metaphysical need' is 'deep 
and incurable'. The problem is that i f this need is thought of in terms of something 'deep and 
incurable' it becomes for Rorty a metaphysical notion which he need only redescribe, or 'side-step' 
not feel the need to cure. I f this is the case Rorty has something to work with, even i f it seems 
impossible to imagine at the moment what this redescription would look like. But even i f the 
metaphysical urge is not structural we can still be seen to have a powerful tendency towards it, and 
this presents the pressing psychological problem of how a human being, as he (albeit purely by 
chance) discovers himself in his current Bejindlichkeit, is supposed to shake off this need and 
become ironic. This need is partly responsible for his anxiety B, and though he is also 'uncanny' 
Rorty needs to show how that uncanniness can be used to fashion a concern for his self, a version 
of anxiety B, that is devoid of the metaphysical urge. 
I shall expand on the problem of irony as a strong static mode of authenticity in terms of what I 
call the 'motivational problem' and the 'bootstrap problem' and suggest that what is more coherent 
is a dynamic mode in which, as with Sartre's 'reciprocal freedom', our social context plays a 
crucial role and which therefore undermines the public/private distinction. 
The question of what motivates the ironist, and what platform he has for his irony leads us to 
question the strength of Rorty's analogies between one's commitment to the project of self-
enlargement and our attitude to artistic preferences and to games. I shall take these one at a time 
and explain why I think they share similar weaknesses. Firstly i t is true to say that artistic 
opcit, p. 61 
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preferences are more open to ironic detachment than other areas. Tastes are personal and can and 
do change regularly and we quickly learn (or should learn) that to treat them as somehow 
immutable is a mistake. Rorty wants to claim that all the ironist's beliefs and values—their final 
vocabularies—should, through the same realization of their contingency, become as malleable, but 
i f this is the case what motivates us to take any of them seriously? Even in art absolutizing is rife, 
and in terms of the radical revision of the strong poet, could this be sufficiently motivated without 
its claim to being right or better, not just for oneself but for everyone concerned? Without this 
metaphysical empowerment it is hard to see why the artist would be concerned enough to create 
and become a strong poet. It is because of this, I would have thought, that those closely involved in 
the arts, and those who make their living from it often do not treat it as a contingency, but rather as 
being in touch with something profound or 'deeply human'.5' Harold Bloom says that 'every poet 
begins . .. by rebelling more strongly against the consciousness of death's necessity than all other 
men and women do. ' 5 2 And i f they become strong the result, the sense created by their strength, is 
not of being in time but of mastering it by '[achieving] a style that captures and oddly retains 
priority over their precursors, so that the tyranny of time almost is overturned, and one can believe, 
for startled moments, that they are being imitated by their ancestors.'Simone deBeauvoir's view 
of the artist also stresses metaphysical motivations: the artist must feel like he is 'capturing' the 
world, 'not by treating his existence as transitory or relative but by reflecting the infinite within it, 
that is, by treating it as absolute. There is an art only because at every moment art has willed itself 
absolutely.'54 
Even i f the creative process is de-mystified great art does not then necessarily assume the form of 
something radically personal, but can rather be seen as something mundane with, presumably, the 
same motivations that underlie other, typically non-ironic activities. In the epigraph to this section 
Stravinsky alludes to this, and in the same passage he writes; 
5 1 Iris Murdoch believes that great art is a transcendence of the self and by so doing makes its 
metaphysical facet quite explicit. Rilke, she comments, 'said of Cezanne that he did not paint ' I like it ' , he 
painted 'There it is" (The Sovereignty of Good, p.59); it is virtually irresistible to look for 'self-
aggrandizement' and 'consolation' in art, but 'to silence and expel self, to contemplate and delineate 
nature with a clear eye, is not easy and demands a moral discipline.' (ibid, p.64) 
5 2opcit, p. 10 
5 3 ibid, p. 141. That Bloom and Rorty often do not seem to share quite the same philosophy is clearly 
important (in that it is less weight to Rorty's claims about artists), but not surprising given his policy of 
misreading people. 
5 4opcit, p. 130 
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I experience a sort of terror when, at the moment of setting to work and finding myself before the 
infinitude of possibilities that present themselves, I have the feeling that everything is permissible to me ... 
if nothing offers me any resistance then any effort is inconceivable, and I cannot use anything as a basis, 
and consequently every undertaking becomes futile ... What delivers me from this anguish into which an 
unrestricted freedom plunges me is the fact that I am always to turn immediately to the concrete things 
that are here in question . . And such matter presents itself to one together with its limitations. I must in 
turn impose mine upon it. So here we are, whether we like it or not in the realm of necessity. And yet 
which of us has ever heard talk of art as other than a realm of freedom? This sort of heresy is uniformly 
widespread because it is imagined that art is outside the bounds of ordinary activity ... 5 3 
With the games analogy, similarly, we must question how far it is possible to be 'playful' without a 
serious background. Our attitude to games is perhaps a better one for Rorty than that of art 
because few games that I am aware of are likely to encourage claims that they have some 
metaphysical significance.56 Ideally, while we are playing them we can be utterly serious and 
utterly involved, but at the same time aware that ' i t is only a game'. Winning and losing mean 
something but they do not require a greater context for the validation of that meaning, and we are 
able, on finishing the game, to let its significance fade. The major limitation of this analogy is that 
we cannot step away from our life as a whole making the motivations towards it entirely different. 
I f the equivalent of the game with its rules and time restrictions is the sum of the contents of the 
projects involved in self-enlargement we do not have the space to step back into that a normal game 
allows us. Of course i f one part fails, an ironic perspective can perhaps be afforded, but only 
because the overall structure remains in place. As Freud says, 'play is opposed not to seriousness 
but to reality', 5 7 and without reality, or something like reality, no sense can be made of 'play'. 
My overall point in criticising these analogies is that in order to be motivated to 'enlarge' ourselves 
we need to believe that what we are doing is aligned with something greater than ourselves. Only i f 
this is the case can we have the space to regard certain aspects of our concerns as contingent—it 
seems we have to believe that what we are doing is important. It does not necessarily have to seem 
important through its relation to something non-human—to God, the Forms or whatever—but it 
does at least have to be meaningful to the lives of other human beings, future generations and the 
like. Rorty points out that the attempt at transcendence by the ascetic priest are extremely useful; 
'the spin-offs from private projects of purification turn out to have enormous social utility' because 
'the result of trying to find a language different from the tribe's is to enrich the language of later 
5 5 Cited in Lynch, W. Images of Hope, p.61 
5 6 With notable exceptions such as Herrigel's Zen in the Art of Archery (although, as the title suggests this 
has more in common with art or a meditative practice than sport) 
5 7 Cited in M.W.Rowe, The Definition of 'Game', Philosophy, Vol.67 (1992), p.474 
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generations of that tribe.' But he wants to claim that this can happen without the individual 
having to think they are transcending anything. 
My claim, on the other hand, is that all strong poets are to one degree or another, ascetic priests: 
when Coleridge said that he wanted to 'create the taste by which he will be judged' 5 9 Rorty's 
emphasis is on 'create' and 'taste', but mine would be on 'judged'. The key point is that he would 
not have written what he wrote unless he thought it would have a profound effect on others, that he 
was somehow creating something that would be regarded as beautiful or true (or even just better) 
in their terms as well as his. 'Proust and Nietzsche are paradigmatic nonmetaphysicians' says 
Rorty, 'because they so evidently cared only about how they looked to themselves, not how they 
looked to the universe.'60 My response to this is to question Rorty's interpretation of their 
motivations, but I will admit that the possibility of its being correct depends on the cogency of my 
structural criticism when added to this psychological one. Still, Bloom admits that the strong poet 
must care about the influence they strive to overcome; '[His] love of his poetry, as itself, must 
exclude the reality of all other poetry, except for what cannot be excluded, the initial identification 
with the poetry of the precursor.' The reason he feels strong is because he still recognizes the 
influence and importance of that person, but also an ideal necessarily other than himself; he 'peers 
in the mirror of his fallen precursor and beholds neither the precursor nor himself but a Gnostic 
double, the dark otherness or antithesis that both he and the precursor longed to be, yet feared to 
become.'61 Even one of Rorty's own quotes from Orwell runs contrary to his diagnosis of the 
strong poet's motivations, and also opens up the second set of problems faced by the ironist ideal: 
'Philosophers, writers, artists, even scientists' he says 'not only need encouragement, they need 
constant stimulation from other people.'62 
This is relevant to the 'bootstrap problem' in a way I shall describe shortly. The force of this 
problem is that i f the ironist is concerned only about how he looks to himself, only about what is 
forced on him and what is most proximal in terms of his 'thrownness' or the 'blind impress' how is 
he to prevent himself from losing his sense of irony? How will he know i f he has retained it or not? 
5 8 EHO, p. 72 
5 9 CIS, p. 97 
6 0 ibid, p. 98 
6 1 opcit, p. 147 
6 2 CIS, p. 176 
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And indeed, how does he know what irony is in the first place? Does he invent his own measure of 
irony, and i f so, what is it measured against. One could say his past selves, but either they are 
ironists and we have the same problem of measurement, or they are metaphysicians but only in 
terms of a public definition of the irony/metaphysics distinction in which case the ironist is 
intrinsically linked to the public domain. 
An alternative is that irony is itself a sustaining 'power'—a state of mind with a boot-strap ability 
to renew itself—but this would represent an angling for metaphysical leverage in the way I earlier 
described the ironist's attempt to overcome our desire to be en-soi-pour-soi; and so we are, I think, 
left only with the public option. What maintains us in our ironic condition is the input of others in a 
fashion similar to Sartre's 'reciprocal freedom'—those who share a desire for irony in the way that 
we do commit to helping us retain our irony. For an advocate of dynamic authenticity like 
Heidegger this is an important mechanism and one which is implied at certain points in BT, for 
example; 
Dasein's resoluteness towards itself is what first makes it possible to let others who are with it 'be' in their 
ownmost potentiality-for-being... when Dasein is resolute it can become the conscience of others.63 
But this solution raises at least three problems for Rorty. Firstly, in order for this to happen we 
must share a common notion of what irony is and implicitly promote this as worthwhile for others 
as well as oneself. Secondly we cannot be ironic about the relations which help us maintain irony 
or else that irony will be lost (This is similar to the problem of how we are supposed to commit to 
having no commitments, or desire to have no desires.)64 Thirdly, it undermines his public/private 
division. Our ironic approach will no longer be just our own business but involve, at least, a 
handful of other ironists. Once this is allowed, there seems to be no place to draw a line between 
what counts as private and what as public. The only way to do this would be to form an elitist 
'ironist's circle' of sorts which contravenes the liberal ironist's agenda of extending the boundaries 
of his 'we intentions'.65 
6 3 p. 344 
6 4 In The Unbearable Lightness of Being Kundera describes an interview or interrogation scenario where 
the difficulty of 'maintaining nonbelief (constantly, systematically, without the slightest vacillation)' is 
demonstrated. To do this, he continues ' requires a tremendous effort and the proper training.' (pp. 185-6) 
6 5 Or worse, a situation where ironists are promoted but are not themselves part of this 'circle' because 
this would be to fall into the trap of committing to irony. This nightmare is close to Williams' image of a 
wholly utilitarian state in Utiltarianism: For and Against. 
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'irony is jealous of earnestness'—Kierkegaard (The Concept of Anxiety) 
I f irony seems not to work as a strong static authenticity it can, I think, work as a weak mode of 
authenticity that does not necessitate 'strength' in the way Rorty seems to indicate. But it cannot be 
read in this way without allowing metaphysics to sneak back in (via some zen-like bootstrap power 
or an absolutizing of our commitments in the way Simone deBeauvoir speaks of), and Rorty 
therefore cannot be happy with this. A static mode of authenticity is palpable in an immediate first-
person sense, but a slightly odd upshot of dynamic authenticity is that it lacks this immediacy and 
is only recognized by others and through a consideration of one's past thoughts and actions in a 
way analogous to William James' description of personal-identity. He describes the present self or 
'Thought' in terms of a 'hook' which 'never appropriates or disowns itself but from which a 
chain of objectified past selves dangles.66 A similar analogy turns up in The Waves where Woolf 
describes our sense of self as a series (or collection) of drops which continually form and fall; our 
current self always in the process of becoming until that world view (or an important aspect of it) 
is shattered, or becomes too heavy and a new one starts to grow. 6 7 A shift occurs, but always only 
from one drop to another; only momentarily do we receive the (uncanny) sense of unmitigated 
reality. The only possible completed sense of self becomes, in Heidegger's terms, one which is 
'present-at-hand'—an object for disengaged inquiry and thus not fully a self at all. For this reason, 
as is the case with the eccentric, we should be suspicious of anyone who declares themselves, in the 
present tense, to be an ironist as to be an ironist they must at any one time be fully engaged with 
anxiety B or anxiety A, but not with both. Kierkegaard seems to make this same point about the 
ordeal of faith. He says; 
This category, ordeal, is not aesthetic, ethical or dogmatic—it is altogether transcendent. Only as 
knowledge about an ordeal, that it is an ordeal, would be included in dogmatics. But as soon as the 
knowledge enters, the resilience of the ordeal is impaired, and the category is actually another category. 
This category is absolutely transcendent and places a person in a purely personal relationship of 
The Principles of Psychology (Volume 1) (Harvard University Press, 1981), p.323. He continues 'Anon 
the hook will itself drop into the past with all it carries, and then be treated as an object and appropriated 
by a new Thought in the new present which will serve as a living hook in turn. The present moment of 
consciousness is thus ... the darkest of the whole series.' 
6 7 See, for example, p. 184. 
200 
opposition to God, in a relationship such that he cannot allow himself to be satisfied with any explanation 
at second hand.68 
It must be significant that even the people in Rorty's canon can be shown to lapse into metaphysics 
at one time or another; the suggestion being that this is inevitable and that the motivation to 
become an ironist, despite the contradiction this involves, is all the ironist can himself experience; 
the achievement of its being something in his past, always slipping away from him. In this 
motivation we find the strength to be open to urangst and the resultant flexibility and meta-stability 
of dynamic authenticity, but from the subjective point of view life will consist of times, like for 
Steinbeck's Doc, when 'he knows [it] is funny, but he cannot laugh at i t . ' 6 9 
Theoretically speaking what this indicates is something like the continuum we found in the last 
chapter between neurotic and existential anxiety; in the current terminology, between cynicism and 
irony. I f our measure is our present self (which must always be in anxiety A or B) and other 
people, what makes this a valid measure of irony? In a sense nothing, but in another sense the 
broader the context of others which affirms our irony the greater validity the claim has. In a sense 
we cannot be essentially ironical or essentially metaphysical but only more or less metaphysical, 
or more or less ironical. Objectively speaking there is no leap into irony as there is a leap into faith 
for Kierkegaard; rather irony defines an ease and flexibility of movement—a 'readiness for 
anxiety'—rather than a unified state of mind. From the point of view of the subject the movement 
from anxiety B to anxiety A may feel like a leap, and perhaps must feel like a leap, but this is only 
possible because the essential limitations of this point of view in time, and it is in any case not a 
leap into irony. I f there is a leap at all it is to an openness to our contingency that makes irony 
possible in the first place, but as I shall expand on in the next chapter this is more like 
Kierkegaard's qualitative leap than the religious leap and even then, any guilt or sense of 
uncanniness that is not directed at the infinite makes even this ambigious. 
Given what I have said I must conclude that Rorty wants irony to be a strong mode of authenticity. 
To begin with he appears to regard himself as an ironist (although he could of course be implicitly 
referring to past selves); and there are suggestions in his work that he leans towards the 'irony as 
6 S REP,p.210 
69 Sweet Thursday (Pan, 1958), p. 184. This refers to a scene where Doc, an intelligent, eligible man is 
'scared stiff of being rejected by an ex-prostitute whom he knows likes him. 
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transcendence' compromise rather than the 'breaking of the public/private divide' compromise. 
One example is his implicit tendency to divinize the imagination. The person who creates only for 
themselves is clearly highly imaginative, and the imagination is of course a unpredictable, 
mysterious element of the psyche. It is easy to see how it might (or musf!) come to be regarded as 
an 'Other'—something one has a discourse with or that one is in awe of, perhaps a power 
sternming from one's past that one is not in control of. It is common for artists to be lost for an 
explanation as to how they came up with the ideas they did, the reason being a kind of duality of 
conscious self and imagination. I wonder i f Marcel has unlocked something of the subjective 
experience of irony when he contrasts being a genius with having talent. Genius is something 
beyond the will ; it is more like a Heideggerian 'openness' to Being which is 'always outrunning 
itself and spilling over in all directions.'71 Within the spiral of uncanniness the individual feels like 
he is making leaps as he encounters new and strange ideas and is forced to radically reorientate 
himself, and the subjective nature of these experiences (as the 'real meaning ... peals through [him] 
for the first time') is such that they are to all intents and purposes his discoveries. For the strong 
poet the sense of uncanniness is likely to be more intense, but the feeling he has, or at least the one 
which compels him to remain strong, would still be one of discovery—a discovery of bis 
imagination. 
I f I am to conclude that the only comprehensible form irony can take is as a dynamic mode of 
authenticity—and i f we are to suspend or defer the accusation that Rorty has given way under the 
metaphysical weight of the 'view from nowhere' and reduced the objective to the subjective—I 
need to meet the challenge of how the ironist can move so slickly from anxiety A to anxiety B and 
back. My answer is the ambiguous nature of urangst and our curious but vital ability to deceive 
ourselves. I do not want to enter into the debate about how self-deception is possible, only to 
acknowledge that it clearly is possible and that it seems such that so long as there is consciousness 
there is self-deception. Sartre accepts that i t is unavoidable and a necessary ingredient of our meta-
stability, and in all 'literature of ambiguity'—for example that of Conrad and Camus (as we shall 
see in the next chapter)—it plays a pivotal role. 'The most wonderful thing I know' says one of 
John Updike's more cynical characters, 'is the human capacity for self deception. It keeps 
everything else going.' 7 2 The degree of transparency of the significance of urangst is important in 
7 0 In a different book, one more privately orientated, this of course might be reversed. 
71 Being and Having, p. 173 
72 Couples (Penguin, 1970), p. 268 
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deterrnining one's willingness to shift perspective—one might say that the more it occurs the more 
runny and transparent the urangst becomes and the more ironic the person is. Urangst, we might 
say, is the oil in our ironic motor. 
« < * » > 
Of course Rorty's work, like Nietzsche's, can be read as 'enticing' us, through its contradictions, 
to reject aspects of philosophical enquiry—as ironic to the core. The final chapter in my search for 
anxiety's meaning considers a couple of writers whose method of enticement is less indirect. Truth 
that is found in novels is often subtle, often disguised and often linked to style, but these novels do 
not profess to be anything other than novels. The reader does not have to become exasperated by 
indirect meanings dressed as direct meanings before the true purpose shines through, but has, in my 
view, a more honest and respectful relation to the writer. I f post-modem philosophy's view requires 
this extra layer, then the existentialist's position is less in need of such self-consciousness. I f the 
anxiety A—anxiety B structure reflects the essential paradox and antinomy of human existence 
then nothing more complex or reflexive is required to make us aware of the difficulties this creates, 
and a literature that wants to make us more human need only present this structure by describing 
life as experienced. 
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Unending Ordeals: Conrad and Camus 
'The desire of being is always realized as the desire of a mode of being/—Sartre (Being and Nothingness) 
'The notion of Ambiguity must not be confused with that of absurdity. To declare that existence is absurd 
is to deny that it can ever be given a meaning; to say that it is ambiguous is to assert that its meaning is 
never fixed'—Simone deBeauvoir (The Ethics of Ambiguity) 
'The picture of the exposed and entangled state is what is required'—Henry James (The Art of the Novel) 
'Outside in the distance, a wild cat did growl / Two riders were approaching...'—Bob Dylan (op cit) 
« « • » » 
In this final part of the dissertation I want to discuss two novels that I see as demonstrating the 
structure and dynamics of existential anxiety. By remaining inconclusive and elusive in their 
meaning and their recommendations on how to appropriate certain revelations, both Heart of 
Darkness (HOD) and The Fall convey a distinctive mood. Both deal with themes of absurdity, 
alienation, freedom and guilt, but in such a way that they are modulated by the ambiguous tension 
at the heart of human existence that is anxiety. 
Apart from these serving as more concrete and contextualized portrayals of anxiety's influence, I 
want to make one or two more points and attempt to answer a question raised by the last chapter. 
One point concerns the relation of anxiety to guilt. In an atheistic world these can be even more 
closely allied than they are in, say, Kierkegaard's world, and what I want to show is that where we 
find anxiety has been acknowledged and appropriated into an authentic mode of existence a likely 
(or even inevitable) upshot is guilt. Just as existential anxiety is neither ethical nor ontological, so 
existential guilt is neither simply that of Heidegger's call of conscience nor of Sartre's strong bad 
faith. Perhaps the most concrete expression of urangst is the guilt experienced by the authentic 
individual; that which constantly reminds him that his view is not stable or complete, or at least 
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that he is not responding readily enough to urangst's demand for movement. We already know that 
the points of view of anxiety's A and B contain the seed of the other and that this is what makes 
anxiety existential, and the same process is found with the guilt that arises from the adoption of a 
mode of authenticity. In the ordeals of the heroes of Conrad and Camus' novels we find a 
movement towards existential awareness driven by anxiety, and in both cases I take guilt to be an 
indication that authenticity has been achieved. I f there is a leap in a secular environment it is closer 
to that of COA rather than that of FT—a movement whereby we come to see ourselves as guilty. 
Both characters come to live with guilt, but one reason why I chose these books is the differing 
mood in which it is experienced. Marlow's orientation is towards anxiety A's objectivity and the 
associated guilt is not dissimilar to Heidegger's guilt before what we are, at not having made 
ourselves 'from the ground up'; whilst Clemence's is towards anxiety B's self-creation within a 
contingent, ethically charged environment and has more in common with the feeling that we could 
be doing more, or be closer to actualizing ourselves, i f it were not for our tendency to flee anxiety 
into self-deception. This latter kind is beautifully represented by a passage in Steinbeck; 
Where does discontent start? You are warm enough, but you shiver. You are fed, yet hunger gnaws you ... 
"What has my life meant so far, and what can it mean in the time left to me?" And now we're coming to 
the wicked, poisoned dart: "What have I contributed to the great ledger? What am I worth?" And this isn't 
vanity or ambition. Men seem to be born with a debt they can never pay, no matter how hard they try. It 
piles up ahead of them. Man owes something to man. If he ignores the debt it poisons him, and if he tries 
to make payments the debt only increases . . . 1 
A question raised in the last chapter is whether a leap of irony is possible: is the ironic mode of 
existence something reached by a shift of perspective that provides an ironic lens to see through or 
an ironic platform to stand on, or does it lie on a continuum with cynicism at the other end? To 
answer this question we need to consider what kind of thing irony is. At the end of that chapter my 
suggestion was that in Rorty's world it can only make sense as a dynamic mode of authenticity and 
this would imply a continuum. I f static, a leap is possible, but without God the price to pay is a 
loss of the potency of anxiety's antinomy. My thesis here is that though irony is dynamic, it must 
engender a sense of immutibility from the subject's point of view because of its relation to the 
perspectivism of anxiety A. An authentic individual must, like Marlow and Clemence, be orientated 
towards either anxiety A or anxiety B. I f anxiety A has priority ironic authenticity is experienced 
as a leap, and movements into anxiety B engender ontological guilt; i f anxiety B has priority 
movements into anxiety A do not feel leap-like, but engender the more ethical form of guilt. In this 
1 Sweet Thursday, p.21 
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situation, as suggested in the conclusion to the previous chapter, only from the point of view of 
other people might one be considered ironic, but in truth a leap of equivalent status has been made. 
Roughly, anxiety A overstates its transcendence, anxiety B understates it. 
These ideas should become more transparent as a result of my analysis of Marlow and Clemence's 
respective stories. 
I 
' in moments of doubt that will come to a man determined to remain free from the absurdities of existence, 
I often asked myself, with a momentary dread, in what what would life try to get hold of me?'—Conrad 
(Victory) 
' in der man vor Fremdheit ersticken miisse'—Kafka (Das Schloss) 
When considering Heart of Darkness the question of a leap will be primary, guilt secondary, and in 
light of what I have said so far, this correlates with Marlow's (and Conrad's) skew towards the 
revelations of anxiety A. Specifically what I intend on doing here is comparing the alteration in 
Marlow's and Kurtz's comportment or mood as a result of their experiences in the Congo with the 
aesthetic-ethical leap that occurs in Kierkegaard's COA and the ethical-religious one that takes 
place in FT. The central features of COA's leap have already been summarized (as far as it can be 
summarized) in terms of non-reversibility, 'existential shift', and guilt. For my purposes here, key 
elements of Abraham's story in FT are as follows: (1) it involves a 'suspension of the ethical'; (2) 
it is largely incommunicable; (3) there must be a prior 'infinite resignation'; (4) it results in an 
'absolute relation to the absolute', and (5) this involves the ethical being returned and renewed 
(repetition). 
Conrad's position is atheistic and so any similarities that arise might be candidates for evidence of 
the elusive 'leap of irony'. That he is aware of the absurdity generated by the single individual's 
simultaneous potential for a commitment to his life and a sense of alienation is apparent in many of 
his novels, and Ian Watt speaks of a 'foreground' in Conrad's own seafaring life 'which featured a 
series of the most direct personal and social commitments—to his career, to his fellow seamen, to 
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his adopted country1,2 which is contrasted with a profound cynicism reminiscent of aspects of 
Dostoyevsky or Camus. Clear expression of this is found in one of his letters; 
The attitude of cold unconcern is the only reasonable one. Of course reason is hateful—but why? Because 
it demonstrates (to those that have the courage) that we, living are out of life—utterly out of it ... What 
makes mankind tragic is not that they are the victims of nature, it is that they are conscious of it .. . 3 
Among Conrad's novels, HOD stands out as readily characterizable as existentialist in that it can 
be seen as wrestling with the anxiety that reveals and is created by this contrast. As suggested, his 
answer (or Marlow's answer i f there's a difference) seems to side with anxiety A's uncanny 
transcendence—it follows Heidegger towards anxiety's 'bewildered calm' more than it does Sartre 
towards an anxiety of freedom through responsibility (although both are important). 
Before looking closely at Kurtz and Marlow I will briefly describe the plot. An anonymous 
narrator introduces us to Marlow, a seaman and something of a loner, who proceeds to tell of the 
preamble to, and his encounter with a renegade ivory merchant named Kurtz. Kurtz's employers, 
worried by reports of his unorthodox 'methods' and lack of communication, send Marlow to 
retrieve him. In order to do this Marlow must first journey from Europe to Africa and then to the 
company's central trading station some two-hundred miles into the jungle. The further Marlow 
travels the more primitive his surroundings become and likewise the more denuded the moral 
constitution of the colonials he meets. If, for the moment, we assume that Marlow later makes a 
leap of some sort then these experiences amount to what Kierkegaard would call a quantitative 
accumulation that offers Marlow his first vague portents of what Kurtz represents. Whilst sitting 
out a long wait at the trading station he receives his first impressions of the primitive, forbidding, 
and yet oddly familiar presence of the jungle; 
Beyond the fence the forest stood up spectrally in the moonlight. . . the silence of the land went home to 
one's very heart—its mystery, its greatness, the amazing reality of its concealed life. 4 
In a similar manner Marlow is slowly introduced to the enigma that is Kurtz, he learns that he was 
a man of exceptional capabilities (a 'universal genius') and high ideals. Beyond this though he 
remains a mystery. Marlow is acutely aware that he is missing something but at this stage has only 
2 Joseph Conrad: Alienation and Commitment in Sykes Davies and Watson (eds.) The English Mind: 
Studies in the English Moralists (Cambridge, 1964), p. 265 
3 ibid, p. 260 
4 HOD p. 80 
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the slightest hint of what it might be. That Kurtz is somewhere up the river he is sure, but he says 
he believes it 'in the same way one of you might believe there are inhabitants on the planet Mars'.5 
In other words, the reality of Kurtz has for Marlow only the thinnest of meanings; it is like 
Kierkegaard's spirit (or self) as presented in the initial stages of anxiety or a shadow in Plato's 
cave. 
Any initial sympathy Marlow has for Kurtz is mostly engendered by his dislike for the petty, 
deceitful and greedy Westerners at the station; 
A taint of imbecile rapacity blew through it all, like a whiff from some corpse ... And outside, the silent 
wilderness surrounding this cleared speck on the earth struck me as something great and invincible, like 
evil or truth6 
This 'evil or truth', as well as describing the contrasting omnipotence of the jungle, is an allusion to 
Kurtz's ambiguity. For Marlow at least, Kurtz is at a distance from this 'corpse'. His respect for 
him, and to some extent his identification with him, increase when he learns about his last visit to 
the central station when, after depositing his ivory, he turned around and paddled back up the river. 
He says; 
I seemed to see Kurtz for the first time. It was a distinct glimpse: the dugout, four paddling savages, and 
the lone white man turning his back suddenly on the headquarters, on relief, on thoughts of home ..? 
At this stage though he does not understand Kurtz's motive for turning around; he has become, 
amidst the corruption and through a lack of any land of grip on his reality, an ideal, and in this lack 
of understanding Marlow's enduring naivete is demonstrated. He speculates that 'he was just a fine 
fellow who stuck to his work for its own sake' . 8 In this we find one of the first examples of Marlow 
as existing in something close to an ethical mode, prior and oblivious to the meanmgfulness of an 
individual beyond his duties and responsibility to others. 
As Marlow begins his journey up the river the mystery of Kurtz and of his surroundings turns into 
an increasing sense of disquiet. The wilderness starts to become less like something that is simply 
'other1, and more like something that has relevance to him. The movement from the 'speck of 
5opcit, p. 76 
6 ibid, p. 76 
7 ibid, p. 90 
8 ibid 
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civilization into the jungle is profoundly atavistic and would offer little restraint before a similar 
moral regression. Marlow, gradually waking up to this reality, comments, with respect to the 
tribesmen on the banks of the river; 
they were not inhuman ... that was the worst of it—this suspicion of their not being inhuman. It would 
come slowly to one. They howled and leapt and spun, and made horrid faces; but what thrilled you was 
just the thought of their inhumanity—like yours—the thought of your remote kinship with this wild and 
passionate uproar. Ugly. Yes, it was ugly enough; but if you were man enough you would admit to 
yourself that there was in you just the faintest trace of a response to the terrible frankness of that noise, a 
dim suspicion of there being a meaning in it which you ... could comprehend.9 
Once Marlow finally reaches the camp he discovers that Kurtz has become a god-like figure, 
exercising limitless powers over the natives, and the ideals with which he entered the jungle have 
been seduced and overwhelmed by his most basic desires and instincts. In Marlow's words, 'the 
wilderness had taken him, loved him, embraced him, got into his veins, consumed his flesh .. . ' 1 0 
Kurtz might commonly be excused as having gone insane, but Marlow has seen enough, and felt 
enough by this point to suspect the situation to be more complicated than this. Kurtz can be said to 
have made, or at least attempted, a leap—he has turned the canoe around—and this I shall dwell 
on for a while. 
Marlow says of Kurtz's 'soul', 'being alone in the wilderness it had looked within itself... I saw the 
inconceivable mystery of a soul that knew no restraint, no faith, no fear, yet struggled blindly with 
itself.'1 1 One way of looking at Kurtz's stal^of-mind would be in terms of Sartre's 'desire to be 
God'. His atavistic movement can be seen as an attempt to dig underneath the human condition in 
order to create himself from the ground up. It is a way of avoiding what Heidegger sees as the 
source of our existential guilt, a way of being answerable to no one, of being independent of 
history, culture and nature. But he also wants a distinctly human reward for this infinite 
perspective—he wants the freedom and the power of self-creation provided only by a bounded 
freedom. The problem is of course that one precludes the other. As we have seen, even for the 
strong poet, i f we are to create ourselves this must at least be against a background of ideals and 
people we can respect. Deep in the jungle Kurtz is able to find an environment where his 
dominance is god-like but here he cannot create himself except in the most depraved sense; he is 
9 op cit, p. 96 
1 0 ibid, p. 115 
1 1 ibid, p. 144 
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without 'restraint' and his environment—the only one that can give him the sense of 
omnipotence—can offer none. To Kierkegaard's mind Kurtz's leap would be abortive: one that 
collides with the bedrock of finitude rather than finding freedom in the infinite. The desire to be 
God for him amounts to a 'defiance' of God and is described as; 
Severing the self from any relation to the power which has established it, or severing itself from the 
conception that there is such a power. By means of this infinite form, the self wants ... to rule over 
himself, to create himself ... He wants to begin a little earlier than other people, not at and with the 
beginning, but 'in the beginning'.12 
Outside of Kierkegaard's religious structure it is not so clear what would count as a leap at all, let 
alone an abortive one. According to Marlow we have in Kurtz someone who 'had made that last 
stride ... stepped over the edge',13 and maybe a comparison with some features of Kierkegaardian 
leaps will help fathom whether something like this really has occurred, and i f so why it has failed to 
achieve anything like completion for Kurtz. 
Of the three characteristics or requirements of COA's 'qualitative leap' I have outlined I would say 
that two are possibly fulfilled but, conspicuously, the third is certainly not. Firstly, i t would seem 
highly inappropriate for HOD to have ended with Kurtz returning to society and taking up a job as 
a bureaucrat or salesman. His 'leap' seems non-reversible, and particularly so as there is nothing 
he encounters that could initiate a reversal except the very essence of what drove him away from 
society in the first place. The second requirement (subsidiary in some ways to the first), that the 
individual's existence undergoes a profound shift, would appear to be the case with Kurtz. His life 
and surroundings are now of a substance that little resembles his former life as a political idealist, 
engaged to be married, and heading for the upper echelons of the ivory business. But one wonders 
if, despite appearances, this has really involved a leap and not just a logical pursuit of the 
motivations that underlie civilization and ultimately the desire to be en-soi-pour-soil 
The other feature—that the individual emerge as guilty, and as claimable by God (or perhaps 
something similarly absolute) is even less obviously fulfilled. Kurtz appears not to experience any 
kind of guilt. In Kierkegaardian terms we can probably say that he endures something like the pre-
leap anxiety that (for Kierkegaard) all men experience whether they respond to it or not: Marlow, 
1 2 SUD, p. 99 
1 3 op cit, p. 151 
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partially relating to his own experience, says '[the wilderness] had whispered to him things about 
himself which he did not know, things of which he had no conception 'till he took council with this 
great solitudes—and the whisper had proved irresistibly fascinating1,14 but in the resultant leap we 
do not find him emerging with the theoretically ambiguous but subjectively powerful sense of guilt 
that for Kierkegaard is so crucial. That this is the case is unsurprising considering that his stepping 
over the edge is motivated by a desire to be self-sustaining. It might however be argued that 
something does claim him. Having witnessed Kurtz's environment Marlow says, 'everything 
belonged to him—but that was a trifle. The thing was to know what he belonged to, how many 
powers of darkness claimed him for their own.' 1 5 To counter this we should point out that for 
Kierkegaard God always has a claim over us, but the important thing for the individual is to know 
and accept himself in this way. Perhaps Kurtz's summation 'The horror!' is a realization of his 
having been claimed by the 'powers of darkness', but one feels, and I think Marlow feels, that 
though these powers are there, they do not necessarily have to claim us—we can show 'restraint', 
even 'faith', in the face of them. 
There is then a poor match between Kurtz's situation and the 'qualitative leap', but, perhaps oddly, 
we have slightly more joy with the ethical-religious leap. Firstly he certainly goes beyond the 
ethical in pursuit of his self or truth (although it is of course not 'suspended'); and secondly there is 
a strong emphasis on the incommunicability of Marlow's experience. An important stylistic feature 
of the story is that the reader is kept two steps from knowing Kurtz and the reality of his 
experience. The first step is Marlow's impressions—'it is impossible', he says, 'impossible to 
convey the life sensation of any given epoch of one's existence—that which makes it's truth, its 
meaning—its subtle and penetrating essence';16 and the second is Kurtz's experience, which 
Marlow himself can only catch glimpses of. The effect of this is to enhance the idea that Kurtz's 
world is something extremely unusual and thus very difficult, i f not impossible, to understand and 
communicate. Marlow says; 
You can't understand. How could you?—with solid pavement under your feet, surrounded by kind 
neighbours ready to cheer you or to fall on you, stepping delicately between the butcher and the policeman 
... how can you imagine what particular region of the first ages a man's untrammelled feet may take him 
1 4 opcit , p. 131 
1 5 ibid, p. 116 
1 6 ibid, p. 82 
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into by way of solitude—utter solitude without a policeman—by way of silence—utter silence, where no 
warning voice of a neighbour can be heard whispering of public opinion?17 
And i f Kurtz represents Abraham in this respect, then Marlow is Silentio. His attitude to Kurtz 
involves abhorrence, but more pronounced is his sense of bewilderment and awe. There is a certain 
honesty or purity in Kurtz's actions that he feels he is denied (or has denied himself); 
1 had been permitted to draw back my hesitating foot. And perhaps this is the whole difference; perhaps 
all the wisdom, and all truth, and all sincerity, are just compressed into that inappreciable moment of time 
in which we step over the threshold of the invisible . . . 1 8 
and earlier, 
There was nothing either above or below him ... He had kicked himself loose of the earth ... he had kicked 
the very earth to pieces. He was alone and I before him did not know if I stood on the ground or floated in 
the air. 1 9 
As already discussed Kurtz attains nothing like an absolute relation to the absolute and as a 
consequence no repetition, but we can perhaps see him as resigned. I f being exposed to the 
falseness and contingency of his ethical and political ideals is enough for him to give up on his 
finite existence then we might interpret him as turning to an infinite ideal in the form of his own 
deification. The trouble with this though is twofold: firstly it is not those humanitarian ideals 
themselves which are made infinite; and secondly his self-deification is not an infinite sublimation 
but something he attempts to actualize. 
Generally speaking Kurtz's story resonates slightly better with the religious leap than with the 
ethical one and this is interesting. One passage which says something about Marlow's character, 
and perhaps about his leap that places him in a more important role than Kierkegaard's Silentio 
concludes, 'when they [these social and moral guidelines] are gone you must fall back upon your 
own innate strength, upon your own capacity for faithfulness.'20 What Marlow means by faith here 
is more like self belief, understanding or mastery than something religious, but what is clear is that 
Kurtz lacks this. Can Kierkegaard's psychology explain why this might be? The answer is 
suggested when Marlow tells us that for Kurtz the 'whisper1 of the wilderness had 'proved 
irresistibly fascinating'. 'It echoed loudly within him', he says, 'because he was hollow at the 
1 7 opcit , p. 116 
1 8 ibid, p. 151 
1 9 ibid, p. 144 
2 0 ibid 
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core'.21 This hollowness suggests that Kurtz, despite possible appearances, was never in the ethical 
mode of being but still in the aesthetic. His previous ideals, perhaps unbeknown to him, were 
merely play or perhaps a levelled version of ethics that concentrates on duty rather than 
inwardness. When put to the test their flimsiness was fully exposed and he did not have the 
resources (although he clearly had the potential) to deal with their relativization. In COA's terms 
Kurtz is someone who acknowledged the call of anxiety, but lacked the humility to accept our 
essential guilt. As such the qualitative leap was never completed and instead replaced with an 
ersatz version, the inauthenticity of which is exposed with the kind of consequences that 
Kierkegaard warns us of at the end of his Psychologically Orienting Deliberation.22 
« < • » > 
Marlow returns to tell his tale but in the existential sense is his journey completed? He was then, 
and still is, a seaman, so we cannot look for irreversibility in this simple fact. I f we look further 
however it seems clear that although he '[drew] back his hesitating foot', his entire journey 
represents a threshold of sorts that precludes him from living in the same way as he did before he 
set out. Amidst this change there are several turning points, one of the most potent symbols of 
which is the scene when he is told of Kurtz turning his canoe around on delivering his last batch of 
ivory. Marlow is just beginning to feel a certain disquiet about Kurtz and what he represents, but 
his naive speculation—'perhaps he was just a fine fellow who stuck to his work for its own sake'— 
is not something we can imagine him repeating after his ordeal. Though filled with ambiguity and a 
dream-like quality, something about his encounter with Kurtz is burned on Marlow's 
consciousness; he tells us, 'it was the furthest point of navigation and the culminating point of my 
experience. It seemed to throw a kind of light on everything about me and into my thoughts'. 
2 1 op cit, p. 131 
2 2 Kurtz perhaps most resembles Kierkegaard's 'genius' (COA, pp. 99-103), described as an 'omnipotent 
[in-itself]', is 'placed outside the ethical', but his 'significance to himself is niF. For Kierkegaard he is 
doomed to emptiness because he is defined not in terms of other men, nor in terms of God, but only in 
terms of 'fate' - essentially nothingness. However great his deeds are they do not contribute to a sense of 
self or spirit defined in terms of a meaningful relation to something exterior. Kurtz is also similar to 
Camus' Caligula about whom Golomb says, 'Like ... Abraham, his 'purity of heart' drives him 'to follow 
the essential to the end', but this end is not the leap to absolute faith, but rather a leap to absolute 
nothingness. Caligula is an illustration of the failure of lonely authenticity. Caligula, who wanted to be 
God, determining the fates of others declares at the end of his life: 'I have chosen a wrong path ... My 
freedom isn't the right one." (Golomb, op cit, pp. 186-7) 
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Significantly though, he qualifies this saying it was 'not extraordinary in any way—not very clear 
either. And yet it seemed to throw a kind of light.' 2 3 
I shall say more about the irreversibility of Marlow's position at the end of this section, but in the 
meantime move on to the related issue of 'existential shift'. At the beginning of the book Marlow is 
described by the original narrator in the following way; 
[he] sat cross-legged ... leaning against the mizzen-mast. He had a straight back, an ascetic aspect, and 
with his arms dropped, the palms of his hands outwards, resembled an idol. 2 4 
Later we are told that for a seaman he was 'not typical' and it is confirmed, 'he had the pose of a 
Buddha'. The suggestion is certainly that Marlow is not the same man since his journey. The 
impression is one of detachment and perhaps serenity, but this Marlow is still a seaman. In an 
article comparing Conrad with Buddhism and Hinduism, Charles Ponnuthrai Sarvan and Paul 
Balles emphasise Buddhism as a philosophy of action and quote from one of Conrad's letters 
written a few years before HOD; 
One becomes useful only on realizing the utter insignificance of the individual in the scheme of the 
universal. When one understands that in oneself one is nothing and that a man is worth neither more nor 
less than the work he accomplishes with honesty of purpose and means ... only then is one master of his 
conscience, with the right to call himself a man.25 
This clearly resonates with Kierkegaard's resignation and I will consider Marlow's period of 
resignation shortly. Earlier I briefly mentioned Conrad's emphasis on work and commitment and 
one feels that this is idealistically heightened when he is led to consider that mankind has no higher 
purpose. Marlow is still a seaman, but one with a profoundly different perspective on himself as a 
seaman because he has now, in a clearer sense than ever before, chosen to be a seaman. 
From what has so far been recounted it may not seem that Marlow emerges from his experience 
with any sense of guilt, but possibly we can identify an ambiguous kind of guilt in the later stages 
of the book. Before I move on to this I first want to mention that I would suppose Marlow to have 
undergone something similar to an aesthetic-ethical leap prior to this particular adventure. To be 
2 3 op cit, p. 51 
2 4 ibid, p.46 
2 5 Buddhism, Hinduism and the Conradian Darkness (Conradiana, Vol.26, no.l, 1994), p.74 
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captain of a vessel amounts to a great responsibility and Conrad has elsewhere referred to a ship as 
'the moral symbol of our l i fe ' . 2 6 In the later novel The Shadow Line there is an important scene, 
imbued with Kierkegaardian leap-like imagery, when a young officer is given his first captaincy. 
'My head swam', he tells us, 'and I felt a heaviness of limbs as i f they had grown bigger1; and as he 
leaves the Harbour Master's office he feels he is 'dealing with mere dream stuff, but when 'at the 
last moment the fellowship of seaman asserted i tself 2 7 he becomes fully aware of what he has 
chosen and the leap is made. I f there is a sense of guilt that accompanies this young man's new 
position it is the feeling of inadequacy, of having chosen what he perhaps cannot perfect and indeed 
what he may not be up to at all (the ambiguity of course being that one can never know the ful l 
consequences of one's choices in advance). 
Marlow, we can assume, has accepted a level of responsibility, and possibly an attendant guilt 
(although with time and experience we might assume that this lessens), but the guilt that this 
journey bestows upon him is of a different kind—one that is tinged with a sense of the infinite, or 
with a solemn but ironic appreciation of our limitations. Early in the story we learn of Marlow"s 
disgust for the men of the company—their shallow and selfish ideals, their greed, moral 
indifference, materialism, and basic self-deception and dishonesty. In a sense he is inescapably 
part of this—fallible, limited, mortal, duplicitous and open to the same temptations and part of the 
same fallen race. The brutality of the natives is after all our ancestry, and whether we know it or 
not most of our actions, even the seemingly altruistic ones, can be shown (as Freud shows us) to 
exhibit this. Marlow's more idealistic attitude is ostensibly morally superior, but the suspicion that 
it is commensurate with what it attempts to oppose cannot be discarded. Earlier on he seeks his 
own form of escape from this ambiguity: his honesty is more ontologically than morally motivated. 
He tells us; 
You know I hate, detest and can't bear a lie, not because I am straighter than the rest of us, but simply 
because it appals me. There is a taint of death, a flavour of mortality in lies—which is exactly what I hate 
and detest in the world—what I want to forget.28 
Kurtz, on first impressions at least, is the antithesis of the company's dishonesty. Geographically 
and existentially he has journeyed far away from society's superstructure and Marlow, particularly 
2 6 Cited in Hawthorn's introduction to The Shadow Line, p.vii (OUP, 1985). 
2 7 The Shadow Line, pp.32-33 
2 8 HOD, p. 82 
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in light of the men at the trading station, admires him for this. Kurtz, we are well aware by now, 
has 'made that last stride ... stepped over the edge', but is it possible to live authentically, not in 
Kurtzian excess but amongst such corruption? 
Marlow is well aware of 'seriousness' and 'levelling'; of society's tendency to anodyne conformity 
and an almost conspiratorial covering up of death and the requirements of authenticity Through 
his anxiety at least Marlow rises above this, though his comment 'one can't live with one's finger 
everlastingly on one's pulse'29 indicates the insuperable difficulty of living amongst others and in 
history whilst maintaining something that might be called 'authenticity'. The guilt attached to this 
realization we now know well; that of, in Heidegger's words, 'never [having] power over one's 
ownmost being from the ground up'. 3 0 Marlow sees his own final attitude to existence as one of 
'careless contempt', a form of resignation in light of the ambiguity and greyness highlighted by 
anxiety. Kurtz, by way of contrast, had 'summed up' and 'judged', and though that judgement was 
'the horror!', simply having something to say—a kind of completion—is seen as a victory; defeat 
taking the form, not of pain, degradation or perdition, but of indifference, of having no right to 
belong. He has not transcended Heyst's position when we first encounter him in Victory. We are 
told; 
It was the very essence of his life to be a solitary achievement, accomplished not by hermit-like 
withdrawal with its silence and immobility, but by a system of restless wandering, by the detachment of an 
impermanent dweller amongst changing scenes. 3 1 
Kierkegaard I think would agree that Kurtz, through naked exposure to the depths of his being or 
soul, is potentially closer to the infinite (or perhaps closer to being in Heidegger's terminology) than 
those who still rely on other people as a measure of themselves. Kierkegaard sees the areligious 
'genius' as someone who, because of his refusal to acknowledge the truth of anxiety and make the 
'qualitative leap', is ultimately hollow, but nonetheless describes him as someone who has gone 
beyond other men and confronts 'the profoundest mysteries of existence'.32 Kurtz, as we have seen, 
discovers no guilt and no claim on himself and so his leap is, on Kierkegaard's terms, abortive. 
This is not so clearly the case in Marlow's eyes. For him Kurtz represents an ambiguous kind of 
2 9opcit, p. 105 
3 0 BT, p.330 
3 1 p. 128 
3 2 COA,p,102 
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guilt—the gnawing, outsiderish feeling that he has passed-up the chance of 'all wisdom, all 
sincerity.' 
Typical of Marlow*s situation, however, is that we might see his guilt working in the other direction 
as well. He has chosen to return to society but knows that his fidelity is not, and never will be, 
complete—a part of him wanted to, and still wants to, follow Kurtz over the edge. What, one might 
ask, 'permitted' him to 'draw back1? The answer, I think, is in fact some form of claim society has 
upon him—in essence an ethical bond. Just how Marlow can accept a claim over himself from a 
world that is seemingly so dishonest and to which he does not 'belong' in an ontological sense is 
clearly a question he wrestles with and one that, like HOD itself, has no simple solution. His 
position is summed-up by his own cynical acknowledgement of his freedom as 'a choice of 
nightmares'. That his choice of the particular nightmare that is society has gained, perhaps for the 
first time, its ful l significance, is made apparent in the famous scene towards the end of the story 
when he is speaking with Kurtz's grieving fiancee. Famously he lies about Kurtz's last words; he 
tells her not that it was 'the horror!' but that he uttered her name.33 
The apparent irony is then that Marlow, a man who 'detests lies', finds he has given himself no 
other option. This action is strong evidence of an existential shift and of Marlow"s acceptance of a 
claim upon him. To some extent the currency of lies is now less abhorrent to Marlow and yes, to 
some extent by maintaining the intended's illusion (in his eyes she could not have coped with the 
truth) he has made a greater commitment to the society or ethical realm which claims him But 
things are more complex than this. I f things were not so complex we might here have a close 
correspondence with the 'qualitative leap'—society (perhaps a Hegelian telos) functioning 
something like God—but Conrad does not allow us the kind of comfort that the intended is 
allowed. At the very end of the book it is clear that Marlow still feels he owes something to 
Kurtz—'the justice that was his due'. His new perspective on lies is not just an acceptance of 
compromise and conformity, but representative of his corning to terms with his own contingency. 
His journey into the Congo has given him a greater insight into his anxiety, but i t is a perspective 
that does not lead him to overcome this anxiety but rather to realize he must assume it in some 
3 3 To stretch the comparison with Kierkegaard a little further, this situation is not dissimilar to Seren's 
pretending to Regine his reasons for calling off the engagement were other than they were. At one point, 
for instance, he claims he wants to 'sow his wild oats'—an aesthetic explanation she can hope to 
understand rather than the 'religious' truth. (See The Journals, pp.91-103) 
217 
fashion. A result of the experience is a finer sense of the distinction between the ontological and the 
ethical. Ontologically speaking lies and self-deception remain repellent, but i f there is any irony to 
be found in the lie it is that a person who does not face their contingency—a person who deceives 
themselves—is capable of nausea in the face of lies in general; whereas a person who is 
ontologically honest respects the ethical status of lies and illusion. As we know, it is hard to see 
how the two worlds could share a perspective, but as was tentatively concluded in the last chapter 
the ironist at least needs this as an ideal, even i f in the final analysis self-deception (tempered by 
urangst) is required to do the dirty work. 
I suggested earlier that, with Marlow's authentic orientation siding with anxiety A, to him there 
must appear to be a leap. Even i f objectively we cannot point to a clear division between the old 
and new Marlow, we are nonetheless hearing from someone who feels in some sense reborn. To 
continue constructing the picture of what gives rise to this state of mind we need to look at what his 
journey shares with Abraham's. Firstly, the suspension of the ethical gradually occurs as he moves 
closer to Kurtz and further from the 'pilgrims'. That it does not entirely occur (he maintains his 
self through 'faith', self-knowledge etc.) is perhaps what stops Marlow from becoming Kurtz, but 
even then there is a period when he falls il l on the boat on the way back where he does seem to 
have lost his grip. His later recounting of his struggle with death ('in impalpable greyness ... 
without spectators, ... without glory ... in a sickly atmosphere of tepid scepticism, without much 
belief in your own right, and still less in that of your adversary'34) would suggest resignation 
except, there being no ideal which sustains him, it is more like Camus' nihilism. Camus himself 
says; 
The leap does not represent an extreme danger as Kierkegaard would like it to. The danger, on the 
contrary, lies in the subtle instant that precedes the leap, being able to remain on that dizzying crest—that 
is integrity and the rest is subterfuge.35 
Repetition is suggested however in Marlow's altered comportment, his resembling the Buddha and 
so forth. He is still a seaman, but, we might say, a different kind of seaman, one who has 
undergone an ordeal. But has he made a leap? What I have said about bis guilt implies he has not: 
he is on Camus' 'dizzying crest' relying primarily on support from anxiety A, but switching to 
anxiety B's more explicit approval of work, fidelity and self-knowledge when the urangst makes it 
3 4 HOD, p. 150 
3 5 The Myth of Sisyphus, p.50 
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too slippery to grip; and so on back and forth. From Marlow's perspective as a story teller it feels 
like a leap has been made, but once The Nellie sets sail I wonder what sense of this is retained? I 
suspect his mood would still be close to that which distracted him from his uncanny surroundings 
as he crawled towards Kurtz; 
I did not see it anymore; I had no time. I had to keep guessing at the channel ... I watched for sunken 
stones; ... I had to keep a look-out for the signs of dead wood we could cut up ... for next days steaming. 
When you have to attend to things of that sort, to mere incidents of the surface, the reality—the reality, I 
tell you—fades ... luckily, luckily.3 6 
And in an important ironic-ethical summation he says; 
The earth for us is a place to live in, where we must put up with sights, with sounds, with smells, too, by 
Jove!—breathe dead hippo ... and not be contaminated. And there ... your strength comes in, the faith in 
your ability for the digging of unostentatious holes to bury the stuff in—your power of devotion, not to 
yourself, but to an obscure, back-breaking business.37 
Still, i f we are to liken resignation to cynicism (in my more specific sense of the word), 
Kierkegaard's view (or at least the view you feel he would like to maintain) is that in resignation 
there is 'peace and repose and consolation in the pain ' 3 8 and in faith a constant struggle. Similarly 
we can point to irony as a constant struggle and a constant movement and say that it is this which 
makes it special or transcendent, but of course my whole point is that it is precisely this which 
precludes i t from being transcendent in the way Kierkegaard wants faith to be. 
As mentioned, Marlow is like Silentio in certain respects, but he himself also struggles to 
communicate his experience. I f Kierkegaard's claim is that Abraham's experience is 
incommunicable even to other Knight's of Faith then this is not Marlow's situation. I f he had 
'made that last stride' we would understand him less (but he would still be understandable in 
principle), but, though his gaze is elsewhere his feet remain, i f only in the driest earth, planted in 
the ethical and we can share the categories i f not the intensity with him. Still, he insists that even to 
himself the meaning of his experience is not entirely clear and perhaps this is further indication that 
his mode of authenticity is dynamic rather than static. He does not have a fixed position from 
where he can locate all the nuances of anxiety; instead he oscillates. I f his mode was static, as 
Religiousness A appears to be, then the problem of communicating to the uninitiated would take on 
3 6 op cit, p. 93 
3 7 ibid, p. 117 
3 8 FT, p.74 
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a new stature, but his self-understanding would be limitless. As it is, his altered comportment most 
resembles the post-qualitative leap individual but, as Kierkegaard maintains, unless this is oriented 
towards faith it is insubstantial—unable to support itself—and ultimately in despair. Marlow's 
'leap' is an intense realization that he cannot be his essential contingency which in a crucial sense 
is no leap at all: without a telos one's status remains fundamentally ambiguous. 
ri 
'Can one become a saint without God?—that's the problem, in fact the only problem I'm up against 
today.' —Camus (The Plague) 
Jacob Golomb points out a transformation in Camus' thought between The Myth of Sisyphus and 
The Outsider in the early 1940s and The Plague and The Rebel in the late 40s and 1950s. The 
later works stress the social element of authenticity and relegate the nihilism of the absurd to a 
starting point akin to Descartes radical scepticism. Upon this a self is created that takes into 
account its cultural and historical limitations. 'For there to be any value in Sisyphus' authenticity' 
Golomb writes, 'someone must assert it as a value that has significance for society, i f only at its 
margins.'3 9 Golomb wants to draw a social ethic and an ethic of authenticity together; he interprets 
Camus in light of this, and perhaps this is a reason why he pays no attention to The Fall which 
seems to me to be Camus' most mature consideration of authenticity. 
The absurdity of our condition is recognized as as intractable as Descartes' reduction, but in his 
post-Rebel phase where we are inescapably social, a profound tension still exists between the 
demands of self-creation and our essential uncanniness. The manifestation of this is guilt, and guilt, 
as proposed, is the definitive product of an appropriated anxiety B. It is nothing as convenient as a 
melding of individuality and morality (although it certainly does not ignore the desire for this), and 
it is not a return to Mersaultian alienation. It resembles Nietzsche, but less so than Conrad or 
Marlow's quasi-transcendence of the morally situated individual. Perhaps like the Sartre of NE 
Clemence is deeply and uncynically social in his comportment, but at the same time aware that 
even an individual so created desires, like any individual, that impossible autonomy that Sartre 
speaks of and the immortality Unamuno sees as the fate of consciousness. The result is that he 
op cit, p. 180 
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inevitably plays out that desire in his social environment thereby wishing the destruction of the only 
thing that can sustain him. 
Guilt is then Camus' theme in The Fall. There is less of a leap in evidence—Clemence slides or at 
most shudders towards his self-styled position of 'judge penitent'—but there is still a discemibly 
new Clemence even i f he refuses to acknowledge this (and this refusal is itself part of his guilty 
orientation). A Kierkegaardian leap requires an essential openness and passivity which, to a degree, 
Marlow exhibits, but Camus' hero is essentially active and self-creating and here we can locate an 
important sense in which, though both strive for authenticity, their subjective relations to the 
anxiety structure are substantially different. 
In this book we hear one side of a dialogue in which Jean-Baptiste Clemence speaks to and 
befriends someone who has wandered into his haunt, a bar near the Amsterdam docks. The bar is 
his court room, or perhaps psychoanalysts office, and the 'judge penitent's' job is to make people 
aware of their existential guilt—in particular their self-deception—by recounting the painful 
process which was the uncovering of his own duplicity. A central motif in the story is the 
Amsterdam fog which is representative of the ambiguity of existential guilt—the ambiguity already 
discussed coupled with the fact that, without God, we must be our own judges.4 0 The critic John 
Cruikshank contrasts this with the 'sharply defined light and shade of North Africa' 4 1 that was the 
setting for The Outsider, and there is indeed a richer, more ambiguous anxiety inherent in The Fall 
that is missing in some of the earlier work. Sartre said of Camus; 
[H]e likes bright mornings, clear evenings and relentless afternoons. His favourite season is Algiers' 
eternal summer. Night has hardly any place in his universe.42 
But The Fall is different. Mersault's cynicism is replaced at the end by a rebellious transcendence 
that, like Marlow's position, leans towards anxiety A. Clemence, on the other hand always affirms 
existence quite straightforwardly, and only occasionally in the ironic sense of affinning he affirms 
it in his denial. But denial does not sit easily with him: it is a punishment he reluctantly assumes, 
and always he is looking for a reprieve, a means of justifying his preferred aesthetic existence. This 
Fog is also used as a symbol of existential ambiguity in HOD. 
Albert Camus and the Literature of Revolt (Galaxy (OUP) 1960), p. 183 
Literary and Philosophical Essays, p. 34 
221 
he finds, but it is hard won, and as indicated it never entirely seems to him that he has made any 
advance at all. 
Just how he arrives at this is interesting in as much as it appears to follow the progression from 
'serious man' to psychoanalyst that I outlined in Chapter 4. Before becoming aware of his duplicity, 
Clemence is utterly immersed in life. He aims to please, to create the perfect social being (he is 
kind, generous, good-looking, intelligent, modest and very popular with both men and women) and 
takes himself very seriously. This state Cruikshank describes, with reference to the basic 
symbolism of the book, as 'primal innocence'. It is a very different kind of innocence to that of 
Mersault, but I think, as with Joseph in Dangling Man, an altogether more recognizable kind. The 
momentum with which we enter life presents us with emotional needs and a social structure usually 
designed to help fulf i l l them already part of our engaged existence. Clemence describes how he was 
'altogether in harmony with life, fitting into it from top to bottom without rejecting any of its 
ironies, its grandeur, or its servitude.'43 
For Clemence, an insight into his inauthentic seriousness occurred one evening when his 'powers' 
were at a peak; 
I was riding on the crest of a wave ... I was happy. The day had been good: a blind man, the reduced 
sentence [he was a lawyer] I had hoped for, a cordial handclasp from my client, a few generous actions 
and, in the afternoon, a brilliant improvisation in the company of several friends on the hard-heartedness 
of our governing class and the hypocrisy of our leaders ... I felt rising within me a vast feeling of power 
and—I don't know how to express it—a completion, which cheered my heart. I straightened up and was 
about to light a cigarette of satisfaction, when, at that very moment, a laugh burst out behind me. Taken 
by surprise, I suddenly wheeled round; there was no one there . . . 4 4 
This laughter is the anxiety encountered in a 'mood of seriousness' heralding bad faith, or the 
reaffirmation of bad faith. It was 'coming from nowhere ... At the same time I was aware of the 
rapid beating of my heart'. It was a laugh which 'put everything properly in its place.'45 From now 
on Clemence is never entirely free from this laughter and its disturbing effect furthers a stripping-
away of both the ontological status of his position amongst others and his self-deception with 
respect to his moral motivations. 
4 3 The Fall, pp. 22-3 
4 4 ibid, p.30 
4 5 ibid 
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From this point of the story onwards, the anatomy of Clemence's bad faith, and bad faith in 
general, come under the microscope. His popularity is greatly aided by his modesty, but in truth he 
almost acquires and nurtures modesty because it makes him popular and more powerful. The same 
applies to acts of kindness. In one example he recounts how, after escorting blind men across the 
street he would touch his hat to them, but of course they could not see this; 
To whom was it addressed? To the public. After playing my part, I would take my bow. Not bad eh?4 6 
A kind of perversion of the 'fundamental project' is apparent in the true nature of his attitude to 
relationships. He thrives on being loved, but he does not want the comrrdtment that is necessary to 
be loved (in return) properly. As such; 
In my moments of irritation I told myself that the ideal solution would have been the death of the person I 
was interested in. Her death would, on the one hand, have fixed our relationship once and for all and, on 
the other, removed its constraint.47 
He then describes his project taken to its idealistic limits; 
I could live happily only on condition that all the individuals on earth, or the greatest possible number, 
were turned towards me, eternally unattached, deprived of any separate existence, and ready to answer my 
call at any moment, doomed in short to sterility until the day I should deign to favour them.48 
This he was able to admit to himself, but clearly it would be very hard to sustain this knowledge 
whilst playing the role of a heroic, generous and modest man. Perhaps it is because this kind of 
attitude to relationships in general is favoured by an unreflective pour-soi that Sartre advocates the 
full awareness of ourselves as a 'fundamental project'. 
His 'essential discovery1 about himself, the one that more than anything prompted the 'laughter1, 
came when he found he was too cowardly to save a girl drowning in the Seine. Crucially, there was 
no one else around when this happened and, at the time, he told no one about it. Given that this 
occurred a few years before the laughter, it places in doubt where he actually lost his 'primal 
innocence'. If he still took himself seriously it would be an ambiguous seriousness, or perhaps a 
seriousness he would have to try harder and harder to maintain.49 But there is no clean movement 
4 6 ibid, p. 37 
4 7 ibid, p. 50 
4 8 ibid, p. 51 
4 9 Like in COA (anxiety defined as guilt, as fate, and as spiritlessness) where, despite a gnawing sense of 
anxiety one refuses to make the qualitative leap and become guilty before God. 
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or leap from seriousness to an acknowledgement of anxiety; i f the act of cowardice is his loss of 
innocence it is of course only his innocence in his eyes that is lost. From that moment he is free to 
reinterpret all that has occurred before (and equally free, in bad faith, not to). I can only suppose 
that he manages to ignore the most crushing significance of this act until the laughter first assails 
him those years later. His description of himself already cited ( ' I felt within me a vast feeling of 
power and ... a completion' etc.) strongly suggests seriousness, but it must amount to a re-
enactment of seriousness, a (successful) attempt to be as complete as one was in one's 'primal 
innocence'. It is the laughter that initiates the assuming of a markedly different state of mind, and 
in this I think we find a clearer break—first to (with continued reference to Sartre) 'sincerity' and 
then to an (authentic) role as a kind of existential councillor. 
In his 'sincerity' Clemence acknowledges himself as morally worthless, declaring that, apart from 
sports and performing on stage, he could never take anything seriously. In lines like the following 
he sounds like Mersault; 
At times people on their deathbeds seem to be convinced of their roles. The lines spoken by my poor 
clients always struck me as fitting the same pattern. Hence, living among men without sharing their 
interests, I could not manage to believe in the commitments I made.50 
He is different however in that he cares very much about himself and his pleasures, despite his 
indifference to others. He decides thus to be his own judge, and imagines exposing himself fully. 
This he does not do and realizes that; ' i t was still a question of dodging judgement. I wanted to put 
the laughers on my side, or at least to put myself on their side' . 5 1 He manages to go some of the 
way though and starts acting and talking in a manner reflecting his selfishness, but mere exposure 
does not take him far enough; 
it is not enough to accuse yourself in order to clear yourself; otherwise I'd be as innocent as a lamb. One 
must accuse oneself in a certain way, which it took me considerable time to perfect. I did not discover it 
until I fell into the most utterly forlorn state.52 
The wrong way is to treat ourselves as a thing that is selfish, evil etc.—the right way involves an 
element of acceptance of our condition as well as an acknowledgement of our freedom in the form 
of an active attempt to remain honest. It is this acceptance that makes the guilt existential, and 
5 0 op cit, p. 65 
5 1 ibid, p.67 
5 2 ibid, p. 70 
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because it is experienced as guilt such acceptance is not experienced as the leap-like status which 
from an objective point of view can justifiably be ascribed to it. 
Full acceptance is a while in coming however, and to begin with Clemence takes an 'outsiderish' 
strategy and leaves the 'society of men' to take refuge in the company of women and 'debauchery1 
as he puts it. His day to day duties are performed purely perfunctorily and the rest of his time he 
immerses himself in sex. This manages to subdue the laughter for a while. Here, like Goldmund in 
the Hesse story, 5 3 he finds a kind of immortality (or a suspension of his mortality at least), and he 
is to a certain extent freed. 'True debauchery1, he says, 'is liberating because it creates no 
obligations. In it you possess only yourself; hence it remains the favourite pastime of the great 
lovers of their own person.'54 He describes this period as a 'long sleep' where 'the laughter became 
so muffled that eventually I ceased to notice i t ' . 5 5 It does not last however, and one day he is 
awakened by a sight that reminds him again of the drowning girl. He realizes that there is no 
escaping himself in this respect and from here onwards it is a question of finding a suitable way of 
dealing with, or living with, his guilt. 
At this stage he starts to get a clue as to his current state of mind. Somewhere here is something 
which approximates to a switch from strong to weak bad faith and likewise the guilt becomes more 
ontologically situated (though always only palpable in the ethical sense). He has given up, or run 
out of, attempts at self-deception and needs to find a way of living with himself, not so much as a 
'freedom', but as guilty. He accepts his limitedness, his lack of completeness and justification, but 
loves himself and his life (meaning losing himself in it for much of the time) nonetheless. The 
honesty with which he approaches it is a kind of authenticity, but in the weak sense of bad faith he 
necessarily remains 'fallen'. The approach he takes is a step towards a kind of solidarity of guilt— 
'we cannot assert the innocence of anyone, whereas we can assert with certainty the guilt of all. 
Every man testifies to the crime of all the others—that is my faith and my hope.'56 Religion he sees 
as a way of assuring our innocence—a 'huge laundering venture'—and as such a fleeing of our 
condition. Clemence's belief is that no one is let off the hook, but, without God, the manner of the 
judgement is desperately ambiguous. He says; 
5 3 Narziss and Goldmund 
5 4 The Fall, p. 76 
5 5 ibid, p.78 
5 6 ibid, p. 81 
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the keenest of human torments is to be judged without law. Yet we are in that torment. Deprived of their 
natural curb [God], the judges, loosed at random, are racing through their job. 5 7 
In his world there is no possibility of an 'absolute relation with the absolute'. Despite the purging, 
we must continue to be in the world of human affairs and we must, then, in a sense continually 
'fall'. In accusing ourselves or others in an ethical sense we become serious, and in making a 
judgement about the seriousness of others we are engaging ethically; we must judge in terms of an 
artificially static conception of authenticity (either anxiety A or B) in order for our judgement to 
have the required weight. Either, from the platform of anxiety A, we charge others of seriousness 
and lay ourselves open to a denial of the necessity of risking seriousness in our commitments as 
well as the denial of a sense in which anxiety A is itself serious;58 or, from the platform of anxiety 
B we charge others of a cowardly and futile attempt at transcendence whilst exposing ourselves to 
the trappings of subjectivity and the intractable problem that such a viewpoint cannot existentially 
appropriate its contingency. What makes existential guilt authentic is that i t indicates a recognition 
of anxiety A, just as Marlow's detached irony indicates a recognition of anxiety B. The possibility 
of movement is acknowledged and approved of even though existential appropriation is not a 
concurrent option for that particular mode of authenticity. 
After closing his legal practise in Paris Clemence moves to Amsterdam and becomes a 'judge-
penitent'—his final, concluding role. As a lawyer one cannot reel-off all one's crimes or potential 
crimes before accusing or defending a client, and in such a way he feels there is something 
dishonest about the whole procedure (it assumes a degree of superiority or transcendence in the 
judge—precisely what Clemence's authentic guilt wants to avoid). The judge-penitent on the other 
hand makes it his duty to condemn himself before condemning others. This part, he has eventually 
concluded, is unavoidable, for the laughter will catch up with us eventually ('I have accepted 
duplicity instead of being upset about i t ' 5 9 ) . But, to make it bearable, to contain and even silence 
the laughter it is necessary to 'thin it out' by condemning everyone and accepting guilt as part of the 
human condition. There is clearly a strong selfish motive contained in this—there inevitably is 
according to Clemence—and this is to be the first to judge. In a very real sense Clemence has re-
established himself as great, as in some way holding power over others ('I permit myself everything 
5 7 opci t , p. 86 
5 8 As Sartre portrays his earlier self in Words (see Chapter 4). 
5 9 The Fall, p. 103 
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all over again, and without the laughter this time' 6 0). This time there is no illusion of selflessness, 
he is merely in command of the truth of fallen existence (as he sees it), an existence he is as much a 
part of as everyone else, but still with the advantage of being able to judge from the lofted position 
of penitent. 
That Clemence has power is arguably not his fault. He is a gifted individual who, no matter what 
he does (within reason) is going to please, or at least have a significant effect upon, others. By 
becoming a judge-penitent we can perhaps see him as assuming the most authentic attitude to his 
power. His selfishness, his influence, his indulgence, his role-playing become the very issue of his 
role and as such he is neck and neck with, or perhaps just a head behind his guilt, and I think we 
can reasonably assume that this is as much as he can do given the character that he is. He is clearly 
no saint, but this way he conjures no illusion to this effect. Instead, he makes indulgence his 
profession and this of course is the confession of many writers. The writer-philosopher in 
particular must be profoundly self-indulged, not to say arrogant to believe that people are going to 
want to read about their thoughts and their lives, and The Fall, quite possibly, reflects Camus' own 
guilt. I will reiterate though that I am not sure gifted people have much choice in the matter i f they 
are going to fulf i l l themselves. Those who have power, in whatever sense, will inevitably influence 
and define the lives of those who do not. The profound thinker's particular talent is to see through 
many of our illusions which is liable to make him an outsider of sorts. I f he is to play a part, what 
more authentic role than self-indulgent critic of all that he sees? So long as people are edified, 
entertained or made to consider their own lives in some way he is making a service out of his power 
whilst keeping it in tact as a power. 
Clemence describes himself as 'an enlightened advocate of slavery6 1 by which he means that other 
people can provide the moral parameters that God once did. He used to promote freedom in a the 
more transcendental sense of anxiety A but, because it clashes with his essentially sociable and 
engaged personality, this he now describes as 'a chore ... a long-distance race, quite solitary and 
very exhausting.'62 (Marlow would of course find it less exhausting.) The emphasis, in many ways 
the emphasis of the whole book, is on the need for some kind of solidarity. 'Anyone who is alone', 
6 0 opcit , p. 104 
6 1 ibid, p. 97 
6 2 ibid 
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he says, 'without God and without a master, the weight of days is dreadful.'6 3 For Sartre, despite 
his emphasis on solidarity, the authentic individual must be his own judge and here is located his 
final interpretation of anxiety—we must be responsible for ourselves. In NE he says; 
We arrive at the type of intuition that will unveil authentic existence: an absolute contingency that has 
only itself to justify itself by assuming itself and that can assume itself only within itself without the 
project justified inwardly ever being able on this basis to justify itself to others in its subjectivity ... and 
that justifies itself only by risking losing itself. But that all at once constitutes itself in a risk and in 
anxiety (who am I to justify myself) as pure autonomy. I have no right whatsoever to will what I will, and 
what I will confers no right upon me, yet I am justified in willing it because I will to will what I w i l l . 6 4 
It seems though that the gap between the first and second act of willing needs to be given a thicker 
interpretation. To avoid an infinite regress, to 'wil l to wi l l ' is to adopt an attitude or mode of 
existing that facilitates authentic decisions (i.e. freedom). The first order choice is of an 
environment where positive choices present themselves and provide the necessary contours within 
which freedom can be exercised meaningfully. This second order environment (the home of anxiety 
B) must to a certain degree be independent of the first order choice (the home of anxiety A) 
because of the incommensurability of the anxieties they involve. I suspect that only a conflation of 
these two can make complete sense of Sartre's 'pure autonomy'. Only anxiety A offers any kind of 
purity, and autonomy can only be meaningful in the context of other individuals (anxiety B). 
This first order choice is thickened for Camus by his choice of a 'master' in the form of the 
judgement of others—guilt. Ideally we will all be slaves, but that would require us all to be penitent 
at the same time which is something to be reserved for the future. The image created is of a sort of 
Utopia of self-awareness and guilt; one in which, like Clemence, we can still function, but in a way 
where our penitence keeps the laughter, the urangst, on our side (so that it remains 'a good, hearty, 
almost friendly laugh' 6 5). This is achieved by the shifts between first and second order choices 
which is similar to the anxiety A-anxiety B movements of dynamic authenticity. 
Clemence is walking a fine line however. His role as judge-penitent attempts to fulf i l l his desire for 
power and autonomy whilst at the same time maintaining his sense of irony. Any imbalance and 
inauthenticity will again assail him. He has become something of an existential psychoanalyst, but 
6 3 opci t , p. 98 
6 4 p.482 
6 5 op cit, p.30. Similarly in Sweet Thursday Doc's 'greatest talent had been his sense of paying as he 
went' until the 'worm of discontent [began] ... gnawing at him' (pp.21-2) 
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his method perhaps has more in common with a writer's use of indirect communication. In contrast 
to the role of analyst, one's upper hand and the seriousness that attends this are constantly 
undermined by self-reference. In his bar (office) in Amsterdam he indulges people (or us, the 
reader) in conversation and leads it towards self-confession with the ostensible aim of jogging their 
(our) conscience; 
I mingle what concerns me with what concerns others. With all that I construct a portrait which is the 
image of all and of no one ... when the portrait is finished .... I show it with great sorrow: "This alas is 
what I am!". The prosecution's charge is finished. But at the same time the portrait I hold out to my 
contemporaries becomes a mirror ... I stand before all humanity recapitulating my shames without losing 
sight of the effect I am producing and saying: " I was the lowest of the low". Then imperceptibly I pass 
from the T to the 'we'. When I get to "This is what we are", the game is over and I can tell them off. 6 6 
He says to the silent character of the book's dialogue (or to us), 'Admit ... that today you feel less 
pleased with yourself than you felt five days ago',67 Assuming this is the case he has done his job, 
but the serious work must of course be carried out by the person who feels 'less pleased'. Clemence 
can only point him in the right direction by revealing the duplicities in his own life, he cannot lay 
down rules or communicate directly to the other and this is very much in the nature of his ethic. 
As indicated, there is another reason for his choice of this indirect approach. I f to help others he 
must reveal himself this helps to prevent him from forgetting the meaning of the laughter. Here 
guilt again strengthens its grip: i f his motive is his own salvation it is essentially selfishness but he 
cannot admit this to himself without destroying the essential illusion that he is committed to 
someone else or an impersonal ideal, and it is this necessary duplicity which provokes the 
existential guilt, and gives substance to his urangst. In terms of the 'spiral of uncanniness' he can 
be ironic about his past selves, but bis present self is for the most part not uncanny and is therefore 
commensurable with the past he wants to detach himself from. Objectively he is aware of the 
absurdity of this situation but he still wants in—he still chooses guilt and the solidarity this 
implies. This is confirmed in the final passage of the book (that which makes sure the reader is left 
thoroughly unsettled) which concerns the suggestion that he has a second chance at saving the girl 
in the Seine; 
6 6 op cit, pp. 102-3 
6 7 ibid, p. 103 
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Just suppose ... that we should be taken literally? We'd have to go through with it. Brrr ...! That water's so 
cold! But let's not worry! It's too late now. I t ' l l always be too late. Fortunately!68 
From another point of view (and one that, in describing it as a 'chore', Clemence seems to have a 
glimpse of) this solidarity is gained to an extent at the expense of others because in revealing that 
others are like him he 'thins-down' his guilt. But of course there is another way—Marlow's way— 
where one's first order choice is to opt out and guilt only occurs when one lapses into an 
acceptance of the judgement of others. This choice Clemence does not (and to all practical ends 
cannot) offer his 'clients', but there again, perhaps such a (potential) person would not take much 
interest in Clemence in the first place. 
« < • » > 
To conclude: as ironic characters go, one like Clemence will tend to experience guilt more keenly 
than Marlow because of his relation to anxiety B. In this world where one's sense of self has close 
cultural connections guilt represents the situation outlined earlier whereby completion is sought at 
the expense (in terms of the power of passing judgement) of the only thing that can sustain it (i.e. 
others and the approval they give). It is precisely the lack of a perceived 'leap' that engenders guilt. 
Without an elevated position (or at least not one that one has the ability or inclination to sustain 
long enough) from which to pass judgement, one can always be judged on one's judgement and on 
one's right to judge. Marlow would not be inclined to judge Clemence (as indeed he does not judge 
Kurtz) because his 'leap' would make him sympathetic to the impossibility of his position. I f he 
does, as he must inevitably from time to time, he becomes commensurable and reveals the inherent 
instability of irony and the interdependence of anxiety A and anxiety B. 
In this way the cycle of anxiety A—anxiety B—anxiety A etc. continues. For Clemence it is 
experienced as guilt, for Marlow as a leap. Is this though like the passionate (and seamless) 
movement between the finite and the infinite made in Kierkegaard's Religiousness B? The 
impression we receive is that once the initial leap to faith is made movement between the two 
realms is not only imperceptible to the observer, but effortless (or at least not entailing the demands 
of uncanniness) for the individual. I would claim that quite the opposite is the case for the atheistic 
authentic—something like a leap in the form of uncanniness is experienced each time Marlow re-
6 8 opci t , p. 108 
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assumes anxiety A, but precisely because this is the case, it is not a leap in the (religious) 
Kierkegaardian sense. Clemence's position is just as rarefied, but does not feel like a leap (as 
indeed in the Kierkegaardian sense it isn't) even though its process and objectives are similar. 
Might we say the realization, which both effectively share, that the revelations of anxiety A and 
anxiety B can never be commensurable, itself comprise a revelation specific to a static leap-like 
state of mind? Clearly not. As explained in the Chapter 5 with regard to Tillich and Nagel, this can 
be formally stated from either point of view, and indeed its significance for that point of view can 
become increasingly vivid, but existentially speaking (i.e. in terms of the ful l impact of existential 
anxiety) a point can never be reached where its significance for both points of view takes on 
dramatic and accurate representation simultaneously. Here we return to our duck/rabbit analogy: 
one is supposed to believe that in Religiousness B one sees both at once but I do not accept this as 
an option in the absence of a (highly obscure) religious backdrop. 
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Conclusion 
' I don't believe there is a way out.'—Thomas Nagel (The View from Nowhere) 
'The wind began to howl'—Bob Dylan (op cit) 
« « » » 
In the Preamble I described the task of this dissertation in terms of a critique of certain writers' 
ideas on anxiety, and in terms of generating my own account of its significance for existentialists. 
In my conclusion I will briefly summarize some of the details of my investigations, and consolidate 
those findings which feed into the broader picture as demanded by the second part of my task. 
Even in the Quietest Moments attempted to make the distinction between anxiety in psychology 
and anxiety in philosophy clearer, and served as a substantial introduction to some of the central 
idea associated with existential anxiety. I concluded that psychology's general inadequacy in 
identifying existential elements of anxiety is highlighted by its inability to make sharp the 
distinction between fear and anxiety. Anxiety, particularly in later Freudian thought and 
(surprisingly) among existential psychologists like Rollo May, tends to look like a version of the 
former—the reason being a failure to locate its essential ethical and, more importantly (in terms of 
the categories that are in question) ontological roots. Relatedly, anxiety is straightforwardly 
regarded as a response to certain key features and not considered as itself a revelation of 
something basic. Of course, i f it does have something unique to reveal it must do so in a way that is 
essentially irreducible—one without discursive reference to specific objects in the world or features 
of our being, but which still reveals something basic to human existence. 
Much of the dissertation's energy was henceforth directed at what this might be and this was 
prefaced in this chapter by an brief outline of the 'anxiety structure'. Anxiety A, B and urangst 
were identified and from that point onwards they form a rough template for interpreting the major 
figures under investigation. One connection that is maintained with psychology is the formal 
similarity between urangst and the kind of anxiety generated by repression and manifesting itself as 
panic attacks, 'free-floating' anxiety, and phobias. Like these, urangst has a source or a cause 
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which is not apparent to the subject; but unlike these it cannot be cured simply by unearthing this 
from the unconscious—the origin of urangst is, essentially, the definitive paradox of the human 
condition, a paradox which the subject must necessarily be living and which he cannot step outside 
of. To do this would be to cure it; it would also be in Sartre's words 'to be God', and it is what lies 
behind Nagel's conclusion—an epigraph to this section.1 
The force of the 'objective' point of view is embodied in anxiety A, the force of the 'subjective' 
viewpoint in anxiety B, and the existential significance of their (and therefore our) 
incommensurability is the essence of urangst. This third and most important form of anxiety is in a 
sense the beginning and end of a cycle: it is that ever-present disquiet which drives us towards 
some form of truth in the (primarily) subjective (the responsibility of self-discovery, self-
actualization, self-creation), or in the (primarily) objective (contingency, finitude, chance, loss of 
self) and then that which indicates that neither of these is adequate. But as soon as we try to grasp 
its essence, try to be our urangst we fail and slip, to whatever extent, into the world defined by the 
concerns of anxiety A or anxiety B. As was recognized by Kierkegaard, and so clearly 
formularized by Sartre, we cannot (without the help of God) be what we are. In its way urangst 
informs us of this, but only in the manner of continually unsettling us and making movement the 
principal feature of an authenticity which is a doomed to never entirely overcome alienation. To 
state our useless passion intellectually is not to transcend it but merely to abstract ourselves from 
our essential existentiality—the very existentiality which drives the desire for abstraction. To 
choose to submerge ourselves in hedonistic or even ethical dealings is always to choose to do this 
and urangst will always remind us of this. 
Infinity's Messenger looked further at links between Freud and existentialism and at a parallel 
drawn in the first chapter between the development in Freud's theory of anxiety and the two halves 
of The Concept of Anxiety. The nature of anxiety changes in Kierkegaard from the signifier of 
something largely unknown and alien to the subject, to the signifier of something he has himself 
buried. In Freud the cause of anxiety can be uncovered and transformed (into fear), and something 
similar is true of Kierkegaard in that the individual becomes aware that his only possibility of 
salvation is faith. In this respect the association between their ideas is symptomatic of 
Kierkegaard's rf/sassociation from the other writers I have been concerned with, but of course it is 
1 Which, for me, answers the original Bob Dylan epigraph from the Preamble. 
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not always clear from his writings that faith really is to be seen as an overcoming of anxiety. For 
Freud some (moral) conflicts are unsolvable and the anxiety they generate can not be cured, and, 
even i f it requires reading between the lines of what is otherwise a relatively direct piece of writing, 
perhaps Kierkegaard's urangst is making its presence felt in his 'deliberation' on original sin. 
That there are parallel 'anthropological' and 'conflict' 2 interpretations of Kierkegaard's work 
(particularly the 'psychological' books) is important in that it again reveals the central ambiguity 
of existence. The former falls into the parameters of anxiety B, and the latter offers a version of 
urangst qualified by the extent to which a confrontation with God and the infinite engenders anxiety 
A. The possibility of repetition of course muddies things, but The Sense of Nothing gave me an 
opportunity to superimpose something like Kierkegaard's developmental model onto Heidegger's 
atheistic system. When the primary revelation of anxiety is contingency the issue of how are we 
supposed to live in light of this becomes paramount. Heidegger's answer, or so I argue, is 
unsatisfactory, but we can at least work a meariingful version of anxiety B into his set-up (which 
some, Elizabeth Ewing for example, believe is assumed to be there anyway) and then consider the 
question of authenticity in light of this. The result is my 'spiral of uncanniness' which represents 
the resolute individual's developing understanding of his urangst, but acknowledges that this 
cannot become meaningful until he has worked or lived through various existentiell possibilities 
(akin to Kierkegaard's 'stages'). I f he ever reaches a more rarefied strata then the 'nothing' which 
Heidegger speaks of can be experienced in the relatively pure sense suggested in What is 
Metaphysics? Up to, and to an extent including this point, 'nothing' (anxiety A) becomes 
meaningful only in contrast to our interpreting self (anxiety B), but what I take Heidegger as 
saying is that in certain rare and peculiar transcendental moments we do indeed grasp this 'nothing' 
and quench our urangst. For the most part though this cannot be achieved, and here again failings 
are revealed in Heidegger's notion of authenticity. A substantial answer to the question of how we 
might live as closely as possible to urangst's central signification is postponed until chapters 6 and 
7. 
What is suggested at this juncture is that a meaningful developmental model is still applicable. We 
do not learn how to 'journey through' our anxiety towards faith, but there is a sense in which we 
can learn to master it and develop a mode of being that is less of an escape and more of an 
2 Expressions used by Nordenstoft in Kierkegaard's Psychology. 
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acknowledgement and an acceptance of our condition. Uncanniness is no longer experienced as the 
shock of realizing that tilings are not what we thought they were, but involves a more graceful 
appropriation. Analogous to this is Ann Beattie's metaphor of 'learning to fal l ' which Martha 
Nussbaum cites as part of an attempt to understand the specific revelations of love. It is more like a 
gradual 'opening up' to the world, to the other, and to one's feelings, than a sudden self-contained 
revelation. Nussbaum compares it to grace which; 
You can't aim for ... It has so little connection, i f any, with your efforts and actions .... Yet what else can 
you do? ... You open yourself to the possibility.3 
As mentioned in the Preamble and in Anxious Engagement the connections between love and 
anxiety appear to be close, but I do not have the space here to develop this line of inquiry. How 
much love is like grace would be an important question is this context—an attunement to anxiety, I 
argue, cannot be achieved except possibly in the rare moments Heidegger speaks of, but there is 
something in the process of adjustment and self-mastery that requires a similar kind of openness 
coupled with an involvement with one's self as a particular project. 
Anxious Engagement also looked at stages of self-mastery or authenticity in the face of anxiety, 
but Sartre's application of the concept is principally in the realm of anxiety B. I argue that in 
certain ways nausea plays the role of anxiety A, but that his notion of anxiety and its relation to 
freedom and nothingness is not complete unless a more explicit form of anxiety A is in play. 
Without it (and therefore without a singular concept or structure) there is no urangst, and without 
that his anxiety is ethical rather than existential. An acute sense of individual responsibility and 
freedom create its own kind of uncanniness which can in turn lead to a further metamorphosis of 
urangst which engenders anxiety at the contingent status of values. Even i f this latter switch does 
not occur, its potential, as attested to by the urangst which underlies uncanniness, introduces the 
requisite dynamic. In his chapter on 'bad faith' Sartre seems to imply something like this— 
particularly in his reference to our condition as 'meta-stable'—and the weak and strong notions of 
bad faith align themselves with this essential disjunction in human existence (and also in the 
ambiguousness of existential guilt introduced by Kierkegaard and further nurtured by Heidegger). 
Generally Sartre on bad faith is more revealing of the complexities of anxiety than his specific 
references to the concept itself. 
3 Love's Knowledge, p.278 
235 
The latter part of this chapter concerned itself with 'reciprocal freedom/anxiety'. The issue there 
was the role of the other in awakening and sustaining our sense of freedom, and how, in line with 
my previous analysis this must involve not just one's sense of personal responsibility but the whole 
anxiety structure. The aim of reciprocal anxiety is to make the other aware of their ambiguity for 
no other sake than itself. More specifically, I am highlighting our tendency not just to flee the 
revelations of anxiety A and anxiety B, but to dwell too comfortably in the embrace of one or other 
of these (for example in the form of a self-less contemplative detachment, or a thoroughly 
committed ethical or self-creative engagement) whereby their revelations harden and lose their 
broader significance. Bad faith in this sense is not a fleeing from our nothingness or our freedom, 
but from our ambiguity. The authentic other plays a vital role in enkindling the urangst which is a 
catalyst for the movement essential for dynamic authenticity. How this is achieved depends on the 
individual's particular take on existential anxiety and on their particular relationship, and though I 
maintain that the structure is essentially the same in all cases, the process itself is infinitely varied 
and complex. Two examples of authenticity are analysed in Unending Ordeals and both reveal the 
importance of the other, but these should not be taken as definitive in all their details. 
The Existential Awareness of Non-Being consolidated the anxiety structure (this time with more 
specific reference to Nagel's ideas on the absurd and 'the meaning of life'). Features that arose 
from the core chapters on Kierkegaard, Heidegger and Sartre were pulled together with the help of 
my analysis of Tillich's types of non-being, and here we first encountered the different categories 
of authenticity. This forms part of the answer to one or two of the questions concerning anxiety 
outlined in the Preamble—specifically "Can we overcome anxiety?" and "How should we respond 
to it?" The answer to the first is essentially "no", but this is mitigated by the answer to the second 
which indicates that a certain kind of response will alter the way in which anxiety is experienced. A 
dynamically authentic mode of existence reduces the intensity and suddenness (but not the 
significance) of the 'existential shock' and give some reason for supposing we can get close (but 
never all the whole way) to existentially acknowledging our urangst. 
That authenticity must be dynamic rather than static I attempted to demonstrate in Chapter 6 with 
reference to irony. I criticized Rorty in that he seems to want irony to be static—my argument 
being that this cannot be achieved without recourse either to religious-like metaphysics or to an 
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absolutizing of our values and socio-historical environment, and thus without denying or at least 
adulterating our anxiety. My answer is that with the aid of self-deception we do both, but that 
authenticity or 'strength' is achieved by an ability to shift platforms, and that this process is a 
function of our ability to respond to the presentiments of our urangst. I qualified this process in 
Unending Ordeals with my claim that such authenticity will involve an individual being primarily 
located in the realm of either anxiety A or anxiety B. (This is in a sense a choice, but one that is 
partially determined by the form of anxiety in which we most readily find ourselves). Marlow and 
Clemence are both ironic and both embody a sense of detachment and a sense of guilt but, because 
of their differing relations to the anxiety structure, experience these to different degrees and in 
different ways. I f anxiety A is one's primary location, I argue, then one's response to it is 
experienced in terms of what I call a 'leap of irony' (although objectively speaking there is no such 
leap that can be identified); and i f one's primary location is anxiety B then one's response is an 
unambiguous sense of guilt (which, likewise, has no objective basis—only the paradox of 
existential guilt). When one's (felt) transcendence is occasionally (but inevitably) undermined then 
guilt is experienced, and when one occasionally considers (is forced or implored by urangst to 
consider) the baselessness of one's (felt) guilt then a brief sense of transcendence is experienced. 
These occasions might of course engender a switch of primary perspective, but my point is (and 
this ties in with the broad developmental model) that having been through a considerable ordeal to 
reach this stage—as Marlow and Clemence have—this is unlikely. 
These two chapters engaged the question of what a 'leap of irony' might mean (there being no God 
to facilitate repetition) and relatedly the possibility of overcoming anxiety. It also reached some 
conclusions as to the relation between anxiety and authenticity, absurdity and guilt. The last of 
these has proven to be very important: not only does it exhibit the same structure as anxiety (as do 
other concepts such as individuality, death and 'falling'), but it seems to me to be a key way in 
which anxiety is authentically displaced. As indicated, urangst cannot be existentially appropriated, 
and the initial shock of a perspective change is short-lived and effectively paralysing, and so 
anxiety must make its impact felt by proxy—by means of a mood or attunement that is existentially 
receptive and (in Heidegger's terminology) 'ready' for movement. To answer the question "What is 
it to know oneself as anxious?"; it is to know oneself in light of a world before which we feel 
principally detached or principally guilty (including their attendant peaks of uncanniness), and only 
occasionally and fleetingly experience the full , object-less force of urangst. 
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A further type of anxiety was introduced in Chapter 5, namely 'death anxiety'. Death certainly has 
connections with anxieties A and B (e.g. it can help make us aware of our contingency and of our 
individuality), but none that are unique to it in the way Heidegger and Tillich suggest. As far as I 
can see neither of these successfully deal with death in the way they want and claim to, and my 
response to this has been two-fold. Firstly, in this context, I do not give death any more attention 
than concepts like guilt and contingency receive (in fact probably less); and secondly, I 
nevertheless acknowledged its peculiar status by putting the experience it is associated with in a 
category of it own. The feeling aroused by the contemplation of our own death is unlike anything 
else—it is neither fear nor sadness nor a sense of futility (for example)—but i t is nonetheless 
something, and because it is without an object and entirely slippery, something best described as 
anxiety. This anxiety is much darker and denser than anxiety A, B or urangst, but its claim to be 
'existential' is more tenuous. Broadly though I think it deserves this title because it cannot be cured 
and, arguably, should not be ignored i f we want to attain authenticity (partly or perhaps mostly 
because it involves a shock that slides with relative ease towards the anxieties A and B). 
Finally, two of the more important but tricky questions—"What kind of thing is anxiety?" and 
"Why is it so important to the existentialists?"—turn out, pretty much, to share the same answer. It 
is tempting (and in a sense true) to say that anxiety can only be described as the kind of thing to 
which the last hundred-thousand words apply—particularly as it appears to inhabit a category of 
its own—but I can at least make some attempt at summing-up its general ontological location. 
I f we concentrate on the experience then anxiety is like an emotion as far as it is something which 
is felt, but unlike one as far as it has no object. This objectlessness complicates things as far as the 
experience goes, and we find that it covers a wide range—from panic and dizziness to uncanniness 
and disquiet to 'bewildered calm' and serenity—and this makes one more weary about calling it an 
emotion. It has the passivity of a sensation but is also infinitely denser in terms of its portents and 
interpretative capacities. Perhaps then the Heideggerian 'mood' or 'attunement' is the most 
appropriate category. Like a standard mood it is all-embracing—something in which we dwell and 
that conditions the way things in the world are encountered—but what other mood is so flexible 
with respect to the way things are encountered? What other mood offers one the chance to grow 
into it in the way anxiety does? As suggested in The Sense of Nothing, anxiety is more like a meta-
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mood; one which afflicts other moods so that we experience anxious joy, anxious guilt, anxious 
irony and so on. 
Relatedly we find that unlike other moods anxiety contains its own specific kind of knowledge: it 
reveals something quite basic about us and the world that cannot be captured or expressed by any 
other means. This is the crux of anxiety's irreducibility—its uniqueness. It reveals or contains the 
full existential significance of the central paradox of human existence. This paradox is formally 
described in terms of what I have called the 'anxiety structure', but this can never replace the 
experience which, though indescribable in the same way that all emotions and sensations ultimately 
are, is given an added dimension because its origin—the clash of the subjective and the objective, 
the ethical and the ontological etc.—is categorially unusual. Other concepts that express it are, as 
shown, guilt and ironic detachment, but they are less pure in that they can be explained in terms of 
the structure and in terms of the more viscose and articulate origins of the uncanniness associated 
with anxieties A and B. Purer still is urangst which rightly inhabits a category of its own. Our 
responses to it are as varied as the ways it is experienced; we can, and mostly do, attempt to hide 
from it, but we can also in varying ways and in varying degrees attempt to live with it. Crucially 
though we can never master i t (for that would be to master ourselves) and in this very important 
sense we are always more than what we explicitly take ourselves to be at any one time, always 
oozing over any and all the boundaries we necessarily and continually construct. This, I would 
claim, is the central revelation, premise and preoccupation of existentialism, and this is why 
anxiety has a special place in the philosophy and literature of this otherwise loosely defined 
tradition. Add to this our overriding desire for completion—to be free from urangst—and we can 
see why human existence for the existentialist, despite and because of its ambiguity, is shot through 
with a particular sense of tragedy. 
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